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In historiographical terms the most significant contribution of
this study is to demonstrate that English medieval history cannot be

written solely from the standpoint of the king.

The history of the North

from 1000 to 1135 shows that court-centered history obscures the continuity and importance of regional problems and gives too much prominence
to the king as a causative factor.

Both before and after the Conquest,

in fact, northern history proceeded from the interaction between the

northern nobility and the king.
clash between the two parties.

Prior to 1080, it was dominated by a
Politically, the northern nobility con-

both
sisted of two groups, the men of York and the Northumbrians, and
royal
groups had become distrustful of the king by 1065 because of

threatened
attempts to govern the North through unpopular earls who

local privileges.

The northerners' attempts to resist these earls led

northern revolt of 1065 and
to conflict wnich culminated in the great

Anglo-Saxon kingdom.
which seriously undermined the unity of the
over, this conflict did not end in 1066.

More-

As a result of his initial

appeared to pose the same
dealings with the North, William the Conqueror

northerners resisted him accordingly.
threat as his predecessors, and the
and the Northumbrian revolts
The general northern revolts of 1067-1070

extension of pre-Conquest northern resisof 1074 and 1080 were a direct
element in these events was the
tance to the king, and the only novel

vi

solution that William ultimately imposed, the destruction of the native
nobilities of Yorkshire and Northumbria in 1069-70 and 1080 respectively.

These measures ended northern opposition to royal government, but
they did not give William the Conqueror or Rufus control of the North

because their power above the Humber was directly limited by their own
nobles.

Much of northwestern England and southwestern Scotland was

unattractive to the Conqueror's barons, and they would not settle there.
This factor restricted Norman settlement to Yorkshire, Durham, and

southern Lancashire, and even in these shires the Normans either

destroyed the manorial regime of the North or imposed new burdens on the
peasants in an attempt to increase the value of their new estates.

The

limited extent of Norman settlement put the Normans in a weak position.

Both the Conqueror and Rufus had to deal with the Scots through diplomacy and demonstrations in force because there were no local Norman

landholding classes in Cumberland and Northumberland, and the Normans

already in the North had difficulty redeveloping Yorkshire and settling
from the
above the Tyne because they had little protection against raids
Indeed, this situation did not improve until after 1100 when

West,

Henry

I

brought to England a new group of nobles who were willing to

take lands in the Northwest,

Their settlement in Cumberland and in Gal-

security which allowed
loway under Earl David provided the basis for the
coast plain into Northumthe spread of Norman settlement along the east
of the Anglo-Norman
berland and Lothian and the subsequent development

southern Scotland during
society which characterized both the North and
the High Middle Ages,
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CHAPTER

I

THE DANES OF YORK AND THE HOUSE OF HAMBURGH

One of the basic problems in the history of the Norman Conquest is

why the Northumbrians and the men of York resisted the Normans with such

self-destructive tenacity, and despite the importance of this question,
it has not received much attention in this century.

this are obscure.

The reasons for

It may be partially the result of the conviction that

the South is the only really important part of England.

Also a close

study of the northern resistance to William the Conqueror inevitably

discloses that he made at least two blunders in dealing with the North
and that he only rescued himself from the results of these mistakes by
genocide.

Such discoveries fit poorly into the current picture of

William's efficiency.

Finally, it may be true that the behavior of the

northerners in the face of the Conquest actually reveals a distressing
exception to the "precocious" unity of Anglo-Saxon England.

The idea of

backwoods Northerners being so impertinent as not to appreciate the

splendid unity offered them by the West Saxon kings with their shires,
fyrd, and Danegeld is undoubtedly as unpalatable to some historians as

the picture of William the Bastard making mistakes is to others.

In any

case, in most accounts of the Norman Conquest, the men from beyond the

Humber come on stage long enough to "revolt" a few times.

They do this

out of conservatism, fail miserably, and are heard from no more.

Such will not be the case in the following pages.

The behavior of

the Northumbrians and the Yorkshire men during the reign of William the

Conqueror is inexplicable if it is separated from their pre-Conquest

2

Map 1.

Political Divisions of the North in 1000

3

political experience.
wipe out the past.

William won Hastings, but his victory did not

The men of the North in the 1060 's and 70 's acted as

much in response to past realities as to the new reality of the Normans.
This chapter will begin the investigation of their past.

The basic

question which must be answered is whether there was a political side to
the cultural regionalism of the North in Anglo-Saxon times.

another way, the question is:
force?

Put in

Was northern separatism a political

To answer this question, this chapter will discuss the more

inqjortant aspects of northern geopolitics and reconstruct the history of

the North from the second period of Danish invasions to the beginning of
the reign of Edward the Confessor.

It is necessary to go back this far

because the history of the North during this period has never been properly understood, and some important insights of earlier scholars have

been largely ignored."^
The first question concerns the extent of the North.

bounds of this region?

What were the

To the unwary this may seem an easy enough ques-

In the eleventh century the North consisted, more or less, of the

tion.

present counties of Yorkshire, Durham, and Northumberland on the east
plus Lancashire and the southern parts of Cumberland and Westmorland on
the west.

With one exception, the northern parts of the latter counties

were included in the kingdom of Strathclyde or Cumbria.

2

This definition is fairly accurate in a political sense, but it is

necessary to go beyond politics to adequately define the North.

In few

parts of Anglo-Saxon England was geography more important than in this
region.

This was true largely because of its negative effects.

North-

agricultural
ern landforms hindered internal communications, limited

4
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possibilities, and left what good land there was open to invasion.
Indeed, in only one direction did the North have imposing natural

defenses:

towards the south.

The Humber has been said to mark a line

of very ancient division among the Anglo-Saxons,"^ and a concrete example
of this is the fact that prior to the Danish invasions, the power of the

Bretwalda did not usually cross the Humber unless this position was
occupied by the Northumbrian king.^

The importance of the Humber as a

dividing line probably came from the fact that for most purposes the

North was nearly a separate island during this period.

The Humber comes

far inland before turning north towards York, and its function as a bar-

rier to land travel was taken over west of the turn by the swamps along
the lower Ouse.

West of the mountains, the peatmoss bogs along the

Mersey formed an effective barrier between Lancashire and Cheshire.^
The only good land routes to the Midlands were between the Ouse swamps
and the Pennine foothills on the east and through the Manchester area on
the west, but both these passages are crossed by transverse rivers and

were easily defended against an invading army.

Moreover, it is known

that these roads north were very bad in the early twelfth century, even

for small groups of travellers, and that York's main connection with

southern England was by ship either up the Trent to Lincoln or down the
east coast.

6

The North was, therefore, cut off from easy communications with the
South.

It was, unfortunately, more cut-up internally.

Beginning in

the south, the Pennines run north between the Humber and the Mersey and

continue all the way to the Tyne Gap.

In Cumberland they are flanked by

the Lake District, the highest and wildest area in northern England.

6
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The Tyne Gap runs from the head of the Solway Firth to
the North Sea,
but north of it rises another range of hills which merge into
the South-

em

Highlands of Scotland.

These highlands stretch from Galloway on the

west all the way across southern Scotland and reach the North Sea
between Lothian and Tweeddale.

Although these upland regions are not of awe-inspiring height and
can be crossed by a number of routes, they effectively divided the North

into three areas:

the east coast plain, the west coast plain with the

Vale of Eden, and the uplands themselves.

These mountains and hills

functioned as a serious barrier to communications between the coastal
plains and were agriculturally marginal.

Except where pierced by river

valleys such as the Vale of Eden or the Tweed-Teviot system, much of the
uplands was only useful as summer pasture for the settlements in the
valleys.

Consequently a big slice of the North running from top to bot-

tom was lightly exploited, nearly empty land.

Unfortunately in the Mid-

dle Ages, the usual corollary of low settlement density, pastoralism,

and poor communications was a "free-zone," that is, an area which was

normally beyond the control of local forces of law and order and became
the refuge for the peasant's primeval enemy, the wolf, and his societal

enemy, the outlaw.

Such was certai-nly the case in the North of England,

as will be seen later.

Thus the North was rather different from its outlines on a political map.

It was cut off from the South and had a dangerous and unpro-

ductive "free-zone" running up its middle.

In fact, for most purposes

the North consisted of the two coastal plains, and of these the one on

the east was by far the more important.

It runs north through the Vale

8

of York, eastern Durham and Northumberland to
Tweeddale.

rich area (the Merse) it is broken by the Lammermuirs

,

Above this

the eastern end

of the Southern Highlands, but reappears in Lothian and
broadens into

the Midland Valley of Scotland.

West of the Pennines, there was a

poorer, smaller plain which reached from the Mersey bogs north
through

western Lancashire, around the Cumberland coast to the Vale of Eden, and
finally west into Galloway south of the Southern Highlands.
The east coast plain, which was the most developed part of northern
England, was a land of moderate rainfall, indifferent to good soils, and

village agriculture, and potentially it could carry a large peasant population.

The western plain was smaller and wetter.

Its inhabitants

practiced mixed agriculture and usually lived in hamlets.

Both these

areas were dangerously open to invasion from the north and the sea.

The

Southern Highlands of Scotland could be crossed in the west either by

Annandale or Nithsdale, routes which linked Clydesdale with the Galwegian
plain and thence to Cumberland.

between Lothian and Tweeddale:

In the east there were two routes

by Lauderdale or the coast road.

itself had no natural frontiers except to the south.

Lothian

Finally, the long

coasts of the North had traditionally stood open to sea-borne invasion,

pre-eminently by the Tyne and Humber-Ouse system, but also from the Irish
Sea up the rivers

sind

creeks of the West.

The North was not a single natural region.

Its geography divided it

into three regions and left the most important of these open to invasion.
This emphasis on the negative aspects of the subject may seem to some

excessive, but it is appropriate given the history of the lands beyond
the Humber.

In reading most accounts of the Norman Conquest, one gets

the vague impression that Anglo-Saxon England was
an ancient kingdom.
In fact, it was not in the North.

Prior to the Danish invasions of the

ninth century the kingdom of Northumbria had existed above the
Humber.
It was one of the original Anglo-Saxon kingdoms and had stretched
from
the Humber north along the eastern plain across the Lammermuirs into

Lothian, probably all the way to the Firth of Forth.

During their days

of greatest power, the Northumbrian kings had also extended their rule

over the Pennines into Cumberland, Lancashire, and the Galwegian coastal
plain.

In the ninth and tenth centuries, however, there occurred a

series of changes which were catastrophic from a Northumbrian point of
view.

These can not be considered in detail, but their main outline is

necessary for a clear understanding of the North.

without irony.

What happened was not

The Northumbrians, once sea-borne invaders, were unable

to withstand the attacks of the Danes who conquered Yorkshire and proba-

bly much of the land between the Tyne and the Tees and set up their own
kingdom.

The Northumbrians living above the Tyne kept their indepen-

dence but were militarily at a disadvantage against their northern

neighbors after the loss of Yorkshire.
tunes continued to decline.

In the tenth century, their for-

From at least 900, the Strathclyde Britons

(the Cumbrians) expanded south over the Southern Highlands and gained

control of Cumberland and probably Lancashire.^

Sometime during the

same century, probably^. 973, the Scots took control of Lothian, and

perhaps Tweeddale, the northernmost provinces of the defunct kingdom.

g

Meanwhile the Danish kingdom of York had been replaced by a Norwegian
kingdom, and the rump of Northumbria, the lands between the Tyne and the

Tweed with the northern part of Durham, endured

— perhaps

because it was

10

the most worthless part of the eastern plain.

In 954, all this turmoil

finally stopped; after several abortive attempts the king of
Wessex

annexed York and Northumbria (the land between the Tees and the Tweed).
This was only a little over a century before the Norman Conquest.
The question is to what extent the kings succeeded after this date in

incorporating the North into their kingdom despite the rather major distractions of the second wave of Danish invasions, the period of Danish
kings, and the political crises of Edward the Confessor's reign, and

although there are several points of view from which this question could
be approached, the initial requirement is precise language.

The North

was not a homogeneoiis region either geographically or ethnically.

None-

theless, the term "!Sorthumbrians" is usually used to refer to the inhab-

itants of the

modem

counties of Yorkshire, Durham, and Northumberland.

Sometimes, however, it only means the inhabitants of any one of these
areas.

This usage reflects the original meaning of "Northumbrians" and

also southern English usage in the twelfth century; it also leads to

unwarranted vagueness and false conclusions.

will be followed.

Hereafter northern usage

"Northumbrians" will refer to the people living

between the Tweed and the Tees.

If it is

necessary to single out the

people between the Tyne and the Tees, they will be called the "men of
St.

Cuthbert," the "men of Durham," etc.

will be called the "Yorkshire men."

The inhabitants of Yorkshire

"Northerners" will refer to all the

peoples between the Humber and the Tweed.

These terms may seem somewhat

ponderous, but they will clarify the following discussion.
be best to consider Yorkshire and Northumberland separately.

It will also

11

Yorkshire was a large, complex area which ran roughly
from the
Humber to the Tees with a substantial extension south of
the line of the

Humber on the southwest.

The shire also contained a great deal of the

Pennines, and the northern part of Lancashire (the part above
the Ribble)
was linked administratively to York.
It is an easy enough task to point out the cultural peculiarities

of Yorkshire east of the Pennines.

The dialect spoken by the natives

was unintelligible to men from southern England.^

In the Pennine foot-

hills on the west remnants of both the Northumbrian aristocracy and the

traditional social structure of the North survived the Danish invasions.''"^

Most scholars would add that these invasions and the subse-

quent Danish settlement had produced a distinctive society in the eastern part of the shire.

This point will be discussed later.

For the

moment it can be safely said that at least a Danish aristocracy had been
created in Yorkshire, and that the area was part of the Danelaw.

Indeed,

miscellaneous examples of Danish influence can be cited, such as its
distinctive body of customary law, its system of monetary reckoning, and
the names of the agricultural tenements of its peasants.''"'^

The fact

that many of the Yorkshire peasants were relatively free and that the

manor (in a southern sense) was not common in the county has also been
ascribed to Danish influence,

12

but even though this attribution is doubt-

ful, the basic phenomenon is not.

The political position of Yorkshire within the kingdom was also

somewhat unusual.

In particular, the power of the king appears to have

been less in this shire than south of the Humber.

He had demesne lands

in Yorkshire, but they were small in comparison with those of the earl

12

who also had the hoisage of most of the small

thegns.-"-^

These two fac-

tors limited the kiu^'s authority, but he still had
important rights.

The king appointed the earls of the shire and the
archbishop; these pre-

rogatives were exercised.

He also received the pleas of the crown and

heriots of important thegns, 14 and despite the fact that his power of
,

.

,

enacting new laws was supposedly limited by Edgar's grant of legal

autonomy to the northern Danelaw in 962 in return for their loyalty, it
is doubtful if later kings felt bound by this provision. "^^

In conclu-

sion, it has been said that the king's power in Yorkshire was essen-

tially that of an c^rerlord,"''^ but this is an understatement.

The Anglo-

Saxon kings had important rights in the shire and tried to exercise

What is uncertain is how well they succeeded."''^

them.

Northumbria (Bernicia) was as exotic as Yorkshire in its own way.
The earldom stretched from the Tees to the Tweed between the central

hills and the North Sea.

This area had been spared significant Danish

settlement and had an Anglian population similar to the one in Lothian
across the Tweed.

18

Perhaps as a result of these factors, the structure

of the society of these people was somewhat archaic and rather peculiar.
It is becoming increasingly clear, in particular, that their culture had

a definite resemblance to the cultures of both the Lowland Scots and the

Welsh,

19

and some of the details of this social organization will be

discussed later.

For the moment, however, it

is enough to say that in

this area the demands of lordship were not as extreme as in southern

England and still had something of a public character.

The nobility

does not seem to have been numerous, and the peasants were lightly

13

exploited.

In fact, Northumberland was so
peculiar that it stood out-

side the recognized three-fold division of
English law.^°
This last point raises a very important
question:

was Northumberland part of the kingdom?

In what sense

If it really had been regarded

as being part of the kingdom in a normal
sense, one would expect to find

scholars speaking of a four-fold law system in Anglo-Saxon
England.
This may seem a pedantic point, and it would be if
other evidence did
not point in the same direction.

Either during or shortly after Earl

Mowbray's rebellion in 1095, Rufus granted some charters to
the St.
Albans monks at Tynemouth.

In one of these he confirmed all their pos-

sessions and customs In nort de Tyne et in suth de Tyne et in Anglia
("to the north and to the south of the Tyne and in England").^"*"

This

phrase draws a clear distinction between "England" and the lands above
the Tees

(Northumbria)

still be significant.
Saxon conditions.

If the charter is a forgery,

.

this usage would

If the phrase is a formula, it represents Anglo-

In some sense there was a distinction between

Northumbria and England.
This idea is strikingly confirmed by Domesday Book which literally

stops at the Tees; no part of Northumbria is described in its folios.

This fact has never been adequately explainedo

Scholars have suggested

that it was left out either because it was too devastated to be worth

anything to the king or because the natives were hostile,
of these explanations will do.

devastated very thoroughly.
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but neither

Yorkshire was surveyed, yet it had been

At the time of the survey, Northumberland

had both a Norman earl and bishop who could have given adequate protection to the judges if such had been necessary.

In fact, Domesday

14

confirms in a negative sense the distinction drawn
in Rufus's charter:

England and Northuui^erland were different.
The same idea is found in the Dialogue of the Exchequer

.

It says

that the counties wiiich belonged to the king "of
ancient right" paid

their dues to the king by blanched farm but those acquired
"through some

incidental cause" paid by tale.

This second group comprised Sussex,

Shropshire, Cumberland, and Northumberland.^^
It would be possible to attempt to explain the difference
between

England and Northuicoria by inferences drawn from the supposed purpose of

Domesday or similar types of logic based on the Dialogue of the Exchequer , but this is tannecessary because there is safer evidence which

requires no long line of sequential reasoning.

The difference amounted

to the fact that north of the Tees the king was literally the overlord

and had no direct powers.

There is no evidence, for instance, that the

king had any demesme lands in Northumberland prior to the suppression of
the earldom, and before the reign of William the Conqueror, there were

no royal mints or burghs in the area.

It was unshired and, as mentioned

earlier, stood outside the recognized bodies of law.

No royal writs or

charters survive which relate to Northumberland, and it is clear that
the kings did not have the power to make them.
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Finally, and this is

the crucial point, the king lacked the power of appointment beyond the

Tees until very late.

Siward was earl;

au-d,

No bishop of Durham was chosen by the king until

even after this, the choice seems to have lain

with the earl more than with the king.
suggests that
church.
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befoiDE:

Twelfth-century Durham tradition

this the bishop was elected by the clerks of the

With one possible exception, the earls of Northumberland were

15

also not chosen by the king.

From at least 954 they were all members of

one family, the house of Bamburgh; and the family
itself probably goes

further back into the tenth century.

The house of Bamburgh to all

intents and purposes ruled Northumberland, and it will
be suggested later
that they paid no tribute to the king.^^

This is an interesting discovery:

above the Tees.

Royal power was very limited

In Yorkshire it was somewhat stronger but still weak in

comparison to the South.

This situation undoubtedly went back to the

submission of the North to King Eadred in 954; perhaps it was the price
of Danish and Northumbrian submission.

If so,

the earls of Northumber-

land got a far better deal than the Danes of York.

The important fact,

for the purpose of this discussion, is that royal weakness in the North

persisted well into the eleventh century.

Politically the North had not

been well-integrated into the rest of the kingdom.

It must have been

difficult for the king to exercise control in York, and nearly impossible for him to do so in Nor thumb ria.

The real question is whether this was politically important.

Was

there political expression of the regional identity of the North?

Did

the Danish aristocracy of York want out of the kingdom or did the house

of Bamburgh resent the overlordship of the house of Wessex?

If neither

of these situations existed, royal weakness in the North only meant that

the kings received less money from the area than they might have and

there was no northern separatism.

Actually, the question of Northumber-

land can be dismissed for the moment.

Prior to 1016 there is no sign

that the earls were uxihappy with their position within the kingdom.

Northumberland had had a bad time before 954 when it was caught between
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the Vikings of York, the Scots, and the
Cumbrians, and the earls must

have valued royal support.
In Yorkshire things were different.

There are some signs that the

inhabitants cherished memories of independence, but
unfortunately, there
is no contemporary evidence on this question which
is very explicit.

A

thirteenth-century chronicle does say that the Yorkshire men
disliked
the idea of Athelstan being their king and taking tribute and
that in
966 Edgar feared a separatist movement in the North.

This chronicle

is not, however, particularly trustworthy, and these statements,
found

nowhere else, are doubtful evidence.

They are not, on the other hand,

at all inconsistent with certain other things known about Yorkshire

after 954.

All of the archbishops

of the city after Wulfstan I, in the

mid-tenth century, came from south of the Humber, most of them from the
eastern Danelaw, and this should be understood as an attempt to provide
archbishops able to deal with the Danish inhabitants but unlikely to

work for local independence.
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A number of these men also held

a south-

ern bishopric in plurality, and this may have been another way to ensure
their loyalty, although the poverty of York could also have been a
reason.

30

This same lack of trust in natives is found with respect to the
earls of Yorkshire,

Before 1016, two of the earls, Osulf and Uhtred,

were members of the Bamburgh family; and two others, Oslac and iELfhelm,
were from south of the Humber.

Only Thored may have been a local man,

but it is equally possible that he was Oslac 's son.
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These appointments

of archbishops and earls indicate that the kings feared giving the York-

shire men local leadership, and there are signs that even outsiders
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could not necessarily be trusted beyond the Humber.
was banished from the kingdom.

In ca. 992 Earl Thored disappeared with-

out explanation, and in 1006 Earl
sons blinded.
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In 975 Earl Oslac

/lllfhelra

was killed at court and his

No reasons for any of these events are given in the

Chronicle, but it was certainly a suspicious mortality rate.
The impression that the men of York could not be trusted
is

strengthened by certain aspects of the second period of Danish invasions.

In particular,

the North and the Danish Five Boroughs just to

the south were left almost untouched through thirty-six years of raids.

Furthermore, on the one occasion when the Danes did trouble the North,
the men of York behaved rather suspiciously.

In 993 when the Danes

sacked Bamburgh and, after entering the Humber, plundered Lindsey (the

northern part of Lincolnshire) and the East Riding of Yorkshire, the
northerners did raise an army, but it would not fight the Danes.

Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
the army fled,
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The

says that this happened because the leaders of

and Florence of Worcester adds that they fled "because

they were Danes on the father's side."
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Probably Florence was right.

After 993 the Danes did not return to the North until 1013, and this
twenty-year interval oould not have been the result of chance.

Swein

must have thought that the inhabitants of the northern Danelaw were

already sympathetic to his cause for otherwise he would have raided them.
He might, of course, have been deceiving himself, but the event proved

otherwise.

When he sailed up the Humber and Trent to Gainsborough in

1013, the North immediately subnoitted to him.

Uhtred of Northumbria led

the way, and he was followed by the Danes of the Five Boroughs, tliose of

Lindsey, and finally all Danes living north of Watling Street.

Sweiu
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then moved south and only began to harry the
countryside after he passed

Watling Street.

The men of York had not fought one battle to oppose

himo
It is difficult to be sure how much to make of
thiso

The submis-

sion of 1013 is not particularly significant; by then the
kingdom was
falling apart.

Swein's sparing of the northern Danelaw means more, and

it fits quite nicely with the Anglo-Saxon kings' lack of trust
in the

Yorkshire men as shown in their appointments to the archbishopric and
earldom.

Probably the correct conclusion is that the Danish aristocracy

was separatist, although it is possible that they may have been simply
unreliable against the Danes.

At least they do not seem to have

actively aided the invaders.
This second suggestion probably gives the Danes of York too much
credit, however, because Ethelred had strong political support in the

North.

Earl Uhtred of Northumbria was loyal to the king until 1013, and

he may have kept the Danes quiet.

had advanced him in the world.

Indeed, this was probably why Ethelred

Uhtred was the son of Earl Waltheof of

Northumbria of whom nothing is known other than the bare fact of his
existence and that he was an old man by 1006.

In that year, Malcolm II,

king of Scots, invaded Northumbria and, after the usual harrying,

besieged the newly founded episcopal city of Durham.

This was clearly a

serious situation for the Danes were raiding southern England at the
time and Ethelred could send no help.
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Earl Waltheof, who stayed in

Bamburgh, did nothing, and Malcolm may have been well on his way towards

taking the city.

At this point, however, Uhtred, who had some interest

in the matter, intervened.

He had married Bishop Aldhun's daughter and
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held, as a result, a nuniber of estates belonging
to the church of Durham.
It would seem, in fact, that he was the bishop»s
insurance policy, and

the bishop's prudence was rewarded.

Uhtred called together an army from

both Northumbria and Yorkshire and defeated the Scots.
The sequel gives some interesting insights into northern
culture

and politics.

with him.

Uhtred was proud of his victory and brought trophies home

The heads of the Scots were cut off, washed and neatly

groomed, and put up on poles around the city walls.

The women who had

cleaned the heads were each given a cow for their services.
received a reward for his victory.

He also

Ethelred was pleased and allowed him

to succeed his father as earl, even though the latter was still alive.

Furthermore, the king also gave Uhtred the earldom of Yorkshire which he
had just made vacant by killing Earl iElfhelm. 38
felt that Uhtred was more reliable than iElf helm.

Ethelred apparently
Soon after receiving

this honor, Uhtred dismissed his first wife, the daughter of the bishop

of Durham, and married Sige, the daughter of a rich citizen of York,
Styr, son of Ulf.

This incident is usually used to show the loose mar-

riage customs of the northerners, but it has a second meaning.

By the

marriage, Uhtred was trying to gain local political support south of the
Tees.

This is made quite clear by the fact that the bishop of Durham

sent Uhtred' s ex-wife south also and married her to an important York-

shire thegn.
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Bishop Aldhun and Uhtred were still working together,

and the object was to make sure that Uhtred could successfully rule

Yorkshire.
He must have been able to do this, although there are no details.

The De Obsessione Dunelmi does say that Uhtred was quite successful in
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war after becoming earl, but it does not name
his enemies.

The only

information it does give is a story, somewhat confused
in its details,
about how Uhtred refused to desert Ethelred in favor of
Swein,^° and
this was apparently true for Ethelred gave Uhtred
his

Elfgiva, in marriage. "^-^
Uhtred'

s

support.

ovra

daughter,

This is a sure sign that the king valued

Little else is known about Uhtred after this except

that in 1013, he submitted to Swein, but by then everyone was
going over
to the Danes.

Cnut.

When Swein died in 1014, Uhtred did not support his son

Rather, he seems to have gone back to Ethelred' s side for the

king's expedition into Lindsey in 1014 would have been very dangerous if

Uhtred were hostile.

42

Perhaps the earl took part.

In any case, he

campaigned with Ethelred' s son, Edmund Ironside, in 1016 in Cheshire and
the surrounding shires.

This was Uhtred's only known campaign in direct

support of the royal house, and it is probably significant that it

occurred the year after the two chief Danish thegns of the Seven Boroughs had been killed.

Edmund had installed himself in their place,

and this change probably freed Uhtred for operations to the south.

Unfortunately, in the middle of this campaign Cnut moved north and

invaded Yorkshire, and he was too strong for Uhtred to fight:
had already submitted to him and Earl Eadric was his ally.

Wessex

Uhtred "sub-

mitted then out of necessity," but he was assassinated when he went to
meet Cnut who then made a Norwegian, Eric of Hlathir, earl of Yorkshire.

This is the end of the story as it is usually told.

The sources

for Cnut's reign in general are bad, and for the North they are almost

nonexistent.

There is, however, one curious tale which does come out of
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these years; and, if properly
understood, it throws a great
deal of
light on both Uhtred's role as earl
of York and on Northumberland
after
1016.

This is, of course, the famous
Northumbrian blood feud.

baldest form the story goes as follows.

Uhtred obtained his second

wife, the daughter of Styr, son of
Ulf, at a price:
Styr»s enemy Thurbrand.

In its

He had to kill

Uhtred, however, was not able to
do this,

although he must have tried.

At least Thurbrand came to hate
Uhtred and

killed him when the earl arrived to submit
to Cnut in 1016.

Eadulf

Cudel, Uhtred's brother, then became earl
of Northumberland and ruled

for a short time^

He was followed by Earl Ealdred,
Uhtred's son by

Bishop Aldhun's daughter.

Ealdred avenged his father's death by killing

Thurbrand, but he was later killed in a particularly
underhanded fashion

by Thurbrand's son Carl.

The two had made peace and promised to go to

Rome together, but when their departure was delayed
by a storm, Carl
took Ealdred to his hall and, after entertaining him, killed
the North-

umbrian earl in the woods.

This

criiae

was not avenged by Ealdred 's half

brother Eadulf, who next became earl of Northumberland, apparently
because he was killed in 1041 by Siward, and justice waited until the
1070 's when Siward 's son Waltheof, grandson of Earl Ealdred through
his

mother, had his soldiers kill most of Carl's sons and grandsons who were

assembled for a banquet near York.*^^

All this is very curious even as it stands, and few historians have
been able to omit the story from their accounts of the North.

Usually

it is employed to show the barbarity of the Northumbrians, but it actu-

ally has a significance beyond this point.

The story was not written

down until around 1100, by which time its general meaning had been

forgotten and only the memory of
the major events remained/^

its

details, however, suggest that the
original events were not a straightforward blood feud at all, and
Thurbrand is the starting point of
this

interpretation.

On the face of the matter, he
is a suspicious figure

because, in addition to being a rich
and powerful Dane who lived in
York, he bore the title of "hold."
in northern law the Danish equivalent
of a king's high-reeve, and this point
raises the possibility that he

was the leader of the Danes of York.

Thurbrand is also said to have

been the enemy of Styr, son of Ulf, a rich
citizen of York,"^^ and
although it has been generally assumed that
this was some personal
rivalry, such was not the case.

A source, distinct from the blood feud

sources, records Styr's gift of some land to
Bishop Aldhun, and the

details of this transaction clarify what was actually
happening.
made the grant when Ethelred was in York.

Part of the land had belonged

to Styr, and he gave it to Durham with the king's
permission.

Styr purchased.
unius

de

Styr

The rest

In the course of the transfer Styr is described as

melioribus suis (i.e. of Ethelred)

.

He was, then, an

important supporter of the king; this turns things around.

When Uhtred

married Styr's daughter, he was not simply trying to gain political support in Yorkshire; rather, he was allying with Styr, another supporter
of Ethelred, against Thurbrand.

This was the meaning of Uhtred 's prom-

ise to kill Thurbrand, and the probability is that Thurbrand was the

local Danish leader in York.

Moreover, Styr's "gift" of land to Aldhun

supports the idea that Aldhun was working with Uhtred„

The Northumbrian

"blood feud" actually had its origin in Uhtred's attempt to control the
Danes of Yorkshire who were sympathic to Swein and Cnut.
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Uhtred's death proves the point.
the Be Obsessione_Dunelmi.

The fullest account of
this IS
i
in

It says that Uhtred
was ambushed by Thurbrand

as he was on his way to make
peace with Cnut, but the
details of the
story give the event a different
appearance. For the deed,
Thurbrand

used some of Cnut's soldiers whom
he hid behind a curtain in
the hall
which must have been the meeting
place between Cnut and Uhtred.
Upon
Uhtred's entry, the soldiers jumped
out and killed him."^^
ThiLS was more
than a personal feud.
The use of Cnut's soldiers
implies his consent as
does the fact that the killing was
done literally under Cnut's nose
with

no ill effects for Thurbrand-despite
the fact that Cnut had given

Uhtred a safe-conduct.

Furthermore, the De Primo Saxonum AdvPn^n
says

the killing was done per voluntate m Cnutonis
re^ i...^^
as responsible for the killing as Thurbrand.

Cnut clearly was

Finally, the idea that

this was a feud is reduced to absurdity by
the fact that Uhtred was not
the only man killed that day:

come with him were slaughtered.

Forty important Northumbrians who had
The incident was, in fact, an attempt

by the Danes of York and Cnut to destroy Ethelred's
main political and

military support in the North by annihilating the nobility
of Northumberland.

The implications of this are clear.

The Anglo-Saxon kings had

not mistrusted the Danes of York without reason.

They could not be

trusted in the face of a Danish invasion and were probably a center
of
plots and intrigues in peaceful times.

existed by 1016.

In this sense northern separatism

What this reconstruction shows with equal clarity is

that until 1016 the earls of Northumberland were loyal to the kings

despite the small power which the kings had above the Tees.

They were

not separatist, and this Is
not surprising given the
enemies they faced
on all sides.
The next n^jor problem- is to
detennine what happened in the
North
between 1016 and 1041. It is not
even clear who was earl of
York for
part of this period. In 1016 Cnut
appointed one of his generals.
Eric
of Hlathir, earl; but his last
genuine signature as dux is found
in
There is then a ten-year interval
between this date and 1033 when
Earl Siward first witnesses a charter,
and it is not known who was earl
1023.

between these dates in York.^^

Northmnberland the situation is about

as unclear, despite the fact that
the names of the earls are known.

After Uhtred was killed, his brother Eadulf
Cudel became earl.
only a short time and was followed in
turn by Ealdred and
of Uhtred.

shire ear Is,

He lived

Eadulf. sons

These earls supposedly ruled in subordination
to the York-

but what little is known about them makes
this idea ques-

tionable,

Eadulf Cudel, the first earl, is said to have
been lazy and timid,

but this is probably a monk's reconstruction of
his character based on
his only known act, the cession of Lothian.

After becoming earl he is

said to have given Lothian to the Scots because he feared
that they

would take revenge on him for Uhtred 's victory over them.

In return for

Lothian, Eadulf received a "firm peace" with the Scots.

The meaning

of this story is far from clear for two reasons.

First, King Edgar sup-

posedly had already given Lothian to King Kenneth of Scotland in cao973,
and second, in 1018 Malcolm II again invaded the North and annihilated a

Northumbrian army drawn from between the Tees and the Tweed at Carham, a
ford over the Tweed.

Since the account of Edgar's cession of Lothian

'
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58
has been generally accepted,^^
and since the accounts of
Eadulf

s

ces-

sion of Lothian and the battle of
Carha. deserve quite as much
credence
as it, the problem is to fit the
stories together without arbitrarily

dismissing one or more of them.

One way of doing this is to
assume that

Uhtred recovered part of Lothian after
defeating Malcolm II in 1006 and
that Eadulf Cudel ceded this land
to the Scots.
M. 0. Anderson, who sug
gested this solution, which is quite
possible, also believed that Eadulf
had gone over to the Scots and that
this was the reason he gave up the
land,

but there is no evidence to support
this idea.

In fact,

there

was a tradition in Durham in the early
twelfth century that a North-

umbrian earl had led the defeated northern army
at Carham,^^ and this
suggests the less elaborate idea that it was
Eadulf who lost the battle
of Carham and, after the defeat, "ceded"
Lothian to the Scots.

Presum-

ably, the land which he gave up was either some
part of Lothian recov-

ered by his brother or a section of the province
(perhaps Tweeddale)

which the Scots had not obtained in 973.
Earl Eadulf gave up some land to the Scots because they had
beaten

him badly.

This solution is probably correct as far as it goes, but the

incident still raises questions.
larly fearful after his defeat?

Why should the earl have been particuHe ought to have been able to expect

royal help in this circumstance, but it is known that Cnut did not make
a countermove in the North for at least nine years.

Why did he delay?

In any case, how could Eadulf give up land without the king's agreement?

Finally, why was there no contingent from Yorkshire at the battle of

Carham?

It was foolish for the men of Northumberland alone to fight the

Scots if they could avoid it.
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These are serious questions.

Their innnediate implication
is that

some important aspects of the
northern political situation after
1016
are still hidden, and this impression
is strengthened by the next
known

incident.

After Eadulf Cudel's death, his
nephew Ealdred became earl.

He killed Thurbrand, his father's
killer, and was killed in turn by
Carl, Thurbrand's son, in 1038.

This is the blood feud story again.

It

was shown earlier that the origins of
this affair lay in the contest

between Thurbrand and Uhtred for control of
Yorkshire, and the question
now is whether these killings (the second
and third) represent a blood
feud or whether the original contest continued
under Carl and Ealdred.

Again the details of the story combined with
outside evidence show
that the latter was the case.

This is initially suggested by the fact

that the slaughter should have ended with Ealdred'
s killing of Thurbrand
He had taken an eye for an eye and ought to have
been content; the same

should have been true of Carlo

This was emphatically not the case for

the level of murderous activity increasedo

Not only did Carl attempt to

kill Ealdred, but Ealdred tried to kill Carl.
in terms which sound like guerilla war.

The conflict is described

They plotted against each

other, harassed each other with tricks, and lay in ambush for each
61
other.
This apparently went on for quite some time until Carl suc-

ceeded through the stratagem mentioned earlier.

Eadulf, Ealdred 's half

brother, then became earl.
It might be objected, of course, that Northerners took their feuds

very seriously and that this explains both the continuation of the killings and the intensity of the attempts, but such an objection could not
be sustained.

For this incident to be regarded as normal in northern
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society, one would need to cite
other exainples of the same sort
of
thing, and other examples do not
exist. Furthermore, it is clear
that

Carl's true identity had been forgotten
by the time the story was written down. As mentioned earlier,
there is a ten-year gap between Earl
Eric, who last witnessed a charter
in 1023, and Earl Siward.^^

It hap-

pens, however, that a certain Karl
minister began to witness in 1024,
the very next year after Eric's
disappearance, and continued to witness
63
until 1045.
This man was undoubtedly identical with
the Carl who

fought Ealdred, and he was Cnut's earl or
sheriff of York until Siward

superseded him in 1033.

After that, he seems to have occupied a subor-

dinate position for he continued to witness
charters—almost always in
the company of Siward-until 1045.

The fact that he is not named in the

Northumbrian earl-lists is not significant.
any earl of York between Oslac and Siward.

They do not deign to mention
If this identification is

accepted, the "feud" between Ealdred and Carl becomes a
feud between the

earl of Northumberland and the earl of York.

One wonders what Cnut

would have thought.
Actually, once charter evidence is brought into the discussion the

whole problem vanishes.

Carl probably was earl of York.

The most inter-

esting thing however, is that Eadulf Cudel, Ealdred, and Eadulf did not

witness royal charters.

None of them signed as earl or anything else.

It may be objected that not enough charters survive for this to be valid;

but this is groundless.

The earls of York as well as Carl witnessed a

substantial number of charters during this period, and the immediate
predecessors of Eadulf Cudel witnessed surviving charters.

Earl Waltheof

witnessed one, and Uhtred witnessed five despite the Danish invasions.
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The only explanation for this is
that these three earls did
not come to
court; if they did not come to
court, they were in revolt.
The plotting
and ambushing between Carl and Ealdred
was a minor war between Cnufs

representative in the North and the earls
of Northumberland.

There was

no northern blood feud.
This conclusion greatly clarifies the
history of the North after
1016.

By this date there was probably already
hostility between the

Northumbrians and the northern Danes, and
the murder of Uhtred and the
nobles of Northumberland plus the prospect
of a Danish monarchy produced
a revolt beyond the Tees.

caution.

The term revolt, however, must be used with

Uhtred»s successors probably refused to make a
formal submis-

sion to Cnut and, given the tenuous bond between
Northumberland and the
king, the earls may not have viewed their action
as a revolt at all.

In

the long run, of course, this was a hopeless policy
because Northumber-

land could not stand alone.
On the one hand, they faced the hostility of Carl.

On the other,

they had to withstand the Scots who were all too ready to take
advantage
of the situation.

When Malcolm II invaded in 1018, Eadulf Cudel had to

fight him without support from the South and lost badly.

Because of the

revolt, Eadulf could expect no avenging expedition and had to give up

"Lothian,"

He may even have made some submission to Malcolm

is no proof of this.^^

— but

there

The defeat at Carham also put the clerks of St.

Cuthbert (of Durham) in a difficult position.

Bishop Aldhun died of

shock after learning of the slaughter, and the clerks were unable to
elect a successor for over two years.

The traditional explanation for

this is that none of them wished to become a monk, a requirement for
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being bishop of Durha..67

f,,,^ ^.^^ ^^^^^^^^ ^^^^^

^^^^^^

whether Carl or the earl of
Northumberland was more dangerous.
In the
end they chose a man from outside
their circle, an obscure
priest named
Edmund who could take the blame
for the false moves which
appeared inevitable while the clerks rode out
the storm.^^

^^^.^^

^.^^^^ was
forced on him, and he was sent
south to get Cnut's approval for
h is con69
secration.
He was the first bishop of
Durham known to have sought

royal approval.
Edmund proved to be a good bishop,
but the clerks' fears had not

been imaginary.
some years.

After Eadulf Cudel's death, Ealdred and
Carl fought for

Probably Carl made occasional forays into
Northumberland,

and Ealdred hid in the hills until he went
home.

This lasted until an

unspecified date when the two became "sworn brothers,
the urging of friends.

supposedly at

Swearing brotherhood, it should be pointed out,

was the northern equivalent of a peace treaty.

The most likely explana-

tion for this reconciliation was Cnut's northern
expedition.

This is a

shadowy affair, but at some time between ca. 1027 and
ca. 1031, the king
came north and received the submission of Malcolm II
and two northern
sub-kings.^"''

No one is likely to have been eager to fight Cnut at this

time, and Ealdred probably also submitted to him and became Carl's
sworn

brother.

While the king was in the North, he gave Edmund some land;^^

he would hardly have done so if Ealdred was still in revolt.

There was

then a period in the 1030 's when Ealdred acknowledged Cnut's overlordship.

It ended in 1038 with Carl's murder of the earl.

His brother Eadulf then became earl and went back into revolt.

The

immediate results of this were similar to those faced by Eadulf Cudel in

A
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1018:

The Scots took advantage of
the weakness of the earl,

m

1040

(?) King Duncan invaded the North, and
this time the Northun^rians
did
not try to meet him in the field.
The Battle of Carham was not
to be
repeated. They probably retreated
to their fortified places,
churchyards, and into the hills.
Duncan moved south and besieged
Durham, but
he was defeated by the Northumbrians
who had taken refuge in the city

and fled losing many men.^^

Eadulf probably had directed the
defense of

Durham, and after this success he was
"exalted with pride" and ravaged
the land of the Galwegians who had
undoubtedly taken part in Duncan's

expedition.

Still, his pride notwithstanding, he
must have been aware

of the weakness of his position because
he opened some sort of negotia-

tions with Hardacnut, the English king, and
went south to see him in

1041 under the king»s safe-conduct.

Unfortunately for Eadulf, however,

Hardacnut's promise was no better than Cnut's
had been for Uhtred.

The

king betrayed Eadulf, and he was killed by Siward,
the earl of York.'^^
Thus died the last earl of the house of Bamburgh
through the male line-

betrayed by a Dane and killed by a Dane in circumstances
remarkably similar to those in which his brother and father had died.

The family itself was not extinct for there was one more son
of

Earl Uhtred alive, Cospatric, and he may have proclaimed himself
earl,

although the northern earl- lists say that he did not.

They assert that

upon the murder of Eadulf, Siward became earl of all of Northumbria from
the Humber to the Tweed, thus adding Northumberland to Yorkshire.

hitherto ignored source, however, shows that Siward 's acquisition of the
land between the Tees and Tweed was not that simple or immediate.

The

defiance of the Northumbrians continued for another year or two, probably
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under Cospatric's leadership.

The murder of Eadulf was no more
effec-

tive in reducing Northumberland
than had been the murders of Uhtred
and
Ealdred. Finally in 1042 or 1043,
Siward had to invade Northumberland

and waste the countryside to gain
control of the province.

This

worked, and Cospatric probably fled to
Scotland.
The conclusions to be drawn from this
reconstruction of northern

history up to 1043 are startling.

It is clear that it is a mistake
to

assume that the North was in any sense united
by this date or to talk of
some generalized northern "separatism."

Separatism there certainly was,

but its content varied between Yorkshire and
Northumberland.

Its seri-

ousness depended upon who was king and who, if anybody,
was invading the
kingdom.

Ultimately these political feelings probably went back
to cul-

tural differences and past political experience.

The men from above the

Tees certainly hated and feared the Danes, and they had
good reason to
feel this way.

The Yorkshire Danes, for their part, had not been loyal

to the West Saxon kings during the invasions of Swein and
Cnut.

had only been kept within the kingdom by Earl Uhtred.

separatism which was important

— at

They

There was a Danish

least when Danes were invading.

Finally, at the beginning of Edward the Confessor's reign, Northumber-

land was a conquered province.

This cannot be explained away.

Northumbrians had gone into revolt when Uhtred was killed.

The

Two more of

their earls had been killed by Danes, and they had only been brought back

within the kingdom by conquest.

Separatism above the Tees existed by

1043, and it is very doubtful if the accession of Edward did anything to

quiet it.

He may have been a member of the royal house of Wessex, but

Slward was their aarl.
que ring Dane.

He undoubtedly

loo^d larger, and

he was a con-
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CHAPTER

II

EARL SIWARD AM) THE SCOTS
Earl Siward was the last great
earl of the North before the
debacle
of the 1060's, and there is
consequently a strong temptation
to picture
him as a primitive monolith which
stood for the traditional order
of gov-

ernment above the Humber.

But such a treatment of the
earl would be

false for Siward cannot be used as
a general symbol for the old
politi-

cal arrangements of northern England.

He was in reality originally an

outsider, and the years of his power
brought no real solution to the

problems of the North.

At best, in fact, he only kept his earldom
quiet

while in some ways he created new difficulties.
This was the case because Siward was hardly
an ideal earl from the

English king's point of view.

There is, of course, no direct evidence

which discloses what Edward the Confessor thought
about northern problems in the 1040's, but the following reconstruction
seems to be in

accord with the facts.

At the beginning of Edward's reign, the politi-

cal and military situation in the North could not have
appeared promising.

The history of the region before 1042 had shown that three
basic

problems existed.

The most serious of these was the fact that the Danish

section of the population of Yorkshire was not loyal to Ethelred, and it
was doubtful if Edward could expect any greater devotion from them should
the kingdom be threatened by renewed Danish invasions.

In Ethelred 's

days, these Danes had only been kept in check by the power of Uhtred,

earl of Northumbria and York, but Edward could expect no such support
for Northumbria was a conquered and hostile province in 1042.

The king
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could not balance Danes with
Northumbrians and loyal elements
within
Yorkshire. Thurbrand, Carl, and
Siward had made this impossible.

Finally, the Scots were becoming
a serious threat to the
peace and prosperity of northern England. They
had invaded three times since
1000.

On each occasion they had been able
to take advantage of English
distraction which stemmed from either
the Danish invasions or the
rebellion
of the Northumbrian earls.

The ultimate aim of these incursions
was the

annexation of Northumbrian lands, and this
hope was not beyond possible
fulfillment.

Viewed in this context, Siward was something
of an embarrassment to
the king.

He was a Danish parvenu similar to Earl
Godwin of Wessex and

had risen to power under Cnut and his sons.

Siward had become earl of

Yorkshire in ca. 1033 and had added Northumberland
to his earldom by
conquest in ca. 1042.

When Edward became king in 1042, Siward, along

with the other great earls, was one of the political
realities which the
king had to accept.

It was beyond the king»s power to remove him,
even

if such a course of action seemed desirable, and on
the level of high

politics, it probably did noto

If Siward could have been dispossessed,

his fall would only have increased the power of the other earls, a
most

undesirable result.

The difficulty with keeping the northern earl, how-

ever, was that there was only a partial correspondence between his self-

interest and that of the king.

He was both an ambitious new nan and a

Dane who was mainly interested in maintaining his own position.

Being

Danish and a holdover from Cnut's reign, he was undoubtedly popular in

York and perhaps found it easier to govern that shire than had most of
his predecessors.

This might seem to be to his credit except that this

aptness itself raised a question:

fleet sailed up the Humber?

How would Siward react if a
Danish

Such an occurrence was not
at all impos-

sible, and it is hard to see any
reason for believing that Siward
would
have been loyal to Edward in this
circumstance. Furthermore, a wise

counselor could have pointed out to
the king that it would be prudent

t

give the Northumbrians an earl from
their native house and thus reestab
lish the traditional relationship with
the province, but this was impos
sible.

Siward could not be deprived of a major
portion of his earldom.

The only point, in fact, at which there
was any real correspondence

between the king's interest and the earl's
was on the Scottish problem.
Siward was determined to keep the Scots out
of his earldom and devoted a

sustained effort to this end.
Given these factors, it should not be surprising
that Siward made
no significant contribution to solvin- the major
internal political

problems of the North.

Probably they were beyond solution in any case,

and there were some advantages in the situation from the
standpoint of
court politics— provided there were no Viking attacks.

Siward 's unpopu-

larity above the Tees meant that the earl was not as powerful as
the

extent of his lands suggested and that one of his main concerns was
to
keep Northumbria quiet.

This limited his freedom of action and was the

reason he was not too deeply involved in southern politics.
as has been suggested,

that he was "uninterested"

It was not,

in southern affairs.'''

Siward faced serious problems in the North and, as a result, was usually

loyal to the king.
Put in terms of policy, the requirements for governing the North

must have been clear.

Siward had to keep watch on the Danes of York,
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-ke

sure that the Northu^rian
rebellion did not flare-up again,
and
thwart Scottish raids. To accon^lish
these tasks, it was necessarythat

he be strong.

This meant in concrete tem^s
that Siward had to be rich

enough to xaaintain a large band of
professional warriors (housecarls) ,2
and apparently the resources of
the earldom were not sufficient
for this

because the king gave him extra lands
in the South.

Siward held North-

amptonshire from (probably) the early
1040's, and he acquired the neighboring shire of Huntingdon in the early
1050's.^ Although the possession of this Midland earldom may have
been intended in part to insure the
earl»s loyalty, the additional revenues
which these shires yielded

allowed him successfully to dominate the
North.

How close and how obvi-

ous to the northerners this relationship
was will be seen later.

Fortified with a private army which may have
contained as many as
two to three hundred housecarls, Siward
governed his earldom success-

fully.

4

In Yorkshire the nobility was presumably
receptive to his rule.

In Northumbria he may have had more difficulties,
but there he made an

attempt to appease local feelings by marrying iElfleda,
a daughter of
Earl Ealdred.^

The latter, who had been Uhtred's eldest son, had him-

self only begotten daughters, and since Northumbrian women
could inherit
land, it is nearly certain that by his marriage Siward acquired
part of
the lands of her family. 6

More than this, he also probably obtained

some legitimacy as earl in the eyes of the Northumbrians, although there
is a possibility that the Northumbrian earls followed the Scottish rule

of succession by which brother succeeded brother.^

If this was the

case, Cospatric, Uhtred's youngest son, would have had a better claim to

be earl than Siward.
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It is even possible that
Slward's

u^rians went so far as to concede

m

attests

to reconcile the North-

to Cospatrlc a subordinate
position

the government of the
earldom for evidence certainly
exists that the

latter was important In local
affairs, perhaps before
1056; and he may
have worked In conjunction
with Slward.
This question will be discussed later; but whatever
the truth, Slward clearly
did attempt to ally
himself with the native house
of Ba*urgh.
He had by^lfleda, who was
evidently his second wife, a son
whom he named Waltheof In honor
of the
boy's maternal great-grandfather,
and some fifty years later
there was a

tradition at Durham that Slward
had given to Waltheof, presumably
as a
child, the earldoM of Northumbria
with the boundaries which it had
had

m

Ealdred's day.^

If this story Is true, Slward
may have Intended that

his eldest son, Osbeorn. should
become earl of York which Ealdred had

not controlled, and this would amount
to a tacit admission that it was

proper for a Dane to rule York and a
Northumbrian to rule Northumbria.
The division never seems to have
occurred, but it is Indisputable that

Waltheof thought he was a member of the
house of Bamburgh by the time he
reached maturity.

Q

The success of Siward's attempts to identify
himself with the Bam-

burgh family is difficult to establish.

He faced only shadowy opposi-

tion in Northumbria, but this can be explained
as easily on the basis of
his military strength as on the basis of his
marriage.

From 900 years

after the event, his marriage seems prudent; to
Northumbrians at the
time, on the other hand, it may have appeared the brash
move of a

parvenu bent on acquiring a local name.

44

The sensibiUties of the
Northu^rian nobles are unfortunately
lost
beyond recall, but in another
area it is quite clear that
Siward's
actions struck the natives as
being highhanded and aroused
resentment.
He offended the nxost powerful
body of .en in the North, the
clerks of
St. Cuthbert, and their
feelings are part of the historical
record.

These clerks constituted a
privileged corporation which tended
to control the bishopric of Durham in
most respects. They elected the
bishop,
who was usually one of their number,
and carried out the more important

functions of the cathedral church.

Being also essentially secular can-

ons who held property and married,
they occupied a unique position in

Northumbrian society which insured their
inordinate prestige.

Some of

these clerks were known descendants of
the original porters of the holy

body of St. Cuthbert.

This uncorrupted corpse was the most
precious

relic in the North and the most powerful
talisman between the Humber and
the Orkneys.

During the original Danish invasions, these
porters had

cared for the body after the destruction of
Lindisfarne and had trekked
all over the North with it before finally
reestablishing the bishopric
at Chester-le-Street.-"-^

The clerks were thus not only rich and power-

ful; they were also a direct link with the pre-Viking
past of the North.

Siward offended these men in two ways.
of their lands.

First, he appropriated some

Earlier in the century Bishop Aldhun had given Uhtred

several of the church's villages when the latter had married his daughter.

After becoming earl, Siward claimed these villages in the name of

his wife who was an offspring of this marriage.

1

o

The clerks were angry

over this act, but there was little they could do to oppose it.

northern earls had taken church lands o

Other

What was far more serious was

that Siward and Edward
threatened the ancient
privileges of the clerics
theo^elves. Hitherto they had
elected their bishop who
traditionally
had been either one of their
number or at least a northern
cleric, but
this changed in 1042.
In that year Bishop Edmund
went south to visit
King Hardacnut at Gloucester.
The reason for the visit was
not recorded
although it was probably connected
with Siward's recent conquest
of

Northumbria.

The Durham church is unlikely
to have come through the

complicated politics of the years after
1018 uncompromised; and, no
doubt, Edmund needed to explain some
of his past actions.
During the
early eleventh century, however, it
had become risky for important
Northumbrians to go south, and this turned
out to be true again for

Edmund died while visiting the king.^^

The sources do not suggest any

foul play, but certainly Bishop Edmund»s
death was exceedingly convenient for Hardacnut and Siward in that it
opened the way to the estab-

lishment of royal control over the bishopric
of Durham.

The clerks may

have gone through the usual election process
to choose a new bishop, but
the sources do not explicitly say this.

Rather, they report that Eadred,

the principal clerk, bought the bishopric from
the king with the church's

money, and apparently ^^ts was an innovation. '"^

The first step in the

clerks* downfall had been Edmund's trip south in 1020-21
to seek Cnut's

approval for his consecration.

This was the second step:

The clerks

now had to pay for the privilege of electing their bishop.
The end followed quickly

— perhaps

suspiciously soon.

Eadred sick-

ened after purchasing the bishopric and died within ten months.
time the clerks did not select his successor.

lacked the money to buy the freedom to elect

It is
a second

"""^

This

possible that they
bishop after such
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a short interval.

In any case. King
Edward and Siward used the
opportu-

nity Of Eadred's death to
control the selection of
his successor and to
install Durham's first non-northern
bishop,

m

1020-21, Bishop Ed.und

had brought north so.e .onks
fro. Peterborough to instruct
hi. in the
monastic vows which he had taken
to beco.e bishop,
and^thelric, the new
bishop, was one of these monks.
One
source says explicitly that
Edward

appointed him bishop.^^

m

a way it was a reasonable
choice since

^thelric had lived at Durham for twenty
years and was familiar with
northern customs and men.

vation was bound

But on the other hand, the
method of his ele-

to arouse resentment.

Indeed, his appointment was a frontal
attack on the privileges and

freedom of the clerks, and they viewed
it as such.

They despised him

both for being an outsider and for having
been elected against their
will, and^thelric in turn made the
situation worse by extending the

attack on the clerks' powers.

"

He directly reduced their administrative

role by granting the most powerful position
in the church government

after his own to his brother ^thelwine, who
had also been a monk at
Peterborough and had come to Durham during Edmund's
episcopate.

Not

surprisingly these innovations were too much for the
clerks to bear, and
in 1045 or 1046 they rebelled against ^thelric and
drove him out of Durham.

But this did not restore their freedom for long because
the bishop

sought out Siward and obtained his support against the clerks.

The earl

then forced the latter to take back the bishop, a reconciliation
not

accomplished through negotiations and compromise.

Instead, the clerks

yielded only through fear of Siward's power, and iEthelric remained their
bishop until after Siward's death. 18

To this extent the policy had been

successful, but its vasdo»

U

debatable.

Fro. this tl.e on. si„ard
cer-

tainly could count on the
support of the bishop 1„
governing Northu^rla,
and this must have been his
main concern. Yet the clerks
were unreconciled to their loss of power
and their do^naticn by
southern „onks; and
Slward, who was responsible for
this situation, must have
been very
unpopular at Durham. Furthermore,
he had left the clerks with
their
local prestige undiminished, and
this was a dangerous oversight
because
they were destined to use it to
overturn his successor who continued

Siward*s church policy.

While Siward lived, however, his
control over both the church of
Durham and the house of Bamburgh remained
firm, and this left him free
to deal with the threat posed by
the Scots to the North.

In fact,

this

was probably his major concern, and to
understand this aspect of his
rule, it must be realized that the
necessity of keeping the Scots out of

Northumbria was not a traditional problem of
northern government.
Rather, the threat from the Scots had greatly
increased during the first
three and one-half decades of the eleventh century
as the result of a

basic shift in northern power relationships which was
one of the funda-

mental steps in the formation of the Anglo-Scottish
border.
Siward was confronted by a novel and dangerous situation.

For per-

haps one hundred and twenty years, the main threat to the North
had lain
in the West.

Throughout the tenth century the lands between the Huraber

and the Forth had had a dangerous western border which had come into

being early in the tenth century with the expansion of the British king-

dom of Strathclyde or Cumbria.

This development has been traditionally

either ignored or not dealt with as part of the general history of
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northern Britain even though Its
general outlines, at least,
are fairly
clear.
Around the year 900 the Cumbrians
(as they called the^elves)
began to expand out of Clydesdale
toward
the south.

They crossed the

southern Highlands of Scotland and
took control of the Galweglan
coastal
plain on both sides of the Solway
Firth and the Vale of Eden.

At its

height, their kingdom apparently
reached from the head of Loch
Lomond at
least to the Rere Cross of Stalnmore
In the North Riding of Yorkshire/'
and there is some evidence that
it may have stretched as far
south as
the Mersey. 20 Thus there suddenly
appeared a western kingdom in north-

em

Britain which comprised all of the west
coast plain and a large portion of the uplands. The established
political powers which were

located on the east coast plain, the Danes
of York, the house of Bamburgh. and the Scots, would probably have
found this development suffi-

ciently bothersome since there is no reason
to believe that the Cum-

brians were any better neighbors than their
southern cousins the Welsh;
but in fact, the expansion of the Cumbrians
represented only the initial

disintegration of society on the west coast plain for
during this same

period Norwegian Vikings from Ireland began to settle along
the eastern
shores of the Irish Sea from

sula below the Mersey.

Galloway as far south as the Wirral Penin-

The results of this invasion on the Cumbrians

as a people and on their kingdom itself are exceedingly
obscure.

The

Norwegians had been subject to Irish influence before settling in Britain
and ultimately merged with the native Britons to produce the people

known in the twelfth century as the Galwegians.

It is clear, never-

theless, that the kingdom of the Cumbrians survived the influx of Vikings
to soEie extent and that the Cumbrians continued to maintain a line of
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kings of their own who are
intermittently recorded down to
1018.
although we cannot be sure how
real their power was. What
is certain is
that the Norwegians of the
Irish Sea region freely used
the Tyne Gap,
the Vale of Eden-Stainmore route,
and the Wirral Peninsula-all
theoret-

ically within Cumbria except perhaps
the latter-as passages by
which to
plunder the Northumbrians, the Danes
of York, and the English
Midlands.

Ultin^tely they were even able to
overwhelm the Danish kingdom of
York
and set up their own state there.

The significance of these developments
in the present context

is

that the incursions from the West
became so serious that it was neces-

sary

f.or

any ruler wishing to control the
North's eastern plain to domi-

nate the invasion routes through Cumbria
which these marauders used, and
one of the ways of doing this was to
obtain the alliance or submission
of the Cumbrian kings themselves.

Their cooperation was useful against

the Irish Sea Vikings, although it is unclear
whether this was because

they had enough power partially to control
the movement of the Vikings

through their kingdom or whether it was simply
desirable that they not
come raiding through the hills in alliance with
the Vikings.
it may,

Be this as

the direct rel?Monship between security in the
East, on the one

hand, and the control of the invasion routes from the
West coupled with
the submission of the Cumbrian kings, on the other, is clear
in tenth-

century Anglo-Saxon sources.

When the Norwegian incursions first

assumed serious proportions in the early tenth century, the powers of
the Morth tried to meet the threat by banding together.

^Ethelflaed of

Mercia allied with the Cumbrians and the Scots against these new Vikings, and even the Danes of York sought her protection.

In addition to

.
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aiding these allies actively,
^thelflaed also built forti
dresses at
Chester. Eddisbury, and Runcorn
to protect her northwestern
frontier,
and after King Edward took direct
control of Mercia in 918, he
followed

a similar policy.

He built a nu.ber of boroughs
in Cheshire and Derby,

including the ones at Manchester,
Bakewell, and Thelwell, fortresses
which seem clearly designed to secure
the invasion routes from the
Irish
Sea littoral into the Midlands and
to dominate the southern routes
east
into Yorkshire, and he also attempted
to gain the same ends by diplo-

matic activity.

After he had built Bakewell in
920, the king of the

Strathclyde Welsh (the Cumbrians), the
king of Scots, and the rulers of

York and Bamburgh all came to him and
"chose him as father and lord."^^
Presumably this meant that they would cooperate
in maintaining the peace

of the North and deny passage through their
lands to the Irish Sea

Vikings
The same sequence of events was repeated under
Athelstan during the

920's and 930's.

After he took control of the Viking kingdom of York
in

927, he moved immediately to secure the western borders of
his new prov-

ince by crossing the Pennines.

Athelstan met the kings of the North at

"Eamont" in the Vale of Eden, which apparently marked the
eastern border
of the Cumbrian kingdom, and there the kings of the Cumbrians,
the Welsh,

and the Scots plus the rulers of Bamburgh made peace with him.^^

This

agreement did not last for long, however; and in 934 Athelstan invaded
Scotland.

On this occasion, the chronicles concentrate their attention

on his war against Constantine, the Scottish king, but it

is clear that

this expedition also included operations against the Cumbrians because

in the same year Athelstan purchased Amounderness , a large section of

Lancashire above the Ribble, fro.
the Vi.ings and gave it
to the archbishop of York. 26 A^ounderness
doMnated the western end of the
Aire
Gap, the easiest passage
between the Irish Sea and York,

and control of

this route was necessary for
the defense of York.

Later, when the

ascendancy in the North which
Athelstan won by the campaign of
934 and
his victory at Brunanburh in
937 ended with his death, his
successor

Edmund had to retrace the latter's
steps, and his attempt to do
so provides perhaps the clearest example
of the importance of pacifying
the

West.

In 944 Edmund came north and
drove out the Norwegian kings of

York.

Then in the next year he crossed
the Pennines into Cumbria, ravaged the countryside, and gave the
kingdom of the Cumbrians to Malcolm,
the king of Scots, on the condition
that the latter be his ally.^^ This

ambitious attempt to solve the problem of
the North's western border
unfortunately seems to have led to no permanent
results for there is no

evidence that Malcolm's control over Cumbria
was anything more than nominal, and the native line of Cumbrian kings
was in power again within a

generation.
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Indeed, well before that in 954 Eric Bloodaxe,
the last

Norwegian king of York, was killed in battle on
the heights of Stainmore, the gateway to

Yrt-k

from the head of the Vale of Eden, and

although the account of this event does not disclose whether
Eric was
retreating or trying to regain his lost kingdom, neither
possibility suggests that there was much reality in Scottish control over Cumbria.

After this date, the power of the Vikings of the Irish Sea littoral

began to decline.

This was a slow process, however, which lasted into

the twelfth century, and incidents still continued to occur which show

that the western border had not yet lost all its threat.

In 966,

for

instance, a Yorlcshire noble
ravaged Westmorland, undoubtedly
In response
to raids over Stain.ore,30
3ix years later Kenneth II
harried C^bria all the way to its southern
border.
The sequel shows that the

mechanics of the western border
had not changed.

Kenneth's expedition

presumably gave hi. some control
over the northern end of
the western
frontier; and, probably as a result.
King Edgar "granted" hi.
Lothian a
year later.^^ ^^.^^^^^^
^^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^
^^^^

order to hold the eastern plain.

In fact, another incident
which

occurred in 973 confirms this fact.

During the summer King Edgar

brought his navy north to Chester
where he received the submissions
of
six northern kings including the
Cumbrian monarch,^^ and it should also
be noted that even at this date Edgar
may have been on the border of Cumbria when in Chester. The Scottish
chronicle which describes Kenneth's

invasion of the year before says that he
ravaged Cumbria all the way to
the Dee, the river upon which Chester
stands, and if this statement is

correct, Cumbria still included Lancashire.

Finally, in the year 1000

King Ethelred harried Cumbria while his fleet
wasted the Isle of Man.
Given the threat from the Danes which Ethelred
faced, this expedition is
again proof that the western Vikings were still
dangerous and had been
raiding the North.

Moreover, it may also be significant that the earli-

est indication that the English held southern Lancashire
comes from the

will of Wulfric Spot which dates from 1002-1004, at most four
years
later than Ethelred' s invasion of Cumbria. "^^
The existence of this dangerous western border was a crucial ele-

ment in the relations between the Scots and the English during most of
the tenth century because the Scots were themselves threatened by the
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Cumbrian kings and the western
Vikings.

Even as late as 971,

fo,
3r exampie, Kenneth II's predecessor
was killed by the Cumbrians,
aid Kenneth's
invasion of their kingdom was
apparently launched in revenge.^^
The

corollary of this threat was
that throughout most of the
tenth century,
Anglo-Scottish, or at least
Northumbrian-Scottish relations, were
usually good. The only exception
to this is the reign of
Constantine II
(903-43) who certainly invaded the
North once in alliance with the
Vikings, and perhaps three times.
But even his credentials as a
militant

opponent of "Englishmen" are diminished
by the fact that during the
910's he had defended the Northumbrians
against the Irish Sea Vikings
and submitted to Edward.

friendship.

The usual relationship was in fact
one of

The submissions of the Scottish kings
to Edward, Athelstan,

Edmund, and Edgar were essentially alliances
against the extension of

Viking power through the "kingdom" of
Cumbria or against the Cumbrians
themselves.
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"

There were no invasions of the North by the
Scottish

kings after Constantine* s death, nor were
there Anglo-Saxon expeditions
into Scotland.

This situation changed radically after 1000 for
between this date
and the 1060 's most of the elements which were to
characterize the

northern border during the High Middle Ages came into being.

The first

sign of this transformation took place in 1006 when Malcolm
II invaded
NorthuEibria and tried to take Durham.

This was the first Scottish inva-

sion of the North in over fifty years, and it probably came as a
shock
to the aging Earl Waltheof who was unable to deal with the
situation.

"^^

Why Mal<:olm invaded is problematical, but the general political context

which made his attack possible is clear.

The Cumbrians and the western

Vikings, while not without
power, were no longer the
ove..hel.ing threat
that they had been. Furthermore,
both the Northund,rian earl
and the
Anglo-Saxon king were now completely
distracted by the Danish invasions.
These factors gave Malcolm II a
freedom of action which his
predecessors had not had, and he used
it to try to take over
Northumbria. Furthermore, after the invasion of
1006 failed, Malcolm did not
give up the
new policy, which is a clear indication
that his invasion had not been
the result of whim.
In 1018 he moved south again,
this time presumably

m

alliance with the Cumbrian king, and
won the battle of Carham; and

the results of this victory were grave
in the long run because they pro-

duced a further shift in the power
relationships in the North/^

Carham

perhaps resulted in the advance of Malcolm's
frontier in Lothian as was

suggested earlier, but its real importance
lay in the West for Owen the
Bald, king of Strathclyde (Cumbria) died
in the battle.
of his line.

He was the last

With his death, Malcolm was able to extend
his rule over

at least the eastern part of the Cumbrian
kingdom, and it is likely that

he installed his brother as ruler of the area.^^

This must have

involved fighting and explains why Malcolm did not
exploit his victory
at Carham by further raids in Northumbria after
1018.

The stakes in the

West were ultimately higher because, with control of Cumbria,
Malcolm

would have access to at least three important routes between west
and
east (that from the upper Clyde down the Tweed, the Tyne Gap, and
the

Stainmore passage) and a host of secondary routes which in effect turned
the flank of the North of England.

Scottish control of the West thus

offered the hope of control of the East, and the first attempt at the
fulfillment of this hope was not long delayed.

Malcolm's grandson

s

Duncan was the first king of
Scots to utilize his
position as king of
the Cun^rians to attack
Northumbria when he invaded
and besieged Durha.
in 1040. The fact that he had
led the Cumbrians over the
border, in
addition to his own Scots, is shown
by Earl Eadulfs reprisal:
aged Cumbria after Duncan's
defeat/^

He rav-

This was the basic geopolitical
problem which Siward faced.

With
the Scots in control of Cumbria,
their king could lead an army
over the
Tweed in a frontal attack on the
earldom while sending the Cumbrians

east through the hills to raid and
disrupt communications, and such tactics could place the Northumbrians
in an extremely perilous position.

Indeed, ultimately they could lead
to Scottish control of Northumbria.

Consequently, the possibility that Duncan's
invasion of 1040, the first
of this type, might be repeated had
to be forestalled, and Siward applied
his energies to the task.

Apparently he followed a two-fold policy

which consisted of expansion in the West to
close the major invasion
routes combined with an attempt to put the
Scottish king in a dependent

position.

No chronicler, of course, says that these
were Siward'

intentions, but his recorded actions indicate that
this was the case.
To a certain extent, moreover, this was an
opportunistic policy; for as
a result of circumstances which he had had no hand
in creating, Siward

possessed the perfect means with which to interfere in Scottish
affairs:
He could make use of Malcolm Canmore, the son of King
Duncan.

That this possibility existed was a direct result of the imperfections of the Scottish political system and specifically of the succes-

sion crisis which followed the death of Malcolm II, the great-grandfather
of Malcolm Canmore.

Malcolm II (1005-1034) had been a very powerful

king.

He had invaded the North
twice, and after 1018 his
rule, which

encon^assed Lothian as far as
the Tweed and Cumbria in
addition to Scotland, had stretched further
south than that of any of
his predecessors.
During his later years, moreover,
neither the earls of Bamburgh,
who
were usually in revolt against
Cnut, nor the great Danish
king hi^elf
made any serious attempt to push
back his power/^ Nevertheless,
the
last part of his reign was filled
with turmoil and battle, and
although
it is impossible to be certain
of the reason for this, it
seems likely

that the basic difficulty stemmed
from the fact that Malcolm had no
male
heir. However, his only daughter,
named Bethoc ("Birchtree") , had mar-

ried Crinan the thegn, the abbot of
Dunkeld, by whom she had two sons,

Duncan and Maldred.^"*
in it is uncertain.

This situation led to trouble, but
Malcolm's role
It is possible that he desired
that his grandson

Duncan should succeed him, and if this was
the case, he was violating
customary practice for it was usual in Scotland
for a king to be succeeded by his brother or his cousin.

What seems more likely, however,

is that Malcolm's potential successors
by the traditional rule were

encouraged by his lack of an heir to hasten his death.
son, he could be killed without fear.

Since he had no

There would be no one seeking

vengeance and the throne ten or twenty years after
the deed.

But if

this second hypothesis is true, Malcolm's relatives
gravely misjudged

him; by the time of his death in 1034 he had managed to
exterminate

nearly all of the possible claimants to the throne aside from his own
grandsons.

The king had had either a brother or a second cousin named

Boite of whom little is known except that he seems to have predeceased

Malcolm, but he left behind a son and a daughter.

In 1032 the

daughter's husband. Gillaco.gain,
the

™r

of Moray, was burned to

death, probably by Malcol.
or his agents, and a year
later Malcol. bin.
self killed Boite's son/^
These two incidents neutralized
the descendants of Boite, but Malcol. was
still not secure for in 1034
he died after
defeating an unnamed enemy. This
event is very obscure, but an
Irish

Chronicle records that Suibne, son
of Kenneth, king of the
Galwegians,
also died in the same year. Given
the events of 1032 and 1033 and
the
common patronymic of Malcolm II
and Suibne, this was not
coincidence.
Suibne, who was probably a brother
of Malcolm II and who had ruled
Cum-

bria for the king, must have died in
battle against his brother in
1034. ^

In any case, Malcolm II's murderous
ways were quite successful.

By 1034 only his own grandsons and
Groch, Boite's daughter, were still

alive; and Duncan, his eldest grandson,
was therefore able to become

king without opposition.

He then reigned until 1040 when, after
his

unsuccessful invasion of Northumbria, he was
killed by Macbeth, the

mormaer of Moray, who himself had married
Groch.

Once he was in

power, someone, probably Crinan, Duncan's
father, sent the dead king's
sons out of the country. 48

Thus Malcolm fell into Siward's hands, and he may
not have been
alone.

A late source says that at this time Siward received a
number of

other refugee Scottish nobles,

and certainly Duncan's younger brother

Maldred could not have felt secure in Scotland and probably
came south.
This is particularly likely because he had married a daughter of Earl

Uhtred and would have been among relatives south of the Tweed,

and, as

a matter of fact, in later years Maldred's son, Cospatric, seems to have

thought of himself as a Northumbrian which would be understandable if he

.
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had been reared among

Ms

mother's people while his
father was in exile.

It is even possible that
Crinan himself came south
although there is no

direct evidence for this.

At any rate, the usefulness
from Siward's

point of view of Malcolm,
Maldred, and whatever other
Scots were in
Northumhria was two-fold. Ultimately
either Maldred or Malcol. could
be
used for direct intervention in
Scotland since they both had
clai^ns to
the throne.

Short of this, Siward could
use their presence in Northum-

hria to control Macbeth simply by
threatening

to allow

them to come over

the border with a Northumbrian
army if Macbeth caused trouble.

comfortable position for the earl of
Northumhria

to be in,

It was a

and Siward's

ability to threaten Macbeth was perhaps
the reason why the latter failed
to imitate his two predecessors by
launching a major invasion of the

North.

Macbeth only raided the North, and his
relative restraint was

certainly not due to his insecurity within
Scotland itself.

what one may think of the validity of his
claim

No matter

to the throne, he feared

no rivals when he made his pilgrimage to
Rome,^^ and this security could

only have been possible if he had reached
some understanding with
Siward
In addition to the diplomatic leverage which
Maldred and Malcolm

supplied, there were other possibilities in the
situation which were

perhaps more important.

Malcolm must have been

1040 's and consequently of little immediate use

matic game.

a boy
to

in the early

Siward in the diplo-

Maldred was older and his claim to the throne undoubtedly

took precedence over his nephew's, but Malcolm had another importance.

Fordun says that Duncan had given Cumbria to Malcolm, and this statement
may have some basis in

f act~Fordun' s

general unreliability on Cumbrian

affairs notwithstanding."

piorence of Worcester refers
to Malcolm as

the son Of the Icing of the
Cumbrians, and this is a
suspicious title to
apply to Duncan.^^ The latter
had been, of course, their
king, but
"king of Scots" or some
equivalent would have been a
more appropriate
title for him.
In fact, Florence's choice
of this unlikely title to

describe Malcolm's father probably
represents what seemed important
about him to the English.
If Duncan had been king
of the Cumbrians,
then Malcolm was his heir from an
English point of view. This was
significant because there is evidence
that Siward had taken over Cumberland, the area south of the Solway.
If Siward felt the necessity
for a
legal title to these lands, Malcolm
could grant it as the "heir" to
the
Cumbrian kingdom. This may, in fact,
have been Siward's price for sup-

porting the cause of Malcolm and Maldred.
The evidence that Siward expanded
into Cumberland comes from a
unique charter which dates certainly
from 1041 X 1065 and probably from
1041 X 1055.^^

The charter was granted by Cospatric, the
third son of

Earl Uhtred, to Thorfinn mac Thore and
concerns certain property rights,

judicial privileges, and fiscal exemptions in
Allerdale, roughly the
northwestern section of the modern county of Cumberland.

The address of

the charter contains the most significant
piece of information.

Cospatric greets the men "dwelling in all the lands
that were Cumbrian, "^^ and this establishes that by the time of the
grant, the lands

south of the Solway were no longer part of the kingdom of
Cumbria.

The

na ture of the charter is in accordance with this; and indeed,
this change
lordship must have been the occasion for the making of the charter.

Apparently it is a confirmation of rights already held by Thorfinn and

60

probably held by his father
Thore before hi..^^
perhaps extends Thorfinn's
holdings.

^^^^^^^.^ ^^^^^Lrms and

This is just the type of
document

one would expect to find
relating to lands which had
been transferred
from one kingdom to another for
the local landholders would
naturally

want the new rulers to recognize
the legitimacy of their
tenures.
also clear that the ultimate lord
of

It is

this area was the English king.

Although Cospatric was a great lord
in Cumberland and confirms
Thorfinn'
possessions without mentioning anyone

else's permission. Earl Siward had

granted peace, i.e. protection, to
Thorfinn,^^ and this establishes that
Siward had the general lordship of the
area.

Furthermore, Cospatric was

geldfree as were a number of other local
landholders, and he extends the
same privilege to Thorfinn and his retainers.^^

Such a concern with not

paying geld is only explicable if the English
king was the ultimate lord
of Allerdale, and this is an important
point because it negates any sug-

gestion that these lands were held by Cospatric
under the Scottish
60
1,-f
king.
It has also been thought that this charter
contains evidence that

Anglo-Saxon control of this area dated from before Siward'
s time because
it mentions rights which Thore and two other men had
had "in the days of

Eadred."

"Eadred" has been identified with Earl "Ealdred," but there
is

no real justification for this hypothesis on linguistic
grounds.

In

any case. Earl Ealdred spent most of his time in rebellion against
Cnut,

and it is very unlikely that he was able to wrest this land from
the
Scots.

Siward was the first earl in the eleventh century who had the

power to make this transfer.

Perhaps taking advantage of Earl Eadulf's

ravaging of this area and of his control over Malcolm, Siward had pushed
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through Che I^^e Gap and
annexed Cu^erland.

ecclesiastically to England.

The area was then

UnUed

Archbishop Kynsige of York
(1051-60) is

said to have ordained two
bishops of "Glassow" while
at York, and the
sphere of operations of these
bishops .ust have been in
Siward's newly
won lands in the West.^^
^^.^ ^^^^^.^^ ^^^^^^
^^^^^^
closed the two best invasion
routes fro. the West, Stain.ore
and the
Tyne Gap. This was an important
rectification of the northern frontier
and meant increased protection
for both Yorkshire and Durham.
T^e acquisition of Cumberland also had a
secondary advantage. The Cospatric
who
granted the charter seems to have
been identical with Earl Uhtred's

youngest son."

Siward had apparently put him in
charge of the area and

thereby paid off, at least partially,
old grievances.
These were important gains.

They offset the Scottish annexation
of

the old kingdom of Cumbria and
perhaps blunted the resentment of the

house of Hamburgh.

It is regrettable that the charter

closely dated than 1041 X 1065.

cannot

be more

It only shows that Siward had con-

trolled Cumberland at some time and does not
disclose when he took it
over.

As a result, the chronological position of
Siward's westward

expansion in the development of his Scottish
"policy" cannot
mined.

be deter-

The general direction of his relations with
Scotland is quite

clear from the mid 1040 »s, however; and the charter may
well come from
these years.

Control over the invasion routes from the West would seem

to be a precondition for any active intervention inside
Scotland, and

Siward led his first army over the Tweed in 1045 or 1046.^^

This expe-

dition is not described in detail in the chronicle which mentions it,
but it seems to have been an exact parallel of the famous invasion of

1054 e.cep. .ha. it failed.

Siward had apparently
decided to

.alee

his

king Of Scotland, a policy
which would theoretically
insure good
relations with the northern
kingdom and peace for the
North.
account of the expedition,

The

however, does not na.e
Siward's candidate for

the Scottish throne, although
it was probably Maldred,
Duncan's younger
brother,^^ and the sequence of
events is also difficult to
reconstruct.
It would see. that Siward
had the support of a party
of Scots led by
Crinan, the father of Duncan
and Maldred, but it is unclear
whether

Crlnan invaded Scotland from
Northumberland, or whether he was
already
in Scotland and rose in revolt
against Macbeth.

Probably the latter was

the case, and the revolt was
to be coordinated with Siward's
invasion.
But if this was the hope, it
failed, for Crinan met Macbeth in
battle

and was slain.

Siward subsequently led an army into
Scotland and drove

out Macbeth according to the
chronicle, and probably this means that

Macbeth fled into Moray in the face of
Siward's advance.

The earl then

raised Maldred to the throne and returned
to Northumberland.^^

He may

have thought that he had accomplished his
aim, or he may have found it

impossible to stay above the Tweed.

Successful invasions of Scotland

nonnally required a supnly fleet because it seems
that it was all but
impossible for an English army to live off the
Scottish countryside for
long, and there is no indication that Siward
had one on this occasion.
In any case, once he was gone, Macbeth returned
and recovered the king-

aom.

The fate of Siward 's king is unrecorded.

The likelihood is that this king, who was probably Maldred, was

killed because Siward waited some eight years before he invaded again.
If Malcolm had been born in £a. 1031, he would have reached
the age of
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twenty-three hy this ti.e
(1054), a pri^ age to try for
a throne whi ch
had to be won through battle.
Certainly relations with
Scotland did not
in,>rove during these years.

Scottish border raids on the
North either

began or continued after 1046.^°

There .ust then have been a
period of

quiet around 1050 during which
Macbeth is said to have gone
to Ro.e, but
this peace did not outlast his
pilgrimage for in 1052 Macbeth
received
the Normans who had been expelled
from England as a result of Earl
Godwin's restoration and took them
into his own service.

Macbeth's

eii,>loyment of mercenaries who
could only be profitably used
against

Siward shows that the situation was
becoming serious again, and it probably means that he was raiding the
North. This, at least, is implied
by
the events of 1053.

In that year Siward went to Scotland
and made some

agreement with Macbeth, and it is even
possible that this was a fullscale invasion although the evidence for
supposing so is not very satisfactory.

In any case, Macbeth soon broke the
agreement and continued to

raid the North.
Thus the stage was set for Siward's famous
invasion of Scotland.

In 1054 the earl collected an army from the North
which was reinforced

by a group of King Edwr- j's housecarls and by a
contingent from Cumberland led by Dolfin, Thorf inn's son, and he also obtained
a fleet which

could bring supplies to the army.

7

The object of the expedition was to

put Duncan's son Malcolm on the Scottish throne, and both Edward
and
Siward must have hoped that once king he would end the hostility
which

had characterized the northern border since 1006.

To achieve this end,

Siward moved north and defeated Macbeth on the Day of the Seven Sleepers
(July 27).

The encounter was apparently a pitched battle in which many

Scots and all of Macbeth^s
Norman mercenaries were
killed.
Siward lost a number of his
own

On his side

and the king^s housecarls/^
and even

though Macbeth hi:.elf escaped
to Moray where he
managed to survive for
three anticlimactic years,
Siward's victory had been
complete enough for

Malcolm to become king.

The oldest accounts say
no more; in fact, they

even omit any mention that
Malcolm replaced Macbeth.

Florence of Worcester, however, says that King
Edward had ordered Siward
both to make
the expedition and to establish
Malcolm as klng.^^ Both statements
are
undoubtedly true in a simple descriptive
sense, but it is inaccurate
to
give them a twelfth-century "feudal"
meaning.
The Normans would do
this soon enough. Malcolm was
king of Scots by inheritance and
battle;

his obligation to King Edward rested
solely on gratitude.

After defeating Macbeth, Siward returned
to England carrying with

him a great amount of booty and probably
under
expedition had been a success.

"

the impression that his

The next year he died at York and
was

buried there in the monastery which he had
built and dedicated to
Olaf .

St.

His bones were thus to be protected down
through the ages by a

fellow Scandinavian, an arrangement which
suggests that the earl had
remained at heart a Dar- to his death.

The stories of his physical

prowess which are based on this aspect of his
character supported by
Shakespeare's version of his war against Macbeth give
Siward heroic

stature.

He stands out as the last great earl of the North;
in the

hands of the romantic he becomes one of the last Vikings.

All this

makes it very difficult to reach an accurate appraisal of
his importance.
If one's view is limited just to his lifetime, Siward
must be portrayed

as a successful earl because he ruled Yorkshire without
any known

problem fro„

ca. 1033 to 1055 and
because he ended the

house Of Ba^urgh.

.evoU of

the

The period of his strong
rule gave the North a

Chance to recover fro. the
turmoil of the preceding
period and perhaps
resulted in the creation of
so„e bonds with the South.
This was certainly the case with the
church of Durha. where Siward
had curtailed
traditional liberties and Installed
Its first southern bishop.
Furthermore, he ^de concrete moves
to blunt the growing
threat from the Scots
by the annexation of Cumberland
which provided protection to
Yorkshire
and Durham from hostile raids
out of the West and by his
support of

Malcolm Canmore which seemed to
promise a period of good relations
with
the Scots.

This is an impressive list of
accomplishments, but it must be noted
that according to later tradition
Siward was descended from a line
of

bears.

The attribution of this ancestry
to the earl may be a direct

reference to his physical strength.

'

Indeed, this was almost certainly

the original intention, but Siward's
descent from bears can be inter-

preted in another way;

Siward ruled like a bear.

He was formidable but

lacked insight, and most of his policies
depended on force or its
threat.

He had imposed an outsider on the clerks
of Durham, and they

resented it.

He had become earl of Northumbria by wasting
the country-

side, and neither his marriage into the house
of Bamburgh nor his accom-

modation with Cospatric, the heir of this family, won
the goodwill of
the Northumbrians.

According to later tradition they revolted against

Siward while he was invading Scotland in 1054, and while
this story

should probably not be accepted as literally true, it does
rest ultimately on the memory of his unpopularity above the Tees.^^

Siward's
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rule did nothing to end
dissatisfaction in North™bria;
i„ fact, his
actions fed it.

Much the same thing can be said
with respect to Anglo-Scottish
rela
tions.

Siward's policies did not lead
to a stabilization of
the border.
The Situation deteriorated
as a result of his acts.
Even though Macbe th
may ha.e been a threat to the
North, he was a peaceful
neighbor in com-

parison to the ruler whom Siward
had raised up in his place.
Canmore's loyalty to his English

Malcolm

benefactors lasted exactly as long
as

he potentially needed their
help.

After this need had passed, he became

a greater threat to the North
than any of his predecessors had
been, and

during the next forty years he
repeatedly led armies over the border.
If Siward's support of Malcolm is
judged by its results, it turned out
to be

a grave mistake.

It brought no security to the
North, only Scot-

tish armies which pillaged and enslaved
the northern peasants.

Finally, the defeat of Macbeth had been
won at a high price.

In

the battle had died Dolfin, Thorf inn's son;
Siward, earl Siward's sis-

ter's son; and Osbeorn, the earl's eldest
son.^°

With their deaths

three potential leaders of the next generation
had been removed; and, in

particular, the losses of the younger Siward and Osbeorn
seriously

threatened the future of Siward's family.

When the old earl died in the

following year, he left no adult heir to become earl and
defend the holdings and position of his family.

This not only threatened the interests

of Siward's one surviving son, the young Waltheof, but it also
opened

the way for a disastrous experiment in the governing of the North,
an

experiment which ultimately culminated in the harrying of the North by

William the Conqueror in 1069.
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CHAPTER

III

THE STRUCTURE OF NORTHERN
SOCIETY

The obstacles involved in
forming a picture of northern
society
prior to the Norman Conquest
are great in general and
on some points
insurmountable. There are few
pre-Conquest charters, and they
are not
very informative. Domesday
Book would seem to offer an
unexampled window into the last phase of
Anglo-Saxon society in the North,
but it is
in reality a treacherous
glass.
The survey was made twenty
years after
the Battle of Hastings by
foreigners who did not understand
everything
which they were recording and whose
interest in conditions TRE (i.e.
in
1066) was strictly limited to the
question of who held what "manor"
at
that date. As a result, Domesday
only provides a one-dimensional
pic-

ture of landholding under King
Edward and hides what, if any,
arrange-

ments the Anglo-Saxon landowners had
made with respect to their lands.

Because of the terms of the inquest,
then, Domesday can contribute little to the discussion of whether
"feudalism" existed in the North prior
to the Conquest, and on other basic
questions, which one might legiti-

mately ask, it is almost as uncooperative.

The description of Yorkshire

is terse and uninformative; there are
few double entries and no impor-

tant statement of local customs of the sort
which are so informative for

other parts of England.
fails by degrees.

Worse than this, beyond Yorkshire Domesday

Southern Lancashire is described in general and

unsatisfactory terms while the sections on northern Lancashire
are little more than a geld list, and Northumbria is not described
at all.

Aside from the light cast by occasional charters, conditions above
the
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Tees are obscure until the
compilation of Boldon
lands of the bishop of Durha.

^de

Boole,

a

custu^l of the

in 1183, and the beginning
of the

inquisitions post Mortem in the
thirteenth century.
These are rather unpromising
materials, but they have been
the
object of a long tradition of
scholarship devoted to the
explanation of
northern society and the Norman
Conquest's impact on it. While
part of
this research has been a reflection
of local antiquarian interest,
it
has also attracted the attention
of scholars of the stature of F.
W„

Maitland, J.

E.

A. Jolliffe, and Sir Frank
Stenton in addition to the

more recent work of G. W.

S.

Barrow and William Rees.^

The principal

reason for this interest concerns what
may be termed the "survivals."
In general, survivals are strange
tenures such as thanage and drengage,

unusual renders like cornage, and distinctive
traditions of peasant custom, which have few clear parallels
in the rest of England after the

Conquest.

They first appear in Domesday's description
of southern Lan-

cashire and then in more detail in Boldon Book and
the various thirteenthcentury surveys.

It is usually assumed that these survivals
represent

direct fragments of pre-1066 northern society and
that, if only they can
be put together correctly, they will yield at least a
general picture of
this society.

This assumption may well be correct; certainly the method

of arguing backwards from the known to the unknown is a tool
commonly

used by Anglo-Saxon and other historians.

Still it is somewhat disqui-

eting since in any such argument it is the presuppositions which govern
both the selection of the survival and its meaning.
of course, both clear and logical

— if

These are usually,

perhaps subject to debate

— but

often in the North they include basic ethnic suppositions such as, for

77

Saxon, o. Oan.sH.

X.eas o.

.Ms „a.„. p„.,.„,3..,

„

coup..

With the endless hypotheses
of pUce-na:.e studies,
can easll, ta.e a
hlstotlan fto. the sutveys
of the twelfth and
thirteenth centuties hac.
'
-t .etel, to the state of notthe.n
society on the eve
of the Conquest

but into fat

eaniet ti.es when

the

M.les and Celts wete sttu,,lin,

fot
the province of Upper
Britain in the post-Ro„a„
period or in
one notable case, hack to
the days before the
Celts themselves ca.e to

-stet. Of

Britain.

m

the face of such

^jestic chains of reason and
supposi-

tion, one can only say
that this chapter will be
principally concerned
with the investigation of
the structure of northern
society during the
last years of the Anglo-Saxon
kingdo. and wiU venture into
the years
before the Venerable Bede only
under duress.

The inquiry must begin with
Mai.land.

In 1890 he published an

important article dealing with
the survivals and argued
that the thanes
and drengs who could be found
In Lancashire and Northumbrla
in the
twelfth century and later were
lineal descendants of pre-Conquest
mlnlstri and eaultes similar to Bishop
Osvald's ridingmen and that the
confusion of tenurial custom which
existed in the North after the
Conquest
was the result of the imposition
of knight service on the old Anglo-

Saxon tenures.^

Although these conclusions have not been
completely

accepted, they were extremely important
because they pointed in the
right direction for further research and
stijmlated the labyrinthine

mind of Jolliffe.

He.

in turn, created, for all practical
purposes

single-handedly, the current picture of Northumbrian
society.

But

before he could do this, another ingredient
was necessary besides the
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existence of survivals above
.he Tees and west of
the Pennines
this was
What .ay be called the
Yorkshire ^at.
a very real sense, the
Yorkshire .oat in its various
guises, has .ade possible
the world of Northumbrian scholarship, and Sir
Frank Stenton began its
excavation in 1910.
in that year he published
a very good essay
entitled "Types of Manorial
Structure in the Northern Danelaw."
Pro. the title one would
assu.e
that the work covered the Five
Boroughs and Yorkshire, but
such was not
exactly the case. Stenton did
use Yorkshire Do.esday for
some important
pieces of evidence for his
construct of Danelaw society, but
on the sec;

m

ond page of his essay he cut
Yorkshire loose with the assertion
"that
the harrying of Yorkshire in
1069 makes it impossible to argue
with
security from 1086 to the conditions
of the Confessor's day. . . ."^

Stenton was later to change his mind
and fill the moat with Danes, but
the essential principle with respect
to Northumbria did not change.

Whether basically unknowable or populated
by Danes, Yorkshire did not
have to be studied with the lands to
the north and west.

This meant in

practice that any reconstruction of
Northumbrian society based on the
twelfth and thirteenth-century survivals did
not have to be squared with

Yorkshire Domesday.
The importance of this freedom was immense for
Jolliffe.

In 1926

he devoted forty-two pages of his most abstruse
prose to explaining the

nature of Northumbrian institutions both before and
after 1066.

This

essay, although very hard to follow at points, covered
most of the rele-

vant evidence and was brilliant in its arguments and
conclusions.

The

general effect which it makes is monumental, and it has never been
seriously challenged.

The reason for this is probably his method of
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investigation,

.olliffe purposed to sta.t
at the botto. of society
and
work up. This .eant that
he submerged hi^elf
in the disjointed details
of the twelfth and
thirteenth-century surveys and
custu.als, where no
one was li.ely to follow,
isolated the survivals, and
co^ined the. in
a convincing picture of
Northumbrian society. To do
this, he assumed
that peasant custo. was
functional in terms of the society
within which
It existed and that one could
deduce the general structure
of a -primitive" society from its body of
custom.^ Thanks to the Yorkshire
moat,
he could do this without worrying
about the intractable folios
of Yorkshire Domesday which, if nothing
else, are an embodiment of the
opposite
principle that society is organized
from the top down.^

Beyond questions of methodology,
Jolliffe's main supposition was
that the -manor" did not exist in
Northumbria and Lancashire prior to
the Conquest and that the vill was
the basis of northern society.

By

the "manor," Jolliffe meant a village
held by a mense tenant which con-

tained an internal demesne worked by the
local peasants for the benefit
of the holder of the village.^

He investigated the subject of peasant

custom from the Mersey to the Tweed and found
that the obligations borne
by the peasants were inadequate for demesne
cultivation on a large
scale.

The northern bonder, a term which may have
meant no more than

"villager," did indeed owe agricultural labor to his
lord, but it was
light and seasonal in character, designed to supplement
the lord's

demesne farming at critical times during the agricultural
year.

The

bonder would usually be required to do one or two days' ploughing,
perhaps some harrowing, and almost invariably three or four
boon-days in
autumn.

In addition,

the peasants commonly helped cut the hay, carted

^

hay, grain, an^ .he

of structural

tions were by

^rk

^

oilstone when necessary, and did
specified amounts
around the lord's hall and
the Mil.

^ans

These obliga-

trivial, but they did not
include week-work and

left the northern peasant free
to do his own work for
most of the year.
The real burdea of the peasants,
at least on the east coast
plain, lay
in their renders of grain,
malt, and chickens and their
"payments,"
originally in kl.d, for feasts,
pannage, and comage (a cattle
render).
These renders a^d services were
forinsec (outside) in the sense that
they were rendered, not to a
demesne or to a manor house within
the vill,

but to a lord's faall with an attached
demesne which was exterior to the
vill.

That ±s to say. groups of these
bondage vills were dependent upon

a lord's hall.

They supported a central demesne with
their labor ser-

vices, intercoms^ned on the waste,
and formed a jurisdictional unit.
Such an

aggW3ration

of unmanorialized, bondage vills around
a central

demesne and hail, Jolliffe called a "shire,"
and he argued that this
type of organisation (hereafter called
the "shire system") was general

throughout all the lands of the old Northumbrian
kingdom in 1066 except
for the bulk of Yorkshire where it had been
destroyed by the Danes.

He further thought that the renders and services
by which the peasants supported rhe lord of the shire were originally
(and inferentially
as late as 1066) communal responsibilities, and
that they were more like

renders to a pre-feudal prince than payments of rent to a
landlord.

bonder's obUg;a.tions were originally "public" duties.

The

He owed them as a

member of the community, and they did not depend on the amount of land

which he held*

Jolliffe held that prior to 1066 Northumbria lacked a

well-developed theory of ownership (by which he seems to have meant

mense o^ershlp.) and that
the Inter^dlate tenures
of thanage and
drengage were Mnisterlal in

nature."

To the Nonnan., the thanes
and

drengs. who were sometimes
associated with bondage viUs,
seemed to
stand between these vllls and
the lord of the shire,
to hold the vills.
as it were; but Jolliffe was
at pains to argue that before
the arrival
of the Normans the thanes and
drengs did not hold the vills
or Intercept
any of the bonders' dues and
services. They held land within
the vill,
not the Whole vill, and were
responsible for supervising the
collection
of the renders in kind and the
performance of the forinsec labor ser-

vices."

aey

were thus essentially stewards,
necessary for superintend-

ing the widely dispersed villages
to the shire, but persons of no
great
consequence who could not be considered
proto-feudal nobles as Maitland

had done.
Such was Jolliffe's picture of
Northunibrian society.

Above the

Tees and west of the mountains the
countryside was filled in 1066 with

shires, large numbers of bondage vills dependent
upon a central caput .

These shires were inhabited by a very small
number of great nobles, a

ministerial lower nobility composed of thanes and
drengs, and a peasantry which consisted of bonders who still possessed
many of the attri-

butes of freemen.

Thanks to Jolliffe's mastery of the evidence and

his arguments, this is a convincing construct, but it
must be emphasized
that it is just that, a logical construct.

With the ambiguous exception

of the Domesday description of Lancashire which the Normans
clearly bungled, it touches no evidence from before the coming of the Normans.

This does not mean, of course, that it is incorrect (and Jolliffe's

treatment of northern peasant custom seems unassailable), but it does
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-an

that

Ms theo^

needs two things to he
convincing which a simple

direct argument fro. a hody
of evidence does not
need:
.olliffe required
theories which would explain
the origin of these
institutions and their
decline. The first he provided
in the closing pages of
his essay where
he noted a nu^er of parallels
between Northu^rian and Welsh
custo. and
suggested that the unique nature
of Northu:^rian society
had its origin
in an extensive Angling of
Celt and Angle during the
early Middle Ages„
Indeed, he thought that in
the West this was probably
the result of the
direct annexation of Celtic
principalities by the conquering
Angles.
This theory of Celtic influence
on the fonnation of Northumbria
would
adequately explain why the North of
England was not like the South where
all the Celts had supposedly fled
or been killed, but his picture
of

northern society still needed a theory
of decline which would put it
in
direct contact with the evidence from
after the Conquest upon which all
his arguments backwards were ultimately
based.

This was necessary

because few examples of functioning
shires are found in the surveys and
inquisitions.

They are, however, filled with groups
of villages which

rather look like sections or fragments of
vanished shires, and to con-

nect these shire-segments with the hypothetical
functioning shires of
1066, Jolliffe developed a theory of "truncation."

mans truncated the shires.
two stand out.

Baldly put, the Nor-

Although they did this in a number of ways,

The Normans had a well-developed sense of mense
owner-

ship; and, therefore, grants of the old dependent vills
by the tenants-

in-chief to their vassals disrupted the traditional system of
forinsec

works and dues within the shires. ''"^

Later, the growth of demesne farm-

ing during the twelfth century prompted lords to concentrate their
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energy on parts of the old
shires and to liquidate
their i^ediate hold
on the .ore^re.ote villages
whose services and renders
were no longer

profitable.l^

These two .echanls^ were
largely responsible for the
fragmentation of the shires and
connect lolliffe^s .odel of
Northu^nbrian

society before 1066 with the
evidence of the later Middle
Ages.
Given the nature of the evidence,

Jolliffe's delineation of North-

und,rian society is brilliant.

His argument fro. the High
Medieval sur-

vivals back to the Anglo-Saxon
period are convincing, and his
theory of
truncation is certainly plausible.
Eis conclusions have not,
however,

become common in the textbooks,

and this is rather curious.

One would

think, on the face of the matter,
that the more interesting parts
of his

work would be his general picture of
Northumbrian society and his ideas
on the impact of the Normans on this
system since both are unusual in

comparison with southern England, but this
has not been the case.

There

has been only one serious attempt to test
Jolliffe's ideas in the light

of the history of an individual shire
(Blackburnshire) ,
rest, the attention of scholars has been
turned elsewhere.

and for the
In particu-

lar, they have been interested in pursuing
Jolliffe's theory on the ori-

gin of Northumbrian institutions.

He thought that

the Celts of northern

Britain had played a significant part in the formation
of Northumbrian
society because of a number of parallels which he saw
between Northum-

brian and Welsh customs in the High Middle Ages and which he
believed
could not have been the result of
societies.

the

independent development of the two

He suggested a number of specific examples of such parallels,

but he did not argue his point in detail, probably because he thought
the similarity obvious. 19

That it certainly should have been obvious—

at least ..o. a

worUe.

o«

txal to .he

c.„ai„ po.„

the po.„e.

^^^^

,oXW. ^e.e

^^^^^^

appea. scewHa. .a„sen-

s.yec.

of oortheo. society,
but the ,uest for Celtic
u„lversals has becoim so
involved u-i
^-u
xnvolved
wxth the question of
Northumbrian institutions that these comparisons
must be discussed.

They are, in fact,
i^ressive.

The bondmen of the Welsh
commotes

owed their prince renders
and services which were
strikingly similar to
those owed by the northern
bonders to the lord of the
shire.
They gave
renders of food for feasts
(the ^westfa) twice a year
as did the northern bonders on the east
coast plain. They had to
support the local ser
jeants of the peace (the cais)
by giving them lodging and
food (the
czlch cais).
This same duty lay on many of
the bonders of the northern
counties where a very similar
system of serJeants of the peace
existed.
The Welsh bondmen and a nui^er
of the peasants in Durham owed
virtually
identical structural works for the
building of the lord's hall, chamber,
and auxiliary buildings, and
in both places they often had
to feed the
lord's horse and dogs.

em

Finally, at least in certain lordships
in east-

Wales, the inhabitants were burdened
with commorth, a cattle render

paid every second or third year, and
this custom is said to have been a

nearly exact parallel to the cornage
and other allied cattle payments

which were made in the twelfth and
thirteenth centuries by many of the
bondage vills, Norman mense lordships, and
even baronies in the lands
north of the Tees and the Ribble.^^

These points of comparison do

indeed establish fee marked similarity
between Northumbrian and Welsh

custom which JolMffe originally pointed
out.

In fact, aside from the

northern bonder's obligation
to help maintain the
Mil of the shire, the
only significant segment of
his burdens which has found
no place in the
comparison with Welsh custo. is
his seasonal agricultural
works, but it
now see^ possible that even
these should be included.
Jolliffe thought
that the Welsh ^aerdref that
is, the prince's demesne
,
land within the
commote which was cultivated by
the bondsmen of the dependent
hamlets,

only developed in the course of
the thirteenth century.
J. Jones, however, has argued

Glanville R.

with great determination and some
force

that the development of both
agricultural bond hamlets and of the

prince's maerdref took place much
earlier in Wales than has been commonly thought; and, if he is correct,
the shire and the commote become
nearly identical institutions through
which a dispersed peasantry sup-

ported a prince by renders in kind and
seasonal works.
Such a conclusion would not be a matter
of mere antiquarian interest.

If the shire and the commote are
essentially the same institution

as the parallels between the two seem
to indicate, one would think that

the shire must have been originally a Celtic
institution.

And, whether

or not one accepts Jones's further argument
that this institution, the

discrete estate, actually goes back to pre-Roman
times,

one can at

least no longer continue picturing the Anglo-Saxons
as exterminating

every last Celt who did not flee to the hills and
mountains of western
Britain.

This, of course, is the intellectual prize to be won by
the

rather tedious comparisons of peasant customs.

If the

method is valid,

it offers the possibility of modifying the idea that
in its origin

England was purely Germanic and uncorrupted by any Celtic "element."
The potential importance of this conclusion, in turn, explains why

historians have concentrated on the
first part of Jolliffe's theory
with
out really questioning his basic
picture of Northumbrian society.
The
latter is altogether too convenient,
not to mention too complex,
to be
tinkered with in this day when the
professional Celts, or in the case o
Jones, the pre-Celts, are demanding
their due in the making of England.

Recently, moreover, the scope of this
discussion has been enlarged

by the inclusion of Scotland, and here
the object is the same:

To clar

ify the nature of ancient Celtic
institutional arrangements by the iso-

lation and comparison of survivals.

Hitherto, this land has been

largely protected from such comparisons,
even when they seem quite obvious, by the assumption that Northumbria
was entirely Germanic in its
24
structure.
This idea is, however, unwarranted, and G.
W. So Barrow

has recently been able to point out a number
of specific parallels

between Scottish and Northumbrian institutions as a
result of the vantage point which he has acquired from his work editing
the charters of

Malcolm IV and William the Lion.

With respect to eastern Lothian and

the Merse, of course, this is not basically surprising.

Both had been

part of the Northumbrian kingdom, and Jolliffe himself thought
that
their institutional make-up was the same as that to the south.

Thanes

and drengs formed the nobility in this area, and the tenure of the
drengs, at least, was ministerial.

The thanes of Lothian held shires,

and the few examples of early peasant custom which survive from this
region show a system of works and renders nearly identical with that

found in Northumbria.

25

In addition to re-emphasizing these points,

Barrow's contribution has been the observation that the similarities did
not stop on the borders of ancient Northumbria.

In West Lothian,
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eastern Stirling, and throughout
eastern Scotland generally up to
Ross,
the native nobility below the earls
consisted of thanes in the twelfth
and later centuries.

These thanes held areas called
"shires" from the

king by a tenure which seems to have
closely resembled the feudal tenure
of fee-farm, and their shires were
often identical with the parish.

These points are revealing because in
Northumbria the thanes were also

classed by the Normans with the tenants in
fee-farm, and the shires had

apparently once been identical with the parish.

Barrow further noted

that a substantial number of the naaies of
the shires above the Forth

were of an early type; and, although the evidence
on the thanes is admittedly not very detailed, he was unable to find
significant differences

between them and the Northumbrian thanes discussed
by Jolliffe.^^

There

was, then, an apparent structural similarity, at least
on the upper levels, between eastern Scotland and Northumbria, and the
possibility that

this was due to common origins is supported by certain revenues
of the

Scottish king.

He had traditionally the right to collect two nearly

universal tributes which were the mainstay of his government and which

seem to have their parallels both in the North of England and in Wales.
Throughout Scotland north of the Forth and the lands of the defunct

kingdom of Strathclyde, the king received cain either every year or once
every several years.

The cain was a food render which in the West con-

sisted of cows, pigs, and cheese; and Barrow argued that it was the
Scottish equivalent of cornage, the cattle render which many of the

Northumbrian bondage vills owed.
tish king was coneveth.

The second great tribute of the Scot-

It was found in eastern Scotland, including

Lothian, and consisted of feasts owed to the king by the populace.

Not
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surprisingly, Barro„ saw 1„
i. .

p^.^,,

^^^^

^

^^^^

of the bondage vxlls and
drengages In Northu.i>rla and
Lothian owed under
the name of waiting,

Barrow concluded his discussion
of these points

by suggesting that
the king of Scotland's cain
and coneveth, the king of
England's cornage
and waiting, and the Welsh
prince's
and gwestfa-not to mention
the king of Man's pecunia
(cattle) and acconeuez (coneveth?
)-repre-

c™h

sented a co^non system of renders
and by asking what the relationship
was between these hospitality
dues which appear to have been
so widespread in highland Britain.
He did not formally answer this
questionjust as he did not answer similar
questions, which he posed, about the

relationships between the Scottish thanes
and the Northumbrian thanes,

between cain and cornage, or between the
system of Serjeants of the
peace in Scottish Strathclyde and its
counterpart in the North of

England~but the general terms of his discussion
would seem
answer inevitable:

to make one

A theory of radical Celtic origins for the
institu-

tional structure of the highland zone.^^

What began as a fairly harmless discussion of
the survivals of preConquest Northumbrian society has in the end produced
some rather sweeping conclusions.

One is being asked to see in the survivals the fag
end

of an old royal support system which remained in
operation in Wales and

Scotland as late as the twelfth and thirteenth centuries
and which sur-

vived in Northumbria in a recognizable form as late as the Norman
Conquest.

Up to this date, the structure of society in northern Britain

was basically uniform on its upper levels.

The countryside of both

eastern Scotland and Northumbria was divided into shires held by thanes

^

above the Tweed and by
..
i-ords of the
hho shire"
y "lords
south of this river.
These
men rendered the great
eat
hosnit;,!-.dospitalxty dues to the king
g
and directly supported the local police
just as cne
the aen of th.
i
u
the u
Welsh
commotes did these
things for their prince.
Surh xs
-fc the
i-u^
^
P mce.
Such
picture
yielded by Northumbrian
scholarship and its offshoot,
the
cue searcti
search tor
for r«i^Celtic universals.
It is
all very symmetrical and
rather majestic.
The question, of course,
is whether one can accept
it, and it is to
be feared that one cannot.
There are two reasons for this.
In the
first place, the comparisons
of custom upon which this
edifice is raised
are over-generalized and ignore
certain major difficulties.
T^. cain of
eastern Scotland, for instance,
was a general food render,
principally
of grain, not a cow render like
comage.^^ This blocks its identifica-

tion with cornage, even if the
latter was a commutation of old food

renders as Rees thought, because
there was actually a well-developed

system of grain renders in Durham and
Northumberland which ran parallel
with cornage. 3^ Should one conclude
that there had been two systems of
food tribute in Northumbria or that
Rees was wrong about cornage?

The

latter alternative seems more likely
since it is simpler to equate the

Northumbrian grain renders with cain, but this
does not solve all the
problems.

Cornage would need a new explanation.

The question of why

there is no sign of royal cain, cornage, or
even peasant grain renders

in Lothian and the Merse would

stiU

remain.

Theoretically this area

should provide institutional links between Northumbria
and Scotland, yet
it does not.

Waiting is also a problem because it is not altogether

clear that it was really as common in Northumbria as
these discussions
imply.
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Finally, commorth was not a general obligation which ran

^

parallel with gw^stfa in
Wales but was restr^r^.^
^^stricted .to certain
lordships

sarily .ean .Ha. .he
a..e.p.s .o compare Scc.ish.
No..Hu*.ian. and
Welsh cus.o^ a.e ul.i^.el,
„.o„g. hu. .he. do weaken
.he co^ari=o„s
by des.roying .he s3™e.^
upon which .hey ^nly
depend for .heir
force.
The second reason why
this picture cannot be
accepted is that these
comparisons are either directly
or indirectly based upon
Jolliffe. His

reconstruction of Northu^rian
society has gone unquestioned
on account
of its convenience and
co^lexity, but there is reason
to believe that
it is defective because of
his basic approach, that is,
his endeavor to
reconstruct Northumbrian society
fro. the bottom up. As a
result of
this, he almost completely
ignored the place in society of
the men who
held the shires, his "lords of
the shire," and consequently
produced an

artifically primitive (pre-feudal)
impression of Northumbrian society.
Furthermore, it is essentially a
frozen system which he described.
There are no mechanisms for change
in this society, and it survives

unaltered down to its truncation by
the Normans.
ious flaws.

Both of these are ser-

On a theoretical level they limit
the validity of his con-

clusions, and they may be responsible
for the difficulties encountered
in the comparison of custom.

In particular, a theory of institutional

divergence might clarify the situation,
but this is just what Jolliffe's
denial of change precludes.
It is one thing, however,

to say that Jolliffe is probably wrong;

it is quite another to show where.

It seems unlikely that these diffi-

culties can be cleared up and a theory of
institutional divergence
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supplied sl^ly by reworking
the ^tertal

„Mch

he covered.

Many of his
conclusion, see. indisputable,
and the real problee is
that his evidence
is, in effect, one-dimensions
1
tk-:„ iaimensional.
This
limtation is Inescapable unless
so»e earlier infonaation ean
be brought to bear on these
subjects, and
it is here that the Yorkshire
.oat beco.es a ^tter of the
first importance.
If the society which
existed in Yorkshire in 1066
was not radically different fro. the one
above the Tees, Domesday's
description of
Yorkshire can be used to supplement
and check Jolliffe's
reconstruction
of Northumbrian society before
the Conquest.
If. on the other hand,
the
Danes seriously altered society
«-xecy soutn
south o±
of rh^
the To^o
Tees, this comparison would
be impossible in a laeaningful
sense.
•

•

In other words, it must be
determined if the Yorkshire moat will

hold water, and at the beginning
it may be noted that the concept
itself
is rather suspicious.
This chasm is altogether too convenient
for both

Northumbrian historians and students of
the Danelaw.

It allows the for-

mer to argue backwards from High
Medieval evidence without any worry
that their constructs will be threatened
by Yorkshire Domesday, and it

permits the latter to ascribe institutions
to the Danes without bothering to consider parallel institutions
above the Tees.

In the face of

such wondrous utility, one might well ask for
evidence, and it is at
this point that the question becomes very
curious.

The disquieting

truth is that Domesday has been used as the
principal "direct" proof

throughout the Danelaw that the Danes had altered the
structure of society.

The reason for this is twofold.

On the one hand, there is practi-

cally no evidence which discloses what effect the Danes
had had on

native English society prior to 1066; but, on the other hand, eastern

Knsla„d appears .o be
.a.her different fro.
the western Midlands
and
Wessex When these reslons
are described In
.o.esda,.
x„ perticuXar. the
East is Characterised by
the so.e and by soUe.en.
LogicaUy,

of course
the restriction of this
institution and social group
to eastern England
proves absolutely nothing
since this region „ight
have been distinctive

prior to the arrival of the
Danes, and since Northu*ria,
which ^ght
have had a si^lar structure,
is not described in
Do„esday.
This

last

point is of particular importance
because it is doubtful if the
Tees had
ever formed a boundary between
Durham and Yorkshire, but the
distribution of the soke as it appears
in Domesday has nonetheless
created the
presumption that the Danes were
in fact responsible for the
differences
between the Danelaw and the rest
of England. Furthermore, this

presu^-

tion has been strengthened as
the

i^act of

the Danes on the place-names,

personal nomenclature, and customary
law of eastern England has been
worked out. Within these realms
their influence, whether direct or
indirect, was certainly great, and
this makes it easier to believe
that
they influenced the basic framework
of society as well.^'
In terms of the structure of society,
the question of the Danish

impact on eastern England can be limited
to the territorial soke.

Was

It a Scandinavian creation or a native
institution which had survived
the ninth century?

Generally speaking, sokes were estates which
con-

sisted of a main village with dependent
pieces of property called bere-

wicks and sokelands.

The larger territorial sokes covered wide
stretches

of countryside, and the berewicks and
sokelands might be either complete

villages or only parts of a village.

The resemblance between this type

of estate and the Northumbrian shire is obvious,
but the identification

its .odern

f„™

.his hypothesis Is

^1„1,

,he „or. of

SU

Frank S.enton.

on the one hand, his
definition of the soke as a„
Institution would preclude such an Identification.
He admitted that in

so^

sokes the soke-

n^n o«ed their lord light
agricultural services such as
„„„l„g or helpins with the harvest which were
survivals of pre-«norlal
conditions and
"^^
were not "derogatory
.

^^t/::^l^i::^t^TJ::^

T--- ^^^^^^

^

eleventh 'c;ntury rest upon a
°'
great'^bodv'nf
^-^'s dependents, free and
unfree to 33^^^:" ""f^^^-^g ^
"^^^^ his fold, his church, to the
*
excision of
exclusion
o^ ^n
all competing
institutions.

The emphasis here is on the idea
that the sokes were held together
by
suit, rents, and nonderogatory
service; in 1927 he would call it
"honor-

able" serv^ice.^S

Sokes were basically jurisdictional
units which could

not be confused with shireSo

The main purpose of this definition,
how-

ever, was not to differentiate
sokes and shires, although it inciden-

tally did thiso

Rather, the nature of the sokes after
1066 had to be in

accordance with their origins which Stenton
saw
the Danish settlement.

as the direct result of

He envisaged the Danish invasions as
having been

a folk migration of free and equal
peasant warriors "at least comparable

ia scale to the later movement from which the
duchy of Normandy arose. "^^
In fact, he thought that they had come in
massive numbers and that the

territorial sokes had resulted "from the settlement of
the rank and file
of the Danish armies around the men who had led them
in the invasion.

The sokeiands were the estates which these free warriors
had occupied;
and, for obvious reasons, it would not do to have their
supposed

.
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descendants, the soke^n,
,„.de„ed

„Uh semces

inappropriate to their
Ihus the Dane. ca.e to occupy
the Yorkshire .oat and
the lands to
the south.
There was. as Stenton
rank.

admitted, no direct proof
for this

hypothesls.^1 but his prestige was
such that it has been
accepted, nevertheless.
It meant, of course,
that Domesday could be
taken at face

value as describing a society
basically altered by a large
Influx of
Danes
It would be unjust and inaccurate,
however, to lay the burden for
the creation of this intellectual
chasm across the face of England

solely on Stenton because initially
Jolliffe concurred completely.

In

his work on Northumbria, he
investigated the question of whether
shire

survivals existed in Yorkshire, and
he found several examples of them
in
the West Riding and the western part
of the North Riding.
These will be

discussed in detail later, but for the
moment

which is important.

it is

their distribution

The existence of shire survivals in western
York-

shire and their absence from the Vale of
York and the East Riding led

Jolliffe to conclude that:
The line at which . . . [Northumbrian] custom
stops is not an early
Anglo-Celtic frontier, but a Danish one, that of the
kingdom of
Anlaf which destro-ed Deira, and the break is too
abrupt to leave
its meaning doubtful. ^2
In other words, the Danes destroyed the shire
system throughout most of

Yorkshire.

Somewhat later, however, Jolliffe modified this position.

In

an interpretive essay published in 1934 he argued that
the territorial
sokes were not of Danish origin, that both sokes and Northumbrian
shires

were analogous institutions arising from the pre-feudal stage of AngloSaxon society, and that the bonds of suit, rent, and service which held

the sokes together were
ancient royal dues."

It .ust be noted that

this „as „ot exactly the same
thing as saying that the
soke and the
shire were the same Institution;
rather, they were both relics
of the
"era of the folk" and had
originally served the sa.e end/*
The impli-

cation was that Domesday still
did not describe Northumbrian
Instltutions.

That this position came very
close to enjoying the best of
both
worlds did not become a serious
problem for Jolliffe's explanation

of

the soke has been largely ignored.

This is unfortunate because he
was

more right than wrong, but it is
understandable.
shire were either general or ill-conceived,
and

His arguments on Yorkit took more than them

to drive the cohorts of Danish sokemen
out of Yorkshire.

Recently,

however, a good deal of work has been
done which supports the general

idea that the territorial soke was an
Anglo-Saxon (or Anglo-Celtic)
institution.

P.

H.

Sawyer has shown that the Danish armies
numbered

between two and three hundred men rather than in
the thousands, and he
has suggested ways in which a dominant aristocracy
of relatively small

size could affect place-names and law in the way
that the Danes did.^^
This discovery is of fundamental importance because
it destroys the idea

that the Danish invasions represented a folk migration
and deprives the

sokemen of most of their hypothetical Danish forefathers.
the point, however, has been the work of R.

H.

C.

Even more to

Davis who has investi-

gated the socage customs of East Anglia which the Danes are usually

regarded as having introduced.

He would translate "soke," not as "juris-

diction," but as "customs which the aforesaid land owes the king."^''
These customs consisted of hidage, wardpenny, and foddercorn in addition

to

^„i„g .ervices.

relief, and

gers™/«

and DavU was able eo
show
that soueland, the land
burdened with these services,
was pre-Danlsh In
its origin.

—n

t"icts'c:ve"li8
cente?

^^l^^^^ -

lllrirlltltT '""t'T'

^^l^^^^'

"^^

"^^"^^

He thought that this system
had once been .uch like the
Northumbrian
Shires, the lathes of Kent, or
the Welsh co-otes but that
its outlines
had been obscured by the commutation
of the renders and by royal
grants
to the nobles and the Church
of the dues and services
which the sokelands produced.
Davis did his work before Sawyer
,and it is therefore understandable

why he did not feel that his conclusion
that the sokeland was AngloSaxon could be extended to the northern
Danelaw.^^

He still faced the

-

concept of the Danish invasion as a
folk migration and the very real

presence of the invasion's latter-day
outriders, the philologists; while
they, in turn, were now burdened with
the necessity of explaining why

sokeland was Danish in one area and Anglo-Saxon
in another.

This has

never been done, and the only important
extension of the discussion
beyond certain attacks on Sawyer's theories on
the formation of placenames

has been the work of G. R. J. Joneso

His interest in the matter

has been unique in that he has been trying to
establish the Celtic ori-

gins of the "discrete estate."

The soke is a regional example of the

discrete estate, as is the shire, and Jones has argued that the
sokes in
Yorkshire were formed when the Celts subjugated the pre-Celtic popula-

tion of the area. 53

If one could be sure that this idea is correct,

it

woul. i»e«aeeX, .educe

theo., of a

nonse^e and .ake thei.
identification

Oa„U, o.i,i„

,He so.es to

as a„ Anglo-Saxon
institution a

secondary ^tter, the result
of Angl.Saxons
replacing Celts as the
lords of these estates.
Unfortunately,

Jones has very little
evidence

to

«>rk With, and his arguments
are

of necessity extremely
tenuous.^^

They cannot be taken as
established, although they

^y be correct. One
result, however, of his
deter^natlon to prove the Celtic
origiri Of the discrete
estate has been his discussion
of the Danish placena-es of Yorkshire. He has
argued persuasively that „ost
of the„ were
the result of the renaming
of Anglo-Saxon villages by
the Danes rather
l^^iate

tha. new creations, and he has
hypothesized that the important
Danish
leaders took over the soke centers
and granted out the dependent
vil-

lages to their followers from whom
most of the b^-names with a
personal
name for a first element were derived."
r,-,is last point is
particularly important because it provides
a reasonable explanation for
the

aristocratic implications of the numerous
b^-names of eastern England

«hlch have never been adequately accounted
for on the basis of
migration of free and equal warriors.'^

a mass

Furthermore, it would account

for the fact that the

r

In villages of the Danelaw sokes have
an embar-

rassing tendency to have English names.''
Taken together, the work of

Sawj-er. Davis, and Jones

strongly sug-

gests that the Danes did not significantly alter
the institutional

structure of the Danelaw and that the soke was an
Anglo-Saxon institution.

This is in accord with the latest research on the Danes
in Nor-

maady which has produced similar conclusions.

and it provides new sup-

port for Jolliffe's idea that the soke and the shire were
analogous

institutions.

Unfortunately, this does not
settle the issue.

established that the

solce is

With it

probably a native institution,
it beco.es

important to determine whether
Jolliffe's concept of analogy
is correct,
or whether this idea is only
a s.oke screen, a new
version of the York-^
shire aoat which will save the
pri^nitive si:.plicity of
Northu.bria while

dr^ging the Danelaw into

the realm of the Anglo-Saxon
"folk."

Cer-

tainly the history of the Northmnbrian
kingdom provides no basis for
assuming that Yorkshire was different

in its institutional make-up
from

the lands above the Tees once the
influence of the Danes

is discounted,

and two things are immediately
apparent which indicate that the
distinction might be groundless. First, there
are examples of sokes in York-

shxre being called "shires."

Both Howden and (North) Allerton were

called shires, and so were Hallam and
Sowerby, a division of the Wakefield soke. 59

-

Second, this suspicious verbal identification
of sokes

ami shires is matched by an even more curious
phenomenon on
peasant custom.

the level of

While Yorkshire is not blessed with numerous
documents

disclosing the nature of local peasant custom,
occasional examples do
appear in the late twelfth and thirteenth centuries,
and these are quite
significant.

The earlVst instances are in the Templars' Inquest
of

1185, a document roughly contemporaneous with Boldon Book, and one
set

of these customs, those of Temple Newsham in

very important point.

the West Riding, reveals a

Here the peasants, who held either one or two

bovates each, paid yearly 30d. per bovate rent
arod

(?),

2

hens and 20 eggs,

during the course of the year they ploughed and harrowed for four

days, mowed and made hay one day, and did four boon-days in autumn.

addition to this, they were responsible for repairing the raillpond.

In
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bringing new Mllstones to the
village, and washing and shearing
the
sheep for two days.^« These custom
are interesting in several
respects,
and the first thing to be noted
is that they were not unique.
The
Tenrplars'

Inquest reveals that sinalar
customs were followed at Skelton

and Colton, both in the West Riding,
and at Alwarthorpe in the East
Riding. 1

Moreover, the thirteenth-century
inquisitions post Mortem show

in more detail that services of the
same type were rendered at Harewood
in the West Riding, at Klrkby Moorside
in the North Riding, and at

Burton Agnes in the East Riding.^^

^^^^^ ^^^^^^^

^^^^ customary

tradition could be cited, but the point of
these examples is not to fill

thirteenth-century Yorkshire with villages where
the peasants followed
these customs.

Such a picture would be very inaccurate
because the har-

rying of 1069 had destroyed many of the old
villages.

re-developed during the twelfth century on easy
terms.

These lands were
This process

and commutation produced a preponderance of rent
tenures by the thirteenth century, but the wide dispersal and uniformity of
the system of

services exemplified by those at Temple Newsham probably
mean that these

had been the normal customary system before 1069.

Jolliffe unaccount-

ably did not investigate this point although it is a matter of primary
importance.

His picture of Northumbrian society was based on peasant

custom and the renders which it yielded, yet the peasants of Yorkshire

apparently had been under a very similar system.

Except for the grain

renders and cornage of the Northumbrian bonder, his services are matched

point by point by those of the Yorkshire villein.

Both were limited to

specific tasks at critical times during the year, and neither were subject to week-work.

These points are not conclusive,
but the occasional verbal
Identification of sokes and shires and
the probabl. existence of
a co^on system of customary labor on either
side of the Tees before 1069
certainly
make Jolllffe's Idea that sokes
and shires were only analogous
open to
doubt.

In tenns of evidence, as
opposed to utility, he held this
posi-

tion as a result of his original
work on Northu*rla which had led
him
to negative conclusions:

^^^^^

^y^^^'" ^^^"^

^^^^ vanished altogether from
"° ''^'^ ^"^^^^^^ ^^^^ Howdfnshire or
Inertonshlrp"
Allertonshire
were shires in more than name, and
on the east the
most southern drengage was at Marske,
near Middlesbrough.
In the
west however drengage tenures survive
in the honour of Richmond,
and a number of vxlls are burdened
with forinsec works.
The same
is true in a less [sic] degree of
the soke of Knaresborough. the
manor of Thorpe Arch, and the district
of Leeds, while coLlge is
still paid in the fee of Bowes Castle. 6^
rh.

This distribution of shire survivals was
the basis for Jolliffe's ini-

tial conclusion that the Danes had destroyed
the shire system in Yorkshire, and when he later perceived the similarity
between the soke and
the shire, it stood in the way of the obvious
solution of the problem:

The complete identification of the two institutions.

His examples of

surviving shire customs, principally forinsec labor dues,
were few and
restricted to western Yorkshire, and because of this—if for
no other

reason— sokes and shires could not be
this distribution is false.

the same.

In actuality, however,

For whatever reason, Jolliffe minimized the

examples of Northumbrian custom which he found and failed to discover a

considerable body of additional evidence.
In the first place, Northumbrian custom was more common in the west-

ern part of the shire than Jolliffe's brief discussion would indicate.
As late as the thirteenth century, a number of dependent estates were

linked to their ^no.tal
cen.e.. by fortnsec
agricultural wor.s which
were si^lar to those rendered
by Northu^rian bondage
vills to the
shire centers, and fre,ue„tly
these works still rested
on the vill as a
Whole, rather than on the
individual tenants. The „en
of Bumeston, for

exa^le, owed forinsec ploughing
and reaping

at Carthorpe, and the

inhabitants of Lofthouse rendered
siMlar works at the .anor of Harewood:

reapers in autumn for one day
It

L

ty-three
^ord'^ food

Harewood also received these
services from the dependent
estates of Newhall and Stubb House, but in these
cases the old bondage dues had
been
attached to the mense tenures by
1263. the date of the survey.^^

Jolliffe did not note either of these
instances, nor did he find that
the men of Denton owed ploughing
and reaping services at Otley as
late

as 1315 or that five vills owed
similar services at Ripon.^^

These were

important omissions, but the soke of
Knaresborough is, perhaps, the best
example of his failure to follow his own
leads.

burdened with forinsec works in this estate.

He knew of three vills

Actually, however, eigh-

teen vills seem to have owed boon-works at
Knaresborough, and the old

obligation of feeding the lord's dogs, which was
characteristic of many

Durham villages, was still in force.

Finally, the sokemen of Shef-

field did hunting and forest services which may have
been similar (it is

impossible to be certain) to those found in western Durham.

When combined with Jolliffe' s examples, these instances
of forinsec
works establish that shire customs were far from uncommon
in western
Yorkshire, but the really important point is that his distinction

ire are

—pies

of surviving shire custo:ns
i. the south and the
east.
It is
t.- that they see. to he less
numerous than in the west,
yet they have
a -.ignificance heyond their
numbers for there is reason
to believe that
tl- harrying was .ore severe
in the Vale of York, the
eastern part of
tl^e North Riding, and
the East Riding than on
the flanks of the Pennines
wt^nce so .any of the western
survivals co.e.^° The examples
the..elves
ar. of several sorts. On the
one hand, there were household
rents and

f«rinsec agricultural services
which

znust

have had their origin in a

vanished shire at Kirkby Moorside
in the East Riding.

On the other

h^nd, a number of Norman mense
tenures bore incidents which had
once

l^in on bondage vills or tenures in
drengage.

^ire,

In the far south of the

the manor of Stainton was held
of the castle of Tickhill by

kmight service, yet all the men of

"

the manor, free and unfree, had
to

plough for ten days on the demesne of
the castle.

^.^

^^^^

c^se in Yorkshire of a type of tenure
more common further north which

w^s the result of knight service being
imposed
hmt analogous tenures on
t^e county.

a lower level existed in the eastern
part of

In 1255 Osbert de Bolbec held his manor
at Levisham in the

V^le of Pickering by rent, suit

c^tle. 73
was

on an old bondage vill,

to court, and by harrowing at Pickering

Jolliffe failed to notice either of these tenures,
and this

a serious omission because the twelfth-century
charters show that

s«ich tenures as that at Levisham were more
comnon than the later inqui-

sitions indicate.

The earliest example comes

f rom

ca. 1120-1128 when

Aschetin de Hawsker received Normanby and Hawsker from the abbot of
WFaitby to hold by paying 24s. rent and by doing one
boon-ploughing and
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one autu^ .„o„..., each
,ear. a„a

si^u.

the century at Gulsborough.
at Welbur,

tendale in the East Kldlng.
Rldlna

m

.e„„.es are recorded

U.er

In

the Vale of Vor.. and
at Six-

Finally, .u
there is the question
of drengs

Their tenure was an Integral
part of shire organization,
and dolUffe
argued that the survival of
drengage

had existed there."

m

m

a„ area Indicated that
a shire

this reasoning he „as
correct, hut he also

^In-

tai.ed that the southern „ost
drengage In Yorkshire was
at Marske on the
northeast coast. This Is not
true.

Deep in the East Riding
three

drengs survived into the
thirteenth century at Burton
Agnes, and several
others could be found during
this period at Driffield and
apparently in

Howdenshire.
In the face of these examples
of forinsec services and
drengs,

Jolliffe's distribution crund,les.

Shire custon. were more numerous
than

he thought and were not restricted
just to the west of the shire.

When"

coz^ined with the fact that the
general system of customary labor
prior
to 1069 closely resembled the
one followed in Northumbria, this
discovery

strongly indicates that such customs
represented the predominant system
before the Norman Conquest, and this
hypothesis greatly increases the

pr^ability that

the obvious equation of sokes and
shires is correct.

In

actuality, one does not need to speak in
terms of probability because a
nuii&er of the examples discussed above
show that the dependent members

of the territorial sokes, the berewicks and
sokelands, were linked to the

soke-center by the same type of seasonal agricultural
services as those

which tied the bondage vills

to the shire-center.

Of course, by the time

of Domesday the tenurial arrangements in the county had
been disrupted by
the harrying, the allocation of lands to the Normans, and
by an arbitrary

reclassification of sokelands as
berewiCs, and .hese factors
create a
degree of ambiguity.^^ But
the relationships involved
are still clear.
Denton had been a berewick of
Otley in 1086; in 1315 the
inhabitants of
the vill still performed
one day's ploughing and one
day's reaping at
^«
Otley.
Ledeston had been a berewick
of Kippax in 1086; in the
early
thirteenth century it owed forinsec
ploughing at Kippax.
the other hand, had been
sokeland of Pickering in the
it did harrowing at Pickering
in 1255.«0

Levisham, on

eleventh century;

Hawsker had also been sokeland

in 1086, and it rendered a day's
ploughing and reaping at its old soke-

center of Whitby in the 1120's.«l

Three of the five vills which
owed

ploughing and reaping services to Ripon
were classified as either berewicks or sokelands in Domesday,
and the same forinsec dependence
existed in the manor of Knaresborough.

The post-Conquest manor was a combi-

nation of the old sokes of Aldborough and
Knaresborough.

"

Seven of the

nineteen vills which did boon-works had
been either berewicks or sokelands in 1086, and the remainder are either
not in Domesday or are

deceptively listed with a miscellaneous group
of king's thegns.^^
The soke and the Northumbrian shire were the
same institution.

This idea may sound somewhat radical, but it is
in complete accord with

Davis's work on East Anglia and provides a foundation
for Jones's idea
that the Danes mainly took over existing villages.

Furthermore, it is

not even really in basic conflict with the work of Stenton
except on the

question of the origin of the sokes.

The bulk of his work can endure the

idea of an English origin of this institution, and his assertion that
the

greater sokes were held together by money rents in addition

to

the sev-

eral types of suit can be explained as the result of the commutation of

.
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Old dues.

X.e .os. se.ious
o.,ecUon

.

...3 in.e^.e.tion wo.X.
eo.e,
in fact, f.o. Northumbrian
scholars who would probably
raise at least

three basic questions,
and these .ust be discussed
for the answers to
these questions will
co^lete the destruction of the
Yorkshire .oat and
as a result seriously
change Jolliffe's picture
of Northumbrian society.
The questions revolve around
the fact that, although
the general
nature of peasant custom and
the forinsec dependence of
sokeland are
indeed ren^niscent of
Northumbrian custom, certain other
equally characteristic ^rks of the shire
system do not appear in Yorkshire.
It might
be pointed out, for instance,
that Domesday only records
four drengs in

Yorkshire and that such individuals
should be much more common if
the
shire system existed south of
the Tees,^^ but this objection
would be

wroHg on two counts.

In the first place, the Domesday
commissioners

were only interested in putting on
record who "owned" any particular
manor in 1066, not who may have been

in possession, so that drengs, who

did not have a freehold according
to Jolliffe, would not have been

recorded under 1066.

Second, Domesday does record men in
possession in

1086 and should note any drengs, but its
description of southern Lanca-

shire uses the terms

"J.

ane" and "dreng" interchangeably which
means

that it is entirely possible that the small
thanes listed in Yorkshire
In 1086 were of the same ministerial class
as those in Lancashire

This possibility is supported by three things.

First,

the four drengs

mentioned in Yorkshire are recorded in the very first
folio before any

mention of thanes, and this suggests that the clerks
decided

to abandon

the uncouth title of "dreng" at this point in favor
of the more familiar

"thane."

Second, the small Yorkshire thanes paid the same relief, 40s.,

as the

th»es and

tions, .ne ..e

328
s

s.an .ano..

d.engs of LancasHUe «^
.

^ese

slsnlHcan. p.ece of evident

a.e i,o..a„t considera-

U

a

included under .He land
of ehe Un,.

co^act group at

Hs.

of

.o.

XHese ..nors for.

the end of the description
of the king's larger

estates and „ere predo^nantly
s.all. generally ranging
In size fro.
one-half carucate to five
carucates. They had ,«en
held by na.ed Indl-

so„ why they were not
listed with the king's
thanes."
from this section might
gnc be exnl^ino/i ^-p

Their absence

explaxned, of course, by the
hypothesis that

these manors had not been
Deen oarf
^
part nf
of t-i,«
the king's demesne
before the Conquest
and that they were confiscated
estates, but this explanation
cannot be
true.
One of the most important
characteristics of the ministerial
thanes and drengs on the royal
demesne in Lancashire in 1066
was that
i

they paid rent-for their
••manors,"^^ and the

thanes on the royal demesne in
Yorkshire.

ascribed to their manors for 1066.

sa^ was

true of the small

This is clear from the values

These do not represent a real

sequence of numbers such as would be
produced by even a rough estimation
of the yearly value of 328 manors
which varied in size and were scattered over the face of ^he county.

Rather, their values in all but an

insignificant minority of cases are directly
proportional to the number
of ploughlands which they contained.

Their values were based on the

ratios of 5s., 6s. 8d., and 8s. per
ploughland or simple multiples and

fractions of each figure.

This phenomenon is without parallel in

Yorkshire except for a group of royal and comital
manors which were valued at the figure of .656, 90 and these figures
clearly represent a tradi-

tional feorm or rent.

The men who held these nanors were then the

equivalent of ..e ^nisce.lal
.Hane. of ..e West. an.
the Idea that
there were no drengs In
Yorkshire Is specious.

A detemmed Northumbrian
scholar, however, ^ght
still not assent
despite the discovery of
over 300 Mnisterial
nobles south of the Tees
and demand to know if the
peasants of Yorkshire eade
the grain renders
and comage payments which
were co^on in Northumbrian
bondage vills.
These would be serious
questions. If the institutional
structure of
Northumbria was fairly uniform,
there should be traces of
grain renders
and cornage south of the
Tees, and neither are found
in any nun^er in
the custumals and inquisitions.
Ihey contain only two examples
of peasants burdened with grain renders
and but one instance of the
payment of
cornage (cougeld).'^ But at
least in the case of the first
of

these,
the grain renders, this is
entirely a question of appearance,
an inpresslon analogous to Jolliffe's ideas
about the distribution of forinsec

labor dues and drengs. and just
as devoid of substance.
ary evidence can throw light on
this discussion.

For once liter-

The Chronica

de

.

Melsa contains a curious story that
when King Athelstan returned from
his Scottish expedition, he gave the
church of Beverley the right to
collect four traves of grain, apparently
oats, from each working plough

m

the East Riding.

This render was called hestercorn
(hestornes).

Its

collection was a royal right, and its original
purpose had been to provide food for the king's horses.

This last statement, of course, may

only reflect the chronicler's dislike of
oats, but the main idea of the

account is very interesting.

The grain renders above the Tees were of

royal origin, 93 and this story would prove that
similar renders had

existed in Yorkshire and explain what had happened
to them.

Of course,
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the account itself might
he doubted, but the

O^o,,!,^^^

a serious, if late, source
which embodies local material
in addition to
the works of earlier historians.^^
Furthermore, the matter does
not
rest solely on its authority.
The Hospital of St. Peter
of YorR had a

Similar tradition that Athelstan
granted to the church of York
the right
to collect one trave of
corn from each plough in the
province of Yorlc.^^
This right passed to the
hospital after the Conquest, and
both its existence and the existence of
Beverley's grain renders are
established by
later evidence. Beverley's
right to its traves was confirmed
by both
Henry I and Stephen, and St.
Peter's traves were confirmed by
William
96
.
P
Rufus.
These charters show that a comprehensive
system of grain rend-

^

ers, which probably had consisted
of one trave of corn and four
traves

of oats from each plough, had
existed in Yorkshire, and they strongly

suggest that the stories about Athelstan
granting already existing renders to the Church should be taken
seriously.

Moreover, both the method

of assessment and the political
situation in Yorkshire during the tenth

century point in the same direction.

The levying of the dues on the

basis of the working plough looks very
ancient, and certainly neither

Athelstan nor his immediate successors possessed
enough power in Yorkshire to impose a new general tribute for the
support of the Church.
The most likely hypothesis is, then, that either
Athelstan or one of the

other early kings of Wessex to hold power in the
North granted out

to

the Church the old royal grain renders which the kings
of Northumbria

had once received and which the Danish kings of York had
continued to
97
collect.
These renders in kind would not have seemed very useful to
the descendants of Alfred who never showed any great taste for staying

in Yorkshire, and the
Church in Yorkshire clearly
needed to he re-endowed
after its near destruction
at the hands of the
Danes.

This leaves the .question
of cornage, the most debated
of all Northun^rian survivals.
Its absence fro. Yorkshire
is absolute except at
Bowes castle, and no evidence
of any sort hints that
it has gone unnoticed like the grain renders.
Yet this is not as serious a
problem as
it might appear.
The cumulative weight of
the argu^nt has become
great; and, if there is no
evidence of cornage in Yorkshire,
there is
also no sign of it in southern
Lancashire which was clearly a land
of

shires in 1066.

The nonexistence of cornage in
the latter area lessens

the weight of this objection,
and in an indirect way it suggests
a solu-

tion to the problem.

Most of the traditional discussions
of cornage have

concentrated on the question of what the
nature of the due was

which

has inevitably involved a heavy reliance
on late twelfth and thirteenth-

century evidence.

By this time, however, cornage had
assumed different

forms; and, not surprisingly, the fruits
of this approach have been an

ever lengthening list of definitions whose
current major representatives
are Jolliffe»s idea that it was a pasture
due analogous to pannage and

Rees's theory that it was the equivalent of
commorth . a Welsh cow tribute paid in lieu of old food renders.

The difficulty with such defi-

nitions is that they ignore an important aspect of
the early evidence in
their determination to elucidate the inner nature of the
due.

The only

recent scholar to escape this error is Barrow who accepted
Rees's position and further argued that cornage and the king of
Scotland's cain were
the same render.
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This equation represents a major advance, whether it

is true or not, because it emphasizes an important aspect of cornage
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Which usuaxi,

o.sc„«d 1„

a„<iCelUcpa.anels:

I.

ern England „as a royal
due.

.he discusston of
tKl„ee«h-centu.y details

ea.Uest appearances

.he coinage of „o..H-

I^e first pipe roll,
Henry I-s for 1130

Shows that comage was
paid to the king in Westmorland
and C^berland
and Henry irs rolls disclose
that cornage was a royal
due in Northu^
berland.
Yorkshire and lancashire, on
the other hand, neither
Henry I „or Henry II received
cornage, and the su. which
Henry I obtained
fro. Dnrha. In 1130 apparently
ca.e to hi„ because he had
custody of the
temporalities of the bishopric,
not as a royal right.^"
Furthermore,
the Situation was even -ore
conplex than this because there
is contemporary evidence that Durham had
paid cornage to the king at an
earlier date
in Henry I's reign, and later
sources show that cornage payments
were
made in northern Lancashire and at
Bowes despite the fact that they did
not reach the king. 102 As it first
appears, then, comage was predomi-

m

nantly but not exclusively a royal due.

northernmost counties.

It went to the king in the four

In Yorkshire and Lancashire it either
did not

exist or was found only on the manorial
level.

This distribution of the

right to receive cornage is very curious
for it corresponds with the

northern limit of the geld in 1066.

Most of Cuinberland and Westmorland

were not under the English king at that date,
and Northumbria paid no
geld.

Yorkshire and Lancashire both did.

This is surely significant and

suggests that comage was either an old Northumbrian
tribute or perhaps
even an ancient royal tribute of the North.

It is

difficult to tell for

certain which it was because there is little evidence that
it existed in
Lothian.
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If it did not, as seems most likely, this would suggest
that

cornage was imposed in the last half of the tenth century after Lothian

Ill

had been lost.

In any case, this
hypothesis explains its earliest
names

Which were not "cornage" at
all but rather the "geld of
animals" or the
"geld of cows" in the West and
the "comage of ani^ls" in
the East.^^^
Cornage was the cow tax, not
some primitive render attached
to the bondage vills. Presumably it had
been a general tribute above the
Humber,

but when the geld was laid on
Yorkshire and Lancashire, it was
either
extinguished in these .reas or became
a manorial render.
Free from the
pressure of the geld, it survived in
Northumbria and fell to the king
when Rufus took over the earldom.
Subsequently Henry I granted the cornage between the Tyne and the Tees
to the bishop and monks of Durham.
If this theory is correct, the
absence of cornage in Yorkshire is

only an indication that the Anglo-Saxon
kings had more power there than
in Northumbria, and the subject has no
particular bearing on whether the
soke and the shire were the same
institution.
that they were the same seems inescapable.

In fact,

the conclusion

This means, in turn, that

there is no basis for the assumption that
Yorkshire was radically dif-

ferent from Northumbria and that its description
in Domesday can be used
to check Jolliffe's picture of society above
the Tees.

But with this

determined, it becomes immediately obvious why it was
necessary for him
to create an institutional discontinuity between
Northumbria and York-

shire.

The Yorkshire section of Domesday may not be a mine of
informa-

tion, but it is clear on a number of very basic things which reveal
the

limitations of Jolliffe*s attempt to construct a picture of Northumbrian

society from a selective use of late peasant custom.
out.

Three things stand

First, the peasantry of Yorkshire was divided into the three usual

classes of eastern England, sokemen, villeins, and borders

"""^^
,

and this

-Ues

ve^ ..u.eX.

t.a.

.oXU^e's ass^.Xon

that the

No«hu*na„

peasantry co„.i.ted onl,
of .^o„,.,3,.

^^^^

ao reason why .he class
divisions which existed 1„
Yorkshire should have
.topped at the Tees. Second,
Yorkshire was also the ho.e
of a numerous
Class Of landowners who
ranged in importance fro.
very great nobles to
<,uite

h^hle

With o.ly a few hovates
each.

And although these .en

cannot be counted or the
extent of their holdings
computed except in a
few cases due to the way
in which their na.es were
recorded in Domesday,

it is still clear that
Jolllffe's el,.ive "lord of the
shire-

finds only a few peers among
them.

Third, despite the equation
of soke

and shire, one cannot say
that Yorkshire in 1066 lay
under the shire system as Jolliffe pictured it
in Northumbria. Sokes there
are. The incidents of peasant custom clearly
have their origin and rational
in the
shire.

But the great territorial
sokes stand out like islands in

a sea
of smaller holdings; they do
not cover the shire from border to
border
as Jolliffe would have the
shires do above the Tees. Ihe intervening

spaces are filled with all sizes of
smaller sokes, some of which contain

nothing more than a village with
perhaps a single berewlck or an attached

piece of sokeland, and there are also
many holdings which consist of only
a single village or of part of a village
with no dependent berewicks or

sokelands.

In terms of percentages, the sokes
(the linked entries of the

geographers) account for 64 percent of the
entries in Yorkshire; the single holdings aoonnt to 36 percent.^"*

In other words, although the soke

is characteristic of laindholding in
Yorkshire, it varied in size and

shared the countryside with a large minority of
unitary holdings.

The

latter and the siaaller sokes are explicable in terms of
a decayed and
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f.a^e„.e. sH... .......
^^^^^^^^
Plici^y Of lana.oldi„g
which
before .he

.or_.

.olUHe cUi^.

existed in

.o«H^..ia

..,,^.,,,,„

^^^^^^
^^^^
No«h>.bria„ lanaholdin, had
heco.e complex lo„s .efore
i066 and .hat
the lands beyond the Tee*;
Tees h^ri
had t,^*not remxned some sort
of game preserve
for a timeless Anglo-Celtic
society.

Jolliffe

hi^elf seems

to have gotten the
concept of Northumbria as

a land of large shires
from Domesday's description
of Lancashire as confirmed by^the western portion
of the early thirteenth-century
Inquest of
Knights.
These do indeed show that
above the Ribble the vill
was the
basis of society and that
these vills were grouped together
in large
shires which covered the
countryside. Earl Tostig's
pre-Conquest manor
of Preston in Ax^undemess had
contained some sixty-two dependent
villages, and his estate of Halton
further north had included twenty-two

dependent villages.

Other manors in the area in 1066
contained twenty-

seven, sixteen, and fourteen
villages, and holdings made up of
a single
village or part of a village seem
to be entirely absent.
These

shires of northern Lancashire were
truly "princely" shires, and apparently the five hundreds south of the
Ribble, which belonged almost

entirely to the king, were similar
tmits.^^^

The West was, then, full

of large constellations of villages
which belonged mainly either to the

king or the earl and which provided Jolliffe's
model.
ful if they were anything more than a local
phenomenon.

Yet it is doubtIt was shown

earlier that Lancashire with the adjoining parts
of Westmorland and Cumberland was a late conquest from the kingdom of
Strathclyde, and the
pattern of landholding which existed there in 1066
is just what one
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would expect to find in a
recently conquered area.

si^le, and the clai^ o.

Arrangements were

the .ing were still
strong.

Furthermore, it
be hazarded that if
priMtive simplicity existed
anywhere in Britain in 1066 south of the
Highlands of Scotland, the
lands of the old

^ght

kingdom of Strathclyde were
the place to find it.
There exists no warrant
whatsoever to carry groupings
of this size
over the mountains as the
normal form of tenurial pattern,
but this is
exactly what Jolliffe did.^^^
^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^
^^^^^
appear in Northumbrian documents
of the twelfth and thirteenth
century
as "truncated" fragments of
large shires which had existed
in 1066 and

which had been universal at that
date.^"

Furthermore, he ignored any

evidence which indicated that
Northumbrian society had become complex

before 1066 and was similar to
Yorkshire.

Ti.e

process through which the

bishops of Durham acquired their
estates, for instance, is known to a

certain extent and could only in the
short run have brought diversity to
the shires between the Tees and the
lyne.

Aside from three royal grants

which apparently consisted of a full
shire each or of several shires,
the bishops were granted villages and small
groups of villages by the

local nobility, and they purchased groups
of villages from the various

Scandinavian kings of York and Durham.

Some of the estates which were

given to them by nobles had been originally purchased
by the nobles, and
the bishops further complicated the system of landholding
by "leasing"

assemblages of villages to members of the Northumbrian
nobility

"^"^^
.

In

one notable case, a bishop even gave away a number of
estates with his

daughter in marriage; and, although the marriage did not last,
several
of the villages became hereditary possessions of the woman's
descendants

by a later husband.^^^

Txansactlons of this sort are
incompatible with

the social system which
Jolliffe posited in Northumbria.

There is no

mention of them in his discussion
of Northumbrian society,
nor did he
consider the peasant groups
which existed in Durham in the
twelfth century.
Boldon Book shows that they
were divided into the three
broad
classes of molmen (firmars),
bonders
(villeins), and cottars.

The simi-

larities between the bonders,
the most numerous class, and the
villeins
of Yorkshire were pointed
out earlier, and it see^ that
a like identi-

fication can be made between the
moLaen and the sokemen.

Molmen were

perhaps former freemen; certainly
they were distinct from the AngloNorman firmars with whom they have
usually been confused.
They were
not essentially rent-payers like
the latter.
Several villages were populated exclusively by molmen, and in
a number of others they constituted
a normal segment of the peasant
population alongside the bonders and

cottars.

These men held bovates and performed
agricultural services

which were usually lighter than those of
the villeins and were remarkably like those done by some of the sokemen
in Yorkshire.

Jolliffe

seems to have thought that the creation of
these peasant groups above
the Tees had occurred after 1066,^^^ but given the
parallels between the

molmen and bonders of Durham and the sokemen and
villeins of Yorkshire,
this is quite doubtful.
In

the face of these considerations, it must be concluded that
his

picture of northern society was over simplified.

custom seems to be sound.

His work on peasant

But the shires had been "truncated," and

social diversity had developed long before 1066.

Had Domesday reached

to the Tweed, it would probably have disclosed a society much like the

one wHicH

no doub..

exUte.

Vo.Kah...

«o»Hu...,a wouia .ave appea.e.
poo.e.

Pe.haps

villages „ouX. Have .een
divided between diteereni
lords less frequently
than those in Yorkshire/^"
hut the sa.e social
groups and the sa.e basic
patterns of landholding „ould
have appeared,
were it not for the
difficulties introduced into
the study of English
institutions bv the n;in*>«
i
Danes, t-u-tc.
this conclusion
y
would have been worked out
long ago on the basis of
the general similarity
between the soke and the
shire. That this was not
done has been unfortunate.
The institutional
structure of the North has been
obscured by attempts to divine
patterns
of ethnic institutions, and
the actual indications
concerning the evolution of northern society
^j-cLy wnicn
whirh lie
H*^ in the
t-u^
u-i
shire
fragments have been
ignored except by Jolliffe.
These fragments, in fact, provide
important hints respective to the
evolution of the North's institutions.
It is curious, for instance,
that Jolliffe's three clearest
examples of shires, the Norhan^Islandshire

complex. Bedlingtonshire. and
Heighingtonshire, all belonged to the
Church.

This was evidently not the result
of the fact that the Church

was the only known pre-Conquest landowner
to survive the Conquest above
the Tees

for the same pattern is observable in
Yorkshire.

In 1066 the

great territorial sokes belonged almost
exclusively to the king, the
Church, and the men who had been earls,
were earls, or could be expected
to become earls.

gular phenomenon.

This is suspicious, and it is matched by another
sinBy the time of Boldon Book, Heighingtonshire and
Bed-

lingtonshire both consisted of six villages.

Two examples, of course,

are not very significant, and Norharashire only
comprised ten villages at
121
this time.
But a later survey which includes Islandshire with

.

six.
If the true number was
the former, one »lght
guess that a shire
cc^slsted of either six or
twelve villages; and. somewhat
surprisingly,

this figure can be confirmed.

All that is necessary is
enough encour-

agement to begin the tedious
work of counting villages.

St-inl-P cu. suis appen diciis

»,en Cnut gave

to St. Cuthbert. it
consisted of twelve

vills and was presu^bly a shire.

The lands which Bishop
Aldhun "leased"

to three earls contained
twenty-four villages, and Athelstan's
gift of
South Wearmouth was made up of
twelve vills. Even earlier
(900-915),

Bishop Cutheard "leased" Easington
with either eleven or twelve
vills to
123
a noble.
These examples show that
the Northumbrian shire was prob-

ably a unit of twelve vills or its
multiple, but the truly amazing thing
is that this unit did not stop
at the Tees.

If one goes to the trouble

to count the berewicks and sokelands
of the large territorial sokes
in

Yorkshire, the same number appears with
majestic regularity

TABLE 2

The Composition of Large Territorial Sokes
in Yorkshire

Soke

Aldborough
Easingwold
Palsgrave
Grindleton
Howden
K±lnsea
Kirkby Moorside
Knaresborough
Lof tho use

Berewicks

Sokelands

3

8

1
1

10
21

12

4

24
11
8

11
12

Total

Holder TRE

12
12
23
13
25
12
13
12
13

King Edward
Earl Morcar
Tostig
Earl Tostig
King Edward

Morcar
Orm
King Edward
Earl Siward

TABLE 2--Continued
Soke

BerpiiTi

Mappleton
Northallerton
Pickering
Ripon
She rb urn
Tanshelf
Wakefield
Weaverthorpe
Whitby
Withernsea

r"lf

o

bokelands

—
11
4

16
[23]
5?
9 or 9

7

Holder TRE

11
24
18
or 8

12
36
23
23 or 24

6?

[24]
12

14 or 38

3

8

1

11
11

This list is not all inclusive.

Total

24 or 48

12
13
12

Morcar
Earl Edwin
Morcar
Abp. of York
Abp. of York
King Edward
King Edward
Abp. of York
Earl Siward
Morcar

There were several large sokes
which do

not fit the pattern such as Coinisborough
(28) and Gilling (31), and the
smaller sokes based on the unit of six
have been left out.^^S
^^^^^
are enough examples here to show that
the big sokes of Yorkshire were

based on the unit of twelve.
This is an interesting discovery.

Numerologists can be expected to

have their own suggestions on its meaning,
but its significance probably

reaches no further than the mundane fact that
there are twelve months in
the year, and that this would seem a natural
unit to an agricultural peo-

ple.

Twelve villages made a shire above the Tees.

eleven berewicks and so^elands made

A soke center with

a soke in Yorkshire.

and sokelands were not always complete vills in 1086.

were, and the exceptions probably had been in the past.
twelve villages was evidently very ancient.

The berewicks

But they usually

The unit of

Both Ripon and the Norham-

Islandshire complex were pre-Danish possessions of the Church.

Neither

the tax assessment for the Danegeld, the canicates, nor the specifics of

landlord right, the berewicks and sokelands, bear any clear relationship
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to It in .„..3hire.

The,

pU, a„o.s

the face of .he

u„Us

of e>,elve

an arbitrary fashion which
bespeaks the needs and
^udg^ents of let.
ages. n>e unit Itself
Is probably a relic
of the days when taxatl.
Lon
went by the village. In Durha.
this syste. survived in
a number of villages into the late twelfth
century,

and lolliffe has argued
convincingly

that a.sess.ent by the village
had once been the rule.

The principal

and oldest burden which lay
upon the villages was. of
course, the syste.
of renders in kind and the
hospitality dues.^^*
the English equivalent

of the Scottish

cam

and coneveth. and the grouping
of villages in units

of twelve had in all likelihood
been connected with this system.
Such
groups may have been the basis
for seasonal progresses through
the king-

dom four times a year with a stop
of. say. three days in each
shire to
eat the food and dispense Justice.
Alternately, they could have pro-

vided the court a regular supply
of food in conjunction with the
carting
dues which lay upon the villages.
Other arrangements would also have

been possible, but it is the general
Insight into the early function of
the shire which is important.

Originally the shires had been nothing more
than arbitrary administrative districts of the royal support system
of the Northumbrian kingdom.

They were the mechanism through which food and
(later?) customary

labor were extracted from the peasantry for the
support of the king and
his warriors, and they were not originally
"Celtic principalities,"

although they might have been "Celtic" administrative units
which the
Northuiafarians took over as the basis of their kingdom.

Davis has argued

that the sokelands of East Anglia were a relic of a
pre-hundredal royal

support system, 127 and the Northumbrian shires were probably analogous

enough to impose the hundred or
the wapentake, and the
old shires persisted in altered for. down to
the High Middle Ages,

m

Yorkshire, however, the new institutions
were introduced presumably
after the destruction of the Norwegian kingdom,
and the shires of the area
lost their

judicial functions.

I^ey had also, it seems, been
renamed "sokes" by

the Danes, but this was not a
very serious change, although
it has

clouded the issue.

Later in Scandinavia, sokn meant
"parish" which was,

of course, exactly what the
shires had been in an ecclesiastical
128
sense.
Furthermore, the original nature of
the Northumbrian

was curiously enough not forgotten in
Yorkshire.

shire

There are occasional

exan^les from after 1066 of wapentakes
being called "shires. "^^^
If this explanation of the shire
is correct, it has important impli-

cations concerning the manorial structure
of the North.

Under the sys-

tem of landholding and rights which first
appear in Yorkshire in 1066

and are later explained in more detail for
the North generally, the king
received the old renders and works, which had
characterized the shire
system, from the great sokes and smaller estates
of the royal demesne.

Perhaps the sokes held by the earls should also be
considered part of the

ancient demesne, but on the lands of the Church and
the nobility these

same renders and works went to the landowner, not

been submerged to the manorial level:

to the king.

They had

The right to exact them from the

peasants constituted the normal prerogative of the landowner in the
North.

In a very real sense, these rights were the manor between the

Humfaer and the Tweed, and the work of Eric John on the land tenure of

early Anglo-Saxon England explains how this had come

to be.

He would

define .He

ieoTH wHicH

of an es.a.e as
Boo.Una. no. a. .He
s.an. o. .He

.He peasan.s o„e. .He
king,

^ese

peeui., and originally only
„en. .o .He CHurcH.
the nobilLy, „H1CH had

g.an.s were
By Bede's

«.e

Un.

In pe.-

.1^, However

hl.Her.o only Had a life
in.eres. in es.a.es
began .o ob.ain Bookland.
and .His .ype of .enure
la.er beca.e .He co.way
WHICH land was Held."0

m

^^^^

lies in .He fac. .ha. .He
Nor.hu*ria„ feo™

dues and services produced
hy .He sHires.

.us. have consisted of
.He

If .his identification
is cor-

rect, gran.s of Bookland
provided the .ecHanis. Hy which
the old royal
rights of the shire devolved
to the landlords of .He

dom and became .He basic mnorial
rights of

Nor.Hu*rian king-

the North.

This hypothesis does two
inportant things.

Firs., it provides a

theoretical background for the
landHolding patterns of Yorkshire
in
104.6.

'

The original grants of Bookland
were probably sHires or simple

parts of one.

Over time, however, the normal
mechanisms of Anglo-Saxon

laid transfer, buying and selling,
division among Heirs, and gifts to
the Church in addition to seizure by
the

Vikings in Yorkshire and Durham

wcmld produce the compl-x and fragmen.ed
es.a.es
nobility Held in 1066. "1

nor sold, although

^e

of all sizes which the

Church, on the other Hand, nei.Her
divided

it was sometimes robbed, so .Hat its
shires endured

XKal longer than those of the nobility, and
.he great sokes of .he king
and the earls were unaliena.ed sections of
smaller es.a.es held by the king and

the old shire system.

The

.He Church were obtained from .He

nobility by donation, purchase, and forfeiture for sin
in .he case of the
latter, and presumably by confiscation in the case of
the klng.'^'^
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Second, this hypothesis
partially explains why the
con^arisons of
Northu^rian, Welsh, and Scottish
custom tend to be inexact,
the

m

early Middle Ages, functionally
si^lar royal support system
had
existed in all three areas, but

their development over ti.e
was very

different.

The Welsh syste. lasted
intact into the thirteenth
century

still providing the Welsh
princes with food, lodging, and
local police,
la Northu.i,ria, the shire
syste. was submerged

Bookland except on the royal demesne
and came

and the Church instead of the
king.

to the

manorial level by

to support the

nobility

Subsequently, new burdens, the

kill's three works and the geld, were
imposed upon Yorkshire, and there
are vague traces from after the

Conquest that the Northumbrian earls
had

created a similar system for Northumbria
which consisted of army service, fortress repair, and cornage.133

^he Scottish system met a rather

different fate.

Like the one in Wales, it lasted into
the twelfth and

thirteenth centuries

although its character had changed by
this time.

The kings still received their cain and
coneveth, but the Scots who did
not develop a tenure comparable to Bookland

had achieved the same end by

other means.

The thanes and earls, theoretically
officials of the king,

had in fact become

here "Itary, and they each took a "cut"

(

cult ) of the

renders which in a diminished form eventually
reached the king.

Thus

the Scottish royal support system maintained both
the king and the nobil-

ity by the twelfth century. 1 3 A

Given these different histories, it is

quite understandable why the comparisons which were discussed
earlier are
ofssen misleading.

Such a method of institutional investigation is pos-

sible, but future attempts will have to be considerably more sophisticafiied

since, even if it is assumed that these three systems were once
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slenae. evidence .Ha. .He
sy..e^ ...u,
,
^^^^
ao. U,e .esul. of .He
"pa.alleX s.ow.H" „HicH
.„lUKe .HousH. so
unliUeX,. THe la..e. is
„o. an .^oss.HlU.,.
..naUy. .He ,oes.lo„ of
*e A„8Xo-Saxon fee™
He .aken in.o consid.a.lo„.
pa..icula.
it
Have .o be de.e^lned
wHe.Her .He sHl.e sys.e.
of Ko..Hu.bria
was really unique In
AngK^Saxon England

m

or „hetner i.s ou.llnes
are

only clearer because of
the backwardness of .he
Nor.h.

In conclusion, one very dark
subjec. remain,

i. see^ cer.aln
tha. northern socle.y was
far .ore complex In 1566
.Han Jolllffe .Hough,
and that the existence of
Bookland In the North was a
^jor cause of
this complexLy.
THe latter was also
responsible, in part, tor the

instltu.ional divergence of .He
North from Scotland and Wales,
but it
does not completely explain
landholding

'

as i. erLsted at the time of

Domesday Book.

In his early work on landholding
in the Danelaw, Stenton

found that es.a.es were divided
between n,o .ypes of land, inland
and
sokeland. The former comprised lands
described in Domesday as being
manors or berewicks and mean. .ha.
the soil belonged to the lord of
the

estate.

Sokeland, on f-e other Hand, was owned
by the person who occu-

pied it, presumably a sokeman, and
the lord only had jurisdiction over
this land. 135

One might, of course, take issue with
this generalized

concept of jurisdiction and say instead that

the

sokemen paid the old

royal dues to the lord of the estate, but
this does not abolish the distinction between inland, the origin of which is
.jncertain, and sokeland,

which was Bookland.

Nor was this distinction im its essence the result

of soiae formula imposed on the Danelaw by the
Rormans.

One may suspect
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that Donesday-s e»ploy.e„t
of .he ter. "Inland"
represented a southern
usage, but the sa„e categories
were used
a pre-Con,uest survey
of so.
estates of the archbishop of

m

York.

The survey was „ade ca.
1030 and

covers the sokes of Rlpon. Otley,
and Sherburn.
the

assu^tion

socnland.

It see:.s to be based on

that the lands of these
estates were either agenland or

Agenland, moreover, apparently
consisted of Inlande (demesne

land in the strict sense?) and
werocland, a term otherwise
unknown."^
The distinction between agenland
and

socnland would seem to be the same

as Domesday's distinction between
Inland and sokeland, or the distinc-

tion between inland and gesette
land found in the Tidenham survey
which
has recently been discussed by
J.
F.

McGovern.

He thought that the

£esette land was property held only by
Bookright and that inland was
held by some inferior tenure as well."'

This may be true, but one won-

ders if the emphasis is correct.
the royal dues.

From Bookland a lord received soke,

Stenton thought that a lord actually owned
his inland,

the pre-Conquest agenland or the "land
which belonged to the hall" In a

variant formula of Domesday /-^^

If this explanation is right, and
it

certainly seems to be, then one would suppose that
a lord would have a

great deal more control over and profit from this
sort of land.

Further-

more, there is a strong possibility that the
differences between peas-

ants were somehow correlated with these tenures.

In two instances Domes-

day gives the TRE population of sokes in Yorkshire.

In Northallerton

and its berewicks there were 66 villeins in 1066, and its sokelands
were

populated by 116 sokemen.
tion of the inland

At Falsgrave, Che other example, the popula-

is not given, but it is recorded that there were 108

sokemen on the sokeland. 139

If these two entries are representative,
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one cou.. concxud. .Hat
viXleins Uve. on .nlan.
an. so.e^en on so.eXan.
Such a conclusion vould be
a ^,„. ^tep .o„aras
..i„gl„,
,,3,„,3,„„
Of Anglo-Saxon land law
Into contact „ith the
social structure of the
kingdom, but It can only
he stated as a posslhillty.
One and a half
exa^les are not enough to prove
It; and. 1„ any case,
there renins
the

question of Inland Itself.

Was it so„e old secondary
tenure, as old or

older than BooUand, or was
it a new development, an
intensive £or„ of
noble o^ership which had emerged
in the tenth century, perhaps
connected
with sake and soke?

"
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which
lay across Northumbrian society is very obscure.
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CHAPTER

IV

THE RULE OF lOSTIG AND
THE DESTRUCTION OF THE
NOBLES OF VORK
In the North there is
a unity to the fifteen
years which follow

1055.

n.e cohesiveness is
provided ,y the

so*er theee of the hreaUdown
of royal government above
the Hu*er and the
attendant rush of the northern thegns to destruction.
The development and
tragic dimensions of
these events could perhaps
have been captured in
heroic verse, but no
known saga-maker recorded
the fate of the men of
the North and the blindness which brought them to
it.
Only disjointed or partially
informed
Chronicle accounts of these
events survive, and the monks
who wrote them
were not able to explain in any
detail what happened In the
North.
Their attention was fixed on
the career of William the
Conqueror. The
way was thus opened to the
conventional, William centered
accounts of
northern resistance to the Norman
Conquest.
Such reconstructions have
their value, but with the life of
William as their focus, they tend
to
isolate events in the North from each
other and to obscure their meaning.
This court-centered point of view
creates its ow, system of causation
and emphasizes the connection between
the coming of the Normans and the

outbreak of rebellion above the Humber.
The connection did, of course, exist, but
the region-based narrative of the preceding chapters has
established that royal government In
the North was beset by serious problems long
before 1066 and that Earl

Siward did nothing to improve the situation.

This chapter will show

that an attempt was made to solve some of these
problems on the govern-

mental level in the decade from 1055 to 1065 and that
this attempt not
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only .rough, abou. the
collapse of .o,al authority
1„ the Notth
10S5
but also „a. largely
responsible for norther,
resistance to the Nor»an
conquest.
I^.e biographer of
M„ard the Confessor
.ell have been
correct whan he linked the
elision of Earl Tostlg fro. his
earldo.
With the beginning of Edward's
physical decllne.l The old
.ing knew his
real, well enough to see the
significance of Tostig-s failure.
It Is
this failure which links
together the years

1066 in the North.

Mediately before

and after

Tostig turned traditional
resentments and passive

disloyalty Into actual rebelUon
and thus created a very
difficult political Situation which in the end
»ade a peaceful extension of
Noroan
power over the North i^ossible.
After 1065 the northern thegns
revolted
as much because of what had
happened to them before the arrival
of the

Nonnans as because of what Williaa
actually did to them.

Their ultimate

fear was that their antique world
was in jeopardy, and they resisted

WilUam with methods appropriate

to that world.

These came so near to

success that they provoked the harrying
of the North in 1069.
The immediate origin of this sequence
of events dates from the

deaths of Osbeorn In 1054 and Siward
in 1055 because these deaths made

possible a most unfortunate decision respecting
the succession of the
earldom.

Hitherto, northern earls had possessed
certain definite attri-

butes of family or ethnic origin, depending
on whether they were earls
of Northumbrla or York.

This is perhaps clearest in the case of the

former which had earls from the house of Bamburgh
until Siward and where
even after this date the old ruling family maintained
its local position.
In Yorkshire the situation was somewhat more
complex, yet even here the

earls fell into clearly defined groups prior to 1055.

With the exception

Scandinavians or. less f.e^uently.
.e^e.s of .he house of
Ba*„,H ^
Keve. had a „es. Sa=con
heM df.ec. .„Xe fn eUhe.
province. This changed
in 1055 „l.h the appointment
of Tostlg. Barl
Sodwln's third son. as
earl
in preference to Waltheof.
Slward's ,oung son. or
Cospatrlc. the eldest
surviving representative of
the Ba^nrgh fa^ly.
^e only thing Danish
about lostlg was his na^.
and he had no .no™
connection with the old
ruling fa^iy of ^oxthu^rla.
He was, consequently,
a complete outsider
in the North, and his
appointment was in that sense
revolutionary.
Because of this aspect of the
situation, the choice of Tostlg
stands In
serious need of e::planatlon.
but on this critical point,
there Is no

direct evidence.

It is often assumed that
his appointment represented

an attempt to Integrate the
North more closely into the
Anglo-Saxon klngdom.3 There may well be some truth
in this Idea, and It undoubtedly

appeared so to the northerners.
to share their point of view.

lostlg could hardly have been
expected
But this may have been more a
result than

a preconceived intention for It is
quite possible that the choice of

lostlg represented merely a shortsighted
attempt at family aggrandizement by the house of Godwin.

By the reign of Edward the Confessor,
the

earldoms of the Eastern Midlands and East
Anglla were commonly given to

younger members

of the families of the earls of Wessex
and Mercia." and

the appointment of lostlg may have been
simply the application of this

policy to the North.

Tostlg was the brother of Earl Harold of Wessex

and of the queen, and his acquisition of the
North probably represented
a major victory over the family of Earl Leofrlc
of Mercla whose eldest

sonSlfgar was exiled at

this time, apparently because he too wished to

Of his ea.Xdo. passed
to G,..H.
th.s

e^xanauon

„e«

of ..e eXevat.on
of

,o.„ges. son of CoC„i„ =

Xos.,

.

.h.

„

„„„He„ ean.o.

.s

correct, his appointment
was p.o.a.i, devoia-at
least i„itfaU.-of
an.
Other significance.

Be this as It

^y,

Tostlg „as an unfortunate
choice and .ust have
found hl^elf in an
.nenvlahle position. He
could not have heen
certain
how the northerners would
react to their first
southern earl, and he was
in a weaker position than
his Inmediate predecessors
i^i.cuc(_t;j,i,ors,
It IS ,true that
it
had Osbeorn lived and heco«
earl, he would probahly
have inherited his
father's unpopularity above
the Tees, yet he would
have had. at least,
the support of the Yorkshlremen.

keep Northu:*ria ,uiet.

n,is had allowed Slward
to rule and'

lostig. on the other hand,
fell heir to the

problem left
Hu»ber.

by Slward hut lacked any
i^ortant local support above
the
Indeed, his effectiveness
as earl probably rested
on the Inter-

nal divisions aM,ng the northerners
and on his own warband which
by 1065
nurtered over two hundred
housecarls.^

This was a very Impressive
force,

probably the ..instay of his
government,

of course, to maintain such
an

army was an expensive proposition;
and. like Slward before him.
Tostlg
held southern counties as part of
his earldom to help defray the
cost.

From 1055 he was earl of Northampton
and probably of Huntingdon as well,
and there is evidence that he also
held Nottinghamshire.'

As a result

of these possessions. Tostlg must
have been formidable, even though
he

was an outsider.
Furthermore, there was one immediate advantage
which the new earl

enjoyed because he was not from the North.

The converse of not having

local partisans was the
absence of local eneMes.

Tostlg bad a freedo.
Of maneuver greater than
that of bis l..edlate
predecessors, and be used
it to try to disar. potential
sources of opposition. He
entrusted tbe

actual government of the earldo.
to a local Yorkshire
tbegn, Copsig,^
Who does not appear to bave
been linked either to Siward's
fa^ly or
the house of Bao^urgh.

to

Copsig would have been fa^liar
with local prob-

and customs and may have
acted as a buffer between the
northern
nobility and Tostig.
If such was the case,
Copsig's appointment was a
len^s

prudent decision which minimized
friction.

Tostig may also have tried

to improve relations with the
clerks of Durham.

Certainly by the time

of Symeon of Durham, it was thought
that Tostig had held St. Cuthbert's

church in great veneration and had
given gifts to the church.

It is

also known that Copsig gave several
estates in Yorkshire to Durham dur-

ing this period.^

Since under normal conditions the
giving of land and

ornaments was the surest way of winning
the gratitude of clerks and
monks, these gifts probably represent an
attempt to conciliate the

clerks of Durham.

They were clearly not deathbed bequests.

It is doubtful, however, if this attempt
was successful.

Church normally held one thing dearer than
property:

The

its privileges.

These were what was at issue in the North, and on
this point Tostig did
not abandon Siward's policy.

In 1056 Bishop iEthelric resigned Durham

and returned to Peterborough, whence he had come some
thirty-six years
before.

Two explanations for this rather unusual act survive.

One

source says that he gave up the bishopric because he was weak (i.e.
he

had no local support) and could not properly defend the church's liberty
against unnamed evil

men."*"^

The other account asserts that he robbed

,
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the Church Of a buried
Measure and absconded to
Pe.erborousb.
whatever the truth of the
^tter was. both accounts
show that ^thelric was

"

extremely unpopular in Durham.

It
it IS
is also „rok»M
.
probably significant
that he

chose to relinquish the
bishopric the year after
Siward's d eath.
^thelric had only Rept his
position at Durha. by means
of Siward- s power;
end. With the death of
the earl, he may have
found his position untenable.
It is even possible
that Tostig refused to
support him against
the clerks. This would be
compatible with the first of
the two versions
of his resignation and would
be consistent with Tostig-s
gifts to the
church.
If this was the case,
the earl clearly misjudged
the situation,
however, for he did not allow
the clerks to elect ^thelric's
successor.
Rather, Tostig chose the new
bishop, and he selected
Sthelwine
iEthelric's brother," who was
destined to be unpopular for
the same reasons that his brother had been.
The new bishop was an outsider
who had
not been chosen by the clerks;
in time he too would be branded
a thief.

Tostig did not win the goodwill
of the clerks of Durham by this
appointment.

Although this was to prove to be a
dangerous mistake later, in the
years following 1055 the feelings of
the Durham clerks probably seemed
a

distinctly secondary problem to Tostig.
ficulties with the Scots.

He had much more immediate dif-

During the late 1050's, King Malcolm ceased

to be an English client king and became
a threat to the North worthy of

his ancestors.

The quickness of this reversal was partially
the result

of his success in consolidating his position
in Scotland.

had placed him in possession only of southern Scotland.

In 1054 Siward

Macbeth had

escaped the battle and retreated to Moray, his native
province, where he

lield

out for three more years.
vears

m=,i-,
i
Malcolm

was able, however, to
kill him

in 1057, and early in the
following year he killed
Lulach, Macbeth's
st^son. Who had been proclaimed
king after Macbeth's
death." Thus by
1058 Malcolm had eUminated all
his i^ediate rivals
and was free to

Begin raiding the North of
England.

stewed from

tMs

Certain domestic factors,
which

the nature of Scottish
society, probably urged
him to make

decision.

The Scots seem to have
viewed an invasion of the
North
principally as an occasion for
the forcible transfer of
property: They
ca^ over the Tweed and out of the
hills to steal cattle, take
slaves,
collect general booty. A king
who could successfully lead
such
bloodthirsty Shopping trips gained
not only wealth and prestige
at home
probably also found it easier to
govern. Malcolm II had launched

^
to

reign With an invasion of England,
and his grandson Duncan had
done
same within six years of becoming

^

king.

When Malcolm began to raid

the North, he was, in a sense,
only responding to the necessities
of a
iKxoT

^

kingdom and of a political system based
on a warrior king.
These general considerations are
undoubtedly important in explain-

why Malcolm suddenly turned on his
English supporters.

mere Ingrate whom Siward had completely
misjudged.

He was not a

Still, there were

probably more concrete factors which urged
him to come over the border.
In particular, the Scottish king had a
"just" grievance and was faced

with a very promising chance to right it.

The grievance was, of course,

English possession of the southern part of the
Cumbrian kingdom.

There

was no reason why Malcolm should accept this
diminuation of his ancestral
lands once his need for English help had passed.

This need ended with

the deaths of Macbeth and Lulach, and Malcolm could
attempt its

reconcuest.

This was the flaw in
Earl Siward's Scottish
policy.

Per-

as his son, vould be able
to thwart Scottish
efforts to reclaim Cumberland.
If such had been his
hope, it was not unrealistic
because the

only major victory which
the Scots had won against
the northern English
had been at Carham where they
had faced only the men from
above the Tees.
After 1055, however, the
situation in the North was very
different from
any that Siward is likely to
have envisaged. The North
had a West Saxon
earl, and it must have been
problematical whether he would be
able to
resist the Scots.
In fact, the possibility
that the divisions between
Tostig and the men of his earldom
would weaken English resistance
was
probably a strong inducement for
Malcolm to come over the border.

The incursions began in 1058 or
early in 1059 and were evidently

small raids, perhaps designed to test
Tostig.

If such was their inten-

tion, the earl's response must have
been encouraging to Malcolm.

Tostig

did not reply with raids on Scotland as
might have been expected; rather,
he chose to negotiate.

In 1059 iEthelwine, bishop of
Durham, Kynsige,

the archbishop of York, and the earl
journeyed to Scotland and induced

Malcolm to come south with them to parley with
Edward.

Although this

collection of dignitaries may have been designed
to flatter the vanity
of the young king, it could equally well be
viewed as an expression of

weakness.

The English clearly hoped to pacify Malcolm by
diplomacy

rather than by war.

They brought him over the Tweed, and he met Edward

somewhere in the North, perhaps at York.

The issues which were dis-

cussed at this meeting are not known, but it is likely that
Malcolm

wanted the return of Cumberland.

This demand, if in fact made, was
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tu. .Ke.e .3 .o „o..

eKe

so.ces

became sworn brothers
era. and
anH Mai^^i
Malcolm
Sood .ehavio..

xhe

.eeUng of

MaXeoX. .eceXvea a„..M„,

even have given hostages
for his

105, „as aiplomaticall,
a victor, for

the English.

Xostig had won peace for
the North, and Malcolm
must have
gone hone with his aims
unfulfilled.

At least, this

Is the simplest
explanation for what followed.

Tostig evidently thought
that his sworn brotherhood
with Malcolm could
be relied upon for in
1061 he traveled
to Rome with Aldred.

archbishop of York.

the new

The North was thus deprived
of its two principal

leaders, and Malcolm took the
opportunity to show how happy
he was with
the 1059 agreement. He
launched a frontal attack over
the Tweed, the
type of Invasion which had
become increasingly common as
the eleventh
century progressed. The Scots
laid waste Northumberland and
took slaves.
It la reported that they
even ravaged Lindisfame. and
there is circus

stantlal evidence that Malcolm
crossed the Tyna and harried
Durham
before withdrawing.^* This invasion

is described in only the
vaguest

tenK, but probably

the violation of

Undisfame shows

that it was the

kind of double invasion from the
north and west which Siward had
feared.
This cannot be established conclusively,
but it is very likely.

During

later invasions, the Scots usually
tried to respect the major holy
places of the North, but the Cumbrians
honored no such restraint.

If

this supposition Is correct, the invasion
of 1061 shows the tactical

limitations of Siward's annexation of Cumberland.

Possession of the

western end of the Tvne
a not
ryne r^n
Gap as
dxd
protect the lands above
the Tyne
against raids from the west.
What Malcolm hoped to gain
by this incursion is
not disclosed by
the chronicle account,
but other evidence suggests
that his aim was to
recover Cumberland and that
he succeeded.

This is, of course, a reason-

able hypothesis, and it is
also the easiest way of
explaining the few
things known about the West
through the year 1070. As
was discussed
earlier, Cospatric's charter
established that Siward had held
power over
Cumberland, but the document
itself may date from after
Siward's death
in 1055. Theoretically it
could come from as late as 1064
when Cospatric,
the grantor, was killed,^^ and
if this were the case, it
would be impos-

sible to hold that Malcolm had
recovered Cumberland in 1061.

But such a

late date is, in fact, unlikely
because there is evidence that the
West
had been invaded and conquered
prior to 1065. Parts of northern
Lancashire and the southern sections of
Cumberland and Westmorland were surveyed in Domesday, and by this time
the villages in the area were in
a

derelict condition.

The ravaging of this region, however,
cannot be

ascribed to any of the post-1066 disturbances;
and, in any case, Domesday
suggests that these lands were already
waste in 1066.

Tostig had held

most of them before the revolt of
1065, yet they did not pass to his

successor Earl Morcar.

Tostig was still recorded as their lord in
1066;

and since Tostig actually held nothing by that
date,^^ this must mean
that the lands were already derelict when Morcar
became earl.

Given

this conclusion, it has been suggested that these
estates were plundered

in the revolt against Tostig in 1065, but this explanation
cannot be
sustained because the accounts of the revolt do not indicate that
the

.

«l>.ls did anything

^.e

than kill Xostlg-s
housecarls and rob his trea-

before arching south.

be«».s necessary

to

assu^

With the dls^asal of this
suggestion. It
that northern Lancashire
„as wasted prior to

l0«5-but after 1055 when lostlg beca^
earl.

Given these tl.e Un^ts.

the «,st XlRely hypothesis Is
that the area was devastated
in the course
»f an l-rvaslon of Cumberland.
The occurrence of such an
Invasion cannot
be doubted. Hugh the Chantor
records that Siward's western
bishopric
was destroyed in war. and since
the nu*er of Malcolm's
invasions was

veil reme^ered in the North, this
incursion Into Cu^erland oust be
identical with Malcolm's first major

Invasion of the North in loei.^"

Bhen Malcolm launched his second
invasion in 1070. he used Cumberland
as
kU base and attacked Yorkshire over Stainmore. The
chronicle which
describes this Incident says explicitly
that Malcolm held Cumberland at
this time
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In 1061, then, Malcolm invaded to regain
Cumberland, and he struck

while Tostig and the archbishop were on their
trip to Rome.

The North

was thus leaderless, and there is no word
that Malcolm met any organized
opposition.

He invaded Northumberland, ravaged as
far south as Durham,

and then moved up the Tyne Gap to take over
Cumberland.

During this

last stage of the campaign, northern Lancashire was
wasted to such an

extent that many of the estates there remained without
a lord until after
the Norman Conquest.

Late that year or early in 1062, Tostig returned from Rome and

found Malcolm in possession of Cumberland.

Tne situation clearly called

for military reprisals, but none was forthcomingo

was astonishing:

The earl's reaction

He accepted the loss of Cumberland, and at some date

148

prior to the fail of
1055. p.oBahl. 1„ 10a2,

-de

peace with Malcol.."

The a,.ee..„e.

«e«

^foh „as

to

Scotl™.

a serious sethac.

for the security of the
North,, left cne
the Scot^
bcots -fn
xn n
possession of Cumberland and marked the
abandonment
•-nc

of biward
or
Siward'c,
.
s .ff
efforts
to give the North a

defensible border.

Malcolm's frontier on Stainmore
was now within two
days, ride of York, and
the Tyne Gap stood open.
With Cumberland the
Scottish king gained the
tactical advantage along the
border, and he was
destined to keep it for thirty
years.
The poor defensive position
which characterized the North
during
the reign of William the
Conqueror had its immediate
origin in Tostig's
failure to defend the North.
Since the importance of this
failure was
probably obvious at the time,
Tostig's inactivity requires
explanation.

At no time did he invade Scotland.

Every incident along the border

shows the earl temporizing and
negotiating, and given the fact
that his
later exploits reveal, if nothing
else, that he was a vigerous and
warlike man, his refusal to oppose
Malcolm is mysterious. It cannot be

explained by the idea that the northerners
accepted the validity of the
Scottish claim to Cumberland or by the

hypothesis that Tostig made expe-

ditions against the Sco^s which went
unrecorded because of the failure
°^

Anglo-Saxon Chronirle for the years 1062 and 1064.^^

In lieu of

these two possibilities, the most likely
explanation of his inactivity

must be that his hold on the North was too insecure
of Scotland.

to risk an invasion

If this hypothesis is correct, the earl's
unpopularity

existed as early as 1058-59, at most four years after
he became earl.
This in turn suggests that Tostig was unpopular in the
North from

the time of his appointment.

This idea, of course, is not basically

surprising given the fact that
he was an outsider who
lacked any clai.
to traditional loyalties,
but it does provide guidance
for the interpretation of the events of 1063
and 1064. This is necessary
because in the
Chronicles the revolt which
unseated Tostig in 1065 stands
out starkly
with little background. It
appears unconnected with the
historic problen. of northern governxnent
and is explained as the result
of tyrannical
acts co^r^tted by Tostig.^^ A
nu^er of such acts are specified, but
the real question is whether
the chroniclers have gotten the
sequence of

causation right.

If Tostig's unpopularity
really dates fro. the early

days of his rule, then his "tyranny"
actually may have been the result

of his attempt to govern a restive
nobility.

This hypothesis clarifies one of the
most outstanding charges made

against the earl.

Florence of Worcester says that the
northerners rose

against Tostig to avenge his treacherous
murder of three important North-

umbrian nobles.

In 1063 he had Gamel, son of Orm,
and Ulf , son of

Dolfin, assassinated in his own chamber at
York while the two were visiting him under a safe conduct, and these deeds
were followed in 1064 by
the murder of Cospatric at the king's Christmas
court.

This murder was

supposedly planned by the queen, Tostig's sister,
in the interest of her
,

brother.
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As the account stands, the meaning of these events
is not

clear, but when the identities of the dead thegns are
considered in the

light of Tostig's unpopularity, a rather different picture
emerges.

The

Cospatric killed at court was Earl Uhtred's youngest son and Earl
Siward's collaborator in Cumberland.

By the 1060 's he was the eldest

surviving member of the house of Bamburgh and, as such, had a good claim
to be earl of Northumbria.

The other two thegns were apparently his

s
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a.soci«es.

Orel's fathe. 0.. Had
^.ned

a slste. „, Co^pa^ic's.
a„a

a "Ga^l" is mentioned a„o„g
Cospatrlc'. relatives and
th.gns In his
Cu^rian charter." Ulf. .on of
Oolfm. is pro^ahl, to he
Identified as
the son Of the Dolfln „ho
died fighting Macbeth In
1054 and who was hl^
self the son of Thorflnn.
the recipient of Cospatric's
charter. These
ne„ were the natural leaders
of Northumbrian opposition
to Tostlg's
rule, and their murders were
exact parallels to Thurbrand's
murder of
Uhtred, Carl-s murder of Ealdred,
and Slward's ^rder of Eadulf.
Tostlg
clearly feared the rivalry of
the house of Ba^urgh and
chose the usual
method of stifling Northu^rlan
separatism when he killed Cospatrlc,
the
Ust of imtred's unfortunate sons. It
was ultl^tely, of course, a

foolish thing to do.

Murder may have been the only
convenient way of

dealing with the Hamburgh family,
but separatism above the Tees had
had
its origin in Uhtred's murder and
had been fed by the murder of
Ealdred.
Cospatric's death at the king's court
was sufficient reason for the

Northumbrians to revolt.
This is clear enough, but it leaves the
question of why the men of

York supported the rebellion.

The accounts of the event indicate that

the North generally rose against Tostig,
even though the Northumbrians

may have led the way.

This is a problem because the union of Northum-

brians and Yorkshiremen to achieve a common
goal was without historical
parallel.

It might be, of course, that Tos tig's
general unpopularity

above the Humber was sufficient to induce the men of
York to join the
revolt or that the charge made in the earliest biography
of Edward the

Confessor applies to Yorkshire.

The foreign cleric who wrote this work

asserts that the northerners revolted because of the severity
of Tostig'
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la. enforcement.

He provides a f rigKtening
picture of the lacU of
security Which existed on the
northern roads and i^Ues
that the nobles who
led the revolt had then^elves
lived by robbery and were
aggrieved

because Tostig had li^.ed
their opportunities to
practice their occupation.
This would be a convenient
explanation for the revolt in
York-

shire, but, unfortunately,
its details cannot be
accepted.

First, it is

difficult to believe that the
harsh treatment of highwaymen
produced the
kind of popular revolt which
drove oat Tostig, particularly
since the

sa^^account says that Siward had
law. 9

also been a

stem enforcer

of the

Second, if this explanation vere
accepted, Tostig would appear

blameless of causing the revolt.

Such a conclusion is suspicious

because the biographer tends to be
generally partial to the earl.^^
Finally, it is doubtful if the writer
actually understood the true origin of the brigandage which afflicted
the North. It will be suggested

"

later that this was one of the results
of the loss of Cumberland.
Despite these objections, there still may
be some truth in this

explanation.

At a later point in his narrative,
Edward's biographer

says essentially that many men charged that
Tostig had used the courts
to make money.

When nut this way, the picture of Tostig as the
severe

and unpopular defender of justice begins to make
more sense, for similar
accusations are found in other accomits of the revolt.

Chronicle says that Tostig was expelled

"...

The Anglo-Saxon

because first he robbed

God, and all those who were less powerful than himself
he deprived of

Ixfe and land." 32

This may mean that he administered justice and levied

fines arbitrarily, but it probably refers to the charge found
in Florence

of Worcester who says that the Northumbrians (in this case, everyone
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above .He Hu^e.) .evoUed
Because Xostt. ..a
coUec.ed eno^ous .axes
contrary to custo. throushout
.he Ho«h.33 Here Is
Che real cause for
the revolt.
Taxation reached enough
people to produce the t.pe
of popular uprising which overturned
the earl.

Direct evidence on northern
taxation is slight, needless
to say, hut
it is Clear enough to
show how Tostig found it
easy to overtax the northerners and that such an
atte:npt was a serious
transgression of their
privileges. The northern fiscal
syste. survived unaltered into
the Norinan period as a result
of the successful revolt
of 1065, and an inspection of it shows that the
northern tax assessment was much
lower than
that of the rest of England.
The earliest clue to this comes
from the
Domesday description of southern
Lancashire which contains the curious

statement that six carucates equaled
one hide in this area.^^

equation has usually been treated
as an anomaly.

This

Hides and carucates

were artificial measures of fiscal
assessment, and the two are usually
regarded as equivalent terms.
Theoretically,

one carucate paid as much

tax as one hide, hence the absurdity
of six carucates paying the same
tax as one hide.

Unless the carucates of southern Lancashire
were

exceptionally small, this region had an extremely
beneficial assessment.
It might be suggested that this light
tax burden was due to the fact that

the area had been part of Edward's demesne
in 1065, but this explanation

cannot be sustained.

than Domesday admits.

Actually, this same equation was more widespread

William Farrer has shown that in the twelfth cen-

tury it was in use not only in southern
Lancashire but also in northern

Lancashire with the adjacent parts of Cumberland and
Westmorland, in
Yorkshire, and in Durham.

All these areas paid geld as part of Yorkshire

at tte rate of 4d. fo.
each carucate; .Ix
carucates thus produced
2s.
In tte rest of England
either one carucate or
one hide yielded 2s

No«hu*erla„d

not have paid taxes
even at the low rate found
In the
re3t Of the North; It had
never been assessed
either carucates or
hides and thus stood co^letely
outside the Anglo-Saxon
fiscal syste..^^
in any case, the North carried
a .uch lighter tax burden
than the rest
of the kingdom.

m

This low assessment probably
originated when the Norwegian
kingdom
of York was annexed by Wessex;^^
along with legal autonoro^.
it was the
price of the North's submission.
At the time this would have
seemed a
reasonable compromise, but northern
tax privileges must soon have
hardened into custom. They were, perhaps,
regularized by Cnut,^^ and they

survived until Tostig's day as one of
the most important distinctions
between the North and the rest of the
kingdom.

"

In a sense they must

ha^e stood out as glaring inconsistencies
in the Anglo-Saxon tax structure, but it is doubtful if any
theoretical preference in favor of equal

fiscal burdens prompted the earl to attack
these arrangements.

motive was entirely practical.

His

Because of his unpopularity, Tostig

needed larger sums of money than those which
were available from traditional sources.

Specifically, the money was necessary to support
the

private army upon which his rule depended.

As he was harassed by the

Scots and the house of Bamburgh, his expenditures
could only have

increased so that they led him, on the one hand, to
put pressure on the

judicial system to produce more fines and confiscations,
and, on the
other, to levy higher taxes contrary

to custom.

It was this attack on

the fiscal privileges of the North which united the Yorkshireraen
with

the North^rtans and
produced the popular
support for the revolt o£
1065.
The uprising itself was
heralded by the clerks of
Durha..
They
were no happier with Bishop
^thelwine than they had been
with his
brother. In particular, they
feared that he too would
rob their church
for the benefit of Peterborough,
and a localist party had
developed to
forestall this. The leader of
the group was Elfred, son
of Westou, who,

addition to protecting the sacred
ornaments of the church, had
beco.e
the great scourge of the
ancient
churchyards of the North.

Presumably

clerks had had to endure
sopMsticated gibes fro. their
southern

bishops concerning Durham's poverty
in the natter of sacred
relics.

a^y case, Elfred had devoted great
energy

to digging up the bodies of

important northern ecclesiastics and
transporting thebones

proper display.

In

to Durham for

Until the spring of 1065, his
activities had been a

iiatural and harmless reaction to
cultural chauvinism, but in March of
t2.at year,

they assumed a political dimension.

Some two and one half

««nths after the betrayal and murder of
Cospatric, Elfred brought forth
t&e body of King Oswin, who had suffered
a similar fate in the seventh

century.
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The parallel between Cospatric and Oswin
was obvious, and

the public display of the latter's body at
Durham was clearly an attempt

by the clerks

to incite their flock to revolt.

for his and Siward's infringement

Thus would Tostig pay

of the privileges of St.

Cuthbert.

St. Oswin was unearthed in March of 1065; once
the harvest was in,
tfee

North rose in revolt utilizing the customary northern
tactic for

riRsisting oppression:

the sudden raid.

ment in their tactics, the precision of

Despite this traditional elethe revolt suggests that it was

the

.esuU

Of a ca.efull, f.a.ed
conspiracy.

On the third of October

•

group Of insurgent thegns
entered Yor. by surprise
and took the city,
a. leaders of this force are otherwise
unkno™, which probably indi-

se„ a good .oeent to strike
for Tostig „as absent fro.
the North.
The
men of York immediately
Joined the Northu^rlans, and
together they

killed the leaders of Tostig-s
housecarls as the latter tried
to escape
the city.

This deed probably destroyed
the conunand structure of
Tostig-

men. and on the next day the
rebels were able to kill some
two hundred o
his retainers in Yorkshire and
to take
all of the earl's treasure,

J
and

weapons.

^ney
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After destroying the hated tool^
of Tostig's rule, the rebels
met
together and outlawed the earl. They
then invited Morcar, the younger

brother of Earl Edwin of Mercia, to
be their new earl; and, with
hi. at
their head, they began to mrch south."^^
This decision to go south,

more than anything else, distinguishes
the revolt of 1065 from the later
revolts in the North and shows that the

rebels had competent, if unnamed,

leadership.

In a sense, it was an attempt to
force King Edward to

accept the revolution;

the northerners were not so foolish as
to stage

a local revolt and then wait for the king
to ratify their deeds.

This

aspect of the affair is clear, but their destination
and their behavior

show that they also viewed the trip south as an integral
part of the
original revolt.

They had already destroyed Tos tig's power above the

Humber; it was necessary to do the same thing in the South.

The rebels

apparently crossed the Humber and marched to Lincoln where they
slaughtered more of Tos tig's retainers.

They were joined then by groups of

.en f.o. Lincolnshire,
Nottinghamshire, and Derbyshire,
and the whole
force n^ved on to Northampton.
Here Morcar's brother
Edwin met the.

with an army drawn fro. his
earldom and some Welsh
auxiliaries.
rebels now constituted a
formidable

The

force and negotiations
were opened

with the king through Earl
Harold, Tostig's brother,

m

the meantime,
however, the northerners set
about a systematic plundering
of Northamptonshire which had formed part
of the earldom of both
Siward and Tostig
and was now made to pay for the
strength it had given to the
northern
earls.
The northern thegns were not
oblivious to the relationship

between wealth and power.

They enslaved hundreds of the
men of the area

and stole thousands of head of
cattle.

Perhaps

nK.re

significant than
this, however, was the fact that
they killed many of the natives,
burned

their houses, and destroyed their
winter supply of com."^"^

These deeds

could not have enriched anyone and
were clearly designed to impoverish
the area.

Finally towards the end of the month,
the king agreed to

accept the results of the revolt.

He could not fight the rebels for
a

number of reasons, and he consented, therefore,

Morcar as earl.

to the

appointment of

Earl Harold did not oppose the replacement
of his

brother and swore to upv^old the settlement.

In addition to this,

presumably in the name of the king— renewed the law
of Cnut.^^

he—

This

meant that Tostig's attempt to overthrow the fiscal
privileges of the
North was abandoned.
Thus the experiment of the first southern earl of the
North ended

in disaster.

Tostig had failed in his two principal tasks.

He had nei-

ther maintained the northern border nor succeeded in governing
his earldom.

His murders and attack on the fiscal system of the North had

^.ed.

The successful revolt
which followed ended his
rule and its
abuses, .ut it left a legacy
of ^strust which
weakened the A.,lo-Saxon
M^do. in the last year of its existence
and
which lasted into the

-riy

years of the Nor^n Conquest

.«^.n^on of William's rule over

to

stand in the path of a
peaceful

the North.

For ten years prior to 1065

the northerners had had the
experience of being under what
was to the. a
foreign earl who had tried to
alter their custom. They
did not forget

this

^th

the coming of the Normans
and were on their guard.

Bitherto, the clarity of this
connection has not been generally
i:^«>gnized for at least two reasons.

t^e

First, no one has understood
the

of Tostig's misrule, and
consequently the revolt of 1065 has

^>peared to be the result of straightforward
greed and tyranny.

The

Dreceding narrative has shown, however,
that the real cause for the
revolt was Tostig's attempt to govern

'

the North in the face of northern

resistance.

Second, the northerners' choice of
Morcar as their earl has

been misinterpreted.

It has been maintained that their
selection of a

ifercian indicated that they knew that
the North cauld no longer stand

alone and that they "were apparently fully
conscious of the strong polit-

ical bonds which bound them to the rest of
England. "^^

This ingenious

theory saves the unity of Anglo-Saxon England
froa the bodies and devas-

tation of 1065 by emphasizing the fact that the
rebels sought the king's

approval of their new earl and by asserting that their
very choice of

Morcar served

to restore the unity of the kingdom.

On a constitu-

tional level this theory may not be entirely specious, but
it cannot be

based on the North's choice of Morcar which

is adequately explained on

the basis Of

„o„he™ poUUcs.

and the No«hu^.ia„s.

This

^de

The

dXffUuU. *ieh

the „o„heo,ers

it impossible to choose
one of the two

available notthe™ candidates
and still ^i„tain the
unity which was
necessary to inti^date Edwatd
the Confessot.
The Northu^tians would
not have wiUingly accepted
Siward's son Waltheof, not
would the Yorkshire »en have been likely
to accept

Osulf. son of Earl Eadulf
the cur,

rent representative of the
house of Ba*urgh.

Past antagonise stretch-

ing back at least to the days
of Earl Uhtred and Thurbrand
blocked
either »an. Given this i^ass,
the northerners could only
coepro^se
and choose an outsider.
Morcar had no
discernible connection with

either northern fandly.and his
family had its o«, differences
with the
house of Godwin. He was, therefore,
a

perfect compromise and his selec-

tion left room for an accommodation
of the local „en which clearly
indicates what forces were at work.
Osulf of Bamburgh was given the
rule of

Northumbria under Morcar, and Waltheof
was apparently given Northampton
and Huntingdon.'*^ Thus the choice
of Morcar only indicates the para-

mount nature of local concerns.
The revolt of 1065 was then a conservative
reaction to Innovation

and had brought back to power the traditional
ruling family of North-

mAria and Siward's

son.

The events of the early months of 1066
show

that it had also created new difficulties for
government in the North.

With the death of Edward the Confessor in January,
Harold, Tostig's
elder brother, became king, but the northerners
at first refused to

accept him.

Their motivation was apparently fear.

The source which

describes this incident, although somewhat general and
rhetorical, says

explicitly .hat they feared
Being
existence ot this fear i. shown
hy two Vor.shi.e coia
hoards which were hurled at the accession of
Harold.^ Evidently the
northerners thought
that they could expect no
hetter treatment fro. Harold
than they had
received fro. Xostig. Given
the succession crisis
which the Ung faced
this fear was undoubtedly
groundless, hut he had.
nonetheless, to .ake a
special trip to York to
reassure the northerners.
Even though he
accomplished this
rs bv
by baster,
Eaqr*>ithe incident must still
have been very
disquieting. The North had
threatened, at the very least,
to withhold
its support from the king,
and the whole affair showed
that Morcar. who
was loyal to Harold, had
little control over the ^n
of his new earldom.
•

Still, no matter how fragile the
situation above the Euniber may
have been, the first attack on it
cama from a highly surprising
source,
given the host of potential invaders
who were lurking .round the North
Sea and the English Channel in
the spring of 1066. Upon his
exile,

Tostig had gone to Flanders, where
his father-in-law was count, and
he
had spent the winter there gathering
a fleet for an invasion of Eng1
land.
,
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What he hoped to accomplish with this
force is conjectural.

It

is conceivable that he was working
with either Duke William of Normandy,

his brother-in-law, or with King Harold
Hardrada of Norway, both of whom

intended to conquer England.

But there is no real evidence to support

either alternative, and it is hard

to see how his recorded exploits

could have helped either of then>-e.xcept,
perhaps, as a diversion.

This

is, of course, possible, but it seems more likely
that Tostig was work-

ing only for himself.

He was a bold man; both his successful attempt to
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intimidate the Pope on his
trip
uo Kome
Rome in lOfil
f to
, u1061 and
hxs unsuccessful
«ce^e to .oven, .he «o„H sh«, this
cleatl,. The coM„,
,eat offered
rewards for such .e„, and
lostlg probably
intended to try his luck.

Early in

he descended on the
Isle of Wight and extorted
„oney

and provisions fro. the
islanders.

He then sailed east
to Sandwich,

where he impressed some <?ailr>T-o.
sailors, and, upon the
approach of King Harold,
he moved up the coast and
entered the Hu^er, which

was apparently the^

Object Of his expedition.

Certainly it was not necessary
to come this

far north simply for plunder.

Tostig's force is said to
have numbered

sixty ships; and, if this is
true, it was clearly large
enough to be
dangerous to local forces.^^
Such was undoubtedly its
purpose.
Tostig's
foray was not as ridiculous as
it usually appears when
historians employ
it as the curtain raiser for
the great
invasions of 1066.

allels of this expedition lay in
the Anglo-Saxon past.

The real par-

Twice during the

reign of Edward the Conf essor,^lf gar,
the father of Edwin and Morcar,
had been exiled and had won reinstatement
in his earldom by invading

England with forces gathered in Wales
and Dublin.^"^

The principle

involved was that if an outcast could
wreak enough havoc, the king would
be likely to buy him off by giving
him back his lands and offices.

must have been Tostig's intention in
1066:

northern earldom by raiding it.

This

He would regain his lost

Unfortunately for the success of this

plan, his arrival in the Humber was anticipated
by Earls Edwin and Morcar

who were, after all, the sons of the last
successful practitioner of
this Anglo-Saxon protection racket.

Tostig landed his men in Lindsey

and burned several villages, but before he could become a
real terror
the countryside, Edwin and perhaps Morcar came up and drove
him out of

to

the a.ea.

Most of his

n.^sh

ships then deserte. hi.,
and he escaped

to Scotland with only twelve
ships.

There Tostig became involved
in a

^ch

.ore proMsing invasion
of

the North.

Despite the fact that King
Malcol. supported hi. and
his
refining .en over the
the complete failure of
his own expedition .ust have left hi. with
few prospects for the
future beyond s.allscale piracy. King Harold
Hardrada of Norway was, however,
planning to
invade England that autun., and,
if subsequent events are a
true indication of the king's original
plans, he had use for an
ex-earl of the

s^r,

North.

Harold Hardrada intended to invade
Yorkshire and use it as a

base for the conquest of the rest
of the kingdom.

IT,e

employment of

this essentially tenth-century
scheme, which not even Swein and
Cnut had

used until after they had spent years
pulverizing English resistance,
may have been due to bold antiquarianism
on the part of the Norwegian
king, but it was more probably the
result of a very contemporary under-

standing that conditions in the North
were far worse than they had been
in Ethelred's day.

In any case, Tostig agreed to join
this expedition,

perhaps through the intermediacy of Copsig,
his old associate in governing the North, who had already raised a
fleet in the Orkneys.

This

proved to be Tostig* s final blunder.
The Norwegian fleet came west in late August or
early September.
It stopped at the Orkneys where Harold was
joined by a force led by the

earl of these islands and by

a

group of Irish Sea Vikings.

Then it

moved down the east coast of Scotland where it was met by
Tostig, who

became the vassal of the Norwegian king.

The fleet now numbered perhaps

three hundred vessels, and its prospects for initial success were

good.

King Harold of England was
in the South waiting for
Duke William's invasion, and the North
was apparently unguarded.
Harold
Hardrada and Tostig were able,
therefore, to sail down the
coast, enter
the number by surprise, and
disembark their forces without
meeting any
opposition.^^ Il^is suggests that
Morcar was not in the North at
the
time, but there may be another
explanation.

Specifically, there is

probably a minor lacuna in the
chronicles at this point.

None of them
say how long the Norwegians
were in the vicinity of York
before the battie of Fulford Bridge, nor do
they explain in any detail what
transpired

during that time.

This is an important omission
because it hides the

reaction of the northerners to the
Norwegian invasion.

The little evi-

dence which does bear on this point
is discontinuous and perhaps
contradictory.

Symeon of Durham says that Harold Hardrada
took York by force

before he fought Edwin and Morcar,

but the C version of the Anglo-

Saxon Chronicle seems to suggest that the
Norwegians only entered York

after this battle.

It implies that the earls were not in
York when the

Norwegians landed and that they assembled their
army in Mercia.

If the

Anglo-Saxon Chronicle is correct on these points,
the men of York made
no attempt to oppose the invasion, and this, in
turn, could explain the

precipitate reactions of the earls and the king when they
learned of the
arrival of Harold Hardrada.

They faced not simply an invasion by the

greatest warrior in Christendom, but an invasion which had
received
local support in the North.
This interpretation is not beyond question, but the invasion of the

Norwegians certainly did become this specter before much time had passed.

When King Harold learned of their landing, he immediately began to move
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North.

In the meantime, however
wever, hdwin
Edwin ^r>A
,
and m
Morcar gathered an army
and,

without waiting for the arrival
of the king, engaged
the Norwegians in
battle at FuJford Bridge outside
York on September 20,
1066.

Thi s was a

reckless decision for which the
only justification could
have been t;o
prevent Harold Hardrada from
consolidating his position, but,
in fact,
it produced the opposite result.

After what is said to have
been a long,

hard fight, the Norwegian king
routed the earls, who, in
their flight,
lost more men to the river Ouse
than they had to Harold in the
battle.
After this illustration of his
power, Harold Hardrada entered
York and
allied with the Yorkshire men.
They agreed to help him conquer
the

kingdom by going south with his army,

l^ey also gave the Norwegians

provisions and exchanged hostages with
them.^^

The full implementation

of this alliance was averted, however,
by King Harold of England, who

was already nearing the North with an
army.

He reached Tadcaster by

Sunday, September 24, and advanced through
York the next day.

The Nor-

wegians had had no news of his coming and had
gone east of the city to
Stamford Bridge to receive hostages from the
outlying parts of the shire.

Harold was thus able to catch them by surprise
away from their ships and
to bring

victory.

their,

to battle.

In the fight which followed he won a complete

Both Harold Hardrada and Tostig were killed, and
twenty ships

were sufficient to carry away the surviving Norwegians .^^
With this victory Harold ended the immediate threat to hjs
rule in
the North and proved his ability as a military commander, but
from the

standpoint of the history of the North, these events have a different
significance.

Harold Hardrada's plan, despite its anachronism, had been

basically correct.

After at most one battle, and perhaps from his

arrival, the .en of Yor.
had joined his atten^t
to con.uer England.
Given an alternative, they
no longer saw a need
to he governed hy the
west Saxon monarchy. This
was the legacy of Tostig's
attack upon the
customs Of the North. By
1066 political northern
separatism existed,
and Harold's victory at
Stamford Bridge did nothing
to end it.

Had Harold enjoyed a long
reign, he might have improved
the situation through moderate rule.
In the days of Ethelred,
ethnic factors may
have been partially responsible
for the preference of the
men of York
for the cause of Swein and Cnut,
but since that time the problems
of the
North had been basically political:
the revolt of the Bamburgh earls,
the unpopular rule of Siward in
Northumbria, and finally Tostig's
attempt
to govern the North.
The northerners had allied with
Harold Hardrada

not because he was Scandinavian, but
because they distrusted government

from the South.

Since this was essentially a political
problem, Harold

might have been able to quiet northern
fears.
tion.

But this is only specula-

What Harold in fact did before he left
York was more prosaic„

Morcar had failed either to control or defend
Yorkshire, and Harold
apparently entrusted the shire to ^ferleswein, an
important noble in the

northern Danelaw."

The source which says this is not beyond
question,

but it is probably correct.

Despite the fact that Morcar is called an

earl in the chronicles after September of 1066, he
never again is con-

nected with anything that happened in the North.
that he had no power above the Humber.

This probably means

Certainly all the northern

revolts were led by local nobles.

After making this change, Harold went south to face Duke William
of Normandy, who had landed while Harold was on his northern campaign.

an October 14, the duke con^pletely
defeated Harold's ar^ at
Hastings,

^^

Harold

M^elf

disappeared into the real, of
legend.

With hi.
cha.ce that the problems of
the North would find a
peaceful
solution. During the remaining
months of 1066, William
consolidated his
position in the South by receiving
the submissions of the earls,
of most
of the XBiportant churchmen, and of
London; and on Christmas day.
Archbishop Aldred of York crowned him
as the successor of the
Anglo-Saxon
kings. This :neant disaster for the
North.
By becoming the "legitimateking, Willia^n inherited all the
problems of northern government which

had been created before his arrival,
but at the same time he lacked the
i»ecessary knowledge, if not the will,
to deal with them.

This is clear from his initial northern
appointment.

Before return-

ir^ to Normandy in March of 1067, William
made his first attempt to pro-

vide government for the North, and a worse
choice is difficult to imagine.

He gave the earldom of Northumbria to Copsig,
Tostig's old associ-

ate, who had submitted to William at Barking
in early 1067.^^

an incredible decision:

This was

Copsig had been an agent of Tostig's government

and had taken part in the earl's invasion of 1066.

Furthermore, if the

stories of Tostig meeting Harold Hardrada at the mouth
of the Tyne are
true, Copsig had probably supported himself by piracy
at the expense of

the very men whom he was now called upon to govern.

Any one of these

deeds was enough to make Copsig unpopular in the North, and it is
exceedingly difficult to imagine what William thought he was doing.

To make any

sense out of the situation at all, it is necessary to posit that Osulf,

who had held Northumbria under Morcar, had refused to submit
and that Morcar was no longer the earl of the North.

to William

Otherwise, the

appointment
the

a new

No„hu*.ians and

ean wouU

have .een a .i.ect
p.o.oeaaon

to Mo.cat.

.

,o.h

Beyond this only con.ectute
Is pos-

sible.

Pethaps the „ost likely
explanation is that „ilUa„
was trying
to be conciliatory
.y sending a near native to he
eatl. hut that he had
inaccurate knowledge of the
revolt of 1065 which ca^
ftoa lostig.
The
latter had spent the winter
of 1065-1066 in Flanders
where he could have

been

m

co™.nication with Duke WilUa..

Tostig is said to have
charged

in another context that the
northern revolt had been the
result of a
conspiracy headed by his brother
Harold;" and. If „iiUa„ believed
this,
the appointment of Copslg
would not have seemed absurd.
On the other
band. Copsig himself may have
been
partially responsible for the
deci-

sion.

He was clearly adept at survival
having lived through the revolt

of 1065. Tostlg's invasion of
1066, and probably the Battle of
Stamford
Bridge; there is no knowing what
a man of his talents may have
told the

new king.
Whatever role misinformation may have
played in making Copsig earl,
it clearly did not affect his own
behavior

for he had no illusions about

the necessities of his government.

In early February 1067, he came

north with a band of retainers and took
the traditional first step
towards establishing one's rule above
the Tees:

He sought out Osulf,

the current representative of the house
of Hamburgh.

probably to kill or capture Osulf, but this failed.
ceeded in driving him into the hills where he began
This was undoubtedly easy.

His intention was

Copsig only sucto gather an

army.^^

The return of Copsig convinced the Northum-

brians, if they had any doubts in the first place, that
they could

expect no better treatment from William than they had received
from

Edward the Confessor.

The new earl had crossed
the Tees as an Invader

in the direct tradition of
other Yorkshire

^n

who would have ruled

Northu^bria-Thurbrand, Carl, and
Siward-and .ore recently, of
course,
Tostig. Within five weeks,
therefore, Osulf was able to
raise an

With Which

to

adMnister the equally traditional
solution

On March 12, he surprised Copsig
at a banquet in Newburn.
tried to save himself by fleeing

ar^

to the problem.

The earl

to a church, but the
Northumbrians set

the church on fire.

When Copsig was at last forced
out, Osulf cut off

his head.^^
Ihe sending of Copsig into
Northumbria had been clearly a mistake
both for the earl, who had lost his
life, and for William, whose
authority had been flouted. The earl's
personal unpopularity and his attack

on Osulf were undoubtedly the major
causes of the revolt, but certain
factors suggest that something else may
have been involved.

There is

a"

distinct possibility that the Northumbrian
revolt of 1067 was an echo of
the revolt of 1065 in a second way. William
the Conqueror's most press-

ing need in early 1067 was booty.

His mercenary army had not followed

him to England just because they believed
to the throne.

in the validity of his claim

He needed money to pay off his soldiers, and
in 1067 he

levied a heavy geld to supply it.^^

The collection of this money from

Northumbria must have been Copsig 's first responsibility;
indeed, the

promise that he could collect it may have been the chief factor
which
prompted William to appoint him earl.

Copsig had, after all, substantial

experience in extracting money from the North.

No source says that the

Northumbrians rose against the earl because of the tax, but this may

well have been an important factor

in their revolt.

The two events were
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^....^

^

^

by only a short period
of

bet^ea Christ^s

„uUa.

imposed .he tax some-

of 1066 and hi. return
to Nor^ndy around
Fehru-

2t. 1067.

Copsig went north 1„
^d-February and was killed about
*ive weeks later on March
12.
The Northu^rians had
revolted In 1065 In
over
l«^t
unjust taxes, and they
threatened to do the sa.e
in 1072-74

^

«he

another attempt to collect taxes
above the Tees.™

^eU

of 1067 struck the North as
being outrageous.

^te Anfilc^Saxon

Oe

r.hron.-c

Furthermore,
The version of

written at York, after noting
that Willia. had

pro^^sed to rule in the manner
of his best predecessors,
says:
«me be iaid taxes on the people very
severely.-'^

"All the

The Peterborough

^sion,

on the other hand, mentions
this tax in a matter of fact
way
and only
passing." Given these factors,

m

it is quite possible that

William's first geld provided the
Northumbrians with an example of Norman tyranny which was quite as
frightening
as the return of Copsig and

just as reminiscent of the rule

Peon two points

of Tostig.

of view, then, William's dealings
with the North

nwst have raised the specter

of Tostlg's attack on the privileges
of the

North, and it is no wonder that Osulf was
able to move through the
Sorthunfcrian countrysi(>- at the head of a
small army without anyone

warning Copsig of his approach.
the people were with the rebels.

As at York in 1065, the sympathies of

Ironically, however, William was

spared the full consequences of his mistakes by
events in Northumbrla
itself.

Ihe killing of Copsig marked the beginning of a revolt
which

was directly analogous

to the one which had occurred in 1016, but this

withdrawal from William's lordship soon ended in an ignominious
fashion.
In the fall of 1067, Osulf, who was evidently trying

to maintain the

nor^l

functions of government, was
killed while atten^ting to
bring an
outlaw to justice/^ and this
event gave Willia. the
opportunity to
reestablish his authority above
the Tees without ^litary
intervention.
Upon his return fro. Nonnandy in
Dece^er, the king sold the
earldo. of

Northu^ria

to Cospatric,

son of Maldred, who was an
adventurer appall-

ingly suited to the chaos which
was nc^ developing above the
Hu.ber.
His father Maldred had been the
brother of King Duncan of Scotland,
the
father of Malcolm III, and his
mother had been a daughter of Earl
Uhtred
and his third wife, a daughter of
King Ethelred.^^ Cospatric himself

was, consequently, closely connected
with both Scotland and Northumbria,
and it is impossible to say which
connection
he valued more.

In any

case, he was able to go north and
establish himself as earl, theoreti-

cally under the lordship of William.
The fact that the king had sold him the
earldom probably indicates"

that William was uncertain whether he could
extract a regular income

from Northumbria, and the events of 1068 show
that this fear was not
without foundation for the same sequence of taxation
and revolt occurred
as in 1067 except on a wider scale and unobs cured
by other factors.

William levied his second geld at some date between early
December 1067
and late March of 1068.^^

In the spring Edwin and Morcar revolted, and

the northerners joined with them.

Indeed, the North is said to have

been the main center of trouble in

1068,'^^ and the current geld was

probably responsible for this.

One of the basic laws of northern polit-

ical behavior was that it took a specific outrage
thegns into the field.

to bring the northern

This had been true of every revolt since the

first cause ceTebre, the murder of Uhtred in 1016, and it continued to
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be true .h.ough
chronicX..

^.e

*e

las.

„o„he„ .e,oU

In 1080.

the North rise
sponu^eously.

aace witJi their usual behavioi- =r.A
behavior and s.nce it
ernment and soldiers had ^<.f^ rh^ » -i.

o„l, i„ i058 .o .He

since this is at vari-

-

is clear that
William's gov-

left the North untouched
until this point

Most pr*ahle explanation
is that
the nortterners

^th

the .ing's

the necessary .ncrete

the

de^nds for .one. provided

e^^pU

of

Nor^n

tyranny.

The revolt Which actually
materialised was entirely in
accordance
With this explanation. It
was
essentially negative, a
rejection of

Wima^.s

power, and did not, at least
in its initial stages,
represent

an attempt to drive the Normans
out of England.

The Anglo-Saxon Chron-

icle:s laconic description
of the beginning of the
rebellion caught its
spirit accurately: "Then the
king was infonoed that the
people in the
North ware gathered together and
meant to make a stand against
hi. if he
1,7 J
caine.
William was faced in the spring of
1068 with a general revolt
of the Sorth which aimed at denying
his authority.
The situation was

particularly ominous because the rising
was led by the existing governmental authorities above the Humber.,
Cospatric, his new earl of North-

umbrla, and >ferleswein, both of who^
apparently preferred battle to trying to tax the men of their earldoms.
The only important man in the

North kiaown to have opposed the revolt
was Archbishop Aldred who had had

first-hand experience with William's power, but
he could do nothing.
The rebels knew, of course, that the king
would indeed come North and

made preparations against the event.

It was probably decided to hold

the Hunfcer-Aire line, a tactic which could deny
William access to most

of the Korth and which certainly was followed in 1069,^^
but beyond this
their plans are a matter of conjecture.

They may have thought that they

could Withstand the Conqueror
with the help of Me.cia;
this alliance had
worked against Edward the
Confessor in 1065. Furthermore,
Edgar the

Atheling had escaped fro.
William's control by the
spring of 1068, and
there may have heen those who
wished to crown hi. king.
Alternatively,
the northerners may have
hoped for foreign aid.

been seeking the intervention
of King Swein

English malcontents had

of Denmark, who had a
claim

to the throne; and King
Malcolm of Scotland seems to
have been planning

an invasion of the North for
the summer of 1068.
these possibilities materialized.

m

actuality none of

While the northern thegns,
posturing

in heroic fashion, lived in tents
to avoid the enervating effects
of
houses and fortified suitable places

along the Humber and in the swamps

and woods of the West Riding, William
acted quickly.

Any military cal-

culations of the northerners which were
based either on their revolt

against Edward or on a memory of the long
campaigns of Ethelred's reign"

were soon proved false.

The king first went to Warwick where
he built a

castle, which induced Edwin and Morcar to
abandon the revolt.

advanced to Nottingham and erected a second
castle.

He then

These two successes

demoralized the northerners, who were now without
domestic allies and
found the king bearing down upon them.

Cospatric, Iferleswein, and Edgar

the Atheling fled to Scotland with a number of
important thegns, and the

men of York submitted

to

tie within its walls. 81

come the revolt of 1068.

the king, who entered the city and raised a cas-

Thus without a single battle, William had overIt had been a fiasco, and the northerners'

brave talk of the springtime about standing against the king had only
resulted in the exile of their native leaders and the imposition of

direct Nonaan rule by

Mdsu^r.

They had been shown to be
:nilitarily

ineffective, and William's triumph
seemed complete.
These were the lessons which
the revolt of 1068 seemed
to teach,^
but both were in reality deceptive.
The only thing accomplished
by

William in 1068 was to set the
stage for the debacle of
1069.
Such military power as existed in the
North had not been destroyed.
The northerners had submitted because their
allies had deserted them.

Circumstances, they judged it wise

to

In these

recognize the king and thereby

avoid the reprisals which would follow
a military defeat,^^ but they had
not been cowed.
The fact that they had refused to
meet William in the
field was as much the result of their
conception of warfare as of the

size of his army or his military reputation.

Although the northerners

would occasionally fight regular batUes
as at Carham in 1018, their
taste usually ran to rural ambushes, raids,
and surprise attacks on settlements.

dispute.

The history of the North after 1000
establishes this beyond

While such tactics may have struck the Normans
as treachery

incarnate, they were an effective adaptation to the
small population and

broken terrain of the North.

No invader with a large army was likely to

stay in the North for long, and upon his departure, the
thegns who had

been skulking in the woods and hills could re-emerge and
follow the tactics used by Osulf in 1067 or by the northern rebels in 1065.

The

employment of such means of resistance was in turn the reason why so
many members of the house of Bamburgh had been killed through treachery

by men wishing to govern the North; false promises were literally the
only means with which to catch them.

tried to employ this device.

In 1068 William himself may have

While in York, he sent the bishop of
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Durha. to Scotland to

^.e

a peace treaty and
probably to get Malcol. t

disgorge the leaders of the
northern revolt who had taken
refuge in
Lothian, or .ore probably in
Cu^erland, but despite the
assertion of
Ordericus Vitalis that Malcol.
swore fealty to Willia. through
ambassadors,
thelwine of Durham clearly
failed to accomplish very much.
Malcolm did not expell the northerners,
and Cospatric, >ferleswein,
and
Edgar the Atheling remained at
large to lead future revolts.
They were a threat because William's
success in 1068 provided the
provocation for renewed insurrection.
The revolt of 1068 had been the

result of William's failure to govern
the North through its native leaders.

They had, in fact, led the resistance
to the king, and this left

him with no realistic alternative but to
replace them with Normans.
Consequently, he built a castle, garrisoned
it with five hundred picked

men under William Malet, and entrusted
the government of Yorkshire to
Robert fitz-Richard.^^

This decision was understandable given
the situa

tion, but it led to disaster nonetheless.

The imposition of direct Nor-

man rule coupled with the gelds of 1067 and
1068 must have struck the
men of York as a direct parallel to the government
of Tostig.
more, the Normans apparently acted rapaciously.

Further-

Dark rumors come out of

this period about the imprisonment of Yorkshire
thegns and the confisca-

tion of their estates, and these stories apparently have
some basis in

fact for William Malet, the governor of York castle, definitely
had

acquired estates in the shire before the fall of 1069.
this,

In addition to

the same general picture of Norman behavior is suggested by the

existence of an immense treasure inside York castle by autumn.

This

money had clearly been extracted from the surrounding countryside, and

its collection coupled
with the
thp t-;.t-i«„
taking ofc native lands
by whatever means
was short-sighted and
provocative.
The actual spark which set
off the new revolt occurred
in Northumbrxa. By the winter of
1068, Norman control of
Yorkshire must have
seeded secure enough for
William to
an attempt to bring the
lands
above the Tees under his control,
and to accomplish this
he appointed a
new earl, Robert de Comines,
and sent him North with
seven hundred men.
In January Robert and his men
crossed the Tees and entered
Durham where
they killed and plundered
peasants who were unlucky enough
to be in

^e

their path.

This must have confirmed the
worst fears of the residents

of Durham concerning the real
meaning of the Norman Conquest,
and they

devised a stratagem to deal with the
invaders.

As Robert approached,

they left the city and hid in the
surrounding countryside, and despite
the fact that Bishop ^thelwine warned
him upon his arrival that the

Northumbrians were laying a trap, he took
no notice, perhaps feeling
that William's easy triumph at York the
previous summer had shown the

mettle of the northerners.

In any case, Robert entered the city
and

allowed his men to plunder the houses,
which was probably what the
Northumbrians had hoped would happen.

After night had fallen, the

natives assembled and broke through the town's
gates without warning.

By this time the Frenchmen were scattered throughout
the city, undoubtedly in a state of complete disarray.

Exhausted by the day's plunder-

ing, confused and disorganized in a strange, dark town they
could offer

no effective resistance, and the Northumbrians slaughtered
them all

except for one or two survivors:

Earl Robert himself was cut down in

traditional fashion as
he tried to escaoe th. k
^""^P^
b"^^i"8 house in
which he
had sought refuge.
•

The successfol ma<?<?3rTo
oiassacre r^f
of t-u
the Norman xorce
force at Durham
n„^v,o,„
signaled the
•

now to learn the
„.«e„ing nature of northern
tactics.
caught Rohert flt.-a.chard.
the governor of .or..
a„a,

. .and of rebel,

fro. the protection Of York castle and
killed hi« and a group of
his retainers.
This
left the castle garrison
as the last .or.an force
above the Hu^er. and
they were In the greatest
Jeopardy. Cospatrlc, M
rlesweln. and Edgar
the Athellng had returned
fro. Scotland with the
beginning of the Insurrection, and they »ved on
York with an ar^. „hlch was
soon strengthened by Archil, the greatest
Yorkshire thegn, and the four
sons of
Carl.

The presence of Cospatrlc
and the sons of Carl in the
sa.e ar^
was of the gravest significance.
Carl had killed Ealdred,
Cospatrlc's
uncle; Carl's father Ihurbrand
had killed imtred. Cospatric's
grandfather.
The union of ,„en who had every
reason to hate one another was
an
appalling indication of the degree
of northern hostility to the
Normans,
and William Malet quickly felt
its force. The rebels entered
York and.
in alliance with the men of the city,
besieged the castle whose defenders
sent word to WilUam that unless
they were relieved, they would suffer
'

the fate of Robert de Comlnes and
Robert fitz-Richard.

The king

responded to this threat as quickly as
he had to the revolt of 1068.

He

moved north and surprised the besiegers
within the city walls before the
castle fell.

There followed a shadowy encounter between
the king and

the northerners in the streets which ended
in the relief of the castle

and the flight of the rebels.

Either as part of this battle or after

Its conclusloa. the
Korean, ravaged the city
and plundered the
Churches.

The chronicles describe
this
cms exoediM'^T,
o
expedition as
a victory for the
king
but actually his success
was
only partial.

^

He had kept possession
of

Yor. a.d inflicted a tactical
defeat on the northerners.
his hold on the City, Willia.

To strengthen

stayed there for eight days
and built a

second castle, which he entrusted
to Willia. Fitz-Osbern.
of this
perhaps William's

^,

The choice

.ost trusted and capable
subordinate,

probably indicates that the king
realized the liMtations of
his recent
Victory. It had produced no
political agreen^nt with the
northerners,

and they were still in revolt.

All their i^ortant leaders
had escaped

the battle in the city, and
they had only retreated to the
hills with
their xnen to await the departure
of William.
TUls came soon enough,

leaving William fitz-Osbem waiting
for the counterattack of the
rebels.
He, however, was a more formidable

opponent than either Robert de Comines

or Robert fitz-Richard had been,
and he probably had the further
advantage of knowing what to expect from
the

northerners who had already con-

ducted four surprise attacks on cities or
towns since 1065.

When they

did indeed try to repeat this tactic,
William fitz-Osbern was not caught
unprepared.

They assembled in the hills sometime after
Easter, intend-

ing to renew the siege of the castles, but before
they could reach the
city, he caught them in the open and defeated
thein.^°

This victory relieved the immediate pressure on York,
but it did

not end the revolt, whose leaders were still free and
commanding the sur-

vivors of the two recent defeats.

Indeed, the realization must have

been growing among the Norman leaders that they were facing

a basically

-poss.Me

Situation in the No.t..

T.ei. defeats of t.e
.e.els ha. nei-

ther destroyed the
latter's ^litary strength
nor proven their tactics
u^orlcahXe. After each defeat,
the northerners had only
retreated to
lurk in the hills awaiting
a new Nonnan ^stalce,
and the mechanics of
this Situation are probably
illustrated by the behavior of
the Nor^n
force w.ich Willia. sent to
avenge the killing of Earl
Robert de Conines

advanced as far as Northallerton
in the North Riding of
Yorkshire.
the

Nor^ns were surrounded by

retreat to York.

Here

a dense fog which prompted
an immediate

Symeon of Durham says that St.
Cuthbert had sent this

fog to protect the men of
Durham and that the Normans
realized its
supernatural origin.^^
fact, they must have feared
an attack by the
northerners in the fog; and whether
such was likely is beside the
point.

m

In an open field on a clear
day the Normans did not fear
the rebels;

when conditions were otherwise, they
did.
The main hope of the northerners by
this time was probably that
they would receive outside aid. It
must have

been known in the North by

the sunnner of 1069 that King Swein of
Denmark was planning to send an

expedition to England tMt fall.

His ambition to claim the English

throne had been encouraged by English money,
and it is likely that much
of it had come from the North.

All that the northerners had to do was

to hide in the hills until autumn when
they could emerge with a good

chance of driving the Normans from the North.

They presumably thought

that Swein would go on to defeat William later,
perhaps after several

years of war on the model of the fighting of Ethelred's
days.

ther

Osbeo„

an.

of .He

sons.

X. consisted of f„o
hundred
and forty ships and
included „a„io.s fro.
Poland. Saxony, and
Prisia in
addition to Danes. Theoretically.
tMs „as a force large enough
to

Challenge Willia. the Conqueror
hi^elf. particularly given
the English
allies Which it would assuredly

find, hut this possibility
was cocked hy

subsequent events.
can^aign.

The Banes had co.e to
England to fight an antique

They slowly plundered their
way up the coast and entered
the

Hu^er on Septe^er

8.

By this ti.e their sluggishness
had destroyed

any chance of surprise, one
of the .ain advantages of a
sea-borne attack,
and Wima. had been able to
warn his .en in York of their
approach.
As

it turned out, the advance
knowledge did not save York, but
the Danes-

aversion to pressing an advantage
was an ill omen for the North,
nonetheless. The northern rebels
also

'

knew that the Danes were coming,
and

Edgar the Atheling, hferleswein,
and Waltheof, Siward's son, had
gathered
a fleet of their own from unknown
sources.
They too evidently thought

that sea-borne raids offered the
best hope of beating William, and
the
initial encounter seemed to confirm this
idea. Dpon the arrival of the

Danes in the Humber, the rebels Joined
them.
shock.

Archbishop Aldred died of

He was the man who had crowned William
and presumably foresaw

the destruction to come.

The Danes waited several days in the Kumber
to

give Cospatric with the Northumbrians and
a group of rebels from Yorkshire, led by Archil and the sons of Carl,
time

to

Join the main force.

When this was accomplished, the composite host moned
up the estuary
towards the city.

As they approached, the Normans fired the houses near

the

casues which

they feared

^ght

be used to fill up the
ditches

arouBd the castles, but they
did thei. „or. too well
for the fla.es

and rebel, arched into the
still burning city with the
leaders o, the
North i„ the van. They
caught the Nor^ns in the

streets, and the out-

come was as decisive as in
Durha. in January.

The entire

Kor^n force

was either killed or captured.
To understand the strange
and awesome events which
followed this
victory, it is necessary to
put aside hindsight. Neither
the northerners nor the Danes knew that
they, were soon to be the
object of William
the Conqueror's most brutal
campaign. Furthermore, there is
no evidence
that the Danes had come to England
to fight a major battle
with William
in the fall of 1069. Had that been
their intention, it would have been
far simpler to land in southern
England and offer battle. The taking
of

York had cost time and men, and it
had brought them no immediate accretion of strength. The destruction
of
William's power above the Humber

had satisfied the immediate aims of the
rebels.
known to have gone home for the winter,

Yorkshire men did the same.

The Northumbrians are

and it is likely that the

The Danes were thus left in possession of

York, and this had probably been their goal
from the beginning.

They

had come to England to destroy Norman power
in the North and to establish a base there for the subsequent conquest
of the rest of the kingdom.

This is the simplest and most reasonable explanation
for their actions,

and it is supported by the fact that King Swein did arrive
in the Humber
in the spring, intending to launch

a

campaign.

He found then that he

was too Late and that his expeditionary force was in a pitiable
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-dl.io..

.ea^on fo.

.HU

was .i^le and o„l,

»f .he act. Of WlUia. the
Co„,uetor=

pa^.aU,

.He

.esuU

The cost of taking Yo.U
had been

.oo high.

Because of the fl.e which
the Nolans had set. the
city had
t,eatly destroyed, and
this had put the Danes
in a bad position.
With York intact, they could
have shut the^elves up
behind its walls
««i snugly waited for spring,
and WilUaa could have
done little. To

besiege the city would have
required that the Normans spend
the winter
Iti the open, which
would probably
have broken their health and
which

would have failed in any case,
given Danish control of the
Ouse and Hunter. To take York by assault would
have been extremely dangerous.
The

Danes and the northerners were
equal-if not superior-to the Normans
in
hand-to-hand Hghting. But for the burning
of York, William would have

faced these grim alternatives.

As It was, the plans of the Danes were
seriously upset.

"

October

and William the Conqueror were both
advancing against them, and their

behavior, which seems so aimless in the
pages of Ordericus Vi talis, was

largely the result of this quandary.

They needed a place to spend the

winter, but William would not give them time
to establish one.

Ini-

tially they tried to salvage as much of their
original plan as possible

by going down to the Isle of Axholme at the head
of the Humber and fortifying it as a base for the winter.

This attempt was frustrated by

William, however, who had launched a late fall campaign.

The destruc-

tion of York had given him a chance to fight the Danes
in the open, and
he had seized this opportunity with the fury and vindictiveness
of a man

who has narrowly escaped a fight for his life.

William reached Lindsey

with an army before the Danes' fortifications were complete, and he
was
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«ms.e,ue.tly able to enter the
svaaps and drive the. back
across the
ft»b.r into Yorkshire. This

defeat did not .ake the.
desist £ro. their

P^a.

however.

Once the king had left the
area to deal with a secondary
in Staffordshire, the Danes
recrossed the Hu^ber and .oved
Into

«volt

ii^dsey to establish a ca^.

There a Norman force, which
the king had

J«ft behind, fell upon them by surprise
and dispersed them for
^.

96

a second

:rhese two encounters were a
serious setback for the Danes
who still

lacked a winter base, and they must
have made it obvious
-ihey

had no intention of fighting a major
battle.

^oed

to William that

The possibilities

to him by this knowledge meant
doom for the North.

After being

Sxiv^n out of Lindsey, the Danes had returned

to Yorkshire, and it was

^uiuared that they intended to reoccupy
York.

This was an admission that

their situation had become very serious,
and William, who had returned

from the West, followed them into the North.

The Yorkshire men were not

caught entirely unprepared by this development,
however.

They occupied

the northern bank of the river Aire and held
it against the Normans for

three weeks.

Perhaps they thought they could hold this position
all

winter although it is more likely that the Aire
represented an extemporized line of defense.
have made

atiy

Neither the northerners nor the Danes seem to

preparations in case the Normans crossed the river, and

when this occurred, all organized resistance disappeared.

William

forded the Aire far upstream and moved directly on York through the
hills.

By the time he arrived, the Danes had abandoned the indefensible

city and were apparently lying in the Humber aboard their ships

were now in an untenable position.

'

they

William's relentless pressure had

-de
the

^„3si.le

1.

Hu^er. and

fo. .He. eo es.a.U.h
. base eUHe.
„as „o„ winte..

^ey

„o«,

o. sou.,

could not go ho.e, nor

„ouM

they fight.

Given these circu^tances,
Osbeorn. the Danish leader,
ad^tted his defeat and can.e to
an agreement
„lth Wlllla..

i,e king
gave hl„ Money and ptocaised
that the Danes could forage
along the coasts
of the North; Osbeorn promised
to depart In the spring
without fight98

ing.

This ignominious conclusion to
the Danish invasion left
the North
exposed to the full fury of
Willia. the Conqueror's wrath.
The rebels

had evidently retreated to the
hills when the king crossed the
Aire,
assun^ng. no doubt, that this
invasion would lead to no .ore
permanent
results than his earlier trips
north had. William could be expected
to

rebuild the castles, but with the
comng of spring, they could issue
from their dens to attack them,
probably in alliance with the Danes
who'

might have forgotten by then their
promise to go home.
ers reasoned in this way,

If the northern-

they were completely mistaken for
William the

Conqueror was not to be tricked again.

He had learned the nature of

northern tactics from the revolts of 1068 and
1069, and he now adopted
plan which would make it impossible for the
North
departure.

a

to revolt after his

Leaving detachments to watch the movements of the
Danes and

to repair the castles, he entered the
hills to hunt down and kill the

rebels.

The success of this operation may have been strictly
limited by

the latter's knowledge of the terrain of the North,
but this made little

difference in the long run because the main Norman effort was
reserved
for the peasants who were completely unprotected with their
leaders hiding and the Danes neutralized.

William sent groups of soldiers
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throughout the Vale of Yor.
and the

^,or

.iver valleys with orders
to

harry the peasants, and it
was this ghastly tactic
which finally brought
"peace" to the North. The
Nor^ns ^ssacred ^ny peasants
outright, but
the large number who .ust
have escaped were ulti^nately
doomed as co^
Pletely. The soldiers burned
the villages and the grain
from the last
harvest; they also made certain
that no crop would be planted
in the
spring by destroying the plows
and other tools of the
peasants and by
wantonly slaughtering the livestock.

The most intense destruction took
place in Yorkshire, but the
Northuxnbrians did not escape completely.

William held a macabre Christ-

n^s court in the burnt-out shell
of York to which he had brought
all the

visible paraphernalia of his kingship
to symbolize the legitimacy
of the
continuing slaughter. He then dislodged
a group of rebels from Holder-

ness and moved to the Tees where he
received the submissions of Cospatric
and Waltheof
.

The termination of their defiance did
not save the North-

umbrians, however.

William crossed the river with the intention
of

wasting the countryside, but the situation in
Durham was somewhat different than it had been in Yorkshire.

The villages were empty.

The

peasants, knowing what to expect from the Normans,
had escaped to the

hills and forests with their herds and moveable property,
and the bishop
and clerks had fled to Lindisfarne leaving Durham
deserted.

consequently unable

to

William was

destroy native society above the Tees as com-

pletely as in Yorkshire.

The Normans did march in two major groups

through eastern and central Durham to the Tyne where they destroyed
Jarrow.

Then they devastated the Tyne valley and perhaps southern North-

umberland as far west as Hexham, but their impact on this sparsely

populated
ary.

U„d

WllUa.

too s^all co warrant
a long stay.

So.eti.e in Janu-

led his ar.y back to
the Tees by way o, the
Ro.an road

through the Pennine foothills
and continued on to York.
There he garrisoned the castles and made
arrangements
idngements tor
for the
^Ko government
of the North
before striking west over the
Pennines to harry Cheshire.
Wl.en the spring of 1070
arrived, the northern rebels
did not emerge

from

tl.e

hills to continue their revolt.

They had resisted the Norman

Conquest because they had feared
a basic redefinition of
the relationship between the North and
the king.
This fear had its origin in

Tostig*s murders and taxes, and it
had been intensified by William's
appointment of Copsig, by his gelds,
and by the imposition of direct

Norman rule in 1068.

In 1070 this fear was no longer
important.

The

harrying of the North had been an attempt
to produce an artificial famine,

a^d it had succeeded.

"

Few details survive,

but it is still clear in general what
happened.

as

might be expected,

The chronicles agree

that tJhere was no food in the North for
those who lived through the

actual military operations of the winter of 1069-70.^°^

Some of the

greater nobles survived, of course, but the
mass of the peasantry faced
a griM future in which mechanisms let
loose by the harrying continued

the destruction long after William had left.

After eating their domes-

tic artimals and horses, some peasants sold
themselves into slavery to

avoid starvation.

Others joined the bands of "outlaws" which formed in

the f nee-zone and plundered villages which had escaped
the Normans.

Many starved to death; and, according

to Symeon of Durham,

the roads and

huts of the North were littered with decaying bodies which spread disease

among the living.

There is even evidence that the harrying upset the

balance between

hu^n

society and nature so that
the wolves ca.e down
fro. the hills to feast on
the bounty of Willia. the
Conqueror.
Substantial nu^ers of northerners
apparently tried to escape this
nightmarish world by fleeing to the
South and perhaps to Scotland.
Their
presence is recorded as far away
as Evesha., but this expedient
did little good for many died or
became slaves nonetheless.
These conditions ensured that the North
would never again threaten
William's control of England. He had solved
the political problem of the
North by
destroying native society in Yorkshire
and by severely damaging it in
Durham.
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CHAPTER7
GOVERNMENT BY PUNITIVE
F.XPEDITION
under the very eyes of
the Danes .ho wintered
in the Hu.5er, Yorkshire had been turned into
a waste land.
Upon the arrival of spring,
this force, probably
demoralized by -i-c;^
its lack:
lack of success and
certainly
half starved as a result
o, the Ncr^n tactics,
was no longer a dangerous fighting force. 1
Furthermore, no native ar.y
reappeared to try to
capture the castles In York.
To this extent the harrying
of the North
was a complete success; it
had ended the last significant
threat to

WilliaM-s possession of the
Anslo-Saxon crown.

Yet one must be careful

not to exaggerate the effects
of this event despite the
ove«hel.ing
impression which it leaves. William
had done his best to destroy
native
society in Yorkshire. This had
solved his i«ediate problem
during the
winter of 1069, and it had certain
•beneficial" implications from his
point of view for the future.
Yorkshire could no longer be used
as a
base for a Scandinavian attack on
the rest of the kingdom.
shire could not even support its own
Inhabitants,

This unhappy

Furthermore, York-

shire could now be integrated into
the Anglo-Norman kingdom in a way
in
which the old earldom had never been.
The earldom itself was, of course,
suppressed, and the royal demesne was soon
bloated with confiscated
estates to provide the sheriffs, who now
administered the shire, with a

sound financial base.^

These were important considerations, but other

less hopeful aspects of the situation were
just as pertinent, if not

more so, in the years following 1070.

For one thing, despite the fact

that the men of York were now just as dead as the
heroic age. It is

gained cu„e„c, across .h.

«o«h

Sea.

harrying of the North

.c-

vlthstandins. Scandinavian.
„ould s.ill drea„ fro.
ti.e to tiee of reenacting antique feats of
plunder and pillage in
England, and so.e actually would co„e to try.
Moreover, if it „as true
that the „e„ of Yor.
could not support ^ny Invading
Danes, it «as eaually true
that they
could not support very ^ny
Normans. In 1070 the
redevelopment of Yorkshire lay many years in the
future.
Indeed, the situation in the
North was .ore complex than
it is usually made to appear. The
harrying of the North established
William as

the most powerful and feared
dispenser of political authority
in the
North, but it did not give him
complete control or render his
authority
unassailable. His power was limited
and his authority open to attack

because the old political and military
realities of the North reasserted
themselves in 1070 and the years which
followed. Furthermore, William
seeiDs to

have realized this to some extent.

At least this is suggested

by the two appointments which he made
in the North in 1070.

The archbishopric of York and the earldom
of Northumbria were
vacant, and the king filled both positions
during the course of the
year.
tege'

To the first he appointed Thomas, a canon
from Bayeux and a proof Bishop Odo, the king's half brother.^

Thomas did not, however,

succeed to all the old privileges and liberties
of the position.

Rather,

Lanfranc, the archbishop of Canterbury, made a
successful attempt with
the king's support to limit Thomas's freedom by demanding
a profession

of obedience from him.

This demand and its repetition at the consecra-

tion of later archbishops of York led to a bitter controversy
between

York and Canterbury which
lasted into the twelfth
century.

The later
stages in this dispute,
which were ^rUed hy
pole^cs and forgeries
for. a rather unedifying
episode in ecclesiastical
politics, but in the
beginning serious issues were
involved concerning the
general nature of
the Church in England.*
Furthermore,
ic, the
^ne question
Question had
h,H important
politiCI implications in 1070. Hugh the
Chantor. the early
twelfth-century
historian of YorU, asserted
that Lanfranc defended
his demand for a orofession of obedience from
Thomas before the Ung with
the argument that:

llllrilTJitTJ/V'''
.appen,rthrS^g?: ^-^r'

of the kingdom that

^

Z^T^^^^^^^

"^"^
tr'eachL^s Yo
nen 'anS
men,
and the
theT-°'H'°^'kingdom disturbed and divided.^

2h

L

Lanfranc's argument was not simply
a device to further his own
ecclesiastical aggrandizement. It was based
on a real possibility.

The Danes

actually took York in 1075, and in
1085 they prepared an expeditionary
force which caused William the Conqueror
great anxiety.^
1070,

the very year of Thomas's appointment,

Moreover, in

there had occurred an event

which had serious implications in this
connection.

In the spring King

Swein entered the Humber to take command of
his fleet.

He apparently

disavowed the promise which Earl Osbeorn had
made the previous winter to
depart England in peace; and, in the words of
the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
"the local people came to meet him and made a truce
with

expected that he was going to conquer the country

him— they

Some four or five

months after the harrying of Yorkshire, the men of York
were still prepared to receive a Danish invader; and, although nothing
serious

,

happened

-s

.o.O.

...^^ ^^^^

^^^^ ^^^^

couX, no. .eep ..e
Banes ou. o, ,o.,.Hi.e
.a. so^e .o.n.aUon.
Norman weakness in the
North IS .i.
shown even more clearly
in William

other appointment i„
1070.

-ceived the submissions

Sometime after Christmas
of 1069, he had

of Cospatric and
Waltheof on the hanks of
the

Tees; and presumahly
around this time, he
reinstated the former as
earl
Of Northumhria.
This act of forgiveness
was ,uite uncharacteristic
of
the conqueror's dealings
with landed Hnslish
rebels, and it was a sign
that he had no realistic
hope of depriving Cospatric
of power or controlling Northumhria.
William cannot have had much
faith in Cospatric
Who had been in rebellion
since he purchased the
earldom from the king
in 1068. in 1070, however,
the castles at York were
the de facto northern limit Of William's realm,
and fifty miles of empty
countrys.de separated them from Durham.' Even
kings of the stature of
Cnut had had
trouble governing Northumhria,
and the harrying made this
task doubly

difficult for William.

He could not play the old
game of using the

^n

of York to keep the Northumbrians
in check, and in these
circu^tances
he was forced to recognize
Cospatric, the current representative
of the
house of Bamburgh. as earl.
This decision may have been
distasteful to
the king, but the establishment
of some agreement with Cospatric,
no

matter how hollow it was, was far
preferable to the alternative of
Cospatric submitting to his cousin
Malcolm Canmore or ambushing some new

Norman earl.
The difficulty of exercising power beyond
York led William to maintain the Northumbrian earldom; but there
was a dark side to this situa-

tion for the Northumbrians.

The ruin of Yorkshire may have insulated
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the. fro.

Noo.n

power, bu.

also left the. to face
the Scots alone.

This too became obvious
in 1070 when Malcol.
launched his second invasion of the North. He was
"still in possession of
Cu^erland, which had
been lost by Tostig in
1061; and he now showed how
this flanking position could be used against
the English.
So.eti.e during the su^er,
the

Scottish king led an anny,
probably .ainly composed of
Galwegians, into
Cumberland. This force then
.oved up the Vale of Eden,
across Stainmore, and down into Teesdale
where it began to plunder the
countryside.^'

Malcolm's intentions on this
occasion,
rather obscure.

as on most others,

are

It is possible that his
invasions were only large raids

conducted to gain booty and slaves.

Yet this idea, whose principal

recent exponent was R. L. G. Ritchie,
has been rejected by

J.

Le

Patourel in general terms, and especially
in the case of the invasion of
1070 it seems difficult to sustain.^^

Malcolm's armies did undoubtedly

come for plunder, but if this was
the only consideration, the 1070
inva-

sion was

quite ill-conceived.

Yorkshire had already been wasted by
the

Normans, and the Scots could have gotten
more booty further north.
Indeed, the route which Malcolm's army
took during the first stage of
the invasion and the fact that this was
the only known Scottish invasion

between 1000 and 1200 which originated solely in
the West were both
highly unusual.

Most Scottish invasions included as their main
element

a thrust over the Tweed.

first.

In 1070 Northumbria was left untouched at

Given the configuration of the border, this must have
been

intentional, and it probably means that Malcolm hoped to isolate
North-

umbria further by completing the destruction of the North Riding.

Per-

haps he hoped to detach the earldom once he had shown the Northumbrians

that he could conduct
a ca.pai,„ Xu lorRshlre.

Cospatric was. after

all, his cousin.

Initially the invasion went
fairly
i-iy wej.j.,
well

tHp
.
i-he Scots plundered
and
i

burned down the south side
of Teesdale and .oved
east into Cleveland
Which they also wasted. The
Nor^ns apparently did nothing;
but after
Malcol. was in Cleveland,
something went wrong with
his plans, although
exactly what is not .nown.
The Scots crossed the
Tees into Hartness and
began to ravage up the coast
towards .ear^outh.^^ This
was a violation
of Cospatric's earldo., and
it destroyed any chance
of Malcol. reaching
an understanding with the earl.
It also put the expedition's
booty in
jeopardy.
Fro. either the standpoint
of politics or plunder,
the Scottish attack on Durha. was illogical,
and one

haps Malcolm's

arn^y

had gotten out of control.

can only suggest that perThis was always a danger

with a Scottish army, particularly
for one with Galwegians in
it, and
the king's soldiers may have
gone into
Durham to find more abundant

booty or simply to obtain food.

struck back.

In any case, Cospatric immediarely

He did not, to be sure, elect to
meet the Scots in the

field for he was in no position to
repeat the deeds of Uhtred or even

Eadulf which had resulted in the decoration
of Durham's walls with the

severed heads of defeated Scots.

His reaction was more prosaic.

Cospatric led a counter raid up the Tyne gap
into Cumberland where he
stole the booty which Malcolm had gathered in
Teesdale and sent back

over Stainmore.

This raid enraged Malcolm who, in

retaliation,

now

ordered his men to kill or enslave everyone who fell
into their power.
It would seem that the Scottish king viewed Cospatric
's conduct as a

breach of faith in some sense, but alternatively he may
only have

reacted in frustration because
whatever political

»ere now impossible."

ai^

he .a. have had

The en^ty between Malcol.
and Cospatric reduced

the 1070 invasion to the
status of a raid.

The Galwegians co^nitted

what were to become the usual
atrocities and filled Scotland
with
English slaves. Cospatric
harassed the» with sallies
fro. Ba^urgh and
remained William's earl."'"'^
This in itself is somewhat
curious.

It is doubtful if it
can be

explained on the basis of some
hypothetical loyalty which the
earl felt
towards William. Perhaps Cospatric
simply feared Malcolm more
than he
did William even though he and
the Scottish king were first
cousins and
the earl had spent time in
Malcolm's court. Alternatively,
Cospatric's
behavior may reflect the strength
of the political bond which
united
Northumbria with the Anglo-Saxon crown,
particularly when the Northumbrians were faced with Galwegians.
T^ere really is not sufficient evidence to draw a conclusion.

What is clear is that Cospatric was
in a

difficult situation because the destruction
of Yorkshire made a defense
of the North impossible.

There was no longer any chance of
obtaining

reinforcements from Yorkshire with which to
beat back the Scots, and the
only other source of aid, a royal expedition,
could not make good this
deficiency.

Even if the king found it convenient to send
an army north,

it would inevitably arrive too late.
Indeed, it is very hard to make sense out of Cospatric's
political

position between 1070 and 1072.
seem to have been proper.

His recorded acts, although scanty,

In 1070 he defended his earldom whatever he

may have been plotting, and in 1071 he followed William's orders
concerning the bishopric of Durham.

Bishop iEthelwine, who had become
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bishop under Tostig, had been outlawed
late in 1069, and in 1071 Will
lam
gave the bishopric to Walcher, a
secular priest from Lotharingia.
whom
the king had invited to England to
fill the post.^^ This was another
sign that Northumbria was not really
subdued.

It was not secure enough

to be used as patronage for one of
the king's faithful clerks.

did what he could, of course, to get Walcher
started.

William

He sent the bis-

hop to York under the care of a housecarl
named Eilaf with an imposing

group of magnates and ordered Cospatric to
conduct him on to Durham; the
earl complied.

behavior.

There was also, however, another side to
Cospatric's

In particular, it would seem that the king's
enemies were not

necessarily his enemies.

Several of the leaders of the revolts against

William were still at large, and they were using the
Northumbrian ports.
In 1070 Edgar the Atheling, Siward Barn, and iferleswein
were at Wear-

mouth with a considerable body of followers, and Bishop
^thelwine took
ship for Flanders from the same port several months after he was
outlawed. "'"^

All these men eventually joined Malcolm in Scotland, and the

next year Siward Barn and Bishop iEthelwine with a large body of men came
south again and joined Hereward on Ely. 18
tainly stopped along the Northumbria

To do this, they almost cer-

coast, and although the brief

descriptions of these movements do not connect them in any way with
Cospatric, it is very difficult to believe that these old allies of the

earl were sailing up and down the coast of his earldom without at least
his tacit consent.
In 1072 William the Conqueror tried to put an end to all this ambi-

guity and chaos in the North.

He had been unable to respond to Malcolm's

Invasion for two years because of troubles in the fens with the remnants

Of King Swein's fleet and
with the English rebels on Ely.

m

1072, however, all these difficulties
were past, and some sort of
action above
the Tees was necessary as the
last step in the consolidation
of his
power over the Anglo-Saxon kingdom.
This is obvious, but exactly what

he hoped to acconrplish is not so
self-evident.

Undoubtedly he wanted to

punish Malcol. for his invasion or
invasions and to force him to abandon
his policy of harboring Anglo-Saxon
rebels and allowing them to use
his

kingdom as a base for operations in
England.

The latter aim would

involve the creation of some political
understanding with Malcolm, but

beyond this point William's intentions
are not known.

Indeed, Ritchie

has asserted that the preceding objectives
constituted his only aims and
that William had no intention of conquering
Scotland in 1072.

This may

be correct, but it must be noted that Ritchie's
argument depends
entirely upon such inherent difficulties in conquering
Scotland as the
lay of the land, the distances involved, and the
absence of strong

points which had to be defended. 20

These considerations were probably

irrelevant to William's intentions in the summer of 1072.
liOt

The king did

know that Malcolm would refuse battle, nor can it be assumed
that he

was well informed on the geography of Scotland.

In fact, there is sim-

ply not enough evidence to say with any certainty how ambitious William's
plans were in 1072, and the idea that he wished

to conquer

Scotland is

just as likely as its opposite.
If, however, William did hope to accomplish great things in 107

these plans did not last long.

2,

During the summer he collected an army

of cavalry and a fleet, and after mid August he began to move north

along the east coast.

With him was Eadric the Wild, presumably to act
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as a technical adviser on how
to deal with Celts.

The fleet was perhaps

intended to bring supplies, but
on this occasion it is also
likely that
its purpose was to act against
Anglo-Saxon "pirates" in the
Scottish
ports. At all events, the invasion
went smoothly but not too
successfully. William crossed into
Lothian, but apparently MalcoLn
refused
battle. Presumably with the Scots
withdrawing before them, the Normans
marched through Lothian and crossed
the Forth into Scotland proper
where
they "found nothing that they were
any better for," a commentary
on the

poverty or at least pastoralism of the
northern realm, and by this time

William was probably feeling somewhat
frustrated and exposed.

His

fleet may have had some success against
the pirates, but otherwise he

had accomplished nothing.

Even though he had penetrated into Fife,

there had been no battle.

His army had collected little plunder,
and he

was by now some 230 to 250 miles from York,
his nearest base.

Indeed,

his position was perilous for behind him all the
way to the North Riding
the dales of northern Britain lay athwart his
line of retreat, and it

was Malcolm who was king of the heads of these dales,
a sobering lesson
in geography.

Furthermore, autumn was advancing, and under these cir-

cumstances, William chose to negotiate.

where they came to an understanding.

The two kings met at Abernethy

Malcolm accepted William as his

overlord by doing homage, gave hostages, probably including Duncan his
eldest son, and apparently promised to expel Edgar the Atheling, his

brother-in-law, and other prominent English rebels.

For his part,

William withdrew from Scotland after promising, no doubt, to respect
Malcolm's borders.
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This agreement may have fallen
short of the Conqueror's
expectations, but it had its value
nevertheless. On his way south,
the Ung

plucked its first fruits, that
is to say. Cospatric.

Once back in

NorthunJ^ria he deprived the earl
of his office on the charges
that the

latter had been involved in planning
the death of Earl Robert in
1069
and that he had helped kill Normans
at York later in the same
year,
deeds which had presumably been
forgiven on the banks of the Tees
two

years earlier.

Prior to William's agreement with
Malcolm, the depri-

vation of Cospatric might have had serious
repercussions, but in the
late fall of 1072 it provoked no native
uprising or Scottish invasion in

support of the earl.

Because of the Conqueror's agreement with
Malcolm,

Cospatric could not even stay at the Scottish
court, as was his custom,
and had to go into exile in Flanders

William did not, however,

change his policy with respect to the earldom at
this time.

His expedi-

tion had been an impressive demonstration of his
power which had won him
the submission of Malcolm and had allowed him to expel
Cospatric.

His

actual control of the North depended upon his presence
there, and

William could not stay, even if he wanted to. because there was
not
enough food in southern Northumberland to support his troops.

In

these circumstances he could do nothing radical, so he appointed another

native earl.

His choice fell on Waltheof, Siward's younger son, whose

mother had been a daughter of Earl Uhtred. 27

Waltheof was thus, like

Cospatric, related to the house of Hamburgh through the female line and
could be expected to possess personal authority in Northumbria because
of this fact.

It is even possible that his appointment had been contem-

plated for some time.

Alone among Edward's earls, he had enjoyed

lasting favor from William.

Waltheof had been allowed to
keep
hi.
2p his

father's old earldom of Huntingdon
and Northampton, and he had
b.
>een
accorded the unparalleled privilege
for an Anglo-Saxon of marrying
within the Conqueror's family. His
wife was Judith, the daughter
of

William's sister Adelaide.^^

Waltheof had not been permitted
these hon-

ors for no reason; they were
probably intended to insure that the
new

earl of the Northumbrians would be
a faithful adherent of the
king.

William may have crossed the Tyne on his
way south satisfied.
can be argued either way.

It

In a sense his achievement was
superficial,

but the limits of the possible were rather
narrow in the North in the
1070' s.

With Yorkshire a waste land and in the
absence of a numerous

group of Norman landholders above the Tees,
his power was very limited.
As it was, he had obtained Malcolm's homage,
gotten his enemies expelled

from Scotland, and installed a new earl who was
bound to him by strong
ties.

All these arrangements fell apart within three
years, as it

turned out, but it is difficult to imagine what else
William could have
done.

It is even possible that he realized the fragile
nature of the

situation for he did not pass into Yorkshire before he had left
behind
something more substantial than the promises of Malcolm and the loyalty
of Waltheof.

His army stopped in Durham and built Bishop Walcher a cas-

tle where he could find relief if the natives proved recalcitrant.^^

Even this turned out to be

a failure in the end but through no fault of

William who crossed the Tees never to return.
One can hardly blame the Conqueror.

It must not have been pleasant

for him to be faced with problems whose insolubility was primarily the

result of his own deeds.

The church at Durham even had a tradition.

which had been turned into a miracle
story by Sy.eon»s time, that
William had crossed the Tees at a

dead run that fall through fear
of St.

Cuthbert or, more specifically,
through dread of damnation.

It is

tempting to see in this story a
reflection of the fact that in 1072

William came to understand the consequences
of his acts.^^

Alterna-

tively, the story may only mean that
St. Cuthberfs monks believed
that

he should have understood and feared for
his soul.

They knew about the

harrying.
Indeed, they undoubtedly knew more than
their historian, Symeon of

Durham, chose to explain in detail.

His special concern was the history

of St. Cuthbert's church and, to a lesser
extent, important events which

had occurred in the North.

These were interests which could exclude

much, yet even in his works there are hints that
conditions were far

worse than political and military events alone would
indicate.

Specifi-

cally, one might wonder what he meant when he said
that William built

Durham castle so that Walcher and his men would have
protection ab
incursantibus.

31

Obviously this phrase might refer to Scottish inva-

sions or even to the type of raid characteristic of northern rebellion,
and perhaps one of these was his meaning.

It is also possible, however,

that by this vague phrase Symeon sought to indicate a more mundane real-

ity of the last decades of the eleventh century, a reality which has

escaped historians because it did not often fall within the categories
of events of interest to the chroniclers and which received, therefore,

only a scant description.

Individually, the notices of this phenomenon

are not too informative, although some are highly suggestive.

If they

are combined, they show that one of the most serious results of the
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conquest on the North was an
intensification of the threat fro.
the
free-zone to the agricultural
cooMunlties of the east coast
plain.

Is to say. the

nu*er

That

of "outlaws" increased
dramatically, and to under-

stand this development, it will
be necessary to return to the
years
before 1066.
As late as the reign of Edward the
Confessor, one of the North's

outstanding problems was the large-scale
brigandage made possible by the
wild conditions of the free-zone. Robbers
were so numerous that travelers went in groups of twenty to thirty
men and still found no security

when Siward was earl, and Tostig is said to
have made war on these brigands with some success. ^2

The only specific example of the latter's
law

and order campaign, however, shows that the
problem had wider dimensions

than just the inherent lawlessness of the
Northumbrians.

On one occa-

sion Tostig captured a notorious "outlaw," nomine
Aldan-hamel

.

who had

been plundering, burning, and killing in Northumbria
for a long time;
and after his capture, Aldan-hamel' s family and friends
tried to ransom
him, but to no avail. 33

This is hardly an account of the bringing to

justice of a common highwayman.

The uncouth name, which is presumably a

mangled version of a Norse or perhaps Anglo-Saxon original, his crimes,

which seem in fact to have been raids, and the attempted ransom indicate
that this outlaw was in reality a man of some standing from the hills or

from the West who had lived by raiding Northumbria.
If this interpretation is correct, it has extremely important

implications for northern history during the eleventh and early twelfth
centuries because it suggests that the famed lawlessness of the North
was produced in part by predatory incursions of the inhabitants of the

shores of the Irish Sea and
of the hills of the northern
free-zone.
Such raids would provide a
reasonable explanation for the
fonnidable
level of brigandage which had
existed under Siward, and Tostig's
war
against the "robbers" could be
understood as an atte.pt to thwart
raids
from the West.^^ In fact, this
idea fits in very well with two
pieces
of information which have survived
from
this period.

First, in 1065

Tostig held nearly all of northern
Lancashire with the adjoining parts
of southern Westmorland and Cumberland
south of the mountains, and he

had probably held the great sokes
centered on Gilling and Catterick

opposite Stainmore.^^

These two groups of estates commanded
the most

important routes south and east from
Cumberland and were probably
intended as a barrier against raids.

Second, this explanation is sup-

ported by the only contemporary description
of Tostig's campaigns
against the "Scots."
[They] harassed him often with raids rather
than war.
But this
irresolute and fickle race of men, better in woods
than on the
plain, and trusting more to flight than to manly
boldness in
battle, Tostig, sparing his own men, wore down
as much by cunning schemes as by martial courage and military
campaigns. 36

The Scots, by which this writer probably meant
Galwegians, raided the
North, and Tostig replied with the ambushes and stratagems
appropriate
to this kind of warfare.

Although the information on these raids is very general, it is
unlikely that they were restricted to Yorkshire's border with Cumbria.

Aldan-hamel had been active above the Tees, and this is not surprising
because Northumbrians western border was rather different from what it
is usually conceived as being.

From the standpoint of Northumbria, a

good border was a frontier which lay far back in the hills on a line

similar to that which existed in the
thirteenth century.

With such a

line, the Northumbrians would have
some protection against raids from

the west and certainly warning of their
approach, but in this period
they did not enjoy these advantages.

Twelfth-century evidence indicates

that the Cumbrians had expanded far to
the east in the days of their

power and that the Northumbrians' border with
their descendants, the
Galwegians, was a north-south line.

During the reign of King David, all

the inhabitants of Scotland south and west of
the Clyde were known as

Galwegians, and according to G. W.

S.

Barrow, Galloway "in its widest

sense" comprised all of Scotland south of the Clyde
and west of Teviotdale.
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Moreover, Barrow's definition is probably somewhat
conservative.

Jocelyn of Furness says that Cumbria ran from sea to sea like
Hadrian's
wall, and this outrageous statement contains some truth.

Jocelyn was

presumably thinking of mid- twelfth-century conditions when he wrote, and
there is a way to confirm his statement in part for he also says that
St. Kentigern's bishopric, Glasgow, was coterminous with the kingdom.

'^^

This is significant because David's Cumbrian inquisition makes the same

identification between Cumbria and Glasgow and adds that the former lay
inter Angliam et Scotiam .
the West.
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Moreover, this inter was not restricted to

In the early twelfth century Teviotdale was apparently sub-

ject to Glasgow.
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This does not, of course, bring Cumbria quite to the

North Sea, but it does in general confirm Jocelyn's conception of the
extent of Cumbria.

Furthermore, three aspects of the feudal history of

the northern end of the free-zone amplify his conception.

First,

despite Rufus's conquest of Cumberland in 1092,

which was

Gllsland,

centered on the western end of the Tyne gap, remained subject to the

Scottish king until the reign
of Henry 11.^3
dence whatsoever that North

^^^^^^^ ^^^^^

Tynedale was part of England
until the

reign of Henry

I

II; and third,

the barony of Langley, which
occupied the South Tyne west

at the earliest and more
probably the reign of Henry

of Corbridge, was a creation of
Henry iVs,''

The North of England was.

then, much smaller and less
defensible than is usually assumed.

Until

1092 Northumbria's border with Cumbria
probably ran north from the Rere
Cross on Stainmore to the Tweed and
included on the Cumbrian side the

bulk of the northern free-zone, and
even after this date the Scots held
a large salient which protruded
down to the South Tyne/^

As late as

the reign of Henry II, Northumbria
consisted of the eastern coastal

plain with the immediately adjoining hills.
on the border.

Corbridge and Hexham stood

Given this north-south frontier, Aldan-hamel's
career of

plundering and burning would not have required
exceptional energy on his
part.

He need not have lived outside the modern
boundaries of Northum-

berland.

There are signs that a border with this configuration
must always

have been a source of danger for the Northumbrians during
times of internal weakness or rebellion.

Earl Eadulf had had to ravage the Cumbrians

during his rebellion against Cnut; and Tostig, whose rule was
unpopular,
had struggled against raids from the Westo"^^

But after 1066 this prob-

lem became even more serious because the Norman Conquest distracted and

weakened the traditional governmental powers on the east coast plain to
a degree unparalleled since the ninth century.

occurred in the North.

Unheard of events

In 1068 "Earl" Osulf of Bamburgh, the killer of

Copsig, was actually killed by an outlaw; and when Bishop

i?]

the Iwine and
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his men tried to return to
Durha. 1„ 1070 frc„ Undlsfarne
where they
had fled to escape William,
despite
their

St.

nu^ers and the presence of

Cuthberfs body they were plundered
and harassed by

^"^^^ "l"a

a certain

a..n Tina, oraeno^.n.

^ater in the sa,.
year, Malcolm raided the North
Riding and Durham from Cmnberland,
a tactic which had no recorded
parallel since the days of Norwegian
power in
the North,

The harrying added a new dimension

to this problem because with
the

destruction of stable society in Yorkshire
"robbers" appeared below the
Tees.
Probably most of them were native
Yorkshire
men who had taken to

brigandage to avoid either starvation or
William's "forgiveness," but
whatever their origin, they constituted a
serious problem,

Symeon of

Durham says that throughout the 1070's
travel across the empty countryside which separated Durham and York was
extremely dangerous on account
of outlaws and wolves, which, incidentally,
faced the same problem of

survival as the nobles once the peasants and their
animals were
destroyed; and there are other accounts which confirm
Symeon's information.

The founders of Selby, which was only ten miles from
York, were

harassed by outlaws who lived in the woods during the 1070
's, and Hugh
fitz Baldric, the sheriff of Yorkshire, is said to have
had to travel

around the shire with a small army because there were still
hostile
Anglo-Saxons at large. 49

Finally, the monks at Whitby had trouble with

outlaws during the 1070 's and were so regularly robbed by outlaws from
the woods as late as the reign of William Rufus that they tried to settle elsewhere.

These exaniples show that brigandage
was a serious and enduring
problem in the aftern^th of the harrying.
The surviving peasants must
have enjoyed little security.
Furthermore, Domesday shows that
the
notices of rapine which found their
way into the chronicles do not
give
the true dimensions of the problem.

One of the most curious features
of

this document's Yorkshire folios is
its account of the Pennines and
Lan-

cashire above the Ribble.

These have been interpreted as showing
that

Yorkshire west of roughly the 400 foot line
and the adjacent parts of
northern Lancashire were almost entirely uninhabited
in 1086, but such a
view is mistaken.

The Normans did not actually survey many of
the

Pennine villages and all of northern Lancashire,
and the most likely
explanation for this is that they really did not control
these areas.
Indeed, there is narrative evidence for this
hypothesis.

During the

early 1070's Archbishop Thomas of York had Bishop Wulfstan
of Worcester

perform episcopal functions in parts of his diocese because
these areas

were still unsubdued, and the areas in question can only have been
the
West.^"^

This discovery completes the melancholy picture of the North in the

years immediately after 1069.

The harrying had, apparently, activated

the southern free-zone by filling the hills with disinherited rebels

turned outlaws, and the isolated examples of brigandage in the literary

sources were only outliers, so to speak, of a much larger area which ran

south from the Cumbrian border through the Pennines into northern Derbyshire and in which Norman power was not firmly established as late as
the end of William's reign.
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William had, then, won his crown at a ter-

rible and lasting price for the North.

Norman rule was restricted to
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the east coast plain and to the western
plain as a result of the harrying.

Between there was brigandage.

The harrying also made it extremely

difficult to control Northumbria on a
regular basis, and it made it

impossible to keep the king of the Scots and
the Cumbrians from raiding
the North, particularly given the fact
that the Cumbrian border was so

far east.

These were the basic problems which confronted
Norman rule in

the North during the rest of the eleventh century.

They could not be

solved until a numerous Norman aristocracy was
established beyond the
Humber which could control Northumbria and fight the
Scots.

Such a

group could not be created until Yorkshire was redeveloped,
and this
took time both because of the magnitude of the task and
because the danger to peasants from outlaws based in the free-zone had to
be contained

first.

In the meantime, the events of northern history proceeded from

an outre mixture of traditional problems in an acute form and Norman
weakness.

The North was violent and unstable, and it is no wonder that

William never crossed the Tees again and came only once more to York.
The Ab erne thy understanding could only fall apart.

Although this occurred by degrees between 1072 and 1080, the first
signs of what was to come appeared in 1074.

With the Abernethy agree-

ment less than two years old, Edgar the Atheling sailed back to Scotland
from Flanders with his followers, and it is unlikely that he came uninvited.^^

Malcolm had either decided that he could safely harbor his

brother-in-law, or he was plotting to disrupt the North again.

The lat-

ter would be the more likely of the alternatives if 1074 was also the

year when Malcolm invited Cospatric to come to Scotland from Flanders
and gave him the earldom of Dunbar in Lothian, an event which was
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clearly a prelude to trouble in
Northumbria.

But although the return of

Edgar and Cospatric would logically
fit together, it is impossible
to
date the latter event with any precision.

It may have happened in

1074; but, in any case, the reception of Edgar
by itself was a clear

violation of the understanding between Malcolm
and William and showed
that the former had not been too impressed
by the Conqueror in 1072.

This incident did not, however, lead to any
serious problems in the

North because of two unforeseen events.

While Edgar was in Scotland,

the French king offered him a castle on the
Channel from which he could

harass William.

Edgar accepted, but on his way south he lost all
of his

ships in a storm somewhere along the English coast.
the Atheling's open opposition to the Conquest.

This disaster ended

He regained Scotland

but now sought and obtained a reconciliation with William,
presumably

because he had lost too many followers to remain a plausible rebel.
The Atheling's defection from the forces of disorder was not, however, very important.

retical level.
questions o

He had never been dangerous except on the theo-

Yet the events of 1074 still raise two rather curious

One might wonder, for instance, why Malcolm had risked

William's displeasure for no apparent reason and how Edgar, despite
shipwreck, his own incompetence, and the Normans, had managed to escape

back to
foot.
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S cotland,

particularly since some of his followers went on

These questions, unfortunately, cannot be definitely answered,

but this in itself suggests that some important aspect of the northern

political situation in 1074 was not recorded in the chronicles.

Even

more curiously, the same problem is encountered in the events of 1075.
In that year. Earl Waltheof of Northumbria, whom William had appointed

only three years previously, went
into open revolt in company with
the
Breton earl of East Anglia and the
Norman earl of Hereford. Given
such
a bizarre coalition, the motives of
the rebels were bound to be rather
disparate, but despite the fact that
historians have realized this, no

one has succeeded in producing a convincing
explanation of why Waltheof

joined the revolt.^^

This is not the fault of the historians
who have

studied the revolt, however.

The difficulty

steins

directly from the

primary Anglo-Norman chronicles whose writers either
did not know why

Waltheof had revolted or deliberately minimized his role
in the affair
because his headless corpse had begun to perform miracles,
a sure sign
of innocence.
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The embellishment and outright fabrication which
this

point of view necessitated would not have been possible if
the real rea-

son for Waltheof 's revolt had been current in the South in
the late

eleventh and early twelfth centuries.
Some important event or situation of 1073 or 1074 has been left out
of the major chronicles.

Only its ramifications, which together amount

to the collapse of most of William's authority in the North, are visi-

ble.

Fortunately this gap can be filled, although not with the exacti-

tude which one might wish.

Symeon of Durham knew what had happened, but

he buried the event in one of St. Cuthbert's miracles in the defense of

Northumbrian property where it has successfully eluded historians.

This

miracle shows that Waltheof had excellent reasons for joining the revolt
of Earls Ralph and Roger; indeed, he had no choice at all.

The reason

for this was that William the Conqueror had blundered badly.

Either in

1073 or more probably in 1074, he decided to levy a tribute or tax on

Northumbria and sent a certain Ralph above the Tees to collect

it.^"*"
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The miracle describes the imposition
of this tax as uncustomary,
and
given the reaction of the Northumbrians
to demands for money in the
past, the result might have been easily
anticipated.

But these Northum-

brians were on their best behavior in a
miracle story; and. in any case,
credit, especially credit for defying the
king, belonged to St. Cuthbert.

Kept alive by this necessity, Ralph went
about his business levy-

ing the tribute, but on the night before it
was to be collected, he

foolishly dropped his guard and went to sleep.

Cuthbert his opening.

This, of course, gave

He duly appeared to Ralph in a dream, chided
him

severely for taxing his flock, and intimated that
he would not get away

with it unscathed.

Ralph awoke the next day "sicko"

He had lost all

interest in gathering the tribute and only wished to escape
Northumbria
alive.

After he had made appropriate signs of reverence to St.
Cuth-

bert, this was granted to him.

Upon his departure he regained his

health, but, needless to say, he carried with him no money.

Although Cuthbert was a powerful saint, this story must be a
twelfth-century monk's way of saying that William had tried to tax
Northumbria, probably believing that he had accomplished more in 1072
than he actually had, and that the Northumbrians had driven out the tax

collectors.

Waltheof was inevitably involved in this because either he

had been a party to the expulsion of Ralph or he had failed to protect
him.

Either way, he was effectively in revolt against William.

Fur-

thermore, Waltheof made the now traditional Northumbrian gesture of

defiance of southern authority.

He sent a raiding party of Northum-

brians over the Tees in search of the sons of Carl who were now to pay
for their father's killing of Waltheof's grandfather on his mother's
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side. Earl Ealdred.

One might well wonder what Siward
would have

thought about all this.

His son had changed sides in the
old battle

between Bamburgh and York, but this paradox
did not save the sons and
grandsons of Carl.

The Northumbrians caught them at a
banquet and

killed most of them.^^
The innuendoes of this deed may have been
lost on the Normans, but
its basic meaning was unmistakable.

William's authority in the North

had collapsed in 1074, and it was entirely his
own fault given the
Northumbrians' sensitivity on the question of tribute.

Their behavior

was entirely consistent with what they had done in
1065 and during the

early revolts against William.

The only question involved— and this is

perhaps the reason why William felt it safe to levy the tax—
is under-

standing how they had the effrontery to do it again, especially
with the

harrying only four years past.

Furthermore, they were now faced with

the same old difficulty as in past revolts.

It was one thing to drive

out the agents of an unpopular southern government; it was quite another
to avoid paying for it.

This problem presumably bothered Waltheof , and he may have been

more active in the events of 1074 and 1075 than one can gather from the
chronicles.

In particular, Edgar's return to Scotland and Malcolm's

willingness to receive him with honor were probably connected with

Waltheof 's revolt and may represent the first steps in an unsuccessful
attempt by the earl to obtain aid from this quarter.

Waltheof is also

likely to have been seriously involved in the planning of the revolt of
1075, if only because he stood in such great need of aid.

His momentar-

ily successful defiance of William can only have encouraged Ralph and
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Roger, and he may even have
convinced them to revolt rather
that the
opposite as the chronicles assert."
Finally, the rebel earls invited
a
Danish fleet to co^ to their
aid, and although Ralph
and Roger are
expressly said to have been
responsible for this, it is .ore
likely that
it was the work of Waltheof or
at least accomplished through
his intermediacy.
In any case, a respectable
coalition, which offered Waltheof
more

hope than he had had any right to
anticipate in 1074, had been brought
together by the spring of 1075.
Unfortunately for the earl, it vanished
as quickly as it had been formedo

The rebels were undone by a failure

to coordinate their actions which
stretched from the English borderlands
to Denmark.

No one was on time in 1075 except
William's representatives.

The arrival of the Danes was delayed
by a conflict between the sons of

Swein Estrithson who had died in April of 1074.^^

Despite this rather

major flaw in their plans, Ralph and Roger
took the field anyway, but
they were unable to unite their forces.

Roger remained penned up in the

West, and Ralph's revolt quickly contracted to
the inside of his castle
at Norwich which was besieged by William's forces
for three months.

For his part, Waltheof, the victim, no doubt, of a
growing sense of des-

peration, seems to have stayed in the North waiting for the Danes.
Rumors were current, to be sure, that the North was in revolt,
and

Lanfranc ordered Walcher to be prepared for the arrival of the Danes.
Yet as the revolt in the South collapsed, Waltheof apparently remained
inactive because he realized that the Northumbrians could not act alone,
and when the failure of the Danes to arrive had clearly undone the
revolt, he capitulated.

According to one version of the Anglo-Saxon

Ch£2£lcle, the earl crossed
to Normandy to seek
William's pardon and
offered the king "treasure,presumably the tribute which
had been withheld in 1074. Fro. Waltheof
's point of view this
sign of submission may
have seemed sufficient atonement;
but, if so, he was forgetting
the fat
of Earls Uhtred, Ealdred, and
Eadulf. His was to be no
different.
William dissembled until they had
returned to England and Waltheof
's
safe-conduct had presumably expired.
Then he had the earl cast into
69
prison.
About the same time the Danes
finally arrived with a fleet of
200 ships.

They could do nothing against
the Normans by themselves;

and, after a perfunctory cruise
up the Humber to York where they
sacked

the cathedral, they left the kingdom.

Thus the great coalition of 1075 faded
away.

Military events had

made a mockery of the real danger which
the alliance between the rebels
and the Danes had posed, and William's
authority was again unchallenged

in the North.

This was not the case, however, in Brittany
whither Ralph

de Gael, the ex-earl of Norfolk, had removed
his revolt.

situation was developing there,

A threatening

and it was perhaps this circumstance

which induced the king to treat the Northumbrians moderately.

Waltheof,

who had risen far too high in the royal favor to be forgiven,
was
beheaded; but the royal punitive expedition which might have
been antic-

ipated was not sent into the North.

By the next campaigning season

William had a more pressing use for his soldiers than burning out Northumbrians, so they went unpunished for once.

The king merely appointed a

new earl, and his choice was as conciliatory as it could have been short
of selecting another member of the house of Bamburgh, whose representa-

tives had not been notable for their loyalty.

No new Norman earl was

placed ove. the Northu^rians;
rather, the king built upon
the one pillar of public authority above
the
Tees which still stood.

Walcher wa3 allowed to buy the
earldom.

Bishop

He had reroained both alive

and loyal since his appointment
in 1071, an

inrpressive accomplishment

for an outsider above the Tees;
and his selection was the easiest
solution to the problem of Northumbrian
government

in 1076 for anything else

would have risked an incident.

an attempt

Furthermore, William seems to have made

to bolster Walcher's prestige.

He restored to Durham an old

estate which had been lost, granted some
new property, and confirmed the
ancient l^s and customs of the bishopric.
The latter presumably

included a promise that Walcher' s rule was not

to be disturbed by any

threat of royal taxation.

This makeshift arrangement functioned with some
success for five
years.

It is, however, difficult to form a very clear
impression of the

nature of ¥alcher»s government or its popularity with
the Northumbrians.

He was fondly remembered by later monks at Durham, and Symeon
portrays

him as an honest, upright man who diligently performed his episcopal
duties.

Of course, the support which Walcher gave to the revival of

monasticism in the North would be enough

to account for this, although

there is no compelling reason to believe that it does.^^

Rather, it

seems likely that certain aspects of Walcher 's character were edited
out, so to speak.

man.
flock,

The bishop was clearly an exceptionally ambitious

Why else would he have undertaken the care of
nofc to

mention the government of Northumbria?

St. Cuthbert's testy

Furthermore, if he

really did buy the earldom, one must suppose that he intended to get his

money back.

Walcher had not come into Northumbria just to be a good

bishop, even though he n^y have
been one; and he was sufficiently

political-minded to grasp the basic truth
that to survive above the Tees
he had to come to terms with the house
of Bamburgh.
From an early date

he had adopted a certain Ligulf as his
principal adviser.

The latter

was an important landowner who had
retired to his Northumbrian estates
in the face of the Conquest and who was
married to a daughter of Earl
Ealdred.

He was, thus, like Cospatric and Waltheof,
connected with the

Bamburgh family, and his presence in the
bishop's council must have pro-

vided a link with the native aristocracy.

Indeed, Walcher is said to

have performed no important secular act without
his consent,

and this

policy of accommodation and respect for Northumbrian
tradition was probably responsible for Walcher's survival.

It is also obvious, however,

that there was another side to the bishop's government.

Even Symeon of

Durham does not suppress the fact that Walcher's household
knights often
plundered and occasionally killed the natives and that Walcher
did nothing to stop them.
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This was, needless to say, a very dangerous policy

which could be expected to provoke the Northumbrians, and it is
extremely difficult to account for it.

The usual explanation, which is

an extrapolation from Symeon, is that Walcher was simply incapable of

controlling his soldiers, and this may have been the case.''^

Alterna-

tively, Walcher's soldiers may have acted on the bishop's orders, con-

ceivably in response to native opposition or out of arrogance, situations which Symeon would not have felt free to mention since either

would have put the bishop in

a

bad light.

Whichever of these was actually the case, Walcher's government did
arouse the resentment of the Northumbrians; and, even without the
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misdeeds of his soldiers, this was probably
only to be expected given
the circumstances which had surrounded
his acquisition of the earldom
1075.

WilliaTn's conciliatory settlement of
the rebellion of 1074-75 i s

unlikely to have impressed on them the
inadvisability of defying Norman
power, but it is impossible to tell how serious
this problem was between
1075 and 1079.

In the latter year, however, an event
occurred which may

have been prompted by the weakness of Walcher's government
and which
increased his difficulties with the Northumbrians.

In August of 1079

Malcolm Canmore finally decided that it was safe to ignore
the Abernethy
agreement entirely and launched his third invasion of the North.

Cer-

tain general considerations which had nothing to do with the North
were

undoubtedly involved in this decision.

In 1077 Malcolm had defeated the

ruler of Moray, his chief domestic rival, and this victory had freed him

from internal dangers.
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Furthermore, William the Conqueror was fight-

ing his son Robert in northern France that summer and must have seemed
I
only
a very distant threat.
.
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Malcolm probably also judged, however,

that Walcher would be able to put up no serious resistance.
this proved to be the case.

Certainly

In mid August the Scots came over the border

and freely plundered Northumberland for about three weeks.
time Walcher seems to have done nothing.

During this

He did not even launch counter

raids as Cospatric had done in 1072, and the Scots were able to return

home with many slaves and much booty.
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This invasion set the stage for the last outrage of the Northum-

brians.

Walcher's failure to provide even a nominal defense for North-

umberland apparently ended his prestige; and by spring, Ligulf Walcher's
,

native collaborator, became uncooperative in council.

He was the

natural leader of any resistance
to Walcher, and this was,
therefore, a
serious development. Unfortunately,
what occurred is obscure
because
the only coherent account 6f
the incident, that of
Florence of Worcester,
explains it in terms of a personal
conflict between Ligulf and two
of
Walcher's subordinates, his chaplain
Leobwin and Gilbert, the bishop's
kinsman who managed the secular
government of the bishopric.
According
to Florence, Leobwin had been
jealous of Ligulf for some time and

decided to kill the latter after Ligulf
had opposed him in the bishop's
council.
Since Ligulf was the current link
between the Hamburgh family and Northumbrian government, however,
one may legitimately doubt

whether the incident was this simple; but
even if it was, the Northumbrians had lost too many members of the house
of Bamburgh ever to

•

believe that the event which followed was not
an official act of
Walcher's government.

A classic sequence ensued.

Gilbert, who had agreed to do the deed,

attacked Ligulf 's hall by surprise in the night and
killed him along

with most of his household.

The use of this tactic should probably be

understood as a sign that Walcher and his men were already
faced with a
serious situation, although it is theoretically possible that
the arrogance of Gilbert and Leobwin was so great that they disregarded
the

obvious danger of what they had done.

In either case,

the murder of

Ligulf had been a fatal mistake because whether or not the Northumbrians
had been contemplating a revolt, they had now been provoked by the tra-

ditional act of oppression, the murder of a member of the house of Bamburgh by an agent of the king.

Their reprisal was equally traditional.

Walcher had shut himself up in Durham castle after the murder, but he
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^on

consented to a meeting with
Ligulf's relatives at Gateshead
which
offered a convenient gathering
place for Northmnbrians from
either side
of the Tyne. Presumably he had
been offered some hope that
peace could
i>e restored, but the meeting
was in actuality a trap. When
Walcher
arrived at Gateshead with a hundred
knights on May 14th, he found that

the llorthumbrians would come to no
agreement.

retired to the church, but it did no good.

He then with some naivete

The Northumbrians first

killed all of his retainers who had remained
outside, then cut down
Gilbert and the bishop when they tried to
escape, and finally burned

down the church to get at Leobwin.

The killer of the bishop was Eadulf

Rus, the son of Cospatric who had been killed
by Tostig in 1064.^^

In a fundamental sense the massacre at Gateshead
was the last incident in Northumbrian history because the Northumbrian
nobility had
finally overreached itself.

The rebels did go down to Durham where they

besieged the castle, but they were unable to take it
by assault and

withdrew on the fourth day of the siege.

Probably they reasoned that

the castle garrison was too small to be a serious threat; and,
in any
case, their major objective, the destruction of Walcher and the
instru-

ments of his government, was already accomplished.

In 1080 as in past

revolts, the Northumbrians had acted in response to a specific outrage.

Once this was avenged, there was nothing else for them to do.

They may

even have reasoned with the events of 1075 in mind that the worst which
they could expect would be the imposition of a new earl, and their fail-

ure to press

the siege of the castle, which was within their means,

nxay

have been an attempt to limit the provocation which they gave the king.

If this was the case, it was a futile
gesture.

were undone by their lack of imagination.
had gone home.^^

The Northumbrians

After lifting the siege they

This time William did not simply appoint
a new earl.

He had been doing that since 1067 when his
first earl had been killed.
In 1080, he made a determined attempt to take
Northumbria in hand; and,

even though the measures which followed are not
known in detail, they

seem to have been part of a comprehensive plan.

First, the Northum-

brians were punished for the killing of Walcher and
his men.

At some

date during the summer, William's half brother Odo led
an expedition
into Northumbria to harry the countryside.

No chronicler describes what

transpired in any detail, but Odo's purpose seems to have been
to kill

Northumbrians.

The Normans slaughtered and maimed both the guilty and

the innocent, and they were apparently able to weaken the native
nobil-

ity seriously, killing or driving into exile many of its members.

This was an extremely important event.

It was the final solution to the

old problem of governing the Northumbrians which stretched back to the
days of Cnut's conquest of England.

There would be no more native

revolts above the Tees because in 1080 the Northumbrian nobility had

joined the nobles of York,
Odo's expedition solved one aspect of the general political and

military problem which the North posed, but it did little to insure that
the Normans could keep control of the area.

The Northumbrian nobility

had at least demonstrated little inclination to go over to the Scots
except in extremis , and with them gone, some action against Malcolm was

clearly necessary.
1080.

William met this need with a second expedition in

In the fall, he sent his son Robert into Scotland with an army.
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It has been asserted that the purpose
of this move was entirely
diplo-

matic, that it was a "demonstration
in force" designed to bring about
a

reconciliation with Malcolm,
intention.

but there is no proof that this was
the

William and Robert may have hoped for

a

decisive battle

which would simplify the situation in the North,
and all that is known
for certain is that a battle did not take
place.

Robert led his army

through Lothian to Falkirk where he met Malcolm.

The Scottish king

would not fight, and Robert was faced with the choice
of chasing him
further or negotiating.

Robert chose the latter.

The two men renewed

the Abernethy agreement, and Malcolm gave more
hostages for his good

behavior.

Then Robert returned to Northumbria nullo confecto
negotio .^^

This phrase of Symeon's certainly suggests that the outcome
of Robert's

expedition was thought to be unsatisfactory.
Still, Robert had accomplished all that could be realistically

hoped; and, like his father in 1072, he did not leave the Northumbrian

landscape as he had found it.

On his way south Robert stopped on the

north side of the Tyne opposite Gateshead and built a new castle, the
Newcastle as it would become in time.

multiple significance.

The erection of this castle had a

On the one hand, its location across from the

spot where Walcher and his men had been massacred stood as a warning to
the remaining Northumbrians.

On the other hand, it was a tangible sign

that Norman England now extended to the Tyne.

Some historians would

also add that the location of this castle was an admission that the

country north of the Tyne was debatable, or perhaps even Scottish, 91 but

neither of these suppositions is true except perhaps in a military
sense.

Newcastle could defend Durham but not Northumberland.

h
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Yet this observation, despite its descriptive
truth in 1080 and for
many years to come, obscures the fact that
Newcastle
was probably

Intended as

a

base for the new regime which William created
in Northum-

bria after the conclusion of the military operations
of 1080.

Robert

had secured freedom for the North from major
Scottish invasions, and Odo

had crushed native opposition to Norman rule.

These circumstances made

it possible for William to integrate Northumbria more
closely into the

kingdom than it had been in the past by introducing Normans
into the
ecclesiastical and secular government of the earldom.

Before the year

was out, William de St. Calais, a trusted administrator of
the king,

obtained the bishopric of Durham; and around the same time, a certain

Aubrey became earl of Northumbria. 92

For the latter to succeed, how-

ever, he needed a stronghold between Durham castle, which belonged to
the bishop, and Bamburgh, the ancient fastness of the earls, which was

nearly forty-five miles above Gateshead.

Newcastle provided this.

It

was a secure bridgehead into Northumberland, the necessary preliminary
to the exercise of political and military power above the Tyne.

Moreover, Newcastle did not stand alone.

The expeditions and

appointments of 1080 which brought the formal conquest of Northumbria

were matched to the south by the beginnings of an assault on the freezone.

This was a task of the utmost importance because the creation of

a strong North depended upon the extension of Norman control into the

hills.

Until this was accomplished, the peasants would still be subject

to brigands, and it would not be too important who was earl or bishop

Indeed, this was strikingly illustrated in 1081(?) when William's new
ear 1 of Northumbria actually resigned the honor and went home because he

either could not control the earldom
or thought it was worthless, 93
curious incident forced Williaa to
appoint another earl, Robert de
Mowbray, and confirmed the need for
the policy, which had probably
already begun, of establishing a
series

^.
This

of compact fees at the mouths
of

the major breaks in the southern
Pennines and in other places which
were

subject to the incursions of outlaws and
pirates.

Some of these fees

were explicitly known as castleries, and
all of them were exceptionally
compact units.

Their purpose was defensive in the
sense that they were

designed to control communications, and
some of them, notably those

which adjoined the hills, were intended as
bases for expansion.

Fur-

thermore, their lords usually possessed
formidable judicial powers which

included infangthief, the right to have a gallows,
the right to the
goods of condemned fugitives, the assize of bread
and ale, and the

return of writs except for pleas of the crown.
powers amounted to effective police power.

Taken together, these

They were all that a baron

needed to be a terror to outlaws and robbers, and herein
probably lay
the principal day to day function of these fees.
to provide law and order in vulnerable districts.

They were established

A castlery was not

simply an area organized for the support of a castle; it was also
the

area subject to the castle.
The oldest of these units around the Pennines was in the south and

probably dated back to the days when the marcher earldoms themselves had

been formed.

Henry de Ferrers' castlery of Tutbury dominated the roads

which converged on Derby from the northwest and blocked the major river
valleys of the southern end of the Pennines, 96 and there was a similar,

although smaller, unit west of Nottingham where the holdings of William
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Peverel, which may also have
been a castlery. covered the
city against
the west.^^ These two fees
had probably been formed in
the early

1070's
to secure comnmnications around
the southern end of the
free-zone and to

contain raids from this area.

Hereward the Wake, it will be
remembered,

was killed by knights from Tutbury
according to Gaimar.^^

They also

presumably served as the direct
archetype for the fees which William
created in the North around 1080.
This late date for the establishment
of the castleries and similar
districts in Yorkshire may seem rather
surprising, but it is apparently
correct. W. E. Wightman has argued
from
the details of their descrip-

tion in Domesday that they were formed
late in William's reign, probably
as an aid to Robert de Mowbray, and
his reasoning is convincing.^^

Moreover, Symeon of Durham specifically states
that the countryside of

Yorkshire remained uncultivated and empty for nine
years after the harrying, and the most probable explanation for
the passing of these conditions is that William had begun to create defensive
districts at criti-

cal spots in the North in 1079-1080. """^^

TWO castleries and three exceptionally large and compact fees
were
established to protect ^he lowlands of the North from the various
threats which surrounded them.

There was, on the one hand, the danger

of piracy along the coast; and Holderness, the area most exposed
to this

danger, was given almost in its entirety to Drogo.

On the other hand,

there was the more serious threat from the wild parts of Yorkshire, the
fens and the mountains; and three large lordships, Tickhill, Pontefract,

and Richmond, were established in settled regions which adjoined these
areas.

In the far south of the West Riding and in the neighboring parts
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of Derbyshire and Nottinghamshire.
Roger de

BusU was given

a compact

fee (Tlckhill) through which the roads
from York passed south and which

abutted three dangerous areas, the
Pennines on the west, the fens at the
head of the Humber on the east, and
Sherwood forest on the southeast.

North of Roger's land stood Ilbert de
Lacy's castlery of Pontefract.

It

stretched continuously from the Pennine
foothills to the fens on either
side of the Aire.

Pontefract dominated not only all the roads
running

north-south, but also the entrance of the Aire gap
which was the easiest

passage through the Pennines from their southern
end to the Tyne gap far
to the north.
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The next important passage through the mountains
above

the Aire gap was Stainmore in the North Riding, and it
was blocked by

Count Alan's castlery of Richmond, a solid block of
199 manors on the

eastern slopes of the Pennines and the edge of the Vale of

York."'"^^

RichmoEtd, Pontefract, and Tickhill closed the easiest exits
from the

Pennines and together provided security for the Vale of York.

"

In the

West the functions of these fees and of Holderness were combined in the

lordship of Roger of Poitou who held all of Lancashire between the Ribble and the Mersey along with the western flanks of the Pennines around
the approaches to the Aire

gap.''"^^

Roger's fee was in reality a mili-

tary salient intruded between the free-zone and the Irish Sea pirates.

Finally, by 1086 a new royal castle had been raised far up the Derwent

valley at the Peak in Derbyshire.
T3ae

'''^^

creation of these lordships around the Pennines was the most

imports.nt development which took place in the North in the 1080 's

because they offered the hope that the danger from the free-zone could
be contained and ultimately destroyed.

Unfortunately, however,

the

dally activities of men such as Ilbert de Lacy or
William Peverel, not
to mention Earl Robert de Mowbray in the wilds
of Northumberland, were

not gaudy enough to attract the attention of the
chroniclers, and nothing is known of them.

Indeed, hardly anything at all happened in the

North outside the ecclesiastical sphere between 1080 and 1087
according
to the chronicles.

There were no murders, revolts, or invasions, and

Norman power was uncontested, at least during the daylight hours and
away from the woods.

The only exception to this was the threatened Dan-

ish invasion of 1085 which probably provoked the devastation of Holder-

ness by the Normans, but in the end the Danes did not

come."'"^^

In fact, this rare period of peace even survived the Conqueror's

death in 1087.

The military activities connected with the baronial

revolt of 1088 were limited to southern England, and even though Earl
Robert and Bishop William were among the rebels, there were only minor
repercussions in the North in a direct sense.

Malcolm did not invade

either because he was getting old or because he was waiting to see how
Rufus would fare against the rebels, and Robert de Mowbray obtained a
complete reconciliation with the king.

Indeed, the only ones to suffer

at all were William de St. Calais and the clerks of Durham.

The former,

who may have done some local raiding, was exiled as a result of the
revolt, and the latter had to endure the fiscal tedium of one of Rufus 's

agents until the bishop's restoration three years later.
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With this

exception, the tranquility of the North remained unbroken until 1091
whets open warfare with the Scots broke out.

This appearance of tranquility may be deceptive, however, because

there is a possibility that the settlement of the baronial revolt of

,
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1088 brought a basic change in royal policy in
the North o
there was need for a change from the Norman
point of view.

Certainly

William the

Conqueror had achieved the destruction of serious
opposition to Norman
rule in the North but little else, and when Rufus
became king the Nor-

mans above the Humber were still in

a

weak and unsatisfactory position.

With their settlement limited to below the Ribble in the
West and probably to south of the Wansbeck in Northumberland, "'"^^ they were
potentially at the mercy of the Scots given the fact that the border was as

disadvantageous as ever and that the redevelopment of Yorkshire had only

begun despite the creation of castlexies around the southern free-zone.
This area itself was still for the most part unsubdued, and the peace of
the North depended on the homage of Malcolm Canmore, a volatile subs tance

These circumstances cannot have been pleasing to the Normans in the
North.

Ultimately they could only be solved by time, but in one respect,

the danger which stemmed from the border, the situation could be

improved quickly by a change of royal policy.

Specifically, Rufus could

disregard his father's understanding with Malcolm.

Malcolm's homage to

William has usually be°n considered from the standpoint of whether it
compromised the "independence" of the Scottish kingdom, and this is
unfortunate because the arrangement was as much in Malcolm's interest as
in William's.

The Scottish king did homage and thereby accepted a posi-

tion of political subordination which meant little in practice; William,

however, must have guaranteed him ag3.inst general Norman aggression or
infringements on the border.

In fact, the meeting of 1080 is said to

have included a definition of the border although its precise terms are

.

unknown. '^^

This understanding was to Malcolm's
advantage for it, in

effect, froze the border and indirectly limited
Norman settlement to

areas which were not too exposed to the sudden
eruptions of Scots and

Galwegians.

A breach with Malcolm was, therefore, in the interest
of

the northern nobles if they could be assured of royal
support in the

hostilities with the Scots which could follow, and it is likely
that
Rufus gave this promise in 1088.

As a result of the baronial revolt of

that year, the marcher lords seem to have obtained the abrogation
of

similar guarantees which William had given to the Welsh princes, and
it
is unlikely that the northern rebels, especially Robert de Mowbray
and

Roger of Poitou,

would have been satisfied with less

This can only be offered as an hypothesis, however, because there
is an important gap in the chronology of events in the North under

Rufus.

At some point the king resumed his father's policy of establish-

ing well enfranchised lordships along the edges of the free-zone, but

exactly when these baronies were created can only be guessed.

In one

instance, that of Skipton in Craven, this is not a serious problem.
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Skipton stood at the head of the Aire, and although it was of great
importance because it split the southern free-zone and insured direct
communications with the West, its establishment had only internal significance.

This was not the case with Rufus 's other new baronies which

were all on the Scottish border.

In the West, he gave Ivo Taillebois a

new lordship composed of Ewecross Wapentake, southern Westmorland, and

southern Cumberland.

These lands provided the basis for the later bar-

onies of Burton in Lonsdale, Kendal, and Copeland, and if Furness was

included, as is likely, they constituted a continuous strip of land
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running from the northwestern exit of the Aire gap
to the Irish Sea.
Ivo's lands covered all the routes north into Cumbria
and all the trails
from northern Lancashire over the Pennines from the
Aire gap northwards.
If this land was given to Ivo prior to 1092, it
originally formed a

frontier castlery analogous to Richmond.

1

-I

o

Rufus also created similar

lordships along the east side of the Pennines.

Guy de Balliol obtained

upper Teesdale where he built Barnard Castle and the barony of Bywell
in the Tyne valley.
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Furthermore, it is possible, although not likely,

that Rufus gave Redesdale to Robert de Umfraville who held this valley
by the tenure of guarding or keeping it from the outlaws.
of course, the purpose of Bywell and Barnard Castle also.

"''"'"^

This was,

These lord-

ships blocked either the two or the three most obvious passages above

Richmond from Cumbria into Northumbria and were of the utmost importance
for protecting the coastal plain.

Rufus's fees were, moreover, squarely

on the Cumbrian border, or in the case of Ivo's lands, what was the border before 1092; and, if they were formed prior to 1092, they were a

direct provocation to Malcolm Canmore and a sign that the spirit of

Abernethy was dead.
This problem of t^'mng is important because of the chain of events

which began in 1091 and which led to great political changes in northern
Britain.

In that year Malcolm Canmore shattered the peace of the North

by invading Northumbria, and the question is whether he did this for his

own reasons, such as to aid Edgar the Atheling who had been deprived of
his estates in Normandy, or whether he had been baited into it just as

Rhys ap Tewdwr, the king of South Wales, was being baited in these same

years by the marcher lords of Wales.
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Probably the latter was the

case, although it is impossible
to be certain.
at least, extraordinary.

The invasion of 1091 was

Not only did Malcolm invade
Northumberland in

May, a very bad time of year
for an army to find provisions
in the North
but he apparently hoped to take
Durham, something not attempted
by the
Scots since Duncan's expedition
in the 1040's and which, if
successful,

would have resulted in the collapse
of Norman power above the Tees.
invasion of 1091 was a serious attack,

The

not a raid or only a diplomatic

gesture as has been suggested,

and it indicates that Malcolm either

felt himself to be in an exceptionally
strong position, which is

unlikely, or that he had become alanned at
the growth of Norman power in
the North.

In either case, his bold stroke did not work,
though the

reasons for this are far from clear.
in May.

The Scots entered Northumberland

They then moved south, by-passed or took Newcastle,
and pene-

trated as far as central Durham.

At this critical point, however, the

oldest descriptions of these events become contradictory.

The account

which is usually followed, a summary of Malcolm's raids in the
Historia
Regim, says that Malcolm was confronted by a small group of
knights at

Chester-le-Street just north of Durham and quickly withdrew. "'"'^

Other sources, in 'uding a different passage in the Historia Regum
itself, indicate that this is not what happened or, at least, not all
that happened.

The main narrative in the Historia Regum directly asso-

ciates the failure of Malcolm's invasion with the arrival of William
Rufus's retaliatory expedition in the North in the fall, and one of St.

Cuthbert*s miracles indirectly explains what took place, '^''"^

It indi-

cates that Durham was, in fact, besieged for some time in 1091, that the

opposing knights did nothing

to drive away the Scots, and that the
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latter finally fled for no apparent reason. ^^0

The befuddlement of

invading armies and of historians who would
trace their movements was,
of coixrse, one of St. Cuthbert's most
important abilities, but in this

particular instance the writer goes too far.

To complete the miracle,

he adds that Bishop William was restored in the
same hour as the one in

which the Scots decamped. 121

The bishop's appearance out of nowhere

would have been a miracle indeed; but, in fact, it is known
from other
sources that William de St. Calais was reinstated in the fall
of 1091 by
Rufus, his brothers, and a large Norman army which was on its way
north
to fight Malcolm.
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They were, the ones who saved Durham, and this in

turn means that the Scots had stayed in Northumbria throughout the sum-

mer of 1091.

This was an ominous development, and even if Rufus had not been
hitherto pursuing a policy hostile to the Scots, he now embarked on one.
The English king had come north that fall with an army and a fleet to

force a military decision, and when it became clear that the Scots had

already retreated out of Northumbria, he moved after them into Lothiano
Not unpredictably, this direct approach failed in 1091 just as it had in

1072 and in 1080.

Ma""

olm would not give battle, and Rufus

's

chances of

ever catching him were completely destroyed when he lost his supply
fleet.

The Norman army was soon cold and starving, and the invasion

ended in the usual way.

Malcolm and Rufus met in Lothian, perhaps with

a well fed and properly clothed Scottish army lurking in the nearby
hills., and negotiated a renewal of the Abernethy agreement through the

intermediacy of Edgar the Atheling and Duke Robert.

fealty to Rufus, and the latter promised

Malcolm swore

to return the twelve vills
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which Ralcolm had held under William the Conqueror.
south o

Then Rufus went
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Tkis settlement did not end the natter, however.

Rufus was appar-

ently tmhappy with the results of his invasion of Scotland, ''"^^ and he

may even have felt that he had made
basic problem with the Scots

a

fool of himself.

In any case, the

still renained, and to solve this problem,

he trie-d in 1092 a new tack which con&ined force with deceit.
move was to conquer Cumberland o

His first

The expedition by which this was accom-

plished is described in little detail, but it seems to have been a well
conceived effort to take and hold the areao

In 1092 Rufus led an army

north and drove out Dolfin, the lord who had ruled Cumberlando

With

this accomplished, the king had Carlisle restored and a castle built

there »

Furthermore, peasants with their families and livestock were

brought in from the south

to support the garrison..
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Presumably this

was necessary because the local inhabitants had not been able to practice settled agriculture on any scale with the Galwegians to the north

and

tine

back side of the free-zone

to the

town, and peasants were, then, a unit.

The castle,

east and south.

Carlisle was a self-supporting

significantly improve the configuration of

military colony which

^.Tould

the northern border.

It could close the Vale of Eden thereby protecting

YorksSaire and Lancashire, and it could to some extent hinder movement

through the Tyne gap.
•niese were, however, potentialities in 1092.

At the time, Carlisle

were
was only an isolated strong point whose lines of communication

unprotected and which could not

deferxi itself for long.

Indeed, its

immediate use proved to be diplomatic rather than military.

The

o

Mlitary colony

at Carlisle functioned
as either a bargaining point
with

Malcol. or as bait to bring hi. out
into the open.
Malcol^^s strange behavior in 1093.

This is evident fro.

Despite the fact that the conquest

of Carlisle is usually assumed
to have been an act of naked
aggression

directed against MalcoLn, he gave no
sign for so.e time that he viewed
it as such.

He did not try to stop Rufus in
1092, nor did he invade the

North during the normal campaigning season
of 1093.

Rather, in Septem-

ber of 1093 Malcolm came south peacefully,
laid one of the foundation
stones for Bishop William's new cathedral
at Durham, and then went on to

visit Rufus at Gloucester.

His behavior is puzzling, and this unu-

sual restraint on his part must mean either
that the situation was

ambiguous in some sense or that an iinportant factor
has been misunderstood.

Malcolm was not the man to come meekly

return of Cumberland.

to Rufus to ask for the

Indeed, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle says that he

came south to demand that Rufus fulfill the terms of
some agreement, and
this agreement must have concerned Cumber land. ''"^^

This suggestion, how-

ever, is no help unless one assumes that Rufus had promised to
give back

Cumberland, uncharacteristic behavior for the Red King but consistent

with a transitory vow

reform himself which the king had made when he

thought he was dying during the summer of 109 3
This may account for Malcolm's forbearance.

Yet it does not

explain why Malcolm did nothing in 1092, and another hypothesis is more
likely.

Scholarship on these events has been marred by a basic error

concerning the status of Cumberland.
named Dolfin out of Cumberland.

In 1092 Rufus had driven a noble

The prevailing opinion is that this

Dolfin was the eldest son of Earl Cospatric who had once been earl of
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Korthumbrla and who was later earl
.f Dunbar under Malcol..
but there Is
no direct evidence whatsoever
which
supports the Identification of
the

Cu^rlan Dolfln with Cospatrlc's son."'

it

^ght be suggested about

as

plausibly that the Cumbrian Dolfln
was a descendant of the Dclfln.
son
of Thor. apparently a Cumbrian
noble, who had died fighting
against
Macbeth in 1054. 130 This point is
important because the idea that

Dolfin was Cospatric's son is the only
support for the belief that Cumberland was under the Scottish king in
1092.

The last date when this is

known to have been true is 1070, and after
that there is simply no
information on the question, although it may
be relevant that Malcolm's
invasions of 1079 and 1091 do not seem to have
included contingents from
the West.
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Furthermore, the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle says that
Dolfin

ruled the area~not that he held some official
position from Malcolm or

owed obedience to the Scottish

king."*"^^

The idea that Cumberland was Scottish
port but silence.

is an

assumption with no sup-

The contrary hypothesis that it had fallen away from

the Scottish kingdom at some date after 1070 and was ruled
independently

by a local noble does less violence to the Chronicle' s description
of the

conquest of the area, and makes sense of the events from the fall of 1091
to the early winter of 1093.

When the Abernethy agreement was renewed

in Lothian in 1091, Rufus had undertaken to restore Cumberland, which
was ruled by a native noble, to Malcolm.

The twelve vills (shires?)

which Florence says Rufus promised Malcolm probably represent Cumberland.
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The next year Rufus did drive out Dolfin, and Malcolm had no

reason to suppose that the English king would not honor the rest of the
agreement.

Of course, he did not.

Consequently in the late summer
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of 1093, Malcolm came south to demand that Rufus keep his promise.

The

chronicles, however, leave no doubt that Rufus behaved very badly on
this occasion.

The Chronicle says that he would not fulfill the agree-

ment or even see Malcolm.
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Florence adds that he demanded Malcolm's

homage in court, presumably for Cumbria, and that Malcolm would not
grant it except on the border,
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Malcolm had been tricked.

Rufus was in possession of Cumberland,

and if Malcolm could have it at all, it would be as a fief from William
Rufus, an unacceptable condition.

It is even possible that the whole

incident had been contrived to humiliate the Scottish king or

to drive

him into making a blunder, and there is some support for this idea.
Orderic Vitalis believed that the destruction of Malcolm Canmore was
brought about by treachery although he laid the blame on Earl Robert de
Mowbray rather than on Rufus.
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In any event, Malcolm did make a seri-

ous mistake after his meeting with the English king.

He returned to

Scotland in a rage and collected an army even though it was late fall.

Then sometime in early November, he invaded Northumberland probably with
the ultimate intention of taking Carlisle, but his reaction had been

anticipated.

Earl Robert de Mowbray was waiting for him with an army in

Northumberland, and this is an indication that the purpose of Rufus

's

retention of Carlisle had been to lure Malcolm south of the Tweed for it
could
is very difficult to believe that Earl Robert normally kept—or

even afford to keep by himself--a large enough army on hand in mid

November to fight the Scots in the field.

Malcolm was entering

a

trap.

had crossed
The earl awaited the Scots south of the Aln, and after they

the river, he fell on them by surprise.

In the battle which followed,

242

the buBc of the Scottish
ar.y was either killed
or drowned in the swollen river while trying to
escape. Malcol. hi^elf
and Edward,
his

designated heir, were also
killed.
Thus Willia. II's machinations
reached a successful conclusion.
Malcol. Can^ore had finally
given battle,

and his death opened unusual

possibilities to the English king
and ulti^tely led
the old political structure of
northern Britain.

to the passing of

Judged fro. the stand-

point of the events which followed,
Malcolm appears to have been a
man
who had held back time by his own
existence. Of course, this is
both
the nature of politics and an
exaggeration.

In its immediate form the possibility
which confronted Rufus was
not unparalleled.

Robert de Mowbray had killed the
reigning king of

Scots, his heir, and most of their
army.

This led to internal political

conflicts in Scotland and gave the English
king the opportunity to neutralize Scotland by backing contenders
for the throne.

In this sense

the situation was similar to the one
which had led to the establishment
of Malcoliu Canmore himself as king by
Siward and Edward the Confessor,

but circumstances were particularly promising
in 1093.

Malcolm had been

prepared to ignore Scottish custom on the succession,
which would have

made his younger brother Donald Bane king after his
death, by having
himself immediately succeeded by Edward, his eldest son
"'^^
by Margaret.
The death of Edward and, more importantly given the number
of sons of

Malcolm and Margaret available, the destruction of Malcolm's army,
which
probably had included many of his closest supporters, made this impossible.

Donald Bane, who had been alienated from his nephews by his broth-

er's attempt to disinherit him, was consequently able to become king

late in 1093, and he insured that he
would not be challenged by the sons
of Malcolm and Margaret by expelling
the Anglo-Saxons whom Malcolm had

received during the Norman Conquest and
who had presumably been an
Important source of his strength.^^^

These disasters ruined the hopes

of Malcolm's sons by Margaret and made Donald
Bane a weaker king than
his brother,
"They also greatly improved the chances for
success of Rufus's

attempt to solve the Scottish problem-in so far
as politics could
solve

it— by

setting up his own king of Scots.

Even before Donald

Bane's purge of the Anglo-Saxons had driven Malcolm's
sons by Margaret
into William II' s hands, he had had
-tish -throne^

a suitable candidate for the Scot-

During the reign of William the Conqueror, Malcolm had

given up Duncan, his eldest son by his first marriage, as

a hostage.

In

1093 Duncan was serving in Rufus's army, and his chances of ever becom-

ing king were very small because he apparently had been declared a bas-

tard and thereby removed from the line of succession to the Scottish
throne as envisaged by "St." Margaret. """^^

Duncan was, therefore, a per-

fect tool for Rufus, a candidate who would

ov/e

the Normans everything if

he could be placed on the throne, and after his father's death Rufus

accepted Duncan's homage and gave him an army with which to claim
inheritance.
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his

The dispatch with which this was accomplished strongly

suggests that this operation had been considered in advance.

Between

November 13th, the date of Malcolm's death, and Christmas, not in 1094

as is continually asserted, Duncan was able
Scotland, and drive out his uncle Donald.
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to raise his army,

enter

Rufus and Duncan had evi-

dently been prepared for Malcolm's death, and the speed with which

zDuncan was able to act perhaps
indicates that he used the same
soldiers

.^:Robert de Mowbray had employed against
MalcoLn.

The latter, of

course, is only a suggestion; and,
in any case, the attempt to
set up a
-vassal king of Scots dependent on
Norman arms was only momentarily
successful.

Soon after becoming king, Duncan lost
n»st of his army in an

and continued to rule only on the
condition that he not bring

^aiBbush

Anglo-Saxons or Frenchmen into Scotland to
serve in his army.

This

stipulation rendered him powerless, and in 1094
he was killed by Donald
-who again became king.^^^
4:he

This failure did not cause Rufus to abandon

plan, but it was three years before a new
pretender could be sent

,pver the border.

In the interval another event took place which
revealed the ramifi-

cations in Northumbria of Malcolm's death and of the
distracted conditions of the kingdom of the Scots.

revolted.

In 1095 Earl Robert de Mowbray

This was an unparalleled event.

No Norman had felt suffi-

ciently at home in the North to revolt before, and the very possibility
that the earl of Northumbria could consider breaking with the king

depended on the absence of danger from Scotland.

Furthermore, the same

factor may have been ultimately responsible for his revolt in
sense.

a direct

The early chronicles do not ascribe very intelligible motives to

Robert, but there is one charter in existence which may contain the key
to his behavior.

It is the record of a concord laade between the earl

and the bishop of Durham in 1094 which shows that Rufus had extinguished
the earl's judicial rights over St. Cuthbert's estates.

If this charter

is genuine, which it seems to be, it provides a sufficient motive for

Robert

s

revolt.
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Rufus had probably decided that he did not need
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such a powerful Northumbrian earl with
Duncan on the Scottish throne,

and this hypothesis is supported by the fact
that Robert did not hold

Newcastle in 1095. -"-^^

The earl refused to agree to this.

Specific Northumbrian factors, however, do not explain
the downfall
of Robert.

Had he been alone, he would probably have accepted
the

reduction of his privileges, but he seems to have been
a member of a

widespread conspiracy which involved many nobles, especially
those of
the Welsh border.

Their aim was to overthrow Rufus, and the plot must

have been formed early in 1094 before the great Welsh revolt of
that

year and while Duncan was still alive. -"-^^

Once the Welsh revolted, how-

— except

ever, most of the conspirators abandoned the plan

Mowbray.

for Robert de

He stood no chance alone, and the most likely explanation for

his defiance of the king is that he had been betrayed and that Rufus had

decided to make an example of him.

Robert was, after all, a very con-

venient "example" in 1095 because he had recently inherited the
extremely wealthy estate of his uncle Geoffrey, bishop of Coutanceso ''"'^^

By Easter of 1095, when he would not come to court, the earl was a

marked man; and after he had failed to appear at Whitsuntide, Rufus led
an army into Northumbri

^

where he had little difficulty taking the

earl's castles and capturing the earl himself „

Only Bamburgh, which was

held by Robert's wife, held out for long, and she eventually yielded

when the besiegers threatened to mutilate her husband.
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Clearly times had changed, and perhaps the surviving Northumbrian
nobles were amused.

Rufus had easily suppressed the revolt despite the

isolation of Northumbria.

Robert's men had all been conveniently assem-

bled in castles, and the opportunities which the North offered for

irregular warfare had been ignored, although
this may not have been the
earl's intention.

Furthermore, Robert de Mowbray survived the
revolt,

soinething which no Northumbrian earl, except for
Cospatric, had managed

to do in the eleventh century.

next thirty years.

The earl went off to a dungeon for the

This commonplace baronial revolt had, however,
a

significance beyond its comparison with past revolts.

lost its regional political significance in 1080

The earldom had

when the Northumbrian

nobility had been destroyed in the aftermath of the revolt against
Walcher.

Now it had lost its military utility.

If the Scots had been

so little to be feared that Robert could revolt, then Rufus had no need
of a Northumbrian earl, and he did not appoint a new one.

The earldom

of Northtimbria was abolished after this revolt, or taken into the king's

hands as some Northumbrian monks liked to think. ''"^^

made little real difference.

The distinction

The king took over the demesne of the

earls, and henceforth, Northumberland would be ruled by sheriffs.

This,

of course, represented a fundamental change in the position which North-

un&ria had occupied within the kingdom.

The suppression of the earldom

ended, at least in theory, the administrative and judicial isolation of

Northumbria except on

<"he

estates of Sto Cuthbert, and it created the

novel possibility that royal power could be directly exercised above the
Tees by more prosaic means than the punitive expeditions and murders

wbich had characterized relations between the northern earls and both
the Anglo-Saxon and the Norman kings.

In terms of the future, Rufus

's

failure to appoint a new earl destroyed the threat that a line of Norman
earls would become intrenched above the Tees and pursue the independent

policies of their predecessors.
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With this said, it must also be noted
that the finality of the situation depended upon the continued weakness
of the Scots.

Should a new

leader of the stature of MalcoLn III arise
among them, they could force
the revival of the earldom out of military
necessity and perhaps even

reverse Rufus's conquest of Cumberland.

Indeed, these possibilities

were apparent in 1095 for Rufus did not leave the
North, or was not long
gone, before he took steps to insure that the
Scots would not become a

threat to the North in the foreseeable future.

By late August of 1095,

if not earlier, he had begun his second attempt to
establish a vassal

king of Scots, and this endeavor was probably directly connected
with
his expedition against Earl Roberto

This is established by a charter

made at Norham on the 29th of August which records a land grant

ham by Edgar, Malcolm Ill's third son by Margaret.

to Dur-

The charter dis-

closes that Rufus had already given Lothian and Scotland to Edgar, and

it is likely that this involved something more tangible than the Red

King's recognition of Edgar's right

to be king and a symbolic investi-

ture because the charter records Edgar's gift to Durham of two large

estates in the Merse.

Unless these gifts were anticipatory, which is

unlikely, they indicat'^ that Edgar already controlled the valley of the

Tweed, and the most probable explanation for this is that Rufus or his

agents had established Edgar above the Tweed after the fall of Hamburgh.

In 1095, then, Rufus could safely suppress the earldom

because he had installed

a new marcher lord beyond it.

Furthermore,

this time the plan worked despite the precedents against it.

Rufus was able

In 1097

to send Edgar the Atheling into Scotland with an army to

put his nephew into possession of the rest of his kingdom, and for once

•
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the Atheling acted effectively.

He defeated Donald Bane in battle,

drove him out of the kingdom, and then installed
Edgar as king "in
fealty to King William." 152

All this, of course, had been done before,

but this time it led to important results.

Contrary to any expectations

which might have been based upon the fate of Duncan II or
the perfidy of
Malcolm III, King Edgar both survived and remained loyal
to the Normans.
While he reigned, the North lived in peace with the Scots, and
during
this period ties were established between the Scottish and Norman
royal

families which insured the continuance of peace for thirty years after

Edgar's death.

This abnormal period of peace, in turn, allowed the Nor-

mans to consolidate the hold on the North which they had already won
and, in a very important sense, to extend their rule^
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p. 61; Bishop,
Norman Settlement," pp. 2, 6-7. But this is an exceedingly
questionable xnference. The information which Domesday provides
in these
instances is more likely to be simply incomplete" for it
amounts to no
more than what would have been available from a list of
geld liabilities.
Furthermore, there must have been people in some of these villages
because archaic examples of shire custom were found in some of
them in
the thirteenth century, Jolliffe, "Northumbrian Institutions,"
pp. 28There is, then, some truth in the views of Farrer and Wightman.
29, 31.
Large portions of Domesday's account of western Yorkshire and northern.
Lancashire need not have been compiled any closer to the Pennines than
York castle.
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Wiiliam of Malmesbury, Gesta Pontificum ,
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Stenton, "Introduction to the Derbyshire Domesday," in The
ed. W. Page, I (London, 1905T7
,
303-304; Co F. Slade, "Introduction to the Staffordshire Domesday," in
The Victoria History of the County of Stafford , ed„ L. M. Midgley, IV
(London, 1959), 12o
F, M.

Victoria History of the County of Derby
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Anglo-Saxon Chronicle , s.a. 1074 D, p^ 155.

^^The difficulty in dating Cospatric's return to Scotland is the
result of Symeon's vagueness. He notes Cospatric's flight to Flanders
and then says that he returned post aliquantum tempus Symeon of Durham,
,

HR, p. 199. Inexplicably, Ritchie, Normans in Scotland p. 26, states
that Cospatric got the earldom of Dunbar from Malcolm prior to being
reinstated as earl of Northumbria by William in 1070.
,
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Anglo-Saxon Chronicle

Wllliaa the Conqueror
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,

See Douglas,
s.a. 1074 DE, pp. 155-56.
,
interpretation.
a
different
for
230,
p.

Anglo-Saxon Chronicle , s.a

.

1074 D, p. 136.

o
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The Norman Impact upon Enp l.nH
(Berkeley,
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IjHi^
231- 3J; Barlow,
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I

.

William

1961^),-^.
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pp. 15 7-60.

60_
^P^^^f^'^^lly* the accounts of Florence of
Worcester and Orderic
'°
influenced by this factor. Florence says
that
! ^r^"
Wa^theofTT
Waltheof
only joined
the conspiracy under pressure from
the other two
earls and that he afterwards threw himself
on William's mercy as soon as
possiDle, Florence of Worcester, II, 10. Orderic
takes this line of
explanation a step further by asserting that
Walcheof refused to ioin
the conspiracy at all but promised not to
divulge its existence
Ordericus Vitalis, II, 260-62; II, 312-14. Neither
of these accounts
can be trusted on the question of Waltheof's
involvement in the revolt.
Willxam of Maljnesbury, who was himself undecided on
this point, believed
that the question of Waltheof's guilt was decided
on nationalistic
lines, the Anglo-Saxons being prepared to excuse
his conduct, Willelmi
Malmesbiriensis Mona chi De Gestis Regum Anglorus . edo Wo
StubbT"!!
(Rolls Series, Vol. XC; London, 1889),
Furthermore, the
pp. 312-13.
writers of the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle , which contains the oldest
accounts
of the revolt, betray no doubt concerning Waltheof's
complicity in the
revolt, Anglo-Saxon Chronicle , s.a. 1075 DE,
p. 157.

Vn^oT

^"^Symeon of Durham, HDE, p. 107.
The miracle cannot be dated precisely.
It is preceded by a short account of William's Scottish expedition of 1072, ibid . , p. 106; and it is followed by a long description of
Aldwir/s monastic revival in the North, ibid ., p. 108. The latter came
north sometime in 1073 or 1074, D. Knowles, The Monastic Order in
England (2nd ed.; Cambridge, 1963), p. 167. It would seem, then, that
Ralph's visit occurred in one of these two years, Jo Scammel has suggested that the incident took place in 1096, "The Liberty of Durham," p.
450, n« 2; but this is unlikely
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Symeon of Durham, HDE , p. 107,
Idem,

IIR,

p.

200.

This event is entered under 1073, but Symeon 's
De Obsessione

narrative is a year behind the true date at this point.
Dune 1ml , p. 219.
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Anglo-Saxon Chronicle
cester, II, 10.

,

s.a.

1075 DE, p. 157; Florence of Wor-
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Anglo-Saxon Chronicle s.a. 1075 DE, p. 157. Waltheof was, of
course, an Anglo-Dane; and if Anderson, ESSH , I, 598, n. 2, is correct,
he was a cousin of the Danish king.
,
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Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England
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611.
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Ibid., pp. 611-12; Douglas Williaia the Cont.ueror Po 232; J. Beeler,
Warfare in England, 1066-1189 (Ithaca, 1966), ?.p 48-49.
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Ibxd., pp. 157-58.

^"^e

Douglas, William the Conqueror

An^lo-Saxon Chronicle

,

—

'

rhrn.^^^^°''
sive
l^uxca

pp. 233-35.
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Flores Historiarnm, ed. H. 0. Coxe.
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Syxaeon of Durham, HDE ,
pp. 108, 113.

Ibid., pp. 105-106, 113-14.

^See

ibid ., pp. 108-13.

Idem, m., p. 209; Florence of Worcester,
II, 13-14.
Sjnneon of Durham, HDE , p. 114.
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rbxd.;Ritchie, Normans in Scotland p. 49; Stenton,
Anglo-Saxon
England, pp. 613-14; Douglas, William the Conqueror
,
p. 24o7"^
,

Anglo-Saxon Chronicle , s.a. 1077 D,
81
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p.

159.

Ibid., s.a . 1079 DE, p. 159.

Ibid. ; Flore nee of Worcester, II, 13,
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Ibid., p. 14. Symeon of Durham repeats this story nearly verbatim in the HR, pp. 208-210,
In the HDE, p. 114, however, he does not
mention this incident, and the narrative of Walcher's murder, ibid .
,
pp.
116-17, is somewhat vague on the question of the Northumbrians* motive.

84
85

Florence of Worcester, II,

14.

Ibid., pp. 14-16; Anglo-Saxon Chronicle , s.a. 1080 E, p. 160. De
Primp Saxonum Adventu . p. 383, says that Eadulf Rus, son of Cospatric,
killed Walcher, Symeon of Durham, however, has somewhat different
details. In tlse HR, pp. 197-98, he names Eadulf as the killer but makes
him the grandson of Cospatric. In the HDE , p. 115, the killer is an
unidentified Waltheof.
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Ibid., pp. 117-18.
rbid.

,
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The best description of Odo's
expedition is in ibid. The statement that the Northumbrian nobility
was severely redact; a ^esuU of
thxs expedition is based on the fate
of Walcher's murderers which
although Tnentioned in the paragraph
preceding Odo's expedition i^

^"1'^''^

f

^''^'^^

of Worcester
ox
Worcester, II,
ir'l6^
H xn Symeon of Durham,
16; and
HR, p. 211.
89
Ritchie, gorgans in Scotland,
p. 50.
Ritchie relies heavily on
the account in the Chronic on Monasterii
de Abin.don, ed. J. Stevenson,
II (Rolls Series, Vol. II; London,
1858), 9-10, for his interpretation.
This description is rhetorical and is
probably more of a "war story" of
the abbot who went with Robert to Scotland
than a straightforward
account of what took place.
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211.
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land, p. 51.
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241; Ritchie, Normans in Scot-

Symeon of Durham, HR , p. 199.
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Inde rex dedit illua honorem [the earldom] Albrico
Quo in
rebus difficilibiis parum valente, patriam que reverso
ibid„
Stenton, Anglo-Saxon England , p. 614, identifies Albricus with~Aubrey de
Coucy
.

....

94

Reid, "Barony and Thanage," p. 197; Fo Mo Stenton, The First Century of English Feudalism. 1066-1166 (2nd ed.; Oxford, 1961),
pp. 19496; Beeler, Warfare in En£;land p. 286; Le Patourel, "The Conquest of
Yorkshire,," pp. 425-26.
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J. C. Holt, The Northerners:
A Study in the Reign of King John
(Oxford, 1961), pp. 197-98; Reid, "Barony and Thanage," pp. 191-92.
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Beeler, Warfare in England , p. 287; Stenton, English Feudalism ,
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Ibid .
p. 215; Beeler, Warfare in England p. 38; F. M. Stenton,
"Introduction to the Nottinghamshire Domesday," in The Victoria History
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Domesday," p. 156in Scotland . pp„ 69-70.
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See E. A. Freeman, The Reign of William
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^° l^^ds above the Ribble had been given to undertenants
by
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n
1086,
fols. 301b-302, 332. A few of the barons
above the Tyne
claxmed that their tenures went back to the
Conquest, and their lands
were, for the most part, located in the valley
of the Wansbeck or to the
south. Liber Feodorum, pp. 200-203.
It is questionable, however
whether these claims were valid, see Sanders, English
Baronies Bolam,
p. 17; Morpeth, p. 65; Redesdale, p. 73; Alnwick,
p. 103; Bothal, p.
107; Callerton, p. 109; Mitford, p. 131.
See infra , pp. 315-17.
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See W. Farrer, Records Relating to the Barony of Kendale .
(Cumberland and Westmorland Antiquarian and Archaeological Society, Record Series, Vol. IV; Kendal, 1923), viii-x. Farrer
theorizes that this grant was made in 1091 or 1092, ibid
p. ix; but it
may have been made as early as 1087-1088.
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ed. J. F. Curwen, I
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J. C. Hodgson, The Parish of Bywell St. Peter , Vol. VI of A History of Northumberland (Newcastle-upon-Tyne, 1902), pp„ 18-19; Sanders,
English Baronies , po 25; Ritchie, Normans in Scotland , p. 148, n. 2.

UmfraY'llle's said that they had held Redesdale de antique
Liber Feodorum , p. 101. This is the basis for the idea chat
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Blair, "The Early Castles of Northumberland," Archaeologia Aeliana XXII
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Capitula de Miraculis ^ II, 340-41.
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Symeon of Durham, HR, p. 218.
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Florence indicates that there had been some negotiations
prior to Malcolm's journey to Gloucester and that the object of
the
meeting was to reestablish peace, II, 31.
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Anglo-Saxon Chronicle , s.a.

1093 E, p. 170.
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The idea that the Cumbrian Dolfin was Cospatric's son is commonly held both by English and Scottish historians, Freeman, William
Mfus, I, 315; Scottish Annals from English Chronicles. A.D. 500 to
1286, comp. and trans. A. 0. Anderson (London, 1908), p. 96, n. 7;
Stenton, "Westmorland," p. 221; Ritchie, Normans in Scotland p. 58;
Anglo-Saxon Chronicle , p. 169, n, 6.
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1093 E, p. 170; Florence of Worcester, II, J2; William of Malmesbury, Gesta
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Duncan, Earliest Charters," p. 128; William of
Malmesbury.
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Gesta Regum . II, 476.
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Anglo-Saxon
Chronicle, s.a. 1093 E, p. 170; Florence of Worcester, II, 32; Duncan, "Earliest Charters,"
pp. 126-34.
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The accepted chronology of these events is that Donald
reigned
for six months (mid November 1093 to mid May 1094) and
that Duncan
reigned for the next six months (to mid November 1094). Tliese
dates
appear at the latest in the works of E. W. Robertson, Scotland under
Her
Early Kings, I, 158, cited by Freeman, William Rufus II, 35-36.
,
The
difficulty with this chronology is that it flatly contradicts the AngloSaxon Chronicle which asserts that Duncan became king before Christmas
of 1093, s.a. 1093 E, p. 170.
Florence of Worcester agrees with the
Chronicle , II, 32. Robertson apparently based his dates on Fordun who
was wrong, but Freeman accepted them nonetheless because he did not
believe there was time for Duncan to come north, beat Donald, and get
ambushed before Christinas of 1093, William Rufus, II, 32-35. This, of
course, is debatable, but the dates have persisted, nevertheless.
Their
only support other than repetition is the reign lengths given in the
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1093 E, p. 170; s.a. 1094 E, p. 172.
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charter is printed in the Feodarium Prioratus
Dunelmensis
ed. u
W. Greenwell (Surtees Society, Vol.
LVIII; Durham, 1872) II
Ixxxii°^^i%^^*^epts it as genuine, Regesta Willelmi Conquestoris
o^^u.li'/!^,^;^^g^^\^"^^ > Vol. I of the Regesta Regum Anglo-Normannorum (OxforH,
1913), No. 345.
Scammel, "The Liberty of Durham,"
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There is disagreement on this matter. See Beeler, Warfare
in
En gland , pp. 68, 338, n. 59, for the various opinions
on the subject.
He thinks that Robert took control of Newcastle at the
beginning of the
revolt and that Rufus's first move after arriving in the North
was to
retake it, ibid. , p. 68.
This is not impossible, but it must be emphasized that neither the Anglo-Saxon Chronicle , s^a. 1095 E,
p. 172, nor
Florence of Worcester, tl, 38, mentions a siege of Newcastle and that
the two charters, RRA-N , I, Nos. 366, 367, made apud obsidlonem Novi
^^stri which Beeler regards as proof of the siege. Warfare in England
"
p. 338, n. 59, probably refer to the siege castle built at Bamburgh.
RRA^, I, No. 363: Hoc autem factum est eo anno quo Rex Willelmus
.
.
fecit novem castellum ante Bebbanburgh super Robertum ....
,
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Anglo-Saxon Chronicle , s.a. 1095 E, pp. 172-73; Florence of Worcester, II, 38; Ordericus Vitalis, III, 405-407; IV, 278-81.
Beeler,
Warfare in England , pp. 66-67; A. L. Poole, From Domesday Book to Magna
Carta, 1087-1216 (2nd ed.; Oxford, 1955), p. 109.
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CHAPTER

VI

THE IMPACT OF THE NORMANS
ON THE NORTHERN VILLAGE

The preceding narrative shows
that the North was conquered
in three
stages and that the first two were
completed by the death of Willia.
the
Conqueror. At this date Norman
nobles were established in southern
Lancashire and along the east coast
plain from the south of Yorkshire
north
through Durham into southern Northumberland,
As yet they had not ventured in any numbers into northern and
central Northumberland and north-

ern Lancashire or into the Pennines,
but on the plains their power was

supreme-if not unchallenged along
tains.

its northern edges and in the moun-

This chronology of their expansion is an
important improvement

upon traditional accounts of the subjugation of
the North which make the
establishment of Norman power automatically follow
either the harrying
of 1069 or the punitive expedition of 1080 and which
ignore the territo-

rial limits of this power even in the 1080's and
1090's.

Furthermore,

an understanding of the local importance of the house of Bamburgh
and of
the threats inherent in the North's western border make the
extent of
this expansion more understandable.

traditional in a sense.

Still,

the foregoing account is

It benefits from a regional point of view and

from the inclusion of the pre-Conquest history of the North, but the

process described is familiar in its general outlines.

It is the narra-

tive of the replacement of native landowners by Frenchmen and the con-

solidation of the latter's power by means of the castle, the Church, and
the knight.

Aside from the slaughter, the
es cablishment of this new
aristocracy
was the most important in^mediate
result of the Conquest, and
before the
extension of Norman settlement into
Cumberland and Northumberland can be
profitably traced, it is necessary

to take a

closer look at the settle-

ment of the Normans in Yorkshire and
Durham from the standpoint of a

basic question which is usually shunned:

Did the Norman Conquest repre-

sent a straightforward substitution of
one upper class for another, or
did its effects reach deeper in the social
hierarchy?

Put in the par-

lance of Conquest studies, the basic problem
is to determine whether
these new landlords simply stepped into the
shoes, so to speak, of their

Anglo-Saxon predecessors and ran their new estates
according to local
custom or whether they laade basic changes in the
management and organization of their estates.
To those familiar with the general body of literature on
the Norman

Conquest, this will, of course, appear an unfruitful line of inquiry

because it is generally assumed that the Normans were content to continue the level and type of agricultural exploitation which had existed

in King Edward's day.

R.ecent research has shown, to be sure,

that they

may perhaps have raised rents or demanded higher farms from their manors
and that, on occasion, they may have increased the amount of labor which
they received from peasants by insisting on strict definitions of services;"^ but these qualifications have not shaken the great unvoiced

assumption that the greater Norman barons were basically gentlemen, i.e.
that their greed did not cross class lines.

Perhaps Frank Barlow best

summed up this view on the subject in a recent appraisal of the effects
of the Conquest:
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acquired all the rents and

services which their
^IdlZ
predecessors had enjoyed,
an economic context the chlnee
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the agricultural producers' the
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Ideas
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if'"require full
economic rents.

n^vement to
^
^^^^
But the . . . major barons were
mostly absentees.
They may have pressed heavily on their
stewards reeves, and other agents to
increase revenue from their
estates; but they had no revolutionary
means of exploitation. 2

...

This characterization of Norman economic
behavior may be correct in
general, but at least one recent historian,

R.

Welldon Finn, has held

the opposite view that the Normans demanded
increased labor dues from
the peasants where possible.^

And even if the prevailing view is an

accurate description of the way in which the Normans dealt
with their
estates in southern and midland England, it is really only proof
that
they were reasonably satisfied with their new manors rather than
a sign
that they were either unwilling or unable to reorganize estates
which
did not meet their expectations.

It is becoming increasingly clear,

after all, that the greater Norman barons were mainly parvenus who were
still quite concerned with enlarging their landed wealth,^ and this

characteristic makes it doubtful that they could necessarily be expected
to respect peasant cur*-om when it was not in their interest to do so„

Specifically, one might wonder if the Normans behaved in the same way

above the Humber as they had in the South since in the former region
their new "nianors" were at best lightly exploited relics of the shire

system and more often were wholly or partially waste.

Theoretically,

they might be expected to have taken a rather different line in such

circumstances, and there are, in fact, hints in the works of historians
of the North that this was the case.

These are vague and imprecise, but

:

they are .seful as a balance
.0 the prevailing
opinion nonetheless.
Stenton-s early work on the
estates of the northern
Danelaw 1„ the eleventh century led hi. to the
belief that so^ "process"
was occurring
through which the greater sokes
were breaking up and the
smaller ones

amalgamating
to produce an intermediate
type of estate an ^<.^.^o f
intermediate agrarian unit, II
which%\1^fea™ a S^e^LJic
of tne later manorial economy
mxght find roona

for develop^^J's

What Sir Frank meant by -process"
and "development" is not obvious,
but
they would, at least, seem to be
open to the interpretation that
the
Normans were restructuring the sokes.
by some of the work of T. A. M.
Bishop.

The same conclusion is suggested
In 1934 he made a statistical

study of the vills in the Vale of
York and found that those vills with

demesne land in 1301 had contained some
population in 1086 while those
vills with no demesne land in 1301 had
been waste in 1086.^

On the

basis of this pattern he thought that:
The social depression which had been suffered
after the conquest
by the population of Yorkshire will account for
the prevalence of
a manorial institution in those vills where
any population survived. '

This is a rather stronger statement than Stenton»s
although it is not
clear whether Bishop thought that the Normans had introduced
the manor

into Yorkshire or whether he believed that they had simply continued
it.
The probability, however, is that he held the former view because he

suggested in passing in this article that there might have been a "sudden and limited expansion of the manorial system within a short period
after the conquest."

Certainly by 1948 he was of this opinion.

In

that year he stated this position clearly, albeit in a forbidding foot-

note on the next to the last page of his essay:

assume that such burdens
j
™
-edieval
peasantry of Yorkshire
endured were fastened
I
^"<'
"
1=^-'
1100:
the period of a ?eb»lH
^'"^
P^^ltlon,
entry
Into
possession by alorfign
"v'.» r""""
inhabitants
co^par^^ori^r
I

•
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f
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"
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Finally, Jolliffe himself believed
that the Normans introduced
demesne
farming in Northumbria during the
twelfth century.^^ of course, the

opinions of all three of these scholars
are invalidated to some extent
by the fact that a "mild form" of
manorialism had existed throughout

Northumbria in 1066, but it is not certain
that this discovery completely explains the phenomenon which
they notedo

Consequently, their

views create a sufficiently strong £rima
facie case to justify pursuing
this line of inquiry despite the general
presumption that the Normans

simply installed themselves in the economic
structure which they found,
caulked its seams, and preserved traditional forms
of organization.
In the North this model has a certain unreality,
in any case,

because in many villages there was little of the
traditional rural
structure left for the Normans to respect.

During the terrible winter

of 1069-70, much of northern society was destroyed in Yorkshire
and Durham, and an understanding of this must stand at the base of any
realistic attempt to determine the nature of the Norman settlement of the

North.

Unfortunately, it is impossible to tell how great this destruc-

tion was above the Tees, but as late as the time of Domesday, the marks

of harrying were still evident in Yorkshire where the countryside was
studded with empty villages.

Darby and Maxwell found that "over one-

half of the vills of the North Riding and over one-third of those of the
East and West Ridings were wholly or partially

waste."''"''"

The remainder
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of the vills had some population
in 1086 but not necessarily
as much as

in 1066.

Furthermore, these figures are too
low because they include

only those vills explicitly described
as waste or as containing waste,

but not those vills without recorded
population yet not described as
waste. ^2

Other statistics in this vein could
be easily supplied, but

perhaps a more meaningful impression of
the extent of the destruction
can be gained from a comparison with
Nottinghamshire.

In 1086 there were

more people living in Nottinghamshire than
in any two of the three ridings of Yorkshire, and the population of that
shire (5,573) was more

than double the recorded population of either
the East Riding (2,362),
or the North Riding (2,014)

desolation.

o"^^

Plough teams show the same picture of

The figure for Nottinghamshire (1,969) was more
than twice

as large as the figures for the East Riding (791) or the
North Riding
(847) and substantially in excess of the number recorded for the
West

Riding (1,292).-^^
These figures leave no doubt that the harrying of Yorkshire had

been very effective, and they automatically exclude much of the shire
from the bounds of any theory of Norman economic inertia.
value, many estates above the Humber had to be revived.

To be of

But beyond this

general point, the meaning of Domesday's figures is not so clear because
it is not certain that they can be taken entirely at their face value.

Some rebuilding had presumably taken place between 1070 and 1086, the

date of Domesday's description, but this document's Yorkshire folios

fail to give any intermediate value for manors between 1066 and 1086.
This omission hides the original extent of the waste in 1070, and this

in turn effectively screens the Normans' initial dealings with their new
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estates and creates uncertainty with
respect to Yorkshire's population

m

1086.

Theoretically, there are two zaajor
alternatives which could

account for these figures:' development
in place or forced innnigration.
The population of the shire in 1086 could
have been composed of survi-

vors of the harrying and their children
who had stayed in their ancestral villages and redeveloped them under
their new Norman lords.

If

this was the case, there would be a direct
relationship between condi-

tions in 1070 and in 1086 except that the areas
of waste would have

shrunk somewhat by the later date.

Alternatively, the Normans may have

brought in immigrants from undevastated parts of the
shire or from

beyond its borders to revive completely depopulated villages.

If this

happened on any scale, there would be little connection between
the situation in 1070 and that described in Domesdayo
Two important attempts have been made to deal with this complex

problem. "'^

The first was offered by Bishop, who in 1948 suggested an

ingenious theory based on the second of the two alternatives. '''^

His

ideas were buttressed by an impressive statistical analysis of Yorkshire
.

Domesday, and they were revolutionary in the sense that, if accepted,
they would have forced a re-evaluation of the stereotype of Norman eco-

nomic behavioro

Bishop began by pointing out that the distribution of

waste villages was not uniform in 1086.

In the lowlands there were both

waste vills and inhabited vills, yet the higher parts of the shire, the
Pennines, the Moors in the North Riding, and the Wolds, were covered by
great, unbroken bands of uninhabited or waste villso^^

The obvious

inference from this uneven distribution of waste would be that the Normans had harried the highlands more effectively than the plains, but
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Bishop did not draw this conclusion.

Rather, he asserted that the Nor-

mans had only harried the plains and
river valleys in 1069 and had not

penetrated the Pennines, the Moors, or
the Wolds.

This assertion, for

which, incidentally, he provided no proof,
was the foundation of his
theory.

If it were accepted, then one was
compelled to suppose that

there had been extensive population niovements
of some sort within York-

shire between 1070 and 1086.

In particular. Bishop argued that the Nor-

mans had made an attempt to revive agricultural
production on the York-

shire plain by initiating population movements from
the unwasted highlands down onto the lowlands.

The sporadic distribution of waste in the

lower parts of the shire was a sign that certain vills had
been redevel-

oped by their Norman lords— not that the Normans had spared
an occa-

sional vill in 1069-70, and the bands of waste in the uplands were
the
result of a forced exodus carried out by the Normans.

doing this was to increase their agricultural

Their motive for

profits."*"^

believed that this theory was supported by three things.

Bishop
First, there

were a number of villages on the plain which contained a populated
estate belonging to one Norman lord and a waste estate belonging to

another lord.

He rejected the possibility that the lord of the popu-

lated estate might have simply usurped all the peasants in a partially

waste village and argued that such populated estates had been redeveloped by their lords.

20

Second, there were a number of other vills which

contained excess plough teams in 1086 as conqjared to 1066 but whose values had fallen from 1066.

Bishop believed that these vills were

recently resettled and perhaps expanded.

21

Finally, and this was his

major proof, he thought that as a general rule only those fiefs which
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contained both upland and lowland holdings
had recovered to any significant extent by 1086.^^
This fascinating theory, which vould
dispel some of the obscurity

which hangs over Yorkshire during the critical
period from 1070 to 1086
and which hides the Norman settlement of the
county, is unfortunately
false.

Darby and Maxwell have raised four main
objections to it in

their geographical analysis of Yorkshire Domesday.

First, it was not

"intrinsically improbable," as Bishop thought, that
the Normans had

wasted the uplands.

These settlements were more in need of subduing

than the plain because of their remoteness.

Second, they pointed out

that this theoretical consideration vas supported by the Domesday

returns from Cheshire.

These give a value for each manor not only for

1066 and 1086, but also for the intermediate date when the Norman lord

took possession, and these show that the Normans had harried both the

uplands and the lowlands in this shire but that the uplands had not

recovered as quickly as the lowlands. 25

Third, they were unable to sub-

stantiate Bishop's claim that only those individual fiefs had recovered

which contained both lowland and upland vills. 26

And finally, they

pointed out that there were occasionally great differences in population

between two estates of a single lord which lay in the same village.
Such instances dull the significance of the cases of unequal development
of manors lying in the same vill but belonging to different lords which

Bishop interpreted as a sign of colonization.

27

These points are well taken and leave Bishop's theory quite doubtful.

28

Furthermore, the same conclusion is supported by the findings of

this inquiry.

Northern resistance to the Norman Conquest was based upon
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hit-and-run tactics in which the
woods and hills played a
crucial role
as concealed places of assembly
and refuge. Their reduction
was necessary for the Normans to control
Yorkshire, and Orderic Vitalis
specifically states that William pursued
the rebels into the hills and
woods
during the winter of 1069.^9
^^^^ 3,,,,
^^^^^^^^
^^^^^^^ ^^^^
the Normans did as thorough a job
wasting the difficult country of
the

uplands as they did the plain, but
the unbroken bands of seemingly
unin-

habited vills which appear in Domesday
are to some degree an illusion,
in any case, for they resulted from the
failure of the Domesday clerks to

obtain information on the specifics of
population and waste for many of
the Pennine villages. 30

They cannot, therefore, be taken at face
value,

and the most likely hypothesis is that there
was a sporadic distribution
of waste in the uplands just as there was on
the plain.

These consider-

ations strike at the heart of Bishop's theory by
showing that his

assumption that the uplands had escaped the harrying is
false and that
the impression that they were without population in
1086 is doubtful.

Despite their objections to Bishop's theory, Darby and Maxwell
concluded their discussion of this issue by suggesting that there
might,
indeed, have been some population movement from unwasted to wasted vills

but that there was insufficient evidence to be certain.

That the lat-

ter was a serious reservation is shown by their failure to enlarge upon
the question of what sort of redevelopment they themselves envisaged.

Actually, their suggestion, although it saved the theoretical possibility of redevelopment, was a tacit admission that there was little sign
of it.

This may seem surprising but only from the standpoint of com-

partmentalized thinking.

In terms of economics, there should have been

a ^vement underway by 1086 to
revive the better land of
Yorkshire; but

m

terms of the military situation,
or perhaps more accurately
the police
situation, it is hard to see how such
a movement could have made
progress
in much of Yorkshire. Until the last
years of William the Conqueror and

probably beyond, the Pennines and Moors
were the seats of outlaw bands

which were reenforced along the coast
by pirates and in the northwest
probably by raiders from over Stainmore.

In these circumstances Isolated

colonists could have hoped for little security,
and the most promising
sites for redevelopment would have been
those near still populated vills

which could afford some protection.

Not until the establishment of such

defensive bulwarks as Richmond and Pontefract, which
occurred late in
William's reign, did these conditions begin to pass.^^

General efforts

at redevelopment may then have begun; but, if so, they
are unlikely to

have made enough progress by 1086 to leave a clear mark
in Domesday.
question, then, has been misconstrued.

The

The Normans may have made an

attempt to increase the amount of land under the plough, but only in
those areas where it was fairly safe to do so, that is, in areas where
there was a significant continuity of habitation.

Bishop himself uncovered the clue to what actually happened although
he failed to interpret it

correctly.

In terms of the general statistics

which were discussed earlier, Yorkshire was, indeed, in a destitute condition in 1086.

Most of its villages were either waste or underpopulated,

and only a few had come through the Conquest unchanged. 33

Bishop, how-

ever, pointed out that there were certain exceptions to this, the over-

stocked manors.

These were villages in which the number of ploughs at

work in 1086 exceeded the number of ploughlands (the land which could be
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worked by one plough) traditionally
ascribed to the vill.

By inference,

such vills also had a larger population
in 1086 than in 1066.

Bishop

cited the example of Handsworth to
illustrate this phenomenon.
land for

7

It had

ploughs, yet there were 8h ploughs
at Handsworth in 1086.

A substantial number of similar cases
existed in Yorkshire at this date,
despite the general condition of the shire,
and they were very significant.

Bishop, however, did not investigate
them closely because his

attention was attracted by another
characteristic of Handsworth.

Its

value had fallen from £8 in 1066 to 40so
in 1086, and Bishop thought
that this decline in value was important in terms
of his theory of col-

onization and that it indicated that the 21 peasants
at Handsworth were
recent colonists who "had not yet advanced far in
clearing and cultivation."

He further theorized that the excess teams here
and in other

vills of this type were either engaged in clearing or were
transient and

would in the future move to waste vills,
not be accepted.

but this interpretation can-

The values of manors in Yorkshire were subject to var-

iation as a result of too many possible causes to be used as an index of
the date of colonization,

37

and, in any case, the obvious inference from

the excess team and a half is that the arable of the village had been

expanded, not that there was a floating corps of ploughmen.

At one point in his article, Bishop raised the possibility of plotting the overstocked manors on a map, but he dismissed it because he was

more concerned with the supposed relationship between upland waste and

populated manors in the lowlands within individual fiefs.

38

Had he pur-

sued the idea, however, he would have found the clearest signs which

Domesday can provide of Norman estate development in Yorkshire during
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the years 1070 to 1086.

A map of the overstocked B^nors
shows that

these estates were distributed in a
highly singular fashion across
the
face of the shire. They were not
spread evenly over the plain or even

limited to it as Bishop's theory would
suggest that they should have
been.

Rather, great stretches of prime land
in Holderness and much of

the Vale of York were completely without
them, and there were a number

of them on the unrewarding soils of
the Howardian and Hambleton Hills
and in the Sandstone Hills.

Moreover, the overstocked manors tended to

stand in groups, not in isolation.
located in four main areas:

The majority of these manors were

in the Aire valley and the land to the

south, in Richmond below the Swale, and around
the edge of the Southern

Wolds plus a complex area which comprised the Howardian
and Hambleton
Hills with the valley of the upper Derwent and the adjoining
fringes of
the Vales of Pickering and York (hereafter called the
"Howardian Hills

and vicinity").

Nor is this tendency of the overstocked manors to be

found in groups their only peculiarity.

Domesday's description of the

fief of Ilbert de Lacy consistently names his Anglo-Saxon subtenants in
His fief was situated on either side of the Aire in the largest

1086.

concentration of overstocked manors in the county, and the estates of
his Anglo-Saxon tenants show nearly as strong a tendency
teams as those of his Norman tenants.

to

have excess

Finally, it should be noted that

of the eighty overstocked manors in this area, sixty-seven had fallen in

value.

The manors with excess ploughs were, then, concentrated in a few
areas.

In the one area where Anglo-Saxon subtenants are named, their

estates also tended to be overstocked, and in the same area, which

contained the greatest nuinber of
such manors in the shire, there
had
been a general fall in value. Bishop's
theory cannot explain these
things, but they are explicable in
terms of the hypothesis that the Nor-

mans restricted their efforts at
redevelopment to only a few relatively

secure areas.

In a sense, "redevelopment" does
not accurately describe

the process which occurred.

The areas where there were concentrations

of manors with excess teams in 1086 were
areas which" had either not been

harried in the winter of 1069 or which had
not been ravaged so severely
that the continuity of life had been broken.

In these areas the Normans

increased agricultural production in an attempt to
augment their own

wealth by expanding the arable of existing villages and
probably by
redeveloping nearby waste holdings.
ploughs.

Ihis is the meaning of the extra

Nor is there any need of an elaborate hypothesis to explain

where the Normans got the peasant labor for this expansion.

All discus-

sions of this question have ignored the single most likely source of

"colonists":

the refugees.

The harrying of the North displaced thou-

sands of peasants by destroying their livestock, agricultural implements,
and winter food supply

—not

to mention their seed corn for 1070

— and

set

in motion a population movement which reached the Midlands and ulti-

mately even Scotland.

The object of this migration was

to find food and

probably the chance to sell themselves into slavery, a poor man's alternative to starvation, aside from brigandage, in a society which lacked
credit mechanisms.

Initially these refugees would have made for the

undevastated parts of Yorkshire where the local Norman and Anglo-Saxon
lords had first choice, so to speak.

Presumably they selected the most

desirable, young men and women in their teens and those with special
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skills, and sent the rest on their
way because the stream of starving

peasants represented as

-oruch

of a threat to the local economy,
particu-

larly to livestock, as an opportunity
to acquire cheap labor.

Probably,

in fact, some small villages which had
escaped the Normans were

destroyed by their passage.
As compelling as this line of reasoning
is, some index of continuity is, nevertheless, desirable as a support
for the hypothesis that the

concentrations of overstocked manors were located
in areas which had not

been too severely wasted in 1069 rather than in
areas which had been
completely redeveloped after that date.

Since Domesday does not give

any manorial values in Yorkshire for an intermediate
date between 1066
and 1086, this problem cannot be approached directly,
but rural churches

served by resident priests can be used as an indirect source
of this

information because they are unlikely to have survived at a very much
greater rate than the peasantry itself.

This should be true irrespec-

tive of whether the Nonaans burned down churches in 1069.

Actually they

may have done so if the Yorkshire peasants followed the usual northern
expedient in times of danger

— flight

to the churchyard with all the mov-

able property which circumstances allowed.

But even if the Normans

resisted the temptation provided by such convenient gatherings, the

relationship should still hold because it stems directly from the nature
of churches as parasitic service institutions.

the economy in

cin

With the destruction of

area, the disruption of normal patterns of life, and

the death or dispersal of the inhabitants,

the churches in the area

would cease to exist because both their reason to be and their income
would be gone.

Furthermore, in a devastated area later colonized, a

279

Map

7,

Distribution of Functioning Churches in Yorkshire

1086

280

functioning church would be one
of the last things to be
created sxnce
the population would have to
reach a fairly high level
terms of numbers and prosperity before a
church could be supported.
These considerations, of course, do not form
a flr» basis for statements
about Indi-

m

vidual churches, but they are

vaUd

for groups of churches.

Regions in

which functioning churches were
recorded in 1086 had either been
spared
or not too seriously disturbed
in the harrying of the North.

Therefore,

the distribution of churches
provides a general index of the
continuity
of local habitation.
If overstocked Honors were in
fact located in areas which had
not

suffered overwhelmxag destruction, there
should be a correlation between
the number of overstocked manors in an
area and the number of function-

ing churches there.

High numbers of the former should be found
with

high numbers of the latter, and the opposite
should also hold true.
This relationship does exist.

If the shire is divided into suitable

areas suggested by the distribution of overstocked
manors, topographical
factors, and feudal geography, and if these areas
are ranked according
to the number of overstocked manors and functioning
churches in each, a

marked correspondence emerges (see Table

3

and compare "A" with "B").'^°

The correspondence between files "A" and "B" is close enough to

establish that the relationship in question exists and to show that
the
areas where there were numerous overstocked manors had not been harried
too severely.

rankings.

There is not, however, complete agreement between the two

With the second position slight discrepancies begin to appear,

although from the standpoint of the ranking of the overstocked manors,
there is an exact correspondence through position six.

This is not,
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TABLE

3

Overstocked Manors and Functioning
Churches

»
"

C

A

B

A'

B'

87

37

1

1

1

1

23

14

3

3

3

3

0

3

11

9

8

8

Richmond

19

6

5

7

_

N. Vale of York

19

9

5

5

5

5

S. Vale of York
with H. Levels

14

7

6

6

6

6

2

2

2

7

7

4

4

!

1

I.

II.

III.
IV.
V.

VI.

VII.

VIII.
IX.

Below the Aire
Above thp

Air-a

Pennines

Howardian Hills
and vicinity
Clevp 1

anrl

Vale of Pickering

J-/

c

J

7

8

6

13

5

7

8

X.

N. Wolds

2

2

10

10

XI.

S. Wolds

22

13

4

4

4

16

9

2

XII.

Holderness

Key:

M = The number of overstocked estates
C = The number of functioning churches
A = The ranking of the overstocked estates
B = The ranking of churches
A* and B' = The revised rankings of A and B, each corrected by the
deletion of those areas harried twice in 1069-70.

therefore, a serious matter since the proposition at issue is only that
there should be large numbers of functioning churches in areas which con-

tained numerous overstocked manors, not that there should always be

large numbers of overstocked
manors in areas where churches
were numerous. Most of the discrepancies
could be accounted for, in any
case, as
the result of the inevitable
inaccuracies introduced into the
rankings

by the small numerical bases which
appear towards the end of the
ranks.
Still, this explanation can hardly
apply to Holderness which was
ninth
in overstocked manors but second
in functioning churches.
This difference is not due to some trick of the
numbers, and it suggests an explanation for the discrepancies between
the two rankings.

result of the simplicity of the model.

They are the

Despite the prominence which the

harrying of the North claims in a discussion
of Yorkshire, various parts
of the shire endured other episodes of
destruction after 1069.

Specifi-

cally, Holderness and the eastern part of
the North Wolds had probably

been devastated as late as 1085 in order to
deny supplies to a threatened Danish invasion, and Richmond and Cleveland
had been harried by the

Scots in 1070.

Such incidents as these could be expected to introduce

confusion into the basic data; and, if these areas are
excluded from the
rankings, a rather different result emerges:

There is a perfect corre-

spondence between both ranks for the seven areas wasted only once
in
1068-70 (compare "A*" with "B"').
This agreement and its absence when the four fringe areas are

included in the calculations can best be explained by the following
hypothesis.

In the winter of 1069 William only began to harry Yorkshire

after he had crossed the Aire, and the land to the south of this river
only suffered from the enforced stay of his army as it waited to force
the line of the river.

This undoubtedly produced

a

good deal of local

destruction but far less than the harrying proper which only commenced

once the Nonnans were beyond
the Aire and the Danes
had retreated to
their Ships.
The Nonnans then thoroughly
wasted two great swathes of
land Judging fro. the survival
of functioning churches.
One included
the Vale of York. Richmond, and
much of the region above the Aire;
and
it ran an indetenuinate distance
into the Pennines.

The other area com-

prised the Vale of Pickering, the
Northern Wolds, and Cleveland. Aside
from the south, the Howardian
Hills, the Southern Wolds, and
apparently
Holderness escaped the full fury of
the destruction.

This hypothesis has much to recommend
it.

First, it is entirely in

accord with what little is known from
chronicles about the harrying.
The first great band of destruction
in central Yorkshire would have been

produced by the systematic harrying which
was conducted in December of
1069, and the second would have been the result of
William's later move43
ments.
Specifically, after Christmas the Conqueror moved
east from

York to dislodge a group of rebels from Holderness
and then went north
to the Tees, presumably along the coast.

During the course of this

campaign, the Northern Wolds, the Vale of Pickering,
and Cleveland would

have been harried.

Second, this reconstruction of the harrying is sup-

ported by a significant feature of Darby and Maxwell's maps of
the waste
in Yorkshire in 1086.

These show that the waste in central Yorkshire

above the Aire included a high degree of totally waste villages such as

would have been produced by the methodical operations in December and
that the waste in the east was more often only partial, a reflection

apparently of William's haste to cross into Durham as winter deepened.
Finally, this theory accounts for the existence of a less heavily wasted

strip of land running from the western end of the Moors down through the
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Howardlaa Hills and the Mddle
Derwent to the Southern Wolds
and Holderness.
This area was on the edge o(
both phases of the harrying
but the
direct object of neither.

Once the Norxnan armies had
departed, peasants fled the
blasted
stretches of countryside, and many
of them went initially to the
less
devastated regions.

South of the Aire and in the
other inland areas

which had not suffered too greatly,
some of their number were used
by
the Normans to expand agricultural
production and to redevelop waste
vills during the 1070's.

Most were probably forced to move on.

Tl^ose

peasants, however, who had fled to the
northern part of the shire and to
Durham met a rather different fate.
In the spring of 1070, Malcolm

Canmore suddenly erupted into Yorkshire.

He came over Stainmore and

ravaged Teesdale and Cleveland before
crossing into Durham."^^

Of course,

by this time there was not too much left
to plunder, and the Scots consoled themselves by turning the raid into a
slaving expedition.

This

may even have been their intention from the
beginning since the taking
of slaves was a common feature of later Scottish
raids.

In any case,

they were able to take advantage of the conditions
created by the harry-

ing to enslave large numbers of refugees who had assembled
in some of
the areas through which they passed, and Symeon of Durham
believed that
they were so successful that every Scottish household had the
conve-

nience of an English slave as a result of this expedition.

many of the refugees were not unwilling to go.

Perhaps

This last episode was,

in turn, responsible for the failure of the relationship between over-

stocked manors and functioning churches to hold true on the northern
edge of Yorkshire.
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The Normans increased
agricultural production by
expanding the
arable in localities where
large segments of the native
population had

survived and which had been
the object of population
movements set off
by the harrying.
They may also have redeveloped
waste villages near
these secure areas, but they
probably did not risk their oxen
and seed
in isolated attempts at
reclamation until the 1080's at
the earliest.

Generally speaking, there is a
fairly direct relationship between
what
happened in Yorkshire in 1069-1070
and the situation described in
1086.

A complex form of development in
place had occurred, and Domesday can
be
more or less taken at its word
without

the help of convoluted hypotheses.

This much is sufficiently clear,
but it is imprecise in that it

ignores the fundamental question of how
the Normans organized their

"increased agricultural production."

This is a matter of overriding

importance for understanding the significance
of the Norman Conquest of
the North.

Whether this settlement represented merely the
substitution

of one landholding group for another, or
whether its effects went deeper,

ultimately depends on how the Normans obtained
wealth from their new
manors.

In theory they had a clear choice.

Either they could organize

their expanded (and repopulated?) manors on the basis
of shire custom

and realize an increased revenue indirectly because the
manorial population was now larger, or they could adopt a more direct system.

cases the Normans apparently adopted the latter alternative.

In many
In the

1070*s there was no compelling reason why they should stay within the
limits of Northumbrian custom, and the evidence which has already been

discussed shows clearly that they abandoned it in at least one basic
respect.

What occurred in the overstocked vills during the 1070's was
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not

predcinanay an expansion

of the area under the
plough to .eet the

needs of a .ore nun^rous
village co^unity, although
there „ere instances of this; it was in most
cases a direct expansion or
creation of
demesne land for the benefit of
the lord of the village.

were some 220 overstocked manors
in Yorkshire.

Of these,

In 1086 there

179 contained

demesne land, and in oneone third (f^n^
(60) of -u
these, the ploughs belonging
to
the lord of the manor exactly
accounted for the excess ploughs of
the

estate and were clearly recent
intrusions.

Moreover, if those over-

stocked manors in which the ploughs of
the peasants were only one-half

plough greater or smaller than the number
of ploughlands attributed to
the manor are added to this group,
then the clear examples of manorial-

ization increase from 33 1/3% to 44% of the
overstocked manors containing demesne land.

This group consisted of old bondage vills
which had

been manorialized by the Normans.

The other overstocked manors with

demesne are more complex than this group, but they
had probably been
subject to the same development.
them.

One of two conditions was found in

Either the number of demesne ploughs exceeded the increase
in the

total number of ploughs (24 cases), or it was less than the
total

increase (72 cases).

The former condition probably represents the

expansion of a pre-existing demesne, and the latter is perhaps the
result of a general enlargement of the arable with or without the creation of a new demesne.

Alternatively, individual manors in either group

could have been formed by the revival of waste villages.
12 of

Finally, only

the 41 manors which still lacked demesne in 1086 and were less

valuable than the rest had been granted

to undertenants by

this date.

In Yorkshire, the Nonnan
Conquest did not represent the
simple substitution of one group of landholders
for another. The Normans
broke
with northern tradition by
increasing the amount of land
which was
tilled directly for their benefit.
Probably this meant that they would
be wealthier in time than their
predecessors, but it also had immediate
social ramifications because it was
combined with a preference for one

specific manorial form.

At least this is suggested by
what little can

be learned from Domesday about a
second aspect of the way in which they

organized their estates.

Of course, Domesday was not a
custumal, nor

did it define the terms which it used
to describe the peasants.

But it

seems to record a great social depression
in Yorkshire which was princi-

pally marked by the almost complete
disappearance of sokemen.

There

were, for instance, over three times as many
sokemen in Nottinghamshire
in 1086 as in all of Yorkshire, and the meaning
of this comparison can-

not be explained away by the suggestion that sokemen
had not been numerous in Yorkshire in 1066.'*^

The populations of two sokes, Northallerton

and Falsgrave, are given for 1066, and these two estates
contained more

sokemen (22A) at that date than the North and East Ridings
combined in
1086.
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class.

The Yorkshire sokemen had almost vanished as a significant
This was an important social change, but what is usually not

pointed out is that the fall of those sokemen and even villeins, for
that matter, who had lived through the harrying, was not as great as

economic considerations alone might have dictated.

In the years immedi-

ately after 1069 the problem which faced the burned out peasants was
survival.

There were too many people for the weakened agrarian economy

to feed; and because of the slaughter of oxen and the destruction of
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agricultural implements, cecovery
is not likely to have been
.apid.
Indeed, the situation may have
worsened during the early
1070's until
enough people starved to death
or left for
the economy to stabilize.

In

these Circumstances the Mormaos
could have set what term, they
wished
for the refugees, but they seem
to have acted with some
restraint. When
the population of Yorkshire was
finally recorded in 1086, there
were no

serfs at all in the shire and only
a small number of bordars.^^

This is

significant because it means that the
Normans had not chosen to culti-

vate their new demesnes

^th

either serfs or a naked use of hired
labor.

The only possible exception to this
is the West Riding where bordars

accounted for 33% of the population.

This may mean that some of the

survivors had been reduced to the status
of bordars there, but this is
uncertain.

The percentage of bordars in the population
is impressive

in comparison with the percentages of bordars
in the North and East
Ridings, 16% and 19% respectively, but it is
not much larger than the

percentage in neighboring Derbyshire where bordars were
27% of the population,^"''

Throughout the North and East Ridings the bulk of the population
consisted of villeins in £086.

This class made up 79% of the recorded

population in the former and 73% in the latter.

Even in the West Riding

they were 54% of the population; and, if grouped with the sokemen, who

were more common here thajn in the other two ridings, they and the soke-

men were nearly twice as numerous as the bordars. 52

Given the forces

let loose by the harrying, this preponderance of villeins was clearly

artificial.

If Domesday's employment of the term "villein"

was at all consistent

witJt

(

villanus )

later northern usage, their existence had

been fostered by the Nor^ns,
and this phenon^non
requires explanation.
At the ^ni.u., of course,
it means that the Normans
preferred to have

their demesnes cultivated by
the customary labor of
villeins, the holders of one or two bovates
presumably, rather than by either
serfs or
bordars. But beyond this obvious
point, one is nearly in the dark
on
the basis of the Yorkshire
evidence. Theoretically, the
large nun^ers
of villeins could be explained
within the terms of Northumbrian
society.
The Normans had a greater need
for peasant labor than their
predecessors.

Villeins yielded more free labor
than either sokemen or bordars, so
the
Norman lords maintained surviving
villeins and established indigent

sokemen and villeins (and bordars?) as
villeins,

l^is line of reasoning

could provide a rationale for groups
of overstocked manors such as those
of Hugh fitz Baldric which contained
almost exclusively villeins,

sokeman, 385 villeins, and

7

(1

bordars to be exact)^^ and could explain

those numerous (72 out of 179) overstocked
manors with demense which

show an increase in the number of peasant ploughs.

Both could be under-

stood as attempts to increase the amount of customary
labor available

by the multiplication of the villein population.
This line of explanation may contain some truth, but
a limited body
of evidence indicates that the social depression of
the Yorkshire peas-

antry may also have been the result of an arbitrary act of power
and
greed.

A survey of Ripon, Otley, and Sherburn, estates of the archbis-

hop of York, has survived from around the year 1030, and when its

description of these estates is compared with their description in
Domesday, radical changes are obvious.

These are least pronounced at

Ripon, where the two accounts substantially agree except for five pieces

of land which appear as
sokeland in 1030 but as
berevlcks in 1086.^^

Given the size of the Ripon
estate and the a^unt of time
between the
two surveys, this change .ight
not be judged significant
were it not for
the fact that the same type of
transforation reappears at Otley and

Sherburn on a much greater scale,

m

1030 the estate of Otley consisted

of the head village and sixteen
dependent villages.

Otley and six of

the villages were divided between
agenland and sokeland, and the remaining ten villages were entirely
sokeland.^^ By 1086, however, there
was
no sokeland dependent upon Otley. It
and fourteen of the sixteen vil-

lages mentioned in 1030 are listed,
but they are all described as bere-

wicks.

The accounts of Sherburn reveal the
same phenomenon.

In the

early survey it had twenty-two dependent
villages and parts of twelve

more villages.

Six of these properties were divided
between agenland

and sokeland; the rest were entirely sokeland.

Domesday, however,

describes Sherburn as only having berewicks."

In both of these estates

the rights of sokemen had been annulled.

By 1086 their land belonged to

the archbishop, and the Normans probably were responsible
for this

transformation of sokelands into berewicks.

Furthermore, this act of

tyranny seems to have affected the status of the peasants.

population in 1086 consisted of
dars.
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Sherburn's

sokemen, 101 villeins, and 122 bor-

The Normans did not simply preserve villeins and set up refu-

gees as villeins; they created them by fiat.

There is a little evidence, moreover, that the Normans changed the

nature of villeinage itself.

The obligation to perform week-work was

not one of the ancient burdens which lay upon the northern peasantry,
but two examples of it are known in Yorkshire.

At Carlton and East

Hardwlck. dependent »e»bers of
the

held bovates had to work two
days

of Tanshelf. the peasants
who
a .eeU during 47 weeks
of the year and

Sl^ days a week "during the five
weeks of autu^" on the old
central

de^sne at

Tanshelf. and at Buttercr^e
on the Derwent the bonders

worked four days a week from
Whitsunday

to Martinmas.

These examples

are unique, but they are
disquieting, nonetheless, because
they come
froffl the two areas with
the highest

concentration of overstocked manors

in 1086 and. In fact, from vllls
which themselves seem to have been

overstocked/"

This might be only coincidence,
but It probably means

that at least in these two Instances
the Normans had Imposed heavier

labor obUgatlons on the villeins to
make possible the cultivation of

enlarged demesnes.
It was Bishop who first pointed out these
examples of week-work in

Yorkshire.

He believed that the Noraans had, indeed,
imposed this obli-

gation around Tanshelf (he did not discuss
Buttercrambe)
rejected an economic interpretation.

,

but he

Rather, he thought that it:

must be considered to have been imposed by an exceptional
effort of
socxal and economic oppression, from a motive other than that
of
mere economic exploitation: a sotive presented by the strategic
isaportance of the Aire crossing in the vicinity of Pontefract.^l

Given only two examples of week-work in Yorkshire, this might
seem

a

reasonable idea, particularly since Sishop had misinterpreted the evi-

dence of an expansion of demesne faming, but even without this information Bishop's interpretation ignores the basic problem that week-work

may have been more common at an earlier date than the thirteenth-century
inquisitions indicate.

By this period labor services had been commuted

into doney payments to a great extent in Yorkshire, and it may be that

c«mutation hides old obligations
ju3t a theoretical possibility.

to perform week-work.

This is not

Within a restricted area comparable

obligations should have been commuted
for roughly similar payments,
altthough complete agreement could
not be expected on account of the
bar
g^lLning process and variation in
the value of bovates, money, and
labor

Furthermore, the payments made as commutation
should stand in a close

relationship to the money value of uncommuted
villein services in cases

where the services themselves were originally
similar, provided,

of

corurse, that commutation had not been
carried out too long ago.

These

co^nsiderations are important because of the dim
light which they throw

OH commuted peasant custom

in the vicinity of Buttercrambe.

If these

payments are compared with the combined value of the
rent, renders in
fcLnd, and customary works of the villeins of
Buttercrambe, a suspicious

pattern emerges.

In those manors which had contained demesne land in

1086, the payments ranged from 9s. 2d. per bovate to 13s. 4d. with the

value of the rent, renders, and works at Buttercrambe

well within these limits.

(9s .lid.) falling

The rate at the manor of Helms ley, however,

wfeere there had been no demesne in 1086, was only 5s., half the common
raJte of 10s
Tlals

c

found in -^e vills which had been manorialized in 1086.

pattern shows that the obligations of the villeins of Buttercrambe

were not unique in their scale, and

it probably means that the Normans

head imposed heavy labor duties on the peasants in the surrounding vil-

Lages,
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TABLE 4

Rates in the Vicinity of Buttercrambe^

Date
1271-72

Manor
Burton- le-Willows

1282

Buttercrambe

1258-59

Catton

1285

Bovate Rate

i.ia.ii.'_<i.

icixx/sea

10s.

X

(9s. lid.)

X

9s. 2d.

m

J.UO0

X

Helms ley

West Newton
(a member)

5s.

Pockeley
(a member)

5s.

1285

Howsham

iOs.

X

1245-46

Skerpenbeck

10s.

X

1267-68

It

I,

13s. 4d.

X

Nos. VIII, XLVI, LX, LXXI; II, No. XXIX.

Unfortunately, this line of inquiry cannot be extended to the shire
at large because of the uncertainties inherent in the method.

Yet its

results seem solid in the neighborhood of Buttercrambe, and this means
that the general absence of week-work in the inquisitions is not neces-

sarily significant.

Indeed, this example and the mentality reflected in

the social depression of the sokemen, the preference for villeins, and
the expansion of demesnes make it likely that the two known examples of

week-work were not "exceptional" acts of oppression.

Rather, it looks

more as if the first generation of Norman lords used their power to

establish a seignorial regime which approximated the textbook manor and

Which

m ^ny

cases included the imposition
of week-work on the
villeins.
That the Nonnans took this last
step, of course, can only
be stated as a
probability on the basis of the
Yorkshire evidence, but this
is only to
be expected given the agricultural
history of the shire during
the
twelfth century. The creation
of ^nors was a .ovement
which was inevitably limited in its scope and
duration. Only during the
1070's and
early 1080's did conditions exist
which .ade it possible to i^ose
new
burdens on the peasants of Yorkshire.
Once these years of starvation
and exodus had passed, the Norman
lords no longer held the upper hand.
If they were to redevelop their
remaining waste estates, they had to

attract peasants by offering them easy
terms, and Bishop has shown that
revival along these lines did take place
in the long run.^^

secondary effects was the encouragement of
the widespread commutation

which hides the older burdens of the Yorkshire
peasantry.

What is needed to settle this question is some
way of getting
around the effects of thirteenth-century commutation;
and although this
is apparently impossible in Yorkshire, such
is not the case in Durham.

The agrarian history of the lands between Tyne and Tees
is not so sub-

ject to this complication both because much of the land
belonged to the
church and because this area was not harried to the same extent
as Yorkshire.
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Only limited rebuilding was necessary above the Tees after the

harrying; and, if a brief expansion of manorialism accompanied the Nor-

man Conquest here, its chances of leaving traces in the records were
much better than those of the parallel movement in Yorkshire.

In par-

ticular, it should be visible in Boldon Book, Durham's twelfth-century

custonal, which provides an
Incomparable chance for the study
of northem peasant custom.

To be sure, the various scholars
who have worked with this document
have not discovered any development
of this nature, but this is
not
decisive. The exclusion of Durham
from Domesday precludes a straight-

forward collation of the manorial forms
of 1086 and later peasant custom.

There are no overstocked manors here
to serve as the obvious

starting point for an investigation.

Furthermore, the scholars who have

used this document have had their own
concerns, and these have overpowered Boldon Book.

G. T.

Lapsley, for instance, was interested in
the

survivals, and he based his division of St.
Cuthbert's villages into
classes of forest, pastoral, and agricultural
villages principally on
the presence or absence of cornage.^^

Jolliffe followed a similar line.

He was almost entirely preoccupied with the insight
which the survivals
in Boldon Book could throw on conditions in the North
before 1066.

Beyond this date his only interest lay in establishing a
connection

between the integral shires and the complex manorial forms found in
later records.

This led him to his theory of truncation and an unsup-

ported assertion that demesne farming had increased in the twelfth century, accompanied around Durham by the imposition of week-work on the

peasants.
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Regrettably, he did not pursue this idea since it was only

a logical necessity of his theory of truncation, not a question which

basically concerned him.

Finally, M. Postan, who ignored Jolliffe,

based his analysis of Boldon Book on the false assumption that Durham
had been manorialized on a Midland pattern since time immemorial, and
this curious mistake led him to interpret Boldon Book backwards.
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Actually, the information on
demesne farming in Boldon Book
is one
of its clearest aspects. The
document is not, after all, a
description
of peasant farming or a self-conscious
repository of ancient Northumbrian custom, even though information
on both subjects can be derived

from it.

Boldon Book is an account of the
manorial rights of the bis-

hop, a list of the renders in kind,
payments, and customary labor which

he could claim each year from the manors
he held directly and a record
of the farms of manors held by tenants.

Although at first sight this

information represents a confusing maze with its
welter of detail, if it
is studied closely, certain general
patterns become evident in the vills

which were not at farm, and the most important of
these was the distinction which existed between villages with a demesne
and those without
one.

This was the critical factor which differentiated
villages in

twelfth-century Durham.

General internal organization and peasant cus-

tom were correlated with the presence or absence of demesne
land in a

village except in late functioning shires such as Heighingtonshire.
There were, in fact, two systems for harnessing peasant labor for
the support of the landlord in operation in Durham at the time of Boldon
Book,

The one which has traditionally attracted the most attention was

a survival from the old shires, and it was usually found in villages

which lacked demesne land.

These villages were not completely uniform,

of course, but Butterwick can stand as a fair example of the type.

Buterwyk [Butterwick] renders 32 shillings and 9 pence cornage
and 1 milch cow and 8 scot-chalders of malt and the same of meal
and the same of oats. And every plough [team] of the villeins
ploughs and harrows 2 acres at Sedgefieldo And the villeins do 4
boon-days for every house with 1 man. And they cart a tun of wine
and the millstone of Sedgefield„ The dreng keeps a dog and a horse
and goes on the great hunt with 2 hunting-dogs and 5 ropes, and
does suit of court and goes on errands.^'
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This was the classic bondage
vill.

Butterwick lacked a demesne, and
its

inhabitants, who were all apparently
bonders aside from the dreng,
performed light agricultural duties
in another village. At the
time of
Boldon Book, seven other villages
had the same characteristics, and
six
villages without drengs belonged to
this type.^^ Moreover, the five

villages which contained molmen (firmars)
should be added to this group

because their only distinction was the
payment of a farm assessed on the
bovate in lieu of the grain renders, cow
render, and cornage payments

which were made by the bonders in the
other villages.

The only excep-

tion to this general rule that the custom
of the shire was found in

vills without demesnes was a small number
of villages which had presumably been the centers of groups of bondage
vills in days gone by.

Aside

from Heighington, they had been shorn of their
dependent villages by
1183, but their internal arrangements still bore the mark
of the shire.

Demesnes were either small or defunct except in
Heighingtonshire, and
the peasants either paid compositions for part of
the old dues or were

subject to the usual heavy renders in kind and formalized but
limited

obligations to perform customary labor.
This was hardly the case in the manors where the second customary

tradition was followed.

Despite the prominence which shire custom has

claimed in most discussions of Boldon Book, by this date there were a

number of villages in Durham with big demesnes, and in these villages a
customary tradition, which was an integral part of extensive demesne

cultivation and which had no discernible roots in Northumbrian custom,
was in force.

Villeins subject to this system of obligations performed

.

week-work, and the custoros of
the

o, BoKion, where there was
a

demesne of four ploughs, typify
the system:

Who.

h^:rfh":vi?:s":?\:^r:f"o

the whole year three days in tL
and thirteen days a^ Ch^isJLs
.

~°

L

•

l

•

t'^r^^^'

ir-^^
^nd works
;

'^''^^

°^

through

Whitsunweek

There were also twelve cottars at
Boldon who held twelve acres each
and
had to work two days a week throughout

the year except on the three fes-

tivals mentioned above.

^^.^^^^^^^^

^.^

ninety days of unpaid work each week
throughout most of the year for the
upkeep of the demesne at Boldon and for
other manorial tasks.

the situation at Boldon unique.

Nor was

The peasants in nineteen other villages

were subject to the same customs as their
fellows at Boldon/^ and there
were several other manors with large demesnes
where the peasants did
week-work also, although the obligations themselves
were somewhat different from the three days a week required in the
Boldon villages.

most of the other villages the villeins seem

In

to have held only one bovate,

and they worked two or three days a week from Lammas
to Martinmas and

one or two days a week during the remainder of the year.^^

Finally,

there were three villages inhabited exclusively by cottars burdened
with

week-work.

Jolliffe dismissed all these villages in one brief and

ambiguous sentence which hid both their number and their importance, and

Lapsley classified most of them as pasture vills because their inhabitants paid cornage.^^

Only Postan accorded them their true importance,

but he failed to understand their meaning.''^

In fact,

the manors in

which the villeins did week-work were the most heavily exploited manors
in Durham.

They accounted for most of the demesne land which was not at
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far. and were subject to a
reglne which was diametrically
opposed to the
shire system customs followed
in the villages without
demesnes.
The
latter was predominantly a system
which gathered in the products
of
peasant labor and only a limited
amount of direct labor. The
former
yielded hugh amounts of free labor.
This fundamental distinction

divided the Durham peasantry.
Moreover, the liae of cleavage ran
even deeper than this discussion

would suggest.

There was no simple opposition of
shire custom and week-

work in St. Cuthbert's villages which
might be explicable in terms of
alternative systems for exploiting the
peasants.

Although the differ-

ence between the two customary traditions
was real, the situation

described in Boldon Book had another dimension,
a dimension with implications of the gravest social importance.

It is easy enough to read

Boldon Book and find clear examples of bondage
viUs where the peasants

were burdened with shire customs, but it is quite
another thing to turn
up equally clear examples of villages with
demesnes and peasants bur-

dened with week-work because the accounts of such manors
are long and

confusing and bear an obvious resemblance to the bondage vills.

Again

the situation in Boldon was typical:
[The villein] . . . does in autumn four boon-days at reaping with
his entire household except the housewife . . . and they [the villeins] reap moreover 3 roods of oat-stubble
and harrow it.
.
Every plough [team] of the villeins, also, ploughs 2 acres and harrows them, and then they have once ... a dole .
from the bishop, and for that week they are quit of work, but when they make
the great boon-days they have a dole. And in their works they harrow when it is necessary, and they carry loads
and when they
have carried them every man has a loaf of bread, and they mow one
day at Hoctona [Houghton] . . . and then they have a dole. And
every two villeins build one booth for the fair of St. Cuthbert.
And when they are building lodges and carrying loads of wood they
are quit of all other works.
.

.

.

.

.

.

.

300

In addition to their week-work,
all of these obUgations
rested upon the
Villeins of Boldon, and this is
significant because these services
were
nearly a parallel of those of
the villeins of Heighingtonshire,

Jolliffe's standard exann^le of
shire custom, and of those found
in less
detail in the bondage vills.
Furthermore, the villeins of Boldon
made
the same renders as the peasants in
bondage vills.

Ti.ey

gave hens and

eggs, wagon loads of wood, and cornage;
even the old grain renders were

present being represented by certain
rents and an oat render.

This

situation was typical of all the manors
in which the peasants did week-

work except for the three manors inhabited
solely by cottars.

In all

instances the peasants were not subject just
to week-work; they were

burdened with all the renders and works of
shire custom as well.
This underlayer of shire custom shows that
the Boldon villages and
the other villages with big demesnes had once
been typical Northumbrian

villages.

Furthermore, it means that there were not only two customary

traditions in Durham in the twelfth century but rather two
distinct levels of peasant exploitation, and the heavier of the two, the
manor with

week-work, had been superimposed on the lighter, the Northumbrian
bondage vill.

In light of the expansion of demesne farming which the Nor-

mans initiated in Yorkshire, the explanation of this situation is all
too obvious:

Walcher and his men had manorialized the Boldon villages

and imposed week-work on the peasants.

Boldon Book records the Impact

of manorialization on the level of peasant custom in Durham, just as

Domesday Book disclose-i its general outline in terms of manorial
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structure In Yorkshire.

Yorkshire

Unk

Furthermore, the two exa^les
of „eek-„ork from

these two descriptions for
they come fro. overstocked

vlll. and exhibit the same
combination of week-work and shire
custom as
the Durham examples.

Probably most of the Boldon villages
and the other villages in
this
category had been devastated by
the
Normans in the course of William's

march to the Tyne after Christmas of
1069.

The uniformity of custom

exhibited by the twenty Boldon villages
is itself indicative of this
because it is a sign of a recent,
common origin.

If they had been mano-

rialized piecemeal, in separate, acts of
power, diversity would probably
have been created, and the most likely
occasion when they all could

have been restructured was immediately
after the harrying of the North.
Of course, very little is known about
where the Normans went above the

Tees, but the -rather peculiar distribution
of villages with week-work
does generally fit in with the few things which
are known of William's

movements.

Orderic Vitalis says that William traveled to the Tees after

driving some rebels out of Holderness

,

and this probably means that he

marched north through the eastern end of the Vale of Pickering, skirted
the Moots along the co--t, and crossed into Durham from Cleveland.

With

the Normans across the Tees, Symeon of Durham picks up the narrative.

He says that William divided his force, that Durham was abandoned out of

fear of the Norman advance, and that the church at Jarrow was burned.

Finally, Orderic concludes the episode with the information that the

Normals returned to the Tees from Hexham through some very rugged country.

83

These details are meager but sufficient.

It so happens that the

villages with big demesnes and peasants who did week-work were not
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—

scattered at random over the race
face> of ru^
^
the county;
they were predominantly
arranged in north-south lines
except in the area just south
of the Tyne.

In fact, they all lay on or
near a hypothetical line of
march running

north from Preston on the Tees,
dividing to pass on either side
of the
raised ground in eastern Durham

before reuniting in the vicinity
of Jar-

row, and then running west towards
Hexham.

From Hexham the line runs

south to the Tees either by the old
Roman road through Ebchester and
Langchester, or perhaps through the hills
to the upper Wear valley and

down this valley to the Roman road.

The correspondence between the dis-

tribution of the manor in Durham and what
is known of William's move-

ments during the harrying is too exact

to be coincidence.

The villages

with demesnes were the ones which the Normans
destroyed in January of
1070.

What happened seems clear.

The Durham peasants are known to have

fled when the Normans crossed into the bishopric

They consequently

saved their lives and perhaps their oxen, but many faced
a grim future
nevertheless o

The inhabitants of the devastated villages returned to

find their food taken, their homes burned, and their tools destroyed.
Somehow they had to re^ ild and bring their fields back into production
-

while avoiding starvation, and it is doubtful

if they made much progress

before Walcher and his knights appeared in 1071.

He took advantage of

their plight by setting up demesnes in the wasted villages and by imposing week-work on the peasants.

In return, they received food, tools, and

seed; and presumably the particular social mix in a given village

— mol-

men, villeins, and cottars; villeins and cottars; or just cottars

reflects how desperate conditions were in that village in 1071.

For
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»any-all the villeins and most
of credit.

of the cottars-week-work
was the price

This was the meaning of Symeon
of Durham's statement that

during this period many men "truly
sold themselves into perpetual
servitude, provided that they could
maintain a certain miserable life."^^

Week-work not unreasonably appeared to
be slavery to men accustomed to
the light or indirect customs of the
shire, especially since the two

were combined.
This hypothesis lays a heavy burden on the
shoulders of Bishop

Walcher, but there really can be no doubt
about his responsibility in
the matter.

Evidence from Northumberland is conclusive on
this point.

One can scan Jolliffe and other modern discussions
of

Northumbrian cus-

tom and find no examples of week-work above the
Tyne.

The peasants of

Northumberland appear under the undisputed, although sometimes
decrepit,
sway of shire custom, and this seems quite reasonable
since the Normans

had little impact on this area before the reign of Henry

I,

and

the

creation of manors was a phenomenon associated with the years shortly
after the Conquest.

entirely accurate.

This picture is generally correct, but it is not

Despite the preponderance of shire custom, there

were a few instances of peasants burdened with week-work above the Tyne.
The bonders in at least four of Tynemouth's villages did two days of

week-work except at Christmas, Easter, and Whitsuntide.

The villeins of

Grindon in Norhamshire performed two days of work with a second man each

week throughout the year,

86

and the bonders at Acklington, a member of

the barony of Warkworth, were liable to three days of week-work.

87

These examples are not numerous enough to challenge Jolliffe's general

picture of peasant custom in Northumberland, but they do have

a

direct

305

bearing on the introduction of
the

^or

into Durham.

They all exhibit

the sa.e underlayer of shire
custo. as the Boldon vills and
the villages

with week-work in Yorkshire, and
this in itself suggests a
Nonnan origin
for the week-work. Moreover, they
have one notable thing in
connnon:

They all were probably in Walcher's
possession at some time between
1071
and 1080. Norhamshire, of course,
was one of the most ancient
endowments of St. Cuthbert, and it would
have fallen to Walcher as bishop
in
1071.

Warkworth and Tynemouth, on the other
hand, were part of the

demesne of the earl in this period.^®
but Walcher held this position
also from 1075 to 1080 and was presumably
in possession of these estates.

He is, then, the single thread which unites
the three anomalous examples
of week-work from above the Tyne, and
it must have been under his rule

that these villages were manorialized.

Taken together, the evidence from Yorkshire, Durham,
and Northum-

berland provides an insight into the sombre nature of
the Norman Conquest of the North.

The Normans did not simply dispossess a large

nunh-

ber of Anglo-Saxon thanes and continue to collect the old
revenues.
Rather, they altered the manorial structure in many northern villages.

Until the Conquest, the northern manor had consisted of the right to
receive the old renders and customary works of the Northumbrian shire

from a particular group of peasants.

These were important rights and

had served to support a numerous class of landowners in 1066, but they

were predominantly an indirect systen for drawing off wealth from the
peasantry.

They produced substantial renders in kind, a certain amount

of general purpose work (errands, carting, the maintenance of the mill,

etc.), and only a limited quantity of customary labor for the cultivation
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of the lord's demesne.

The Nor^ns did not accept
this syste. where

they could avoid doing so.

In the 1070's they had
all the advantages

over the peasants-superior
force, Judicial power, and
supplies of grain
and oxen-and they used this
power to introduce a different
manorial
regime.
Capitalizing on the desperate
conditions which they themselves
had created, they increased demesne
cultivation and imposed week-work on
the peasants where circumstances
were favorable, n,ese innovations
were
a radical departure from northern
custom, particularly since week-work

was simply added to the existing
obligations.

They meant that the hold-

ers of these manorialized villages
would be wealthier than their prede-

cessors and that the peasants would be
poorer.

The Norman settlement of

the North was founded upon an exceptional
act of economic brigandage, an

act whose effects passed from generation to
generation except in York-

shire where widespread commutation intervened

to

ease the burden.
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CHAPTER VII
HENRY I'S NEW MEN IN THE NORTH
It has been said that while
Rufus won the North, Henry

I

consoli-

dated Rufus's gains, and this
is true in a descriptive sense.^

Yet this
distinction between the achievements
of Rufus and Henry gives the
establishment of Norman power in the Far
North (Northumberland, Cumberland,

and Westmorland) an air of continuity
and inevitability which the process did not in reality possess.

It would be more accurate to
say that

Rufus won certain short-term advantages
which might easily have passed

away and had, indeed, done so once and
that due to several factors which
had little to do with the North, Henry
realized the potential in the

situation which Rufus had left him.

Even this statement, however, falls

short of the truth in two important respects.

Henry was, in fact, a

"conqueror" in the North although he did it by proxy,
and his consolidation resulted in a fundamental shift in northern power
relationships in

favor of Northumbria and the recreation of conditions
not seen in the

North since before the Viking invasions.
This appraisal of what happened in the North between 1100 and
1135

should not be understood as an attempt to minimize William Rufus's con-

tribution to the creation of stability in the region.

His accomplish-

ments are clear enough, but they were limited to a specific area.

The

Red King's domain was diplomacy and war, and he had achieved nearly

everything which could be hoped for, short of the conquest of Scotland,
from these means.

The building of the castle at Carlisle offered some

protection to the lands to the south if only because any future Scottish

invasion would have as its
first object the recapture
of Cuznberland.
The ending of the Northuxnbrian
earldom removed the threat
that a line of
Norman earls would pursue the
semi-autonomous a^d sometimes
rebellious
policies which the isolation of
Northumbria made possible, and the
killing of Malcolm Canmore allowed
Rufus to establish a friendly king
of
Scots.
These were important improvements
in the northern political situation, but it must be emphasized
that this state of affairs was fragile

and easily reversible.

Siward, the last great warrior to
rule the North

before the coming of the Normans, had
followed
lar to that of Rufus.

a

policy remarkably simi-

He too had taken over Cumberland and
installed

his own king of Scots, Malcolm Canmore.

This first attempt to pacify

the Scots through good relations with
their king had fallen apart as

soon as Malcolm was secure in Scotland, and
Edgar presented the same
danger.

It may be true, of course,

that such a reversal was not a real-

istic possibility for the Scottish king prior to
1099.

The accounts of

Edgar the Atheling's expedition of 1097 which
put Edgar on the Scottish
throne say only that the Atheling drove out Donald Bane,
not that the

latter was captured or completely neutralized; and it is likely
that

King Edgar faced some opposition or at least potential danger
from

Donald between 1097 and 1099 when the latter was finally captured and
blinded.

2

This circumstance insured Edgar's loyalty to Rufus until

1099, and it is not surprising that in that year the Scottish king con-

sented to come south and carry the sword at Rufus 's crown-wearing in
London.

3

But no one could have known with any certainty that Edgar

would remain faithful to the Normans.

Due to Donald's xenophobic expul-

sion of the Anglo-Saxons, Edgar was perhaps less powerful than his
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father.

Yet he apparently brought
some Anglo-Saxons back into
Scotland
with him, and there is no evidence
that his rule was particularly
weak
because his subjects viewed him
as a "usurper."^ Had Edgar
lived long
enough to consolidate his position,
he might well have come over
the

Tweed to waste Northu^erland and
demand the restoration of Carlisle.
Rufus was, after all, no more of
a convincing benefactor to Edgar
than
Siward and King Edward had been for
his father.

Rufus's real failure in the North,
however, did not spring from the

paradox that he had sought peace with
the Scots by supporting Duncan and
then Edgar while he retained Cumberland.

Rather, the flaw in his

achievement lay in the fact that he apparently
did very little to insure
that Cumberland could be retained.

It had been won by an army from the

South, and Malcolm Camaore had been defeated
and killed by another army

specially brought norto.

Both of these incidents were part of a delib-

erate plan to lure Malcolm Canmore into the open and
defeat him.

were hardly typical.

They

The Normans' real strength in the North had been

demonstrated more accurately in 1091 when Malcolm had been able
to plunder Northumbria as far as the city of Durham and escape scot-free.

Until a Norman aristocracy was established in the Far North, such raids
could not be contained, and there is no evidence that Rufus took this
step despite the fact that he had control of Cumberland for nine years
and of Northumberland for five years.

He did, to be sure, install sher-

iffs or analogous officers in the region.

From 1095 Robert Picot was

sheriff of Northumberland, and W. son of Theoderic and a mysterious "Go"
are addressed successively in writs referring to Carlisle.^

Yet the

identities of these three men are unknown, and although the writs in

question .entioa their barons
and lieges, it is doubtful
if these shadowy figures can be taken as
evidence for the existence of
a Nor^n land-

holding class in either area.

If their inclusion in the
addresses of

these writs was not conventional,
they were probably the ar.ed
retainers
of the sheriffs.
Even in the early thirteenth
century when the Norman

equivalent of the Mayflower syndrome
was well established, none of the

tenants-in-chief in Cumberland claimed
that their families had gotten
their lands before 1100, and despite
the fact that some of their peers

in Northumberland did assert that
their ancestors had held post con-

questum Anglie , it is utterly doubtful
that their claims had any foundation.

The claim itself is anachronistic.

No Norman could have gotten

or kept land above the Tyne before the
campaigns of 1080.

Earl Robert

de Mowbray might conceivably have created
some baronies between ca. 1080

and 1095; but with the possible exception of
Herbert de la Val, the

first lord of Callerton, a small barony on the south
coast, there is no

evidence that any of Mowbray's men were reconciled with
Rufus.^

More-

over, none of the supposed early holders of the baronies
in question is

mentioned in or xd.tnessed either King Edgar's grant to Durham or the
several charters made by Rufus while he was in Northumberland in 1095.^
The only exception to this is William de Morley, the first lord of Mitford, whom Gaimar mentions in his account of Mowbray's revolt.

But

Gaimar's description of this revolt is confused and at variance with the

older accounts, and his story about Rufus besieging William de Morley is

unsubstantiated by the other sources.

Furthermore, there is no mention

of William de Morley or any other of the founding barons between 1095

and 1100, and this even includes Guy de Balliol, lord of Bywell, whose
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descendants claimed that Rufus
had given him the family
lands.^^ Most
of these men do appear in
documents made after 1100, however;
and this
along with no mention of them
before 1100 suggests that the
thirteenthcentury claims were inflated.
With the probable exceptions
of Bywell
and Callerton and the possible
exception of Mitford, none of the
baronies in Northumberland originated
before 1100. Combined with the evidence of the more modest Cumbrian
barons, this means that the barons
of
Robert Picot, W. son of Theoderic, and
"G." were the household knights
of these officials.

Circumstances in the North had not changed
signifi-

cantly from the 1080 's when Bishop Walcher
maintained a private army of
over one hundred men and Bishop William
de St. Calais is said to have

kept a force of comparable size.^^

The Normans were still castlemen who

lived in large groups behind their walls and
ditches and subsisted on
the tribute of sullen villagers.

This is not a romantic image.

When

Bishop William de St. Calais died in 1096, a number
of Durham peasants
took the opportunity to decamp into Northumberland
with their cattle.

Others went into Yorkshire either to find refuge in the
southern freezone or, as seems more likely, to advance themselves by taking
part in
the redevelopment of the wasted countryside.

When Henry became king, Norman settlement had scarcely advanced
beyond its limits at the death of William the Conqueror.

Above Durham

which was probably fairly well in hand despite peasant dissatisfaction,
Robert Picot controlled Newcastle, Tynemouth, and Bamburgh.

In the

West, someone held Carlisle for the king, but on either side of the

mountains, the countryside

— or

whatever was left of it after the revolts

and Scottish raids of the eleventh century

— was

unoccupied

by Normans
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except in Durham, .here ^erius
de Cornford appears by
1095, and perhaps
in the very southernnost part
of Northumberland.
^.^^^^ ^^^^^^
of Norman settlement in the
North at this date is, in fact,
surprising;
and, although there was xnore
involved than this, it was the
result of
the fact that the border counties
were unattractive to the Normans
given
the brigandage which the free-zone
and the configuration of the
Cumbrian

border made possible and the threat
of Scottish invasions.
gers had not passed away as if by
magic.

These dan-

Even later in his reign when

he had done much to pacify the North, King
Henry enlarged his bodyguard

when he crossed the Humber, and at least in
1100 there was no certainty
that King Edgar would not resume the raids
which had characterized

Northumbrian-Scottish relations since the early years
of the eleventh
century.

The Scottish monarchy was not yet dependent
upon the Normans

in any fundamental sense, and there is no
evidence of any Norman pene-

tration into Scotland either as members of the court
or as landholders

before 1100.

"'•^

Indeed, this is not surprising given the extent of Nor-

man settlement in the border counties.
The accomplishments of Henry
this set of circumstances.

I

in the North were to alter basically

Due to the fortuitous conjunction of a num-

ber of factors of which the most obvious were Henry's own experiences
during the 1090* s, his political needs and methods after becoming king,
and extremely good fortune with respect to the Scottish royal house, he
was able to transform the scattered outposts of Norman power which Rufus

had left behind into something quite different.

When he died in 1135,

the position of the Nonnans in Yorkshire had been consolidated, a Norman

aristocracy had been installed in the border counties, and King David

had taken the first steps in
establishing a Norman aristocracy
in
Lothian and Cumbria. These
develop^nts laid the foundations
for the
societies which existed in both
the North and in southern
Scotland during the High Middle Ages, and
there vas a unity to their
formation.
Unfortunately, however, the connection
between these developments has
been obscured by gaps between local
studies, English history, and Scottish history.

Indeed, this subject provides an
appalling example of how

inodern points of view can
annihilate the past.

Because of this problem

and because the basic factor which
allowed Henry to settle Normans in
the Far North lies outside medieval
history as it is usually conceived,
it will be necessary to reconstruct
the outlines of this development

piece by piece.

This will involve leaving certain questions,
such as

the curtailment of the northern free-zone,
in abeyance for a time, and

it will necessitate, on occasion, studying
the same evidence from dif-

ferent perspectives.

This may prove somewhat tedious, but since the

demands of "English" and "Scottish" history have succeeded
in turning
the question of the North into a malodorous onion, it
can only be peeled

layer by layer.
The easiest way to approach the problem initially is on the level
of royal politics.

secure.

Upon his accessian, Henry

I

was not immediately

He had only become king through a seizure of the English crown

which nullified his elder brother Robert's right

to

succeed Rufus, and

he was not popular with the great Norman families with estates in both

England and Normandy, who may have preferred Duke Robert to Henry and
who certainly feared for their lands in the struggle which was to
develop between the two brothers."'"^

This combination of factors was

either dangerous or potentially
so until 1106 and to a
certain extent
even later, and two of the ways
in which Henry tried to
strengthen hin.
self were of extreme importance
for the North.
The more obvious of
these was his marriage. Late
in 1100 he took as his wife
Maud, the

daughter of Malcolm Canmore and
Margaret, Edgar the Atheling's
sister.
Usually this marriage has been
interpreted on a rather ethereal level.
It has been seen as the symbolic
beginning of a reconciliation of Nor-

mans and Anglo-Saxons; or. upon the
assumption that Henry was disturbed

by the theoretical weakness of his claim

to the throne,

it has been

explained as an attempt by Henry to create
a link between himself and
Edward the Confessor.

Yet it is more likely that the immediate
point

of the marriage was diplomatic for it marked
an alliance between Henry

and Maud's family, and one need not have
recourse to prophesies concerning the return of green trees or the like to
explain its utility.

The

new king was a shrewd diplomat, and he was acutely
conscious of the dangers which could threaten a state from its frontiers.

Since the late

1080's he had been lurking around the western marches of Normandy,
first
as lord of the Cotentin and later as the protector of
Domfront.

At

times he had been in close association with Robert of Be Heme, a
master

in the art of frontier disruptions ^ and with Hugh the Fat, vicomte of

Avranches and earl of Chester. 18

Both from experience and probably from

his own dreams, Henry knew the threats to orderly government which could
come from such areas, and his marriage with Maud must be understood in
this context.

It insured that Edgar, his most powerful neighbor in

Britain, would not invade the North to recapture Carlisle or to support
Duke Robert, and it performed the same function after Duke Robert was

»

captured and imprisoned.

During his later continental
wars, Henry was

not distracted by Scottish
invasions as his father and
brother had been.
The ^rriage insured that the
relationship with the Scottish king
which
Rufus had established as the
provider of arMes would endure
despite the
fact that^it was no longer a real
necessity for the sons of Malcolm
and
Margaret. 19 When Edgar died in
1107, his younger brother Alexander

became king "with King Henry's consent"
but without the intervention of
a Norman army, and he remained
at peace with Henry.^^
fact, the
relationship may have become closer.

Alexander married one of Henry's

illegitimate daughters, and in 1114 he
actually led an army, probably

but not necessarily composed of Scots, in
Henry's invasion of Wales.
Very little is known about this unparalleled
incident, but it would seem
to have prefigured the nature of English-Scottish
relations after 112A.

In that year David, Malcoljn's youngest son,
succeeded Alexander, and he,
as will be discussed later, was bound by ties of
taste, friendship, and

patronage to Henry

I.

The result, then, of Henry's marriage to Maud was

to give the North a long period of

peace in the North.

peace— in so

far as kings could give

For thirty-five years there were no Scottish inva-

sions, a circumstance without parallel since 1000, and it was during

these years that Normans settled in the border counties and under King

David in southern Scotland.

In fact, it was the latter's cooperation

which made the movement possible because the northern free-zone could
not be reduced without the help of the king of Scots

Another of Henry's solutions to his early political problems had,
moreover, a very direct influence on the settlement itself.

His

response to the disaffection of the greater Norman nobles was to create

a new nobility. U.at is, a
party of nobles who owed their
position in
the upper reaches of society
to hi..
This tactic was noted at the
time

by Orderic Vitalis, who, as a
spokesman for the "old" nobility,
asserted
that Henry had raised these men
from the dust; but despite the
fact that
this idea has parsed from Orderic
into modern accounts of Henry's
reign
as something of a commonplace,
the creation of Henry's new nobles
has

not yet been the object of the
comprehensive investigation which it
needs. ^

general terms, of course, the phenomenon
is clear enough.

His new men led kis armies, kept his
castles, and ran his government.
He, in turn, regarded them with the
spoils of feudal government and with

land.

This was a matter of the greatest
importance for the North

because in 1100 there was more land above the
Humber which could be
granted out as patronage than in any other part
of the kingdom.

The

border counties were largely unoccupied by Normans;
and in Yorkshire,

where William Uje Conqueror had installed his own
supporters during the
1070's and 1080's, plenty of land was available from the royal
demesne

and forfeitures.

To a remarkable degree, the Norman settlement of the

North was the result of Henry giving land to his friends.
In Yorkshire the introduction of Henry's new men amounted to a

minor tenurial revolution.

Early in the reign, some of the established

nobles received grants of land and privileges which appear to have been
designed to win their loyalty and were probably local examples of the

favoritism which such already established families as the Giffards,
Clares, and Beauzsonts enjoyed in the south. 2 3

Robert de Lacy, the lord

of the castlery of Pontefract, for instance, had become sheriff of York-

shire by 1102,

axjd

around the same time he obtained either the grant of

Bowland and Blackburnshire in
Lancashire or the transformation of
preexisting mense tenures of these lands
into tenancies-in-chief .^^ Henry
also gave the soke of Bridlington
to Walter de Gant, an important
land-

holder in Lincolnshire and the East
Riding, and he probably granted the
great soke of Wakefield to William de
Warenne, who already held Coinis-

borough and was earl of Surrey.

Robert, Walter, and William were all

men whose support was well worth having,
and their cultivation by the
king to some extent blurs the line between
the "old" and "new" nobility.
It is still clear, however, that the real
rewards went predominantly to

men more closely connected to the king.

Shortly after Tinchebrai, Henry

gave Robert de Brus some 80 manors from the royal
demesne, chiefly in

Claro Wapentake, and another 13 estates which had been
part of the

Mortain fee, and between this date (1106) and ca. 1118, Nigel
d'Aubigny,
another new man, obtained the forfeited estate of Robert de Stuteville.^^
In Yorkshire this consisted of two large groups of manors, one
centered

on Kirkby Malzeard in the West Riding and the other stretching from

Thirsk east into the Vale of Pickering. 27

These two grants were perhaps

the most striking of Henry's creations, but there were a number of other

instances of his reworking of the tenurial structure of the shire.

Early in the reign, for example, Geoffrey fitz Pain, an important new
man, obtained Warter, which had been royal demesne; and between 1115 and
1118 he was rewarded with the barony of Hunsingoreo

28

The history of

Pontafract, however, provides the most flagrant example of Henry's
devices o

The king's initial attempt to win Robert de Lacy's loyalty

apparently failed, and Robert forfeited Pontefract for unknown reasons
at some date between 1109 and 1118.

Henry then gave the honor to Hugh
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de la Val, pres«ably to insure
his support in northern France;
and „hen
the latter died prior to 1129,
the king gave Hugh's widow to
William

Maltravers. a prominent royal minion,
and sold him the estate for a term
29
of years.
Finally, the three mainstays of
Henry's new regime in the
North, Walter Espec, Eustace fitz
John, and David, all became important

landholders in Yorkshire.

David, who was the youngest son of
Malcolm

Canmore, held Hallamshire (Shef field) .^^

John were Henry's northern justiciars.

Walter Espec and Eustace fitz

Walter was given a large barony

around Kirkham and Helinsley; and Eustace,
who was the farmer of Aldborough, Knaresborough, and the escheated
honor of Blyth (Tickhill) during

Henry's later years, obtained the lordship of
Malton.^^

Even these

examples do not exhaust the list of Henry's changes
in the tenurial
structure of the shire for there are a number of other
examples of the

king diverting the descent of estates to his own
candidates or inserting
subtenants of his choice into established baronies, but the
general
dimensions of his introduction of his new men is sufficiently clear. "^^
By 1135 the king had brought into being a group of nobles who owed
their

rise to him, rivaled in power the descendants of the Conqueror's barons,
and controlled the government and most of the important castles of the
shire.

Beyond Yorkshire, the impact of Henry's patronage was even more
conq)lete.

demesne.

Apparently the Northumbrian countryside was considered royal
This was, of course, a legal fiction typical of Norman jus-

tice, but it was useful to Henry who filled the Far North with his sup-

porters.

In southern Durham he gave Hartness to Robert de Brus and

probably Greatham to the Bertrams, and above the Tyne he created a line

of baronies running to the
Tweed.33

^yne valley and the hills to

the north. Walter de Bolbec,
who probably benefited fro.
a connection

with the Giffards, received Styford,
and in the same region Robert
de
Umfcaville obtained Prudhoe which was
probably augmented before 1135 by
the grant of the serjeanty of
Redesdale.^^

To the east and north, Henry

app^arently gave Mitford to William
Bertram or his father, and he may

ha^^ given the neighboring lordship

of Bothal to a son of William.

Mitford, Bothal, and Morpeth, which may
have been an older lordship,
dominated the lowlands of Northumberland
from the Tyne to the Coquet.

Beyond them six new baronies were created.

Morwick and Hadestone, which

adjoined the royal demesne at Warkworth, went
respectively to Hugh fitz
Eudlo, perhaps the son of Henry's
dapifer Eudo, and to Aschantinus de

Worcester, who had custody of the Durham episcopal
manors after Ranulf

Flambard's death.

North of these fees, Henry established Alnwick, the

greatest of the Northumbrian baronies, for Eustace fitz John
and Elling-

ham for Nicholas

de Grenville.

tlement to the Tweed.

^'^

Finally, the king brought Norman set-

Robert de Muschamp, who may have been the steward

of Walter de Gant, was given Wooler in the Till valley, and
Walter Espec

received Wark on the Twped.
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West of the mountains the tenurial structure of the countryside was

also established during Henry's reign, and here again the process itself
represented the endowment of Henry's followers.

Probably after 1106,

the king gave the lordship of Carlisle, which encompassed the Vale of

Eden with the Cumbrian lowlands north of the Derwent,
Rani?jlf

to Ranulf Meschin.

was the son of the vicomte of the Bessin and had led the van of

Henry's army at Tinchebrai.
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He, in turn, established two baronies.

Burgh by Sands and Liddelstrengt:h,on
the Galwegian border; and
to have tried to install his
brother
William in Gilsland.

h.
le

seems

This attempt

did not succeed for Gille, the
native lord of the area, held
out against
the Normans till ca. 1156, but William
did not go without land/^

Henry

gave him Copeland (also called Egremont
or Allerdale above Derwent) on
the southwestern coast of Cumberland/^
Copeland was the westernmost

menfcer of a string of lordships
which ran around the southern side of

the Cumbrian dome and the western side
of the Pennines, and these too

all went to Henry's supporters.
cashire.

Furness was part of the honor of Lan-

Nigel d'Aubigny received Kendale and Burton
in Lonsdale, the

lordship created by Rufus for Ivo Taillebois.^^

Skipton passed to

William, Ranulf Meschin's brother, when he married
the daughter of

Robert de Rumilly; and the forest of Bowland and
Blackburnshire, members
of the castlery of Pontefract, were held successively
by Robert de Lacy,

Hugh de la Val, and William Maltravers.^^

Finally

Lancashire

itself

was given to Stephen of Blois, Henry's greatest political creation,
ca.
1120, and it may have belonged to Ranulf Meschin prior to this date,

although this is by no means certain,
Throughout Englan'^'s northernmost counties the creation of a Norman

lamdholding class was primarily the work of Henry

fundamental sense this development
kin;g*s patronage.

I

after 1106, and in a

is to be understood in terms of the

Even in Yorkshire where a Norman aristocracy had been

esfcablished during the 1070' s, forfeitures and the abnormal extent of

the royal demesne made it possible for him to install a large group of
his own supporters who represented an intensification in the French

presence in the shire.

In the lands beyond, including those parts of

Durha. not held by St. Cuthbert.
Henry created t.e territorial
aristocracy by granting fiefs to his
supporters.

age was not limited entirely to
Normans.

Furthermore, Henry's patron-

Natives played a secondary but

important part in the process, and
the first si^ that this
would be the.
case comes from a Northumbrian
writ of ca. 1103 which reveals
that Henry
had replaced Robert Picot, Rufus's
sheriff, with two Northumbrians,

Ligulf and Aluric."^^

Subsequent writs and other documents
show that

Ligulf administered that part of
Northumberland dependent upon Bamburgh,
and Aluric, the part dependent upon
Corbridge."^*

This rather curious

return to native officials presumably
indicates that Henry had decided
that the best way of governing
Northumberland in these early years was

through local men, but the system was
actually used even after his new

men had come into the area.

Around 1118, Aluric and Ligulf were

replaced or followed by Ligulf's son Odard of Banburgh,
and he was succeeded ca. 1133 by his son Adam.^^

The reliance on a line of native

sheriffs long after any obvious need for their collaboration
is curious,

and the usage had a parallel in Cumberland where another
Odard, apparently the son of Hildred, the farmer

(?)

of Carlisle, was sheriff in

1130. ^«

The re-emergence of natives in the North was, in fact,

a notable

feature of the years between 1100 and 1135, and the king himself even

exhibited a strange and somewhat contradictory taste for northern AngloSaxons.

For a period of time during the 1120 's he employed as his con-

fessor Prior Athelwold of Nostell who had originally been lord of Pock49
1
lington
in the East Riding,
,

Moreover, Henry took as one of his mis-

tresses the daughter of Forne son of Sigulf , who was apparently a

Yorkshire .an; and he both
rewarded and employed these
northerners. 50
In 1133 Athelwold became the
first bishop of Carlisle.^^
Forne's daughter eventually vas married to
Robert d'Oilli, one of the
king's constables, and Forne himself rose
mightily." He was a minister of the
king
In Yorkshire during the 1120's
and later in Northumberland,
and Henry
rewarded him with a small estate
in Yorkshire and, more importantly,
the
barony of Greystoke in Cumberland.

In addition to these lands, Forne

also apparently acquired Coquetdale
in Northumberland, Coniscliffe
in

southern Durham, and probably large
possessions in upper Teesdale from
King Henry.

He was, in reality, a Northumbrian
"new man," and there

were other examples of the type.

Adam son of Swane, for instance, who

was descended from a family which had held
land around Pontefract since

before the Conquest, received an extensive lordship
east of the Eden in
Cumberland and land in Lancashire from Henry

I,

and his younger brother

Henry acquired Edenhall and Langwathby in Cumber land.

The king's

native sheriffs were also rewarded for their services
with land.

Henry

gave Gamelsby and Glassanby with other lands in Cumberland
to Odard and

Hildred, and he created two baronies in Northumberland, Embleton
and
Dilston, for Odard son of Ligulf and Richard son of Aluric.^^

Further-

more, a number of Northumbrian villages, notably a group of nine near

Bamburgh and the vills west of Rothbury which later became the barony of
Hepple, were left in the hands of natives as thanages, and there seems
to have been an analogous group of serjeanties in Cumberland.

Finally

— and

these were perhaps the most curious grants of all

reestablished the sons of Cospatric in the North.

— Henry

Cospatric II, the

youngest son of the old earl, received the great serjeanty of Beanly In

Northumberland; and Waltheof, Cospatric
dale below Derwent in Cumberland.^^

Vs

second son, obtained Aller-

These grants to natives are numer-

ous enough to show that being a
native was not a bar in the North
to

entering the king's service under
Henry

I.

Some might be tempted to go

on from this to conclude that
here was reconciliation between
Saxon and

Nor^n

in practice, but such an idea
would be highly doubtful.

may conceivably have had a personal
weakness for natives.

mistress and his confessor suggest this,
and such

a

Henry

His Yorkshire

predilection would

fit in with a certain type of romanticism
concerning the Anglo-Saxon

past which the king's new men sometimes
affected.

Yet it must be

noted that Henry's native new men usually received
definitely secondrate land.

If this was reconciliation, the price was
cheap.

In fact,

it seems more likely that they were simply useful
on the local level and

that by employing them Henry's patronage tapped
another source of disaf-

fected men whose gratitude could be relied upon„

The result of Henry's

land grants was, in any case, the creation of a hybrid
aristocracy in
the North, and the chief characteristic of these men was that
they owed
their fortunes to him.

They were his men, whether Anglo-Saxon or Nor-

man, and they were unrivaled from Cheshire and the honor of Tickhill

north.

Their establishment represented the territorialization of

Henry's party.
The creation of a Norman landholding class in southern Scotland can

be viewed as an extension of the same process.
chronologically.

This was certainly true

Normans appeared on both sides of the Tweed during

roughly the same years even though this is usually overlooked because of
the ideological width of the Tweed or on the assumption that there were
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Nor^ns in Northu^erland and

Cu^nberland earlier than was
actually the

case.

Furthermore, King David's
reasons for bringing Nonnans
into Scotland can only he e^lained in
terms of his early education
and his relationship with Henry I.

David, or David "fitz Malcolm"
as he should be

called, was in reality one of
Henry's new men, although his
high descent
and his eventual accession to
the Scottish throne tend to
blind Scottish

historians to this.

He was born around 1085 and
spent only some eight

years in his parents' household
before the circle was broken in 1093
by
the death of his parents and Donald
Bane's purges. At this time, his
elder brothers and sisters evidently
took him to England where he was

reared among the ferman boys of the court.^^

The seriousness and reli-

gious attitudes which he was later to
exhibit may go back to his child-

hood with St. Margaret, but in most other
respects it was his stay among
the Normans which was of critical importance
in the formation of his

character.

David spent his adolescence being educated
by Normans to be

a Norman, and according to both William of
Malmesbury and Orderic

Vi talis, he became one in his tastes and behavior.

This, of course,

explains in cultural terms why he was later to surround
himself with
Normans, and it has been taken as the chief reason for the
coming of the

Normans into Scotland.

The Norman Conquest of this kingdom is

explained as a matter of royal taste.

Yet this approach, evidently

because it seems a sufficient explanation, has obscured how David first
became important

in.

Scotland, and this was the work of Henry

I.

After

his sister's marriage to Henry, David became a member of the royal

household, and he v^tnessed several royal acts.
tant because of his sister.

He was, however, impor-

He signed as "David the Queen's brother,"
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and no one «as likely to have
thought that he ™uld ever become
king of
62
Scots.
Indeed, it was not until he was
grown that anyone could have

predicted this.

David was the seventh son of
Malcolm Cann.ore, and even

though four of his elder brothers
had been killed or otherwise elimi-

nated by 1100, probability suggested
that one of his two remaining
brothers, Edgar and Alexander, would have
a son who would supersede him.
To understand David's relationship
with Henry,

knowledge that this did not happen.
young man with no great prospects.

me

must forget the

In the early llOO's David was a

This may have recommended him to

Henry, who had spent his own youth in similar
circumstances, and in 1107
the king became David's benefactor.

In that year King Edgar died, and

he apparently left David either the lordship of
southern Scotland or the

royal estates in this region.

David, however, «as only put in posses-

sion of this bequest when Henry threatened to send an army
against King

Alexander who was reluctant

to honor Edgar's wishes.

This incident is

hard to explain in terms of Henry's Scottish policy, but unless one

assumes that Maud's demands for justice for her youngest brother were
truly formidable, it means that Henry feared that Alexander could not be

relied upon and had de^-'ded
in Lothian and Cumbria.

to weaken his power by establishing David

David's first rise in the world probably came

because of his usefulness in keeping the Scots weak.
Between 1107 and 1124 David was Henry's marcher lord in southern
Scotland, and the second great improvement in his fortunes was probably

connected with this fact.

On the one hand, he needed sufficient mate-

rial resources to function effectively; and, on the other hand, there

was the necessity of insuring his loyalty.

Both problems were solved in

1113 when Henry gave him Maud de Saint-Uz
for his wife.

daughter of Earl Waltheof

,

She was the

Siward's son. and Judith, William
the Con-

queror's niece; and besides these
genealogical attractions, she was
the
heiress of the earldom of Northampton
and the honor of Huntingdon.

David's marriage with Maud made him
one of the most important nobles
in
England. It also bound him even more
closely to Henry and gave him the
lordship of a number of the Normans who
would later become important in
Scotland.

Henry had, in fact, revived the old
pattern of a Northumbrian

earl holding the earldom of Northampton except
in this instance the earl
in question ruled the lost province of Lothian.

It is also probably no

coincidence that it was during the reign of Henry

I

that the earliest

stories of how Lothian had been lost to the Scots
were inserted into the
chronicles.

These accounts, which are contradictory in their
details,

carried the inference either that Lothian was a fief of
the English

crown or that it had been improperly acquired by the Scots,

and they

may have been intended as the basis for a revived English claim
of the
province.

Alternatively, they may only reflect a feeling at

Durham

that Lothian should have been part of England; but, in any case, from
1107 until 1124, David was Henry's man both in
sense.

a

personal and a tenurial

The Normans who accompanied him around Lothian and Cumbria were

predominantly drawn from the earldom of Northampton or from Henry's

patronage network. 66

These were the men who staffed his government and

received lands in Scotland; and after David became king in 1124, this

pattern persisted until Henry's death in 1135.
entered Scotland.

67

After that, few Normans
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The value of the ties between David and
Henry was not restricted,
however, simply to the maintenance of
peace between England and Scotland
or to the provision of David with suitable
companions.

Henry I's great-

est accomplishment in the North was the
containment, division and reduction of the northern free-zone.

It was this which made estates in the

region valuable enough to be granted out as rewards
for his supporters
and ended the concentration of the Normans around a
few military and
administrative strong points such as Newcastle, Bamburgh,
and Carlisle;

and David's cooperation was an important factor in this
process.

first sight, this is not particularly obvious,

of

At

course, for in North-

umbria, the eastern margin of the free-zone appears to have been
con-

tained by methods which were similar to those enployed further south and

which owed little

to Earl David.

In Teesdale, Guy de Balliol built

Barnard castle in the early twelfth century, and Brancepath above the

Wear is probably of a comparable date. 68

"

To the north, Henry created

two new baronies. Sty ford and Prudhoe, at the mouth of the Tyne gap, and

Robert de Umfraville apparently built

a

castle at Prudhoe.

Further-

more, Norman control was pushed up the North Tyne to its junction with

the Rede.

The valley of the latter was given

to

Robert de Umfraville on

the condition that he close it to robbers, and he accomplished this by

the erection of Elsdon castla.

Furthermore, the line of motte-and-

bailey castles between Hexham and the junction of the Rede and the North
Tyne, that is Gunnerton, Wark on Tyne, and Bellingham, presumably also

date from this period.

Elsdon and the castles on the Tyne controlled

all the important routes out of the northern fr«e-zone south of Coquetdale.

The latter was apparently protected by

a

royal castle at
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Rothbury.^l

The upper reaches of the Aln
and Beamish were dominated by

Cospatric's serjeanty of Beanly which
he held by the tenure of guaranteeing the good intentions of outsiders
entering Northumberland through
his estates.

The valley of the Till was blocked
by the barony of Wooler,

which probably had a castle at Wooler,
and by W^lter Espec's lordship of
Carham.
Walter's castle at Wark-on-Tweed
defended an important ford

over the Tweed, and to the east. Bishop
Ranulf's new castle of Norham,

which he had explicitly built to protect
Norhamshire from raiders, performed a similar function,

These castles along the eastern edge of the
free-zone from the Tees
to the Tweed gave the east coast plain a
measure of protection against

raids; but in spite of the prominence of this
attempt to contain the

effects of the free-zone, it is likely that the most
important work was
done in the West.

The key to creating peace in the Far North was the

control of communications through the hills, and this was established
by
Ranulf Meschin, the lord of Carlisle, and by Earl David.
Ranulf*s work took precedence chronologically.

Presumably

When he received Cumber-

land, Carlisle was an exposed strong point, but probably by 1120, at

which time he gave up his northern lordship to become earl of Cheshire,
and almost certainly by 1135, Carlisle had been linked with Richmond by

castles at Appleby, Brough, and Bowes, and its communications with Lan-

cashire had been secured by the castle of Burton-in-Lonsdale. ^'^

The for-

mer castles in particular were very important because they controlled
the Vale of Eden-Stainmore route and split the Jennines.

Furthermore,

Ranulf blocked the Galwegian border itself with two new baronies.
by Sands controlled the fords across the Solway which were the most

Burgh

practical route to the north, and
Liddel covered the route around
the
edge of the hills.^^ These lordships

and castles put the Norn^ns in a

much better position to control
movements through the southern part
of
the old Cumbrian kingdom, but to
be

really effective, they needed to be

extended beyond the border.

This was earl David»s contribution.

According to local tradition at Glasgow,
David had been sent by God to
punish aud restrain the Galwegians, and

he accomplished this by creating

around the western flanks of the Scottish
part of the free-zone three
large lordships modeled upon Carlisle.

He gave Liddesdale to Ranulf

de Soules, Eskdale to Robert Avenel, and
Annandaie to Robert de Brus.^^

These military districts covered all the dales
between Cumberland and
Annandaie.

The latter contained the Galwegians of Nithsdale
and pro-

vided the basis for keeping the Roman road to the Clyde
open.^^

Eskdale

and Liddesdale dominated the trails leading to Teviotdale
and to the

North Tyne.

Together these fees split the northern free-zone and made

east-west raids impossible.

They were, moreover, matched by a series of

military districts in the north which protected

the Midland valley of

Scotland just as the southern lordships shielded Tweeddale and Northumberland.

David gave Cnnningham to Hugh de Morville and North Kyle and

Renfrew to Walter fitz Alan. 79
The effect of the activities of Ranulf Meschin and Earl David was
the fragmentation and containment of the northern free-zone.

This was a

necessary condition for the revival of northern society on both the
English and Scottish parts of the east coast plain, and there is

a curi-

ous parallel between David's career and the appearance of Normans above
the Tyne.

This pattern can only be stated tentatively, of course.

because of the extremely limited
nature of the evidence, but
it is suggestive nonetheless. There is

practically no evidence that Norman
land-

holders were established in
Northumberland during the first
decade of
Henry I's reign. A shadowy "Graf

fard," who apparently held land
around

Tynemouth, is mentioned, and two
writs refer to Guy de Balliol.

But the

second of these, a writ issued in
1105, strongly suggests that there
were no other important Norman
landholders along the Tyne, and beyond

Graffard and Guy, no outside settlers
are mentioned except for a mysterious colony (?) of Flemings who seem
to have been established somewhere

above the Tyne.^^
changed.

After King Edgar's death, however, this
situation

David vanishes from Henrj^'s charters between
1108 and 1112,

which presumably means that he was spending most
of his time in Scotland, and at the end of this period two
significant pieces of evidence

concernxng Northumberland appear.

First, in 1111 Henry removed the

Flemings from the shire; and second, in the same year
Robert Muschamp,
the lord of Wooler, is mentioned in a writ.^^

This is a rather suspi-

cious coincidence, and it is repeated later in the
1110' s.

From ca.

1116 through 1121 David again fails to attest any of Henry's acts; and

during roughly the same years, ca. 1114-1121 and ca. 1116-1120 respectively, neither Robert de Brus, the future (?) lord of Annandale, nor

Ranulf Meschin witness a royal charter. 83

The simultaneous absence of

these three men is not likely to have been the result of chance, and it

probably means that during these years they were busy in the West bringing order to the Galwegian march.

Furthermore, at the end of this

period, Eustace fitz John, Walter Espec, and Fome son of Sigulf, the

three principal agents of Henry's government in Northumberland, all
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appear above the Tyne, and the
same is true of Walter de
Bolbec and
Robert de Umfraville.^^

m

1121, moreover. Bishop Ranulf
built Norham

castle, and between 1119 and
1124 Berwick and Roxburgh, the
first Scottish burghs, appear.
Finally, in 1122 King Henry
himself came north
and surveyed Cumberland and
Northumbria.^^ If the pattern which
this

evidence discloses can be relied upon,
the attack upon the northern

free-zone was at least contemporaneous
with the settlement of Normans

Northmnbria and Tweeddale, and it probably
preceded the latter.

ir

Fur-

thermore, David's activities were clearly
central to the whole process,

even though their exact nature remains hidden.

The Norman settlement of the border counties and
of southern Scotland cannot be explained except in terms
of the political needs of Henry
I

and his relationship with Earl David.

Henry brought the Normans north

either directly or through David, and with the aid
of David he created
the conditions which made their settlement possible.

The lands of the

old kingdoms of Nor thumb ria and Cumbria were settled as a
unit.

Yet

this conclusion raises a fundamental question which cannot be
answered

satisfactorily within the framework of political history.

If this chro-

nology is correct, then one must ask why the Normans had not taken lands
in the Far North before 1110.
to

They had come to England to get estates,

become greater lords than they were; and their behavior in southern

England and elsewhere in Christendom establishes that they had few scruples, and these largely restricted to the Church, which could stand for

long between them and land in the hands of natives.

Judged from the

standpoint of what they did elsewhere, their neglect of Northumberland,
Cumberland, and even Scotland till the early twelfth century is an
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enigma.

Indeed, this is probably why their late
arrival above the Tyne

has been largely overlooked.

They should have been there; and despite

the fact that Henry I's diplomatic and
political needs provide a con-

vincing explanation of why he gave Normans land
in this area, his reasons were not really unusual.

Both William the Conqueror and William

Rufus had wanted a quiet North so that they could
concentrate their

strength in Normandy, and the need to reward followers
with land was not

new in 1100.

There is no sign that

the

Conqueror or Rufus had more

lands at their disposal than men willing to occupy them.

The idea that

estates in the region were not very valuable because of the insecure

conditions which prevailed there is more helpful, but it only pushes the

problem back geographically.

Why had the Normans not moved into the

hills and mountains of the free-zone before 1100?

The cooperation which

Henry received from David was, no doubt, convenient in this endeavor,

but it was not essential.
way.

Ranulf Meschin could have pushed into Gallo-

No answer to this question is apparent, and this is because the

explanation lies in an unexplored area.
In reconstructing the history of the Norman Conquest it is usual to

concentrate one's atte"*"ion on such subjects as the diplomatic, political, and administrative activities of the kings, the question of feudalism, and military history.

Normally ecclesiastical history is also

included so that the famous triad of castles, knights, and monks tends
to dominate our conception of the Conquest.

This is, of course, inevi-

table because to varying degrees these were the questions which inter-

ested chroniclers or were mentioned in charters.

In the case of the

North, this point of view dates back to the 1090' s when a certain Boson,

a knight of Bishop William de
St. Calais, is reported
to have had a

vision which could be favorably
compared with the concluding
paragraphs
of many modern works on the
Norman
Conquest.

Boson had the privilege of

witnessing through a vision a supernatural
slide-show which revealed
that the significance of the Norman
Conquest of the North lay in the

replacement of Northumbrian spearmen on
fat horses by armored knights
riding chargers, the substitution of

monks for married priests, and the

building of the castle and cathedral at
Durham.^^

One might add on the

basis of this research that Boson should
also have seen peasants laboring under a more intensive manorial regime
to support all this, but his

picture is still strikingly modern.

Unfortunately, however, such a

point of view cannot explain why the Normans failed
to pass beyond Dur-

ham until late in the life of this perceptive knight
because the reason
lies in the mundane.

IVelfth- century writers usually took this realm

for granted, and modern accounts of the Normans either ignore
the day to
day reality of their lives and in particular the fact that they
func-

tioned in terms of an agricultural society or relegate this subject to

generalized discussions of manners and morals or to abstract Domesday
studies.

This is unfortunate because the Norman settlement of the North

was a colonizing process; and, as in most such ventures, mundane considerations played an important role in determining its course and scope.
This question has been deferred until now despite its relevance

between 1070 and 1100 because the most important clue to its solution
comes from an obscure corner of Scotland during the reign of King Davidu
As observed earlier, he was responsible for bringing Normans into Scot-

land, but very little evidence on" this subject has survived.

To a
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remarkable degree the history of
this event is based upon deduct:
tions
fro^ a limited group of charters.

In terms of twelfth-century
Scottish

history this small body of evidence

is regrettable, but in a

roundabout

way it is favorable to the present
investigation because in Scotland
peripheral information concerning the
Normans, which in England receives

little emphasis, stands out clearly.

Specifically, settlement patterns

seem to have existed among the Normans
who took land in Scotland, and
this phenomenon is most striking in the
Southwest.

The men whom David

planted around the Galwegian border formed a very
interesting group.
Their inflefment showed, in the first place,
the importance of David's

possession of Northampton and his connection with Henry

I

for they

either held land in David's Midland honor or, as in the
case of Robert
de Brus, were Henry's new men.
sasae

tauy,

Moreover, these men all stemmed from the

region in France, Lower (western) Normandy or the borders of Brit-

Walter fitz Alan's father was from Dol, and Robert de Brus was

from Brix south of Cherbourg.

Morville is near Brix, and Soules (now

Soulles) is in the vicinity of St. Lo.

Robert Avenel apparently

belonged to an important family of the Avranchin.

oo

That all these men came from the same area is curious, and it might

be explained

as the result of the fact that Henry I's patronage network

had originally been based on western Normandy. 89

But while this consid-

eration is obviously relevant, David's land grants in eastern Scotland
shcaw that it was not the only factor involved.

The Normans to whom he

gave land in Tweeddale, Lothian, and Fife were of diverse origins.
nuiriber of

A

them, in fact, cannot be traced to northern France at all,

even by conjecture; and of these, William of Lamberton

is perhaps

the

,

,

moat remarkable for he took his
„a.e from the village of
La^erton near
90
Berwick.
Others in this group can, at
least, be traced to England
although in some instances not by
much. Walter de Ridale (Tweeddale)
for instance, was from Northumberland,
and William de Sommerville (Lan-

narkshire) and Walter of Lindsey
(Lothian) cannot be followed south

beyond the castlery of Pontefract and
northern Lincolnshire respectively.

The other men in this group, Robert
Corbet (Teviotdale)

Berenger Engaine (Teviotdale), and David
Olifart, were from Northampton,
but the origins of their families beyond
that point are unknown.^^

remaining men came from different parts of
northern France.

The

Hugh de

Morville and Robert Avenel, who both held land
in western Scotland, also
got land in the east, and Simon fitz Michael
(Fife) was a Breton judging

from his name.
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Robert de Bourneville (Lothian) apparently came from

near Caen, and Gervais Ridel (Lothian) is said to have
stemmed from

Blayne in Guienne prior to Northampton.^^

The rest came from the east.

Richard Comin (Peebleshire) is said to have been from Comines near
Lille, and Geoffrey Melville (Angus?), William Maule (Perths.)

,

and

Robert de Umfraville (Stirling^), the lord of Prudhoe and Redesdale in
Northumberland, all were eastern Normans.

Finally, three dependents

of the Warrenes' from eastern Normandy, Alexander de Saint-Martin, Hugh

Giffard, and Bernard de Balliol, received land in Lothian after the mar-

riage of Ada de Warenne to David's son Henry, 96

eastern Scotland formed a heterogeneous group.

David's Normans in
As in the West,

the

importance of the king's connection with Northampton and with King
Henry's friends is noticeable.

Yet there was no exclusive concentration

of western Normans in this part of Scotland as there was on the borders

of Galloway, and this discovery
acuvery makpc;
loi-^^^
makes the.
the latter
arrangement more suspicious than it seemed in isolation.
It might be suggested, of course,
that this pattern is accidental,

and it would be difficult to rule
out this possibiHty on the basis
of
the Scottish evidence which is rather
limited with rbspect to the West.

But if the distribution of Normans in
Scotland has some meaning and is
not the result of chance, one might expect
to find a similar distribution in the border counties of England;
and, if this question is actu-

ally pursued, significant results do emerge.

Of the baronies in North-

umberland, three, Hepple, Langley, and
Warkworth-Rothbury , were established too late to be considered here.^^

Four of the remainder, Beanly,

Dilston, Embleton, and Gosforth, were held by natives
when they first
appeared, and the holders of five other early baronies,
Bolam, Bothal,

and Hades tone along with Mitford and Wooler, have not
been traced to

Normandy although they were apparently Normans.

This group includes

men who took their names from places in England such as Aschantinus de
Worcester and Gilbert of Newcastle, and men with ambiguous names such as
the Bertrams

or Robert de Muschamp.

Eight men remain after these

deductions, and they were nearly balanced between eastern and western
Normans.

Robert de Umfraville (Prudhoe and Redesdale)

,

Walter de Bolbec

(Styford), and probably Nicholas de Grenville (Ellingham) came from

eastern Norman families, and Guy de Balliol (Bywell) should be grouped

with these men although Bailleul-en-Vimeu was a few miles east of the

Norman border.
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Hugh fitz Eudo, on the other hand, stemmed from west

central Normandy, if he really was the son of Eudo de Ria, and there

were two men, Walter Espec (Wark) and Eustace fitz John (Alnwick) whose

o
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families came from the West.^OO

Finally, Herbert de la Val may have

been from the West, although this is
by no means certa^.^^^

From the

standpoint of their origins, the Northumbrian
barons establish that the
group of men who received land from
David in eastern Scotland were not

unusual.

The landholders between the Tyne and the
Tweed were drawn from

families of both Upper and Lower Normandy
with the former in a slight

majority, and they included in their number a
substantial group of men

who cannot be traced to Normandy
If one turns to Cumberland, however, quite
different results emerge

which have a direct bearing on David's western Normans,
and this infor-

mation is of critical importance because it shows that the
Northumbrian
and eastern Scottish evidence cannot be taken as revealing
the composition of a "normal" Norman landholding class in this part of
Britain.

The tenurial structure of Cumberland was the work of Ranulf Meschin and,

after 1120, of Henry I; and they enfiefed a very interesting group of
men.

Seven of the men who received land were natives, which, given the

size of the area, was a rather sizable group; and four of the Frenchmen

cannot be traced to northern France. 102

These men were rather different

from their eastern peers such as Gilbert de Newcastle or David's North-

amptonshire men because in three of the cases, Guy the Hunter, Richard
Redere, and Walter the Chaplain, their obscurity stems from their own
lack of status rather than from their possession of an English placename.

Furthermore, the fourth man, Thurstan de Reigny, was clearly

French even though he has not been traced.
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None of these men has

been shown to have come into Cumberland as the result of secondary immigration, such as certainly took place on the east coast.

This is

curious, but the really important
point is that there were no
Normans at
all from Upper Normandy in Cumberland.
Ranulf himself was the hereditary vicomte of the Bessin, and
six of the seven men who received
land

from him and Henry

I

were from Lower Normandy and Brittany ^^^^

The only

exception to this was a solitary Fleming,
Turgis Brundis, the lord of
Liddel.lO^ Furthermore, this
same pattern is discernible just
south of
Cumberland.

Burton in Lonsdale and Kendale were
apparently held succes-

sively by Ivo Taillebois from west-central
Normandy and by Nigel

d'Aubigny from western Normandy, and the
tenurial history of Skipton in
the Aire gap is similar.

Its first lord was Robert de Rumilly who

came from Remilly in Lower Normandy, and
its second holder was William

Meschin, lord of Allerdale above Derwent and
the brother of Ranulf
Meschinc-'-^''

In Lancashire above the Ribble where most of
the country-

side was taken up by honorial demesne manors, thanages,
and serjeanties,
the only important lordship was the fee of Lancaster
whose first holder,
a certain Gilbert, seems to have been a retainer of
William Meschin, and

the only identifiable landholder in Furness during the reign of
Henry

was Michael le Fleming.
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The concentration of western Normans in

Scottish Cumbria was not an anomaly.

English Cumbria and the region

just to the south were also settled by men from Lower Normandy and Brittany; and the two Flemings, who might be taken as exceptions to this

pattern, have their parallel in Scotland for either King David or his

successor, Malcolm the Maiden, settled a Flemish colony along the head-

waters of the Clyde above Lanark.
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The combination of evidence from the northern counties of England
and from southern Scotland establishes that there was an east-west split

in the settlement of Norn^ns
within the region during the reign
of Henry
I and David.
The lands of the old kingdom of
Strathclyde or Cumbria (in
its widest sense) were settled
by men from Lower Normandy and
Brittany

with some Flemingso

Along the east coast plain, on the
other hand, a

composite nobility was established which
included men from all the for-

mer areas, men whose families can only
be traced to southern England,
and Normans from Upper Normandy who probably
formed the predominant faction.

Furthermore, the nobility which William
the Conqueror installed

in Yorkshire was similar in its composition
to the later nobility of

Northumbria and Lothian.^^°

This settlement pattern, which appears to

be without exception, is so clear-cut that it must
reflect the operation
of some selective factor, and since this
distribution of Normans ignores

national boundaries and is not explicable in terms of Henry
I's patronage,

this factor must have been exercised by the Normans
themselves who

settled in the region.

Indeed, in this selective factor lies the link

between the mundane and the coming of the Normans into the Far North.
At first sight the bizarre arrangement of Normans in the North may

seem to correspond with nothing more significant than the boundaries of
the old kingdom of Strathclyde in the days of its greatest power or, to
the nonromantic, with a north-south line from the headwaters of the Kib-

ble to the Scottish Highlands, but this distribution does have a meaning.
It corresponds with a basic agricultural division of the North which was

reflected in a number of differences between the agricultural systems of
the east coast plain and the West.

The characteristics of these regions

were probably complex even in the early twelfth century.

They certainly

were later, but for the moment they will be discussed in terms of the

distinction which in the first
instance was of
Normans.

::K,st

significance to the

This was the question of northern
cereal production.

From

this standpoint, the North was
transected by the oat bread line.

This

term is entirely a matter of convenience
and was chosen in memory of

Samuel Johnson who was of the opinion
that oats were only eaten by
horses and Scots.

The line itself defined that part of
the North in

which spring crops (oats and barley) were
predominant over winter cereals (wheat and rye), and it was not
absolute in the sense that there

were no exceptions to its sway.

Nevertheless, it was a fundamencal

division of northern farming, and it can be
seen most clearly in the mid
eighteenth century just before the advent of modern
transport and the

industrial revolution severed diet from the confines
of regional agriculture.

In the 1760»s Arthur Young, that great apostle of
agricultural

improvement, toured the North; and, as was his custom, he
wrote an

account of his journey from which it is possible to reconstruct
a rough
map of the bread types of the North during this period. ''^

This infor-

mation should not be understood as necessarily applying to the "better"
people on the wrong side of the oat bread line for they belonged in
terms of food to a wider world, nor does it correspond completely with

what was being grown in that "superior" grains which did not appear in
the bread were sometimes grown locally.

the cheap local grains,

But the bread types do reveal

those grains which did best in the neighborhood.

Such a map is highly instructive.

It shows that the consumption of

wheat bread was largely restricted to the southern part of the east
coast plain.

North of the Vale of York in Durham and southern Northum-

berland, rye became an important bread grain in the local diet although
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wheat was also used; and from Morpeth
on the Wansbeck north, wheat and
rye were both replaced by bread made
from a combination of barley and
peas.

As mxght be expected so close
to Scotland, oatmeal in the form

of porridge also occupied an important
place in the Northumbrian diet.^^"^

The really surprising point, however,
is that reliance on spring crops

was not confined to northern Northumberland.

In the eastern flanks of

the Pennines in Yorkshire oatmeal seems
to have been the primary bread

grain, and spring cereals were unrivaled
in the West.^^^

In lowland

Cumberland the local bread was made from oats
and barley with some rye,
and in Westmorland and Lancashire oat bread
or oatcakes (clap bread) was
the common bread.

The same was true, of course, in southwestern

Scotland, and the English oat bread area apparently
ended in Cheshire,

although there was another zone of barley bread running
down towards

Newcastle-under-Lyme west of the Pennines. "^'^

Arthur Young's journals

show that the North was divided by a line which ran from the Wansbeck
south through the hills into the West Riding, and to the north and west
of this line the usual bread grains were oats and barley.

bution of bread types is quite significant; and

This distri-

it can be confirmed by

the Board of Agriculture reports of the early nineteenth century which

show Northumberland divided between a northern area of barley-peas bread
and a southern rye area and the West still in general confirmed in its
taste for oat bread.

The oat bread line had probably cut across the North since prehistoric times.

This is not to say that the situation in the mid eigh-

teenth century can be carried backwards without

alteration,

of course.

The exact location of the line had undoubtedly shifted from time to time
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with fluctuations in the cUmate,
developments in agricultural practice,
and changes in taste.

Such minor alterations are shown
by the fact that

in 1698 Celia Fiennes, another
journal-writing traveler, did not encounter clap bread until she had penetrated
Amounderness as far as Garstang

or by the probability that northern
Lancashire was in an area of barley

bread in the sixteenth century.

There were also favored areas beyond

the line in the East where wheat could be
grown in the Middle Ages, and

from the late sixteenth century spring wheat
was occasionally grown in
the West.^^°

Furthermore, it is clear that winter wheat was grown
on a

limited basis in Lancashire before this.^^^
tions which are inevitable in agriculture.

But these are the excepF. J. Singleton has col-

lected evidence which illustrates the reliance of the agricultural
system in Lancashire on spring crops, principally on oats, from
the eighteenth back to the thirteenth century, and he has shown that the structure of the field system there was based on their growth.

"''^^

Singleton's research, in fact, supplies a surprisingly direct link

between conditions in Arthur Young's time and those of the High Middle
Ages; and to a certain extent, the same correspondence can be found in
the East.

A portion of the Lay Subsidy Roll for

25 Edward I dealing

with the West Riding has survived, and it discloses in enough detail
what crops were being grown in the countryside south of the Aire and

to

a lesser extent around Ripon to make possible the construction of a crop

sequence map (see Map

123
9

) .

This map reveals that the cultivation of

wheat was limited to the lower parts of the area, generally to land

below 250 feet and to the valley floor of the Calder.

On either side of

the zone in which wheat was grown, there were belts of villages in which
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Map 9.

Crop Sequences in the West Riding in 129 7

rye took the place of wheat; and
finally, on the higher ground towards
the west there were a number of vills
where only oats were grown.

This

is remarkable proof of the age of the
distribution of bread types as

they were revealed in the eighteenth
century, and it is probably a cor-

rect assumption that in the thirteenth
century, the oat bread line con-

tinued on to the north through the edge of
the Pennines just as it did
later.

To the east of the line there is, of course,
little need to

establish the importance of wheat and rye.

The Lay Subsidy shows their

cultivation in the late thirteenth century, and they
are accounted for
in the pipe rolls of Henry III and John.^^^

In Durham where the growxng

of wheat cannot, perhaps, be assumed so lightly, it is
known that the

episcopal demesne manors yielded

2

,065* quarters of wheat and

5

,

236* quar-

ters of oats in 1211, and Boldon Book shows that wheat was produced
on

these manors in the 1180* s. 125

Finally, the oldest fairly general evi-

dence which throws any light on this question, Henry II 's pipe roll for
1172, apparently reflects the oat bread line.

In that year the king

sent 200 skeps of wheat and 100 skeps of oats to Ireland from Yorkshire.

From Northumberland, however, he could only dispatch 300 loads of oats
and from Cumberland, 200 loads of oats.

1

OA

This does not necessarily mean that no wheat was grown in Northum-

berland and Cumberland in 1172, but it is good evidence that there was
no surplus of this grain which could be sent out of these shires.
this should not be particularly surprising.

And

Both areas were beyond the

"economic" or large—scale limit of wheat cultivation as defined by Ho

Dudley Stamp.

According to Stamp, these limits are the 60-degree iso-

therm for July in the north and the 30-inch rainfall line in the west.
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Currently Durham and Lancashire are on
the edge of the area marked off
by these criteria. The 60-degree isotherm
runs in a southwest tending
arc through northern Yorkshire, and
the 30-inch rainfall line stretch
es

north-south across the eastern slopes of the
Pemines.

Lowland York-

shire is mostly within these limits, and
eastern Durham is just on th e

other side of the line in terms of temperature
but not from the stand-

point of moisture.

Much of the Pennines are excluded on either
ground.

In the West, Lancashire and Westmorland are
mostly below the 60-degree

isotherm for July but only barely, and all of the area,
especially

to

the east and northeast, receives more than 30
inches of precipitation
128
T

yearly.

There is a remarkable correspondence between Stamp's criteria
for

wheat cultivation and the historical oat bread line, and this is
quite
understandable.

Wheat can be grown, to be sure, north of Stamp's Jim-

its, but it becomes an undependable crop liable to an alternation of

good yields and poor except in a few favored spots which lie mainly on
the very eastern margins of Scotland. 129

ability

— or

—which

"economic" production

It is this problem of dependis the basis for the similarity

of the eighteenth-cenf'^y bread types and the crop distributions in the

Middle Ages.

The common local breads of the 1760' s were the cheap

breads made from grain which grew well under local conditions.

These

were not necessarily the only crops which could be grown in the neighborhood if one were prepared to take risks; and, of course, it was
exactly "risks" which the medieval peasant could not afford to take.
For him, crop failures meant ruin and starvation.

The northern peasant

had to grow crops which could be expected to do well year after year,

352

#nd this necessity produced the crop
sequences which have b5een encountered. Rye
endure the cold better

^

than wheat.

further north than rye, and oats
will withstand

^ther barley

or rye.^^O

p,,,^^^^^^^ ^^^^^

^re

Barley can be grown

n>oisture than

^^^^ ^^.^^^^^ ^^^^ the

northern peasant's criteria for
growing wheat prior to 1066 were clos
5er
to Stamps
theoretical requirements
than to either the eighteenth-

s

century distribution of bread types or
the situation which existed in the
twelfth century.

Despite the general similarity of shire
custom through-

put the North, there were some important
differences between its demands

in Yorkshire and Northumbria which seem to reflect
the pre-Norman oat

bread line.

shire— in

In Yorkshire, for example, the old grain
renders of the

so far as their composition can be
reconstructed—apparently

were made up of oats and corn, presumably either rye
or wheat.

Above

the Tees, on the other hand, these renders consisted
of oats and bcrley

either in their raw state or as malt and meal, and it is
probably a fair

inference from this that the Northumbrian peasants did not normally
grow

wheat for had they done so, these grains almost certainly would have
been Included in their dues. 132
peasants each year poi

s

The number of boon-plowings required of

in the same direction.

usually had to do two free days of plowing
another in the springe

133

In Yorkshire peasants

a year, one in the fall and

In Northumberland, however,

they did one

plowing a year at oat seed time, and in Durham the oldest tradition
required plowing only once a year.

134

Both Northumbrian grain renders

and boon-plowings indicate that the oat bread line had run somewhere

through southern Durham or northern Yorkshire during Anglo-Saxon times,
and there is evidence that it had at least one outlier in Yorkshire.

In
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the reign of

Him^

the Conqueror, Holdemess
Is said to have yielded

nothing but oats.^^^
The question of the oat bread

Une

is inrportant for understanding

the Norman Conquest of the North
for the simplest reason:

came to England for land-but not
just for any land.

The Normans

This is what we

forget as members of an industrialized
society which is separated from
the countryside by

supermarkets and a commercial system of
food distri-

bution which blurs regional differences.

In the eleventh and twelfth

centuries such differences determined
what most men ate, and this was of

direct concern to nobles because they
had specific expectations with

respect to food.

Nobility was expressed and enjoyed in a standard
of

living, and despite the fact that this
aspect of noble status if often

lost sight of in favor of other questions such
as lordship or judicial

privileges, in the settlement of new lands it was
a matter of the first
136
importance.
A noble standard of living was both a question of taste
and a matter of status; and, as it always is with
status, there were

requirements.

For one thing, wine was important.

R.

Dion has shown

that good wine was an important symbol of nobility and that the
neces-

sity of serving wine to one's guests and dependents led to the extension
of viniculture in France. 137

The consumption of venison which had been

killed by one's own hand was probably another such symbol, and the right
kind of bread certainly was.
For the French nobility in general this meant bread made from wheat
(f rumentum )

,

and the Normans were no exception to this rule.

1

TO

It is,

in fact, doubtful whether they ate any other type of bread or, at least,

thought that they should.

In the lists of provisions for royal castles

wheat and wine occupied the place of
honor, and when Richard fitz Nigel

wrote his account of how the old royal
farm had come to be paid in money
rather than in produce, he assumed that the
only bread grain which it
had yielded had been wheat.

The assumption is, of course, question-

able, but it did reflect Norman feeling on
what the farm should have

provided.

In the early Norman maintenance allotments
bread made from

wheat occupied a dominant position, and the meaning
of such allotments
in Norman society stands out clearly in the rules
which governed the

royal court under Henry I.^^°

At court, all bread was made from wheat.

In Henry »s reign a bushel of wheat, or as the Normans called
it, "a

bushel of Rouen," yielded three grades of bread.

In order of descending

fineness one could obtain from each bushel 40 lord's simnel loaves, 140

salted simnel loaves, and 260 ordinary loaves, and the type of bread

which members of the royal court received each day depended upon their
,

rank.

and

2

141

^
The

chancellor, for example, was given "1 lord's simnel loaf,

salted simnel loaves, and

of ordinary wine."

142

1

sextary of clear wine, and

1

sextary

The steward, however, obtained only "2 salted

simnel loaves, and 1 sextary of ordinary wine," and the various service

personnel of the court were given something called "customary food"

which presumably consisted of ordinary loaves and ordinary wine.
With the companaticum (side dishes of meat, poultry, and fish), these
allotments constituted the diet of the nobles at the court, and they

illustrate two very important points concerning the Norman nobility.
First, despite their wealth, bread was the primary item in their daily
diet; and second, the quality of one's bread was a symbol of personal

status.
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Ihere was a direct connection
between this aspect of nobility
and
regional agriculture. Indeed,
this was the basis for
the settlement
patterns which were discovered
in the
North.

William the Conqueror's

followers hoped to be rewarded
with land, but land which did
not grow
wheat, and particularly land
where wheat could not be grown
was of little use to them.

Such acres would not make them
greater nobles.

In

southern and central England this
was not, of course, a serious
problem
because within these areas the land

and its produce met the expectations

of the Normans, but in other
parts of the British Isles this was
not

necessarily the case.

To illustrate this point in
general, one need

only recall Gerald of Wales' description
of Ireland:
The land is fruitful and rich in its
fertile soil and plentiful harvests. Crops abound in the fields
and

flocks on the mountains. ... The island is, however, richer
in pastures than in
crops, and in grass rather than grain. The
crons give great promise
the Dlade, even more in the straw, but
less in the ear.
For
here the grains of wheat are shrivelled and
small, and can scarcely
be separated from the chaff by any winnowing fan.
The plains are
well clothed with grass. . . . Only the granaries
are without
wealth. What is bom and comes forth in the spring
and is nourished in the summer ... can scarcely be reaDed in
the harvest
because of unceasing rain.^^^

m

In other words, Ireland was a pleasing land except for
the fact that

wheat did poorly there, and this single consideration clouded Gerald's

view of the island.
It might be objected, of course, that Gerald was the spokesman for
a later generation of Normans and that such considerations did not

restrain the Conqueror's rude barons, but in the north there is evidence

which shows that this was a matter of fundamental importance from the
beginning.

The Norman settlement of the North cannot be explained with-

out reference to the question of what kind of land the Normans wanted.
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In tarns of literary evidence,
this point is made explicitly
in a story
concerning Odo of Champagne, the third
husband of William the Conqueror's
sister Adelaide. William apparently
gave him Holderness which had
been
forfeited by Drogo, its first holder,
late in the Conqueror's reign.

Shortly afterwards, however, Odo and
Adelaide had a son, and Odo was soon
petitioning the Conqueror for more land„
According to the story, his

reason was very simple.

Odo disliked Holderness because it
produced

nothing but oats, and he wanted some wheat
bearing land so that he could
feed the child.

William is said to have agreed

to the request.

This

story is admittedly late, but it probably represents
an authentic family

tradition of the lords of Holderness who were descended
from Odoo^^^

And

even if Odo's reputed aversion to feeding his son
oatcakes is not historical, there is other evidence which shows that the
attitude itself did

exist among the Norman nobles who settled above the Humber and
that it

restricted their settlement.

The clearest proof of this comes from Ilbert de Lacy's castlery
Pontefract in the West Riding.

It constituted

a

of

nearly solid block of

territory which stretched from the fens west of the Ouse up into the Pennines; and due to uniq"-^ circumstances, the actual distribution of Norman

settlement within his fee stands out clearly.

First of all, Domesday

consistently names the Anglo-Saxon undertenants who held of Ilbert,

information not usually available elsewhere, and second, Pontefract lay

just to the north and at some points inside the area covered by the late
thirteenth-century crop sequence.

146

This conjunction makes it possible

to compare the latter with the populated estates belonging to Ilbert, and

such a comparison reveals an important phenomenono

In 1086, Ilbert 's
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The populated estates of Ilbert de Lacy

Norman undertenants only held manors in the central part of the castlery,
almost exclusively on land below 250 feet, and their manors corresponded
closely with the area within which wheat was grown at the time of the
crop sequence.

On either side of this central block of estates, the

villages were either held by natives, or they were held directly by
Ilbert and contained no demesne land.

These peripheral strips corre-

sponded generally with the areas in which rye and oats were later grown.

What had happened is clear.

Ilbert and his vassals had only taken

direct possession of that part of the castlery in which wheat either was

.
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being grown or could be grown, and they had left the less desirable land
to Anglo-Saxons

Within the castlery of Pontef ract, Norman settlement did not cross
the oat bread line during the reign of William the Conqueror because the

land to the west was unattractive and valueless to Ilbert's men, and the

same was true all along the eastern flanks of the Pennines in Yorkshire,

although in most other areas it is impossible to tell whether there was
a band of Anglo-Saxon lords to the west of the Normans as there was in

Ilbert's fee.

147

Probably this was a common phenomenon, however, for

some signs of a similar pattern can be found in William de Percy's

estates south of Ripon and in Richmond, and an arrangement of almost

exactly the same type is visible in the description of Henry de Ferrers'
estates in Derbyshire (see Map

148
11)

.

Despite the clarity of this pat-

tern, it does not represent the only reaction of Normans to the oat

bread lineo

In a sense it is an exaggerated example of what happened

for around the Pennines the Normans were faced with poor soil and rap-

idly increasing elevation which brought in its train an ever decreasing

.149

growing season and increasing ram.

Elsewhere the oat bread line did not bring Norman settlement to an
immediate stop.

Roger of Poitou, for instance, is said to have disliked

Lancashire, which is understandable since it was probably an oat bread
area, but he managed to attract a few Normans into the region.

ine

details of his enfiefments, however, indicate that this was a difficult

process in which he was none too successful.

In 1086 Roger's Norman

tenants formed only a small group which numbered fifteen men if no two
of them had the same

narae.-'"^-''

With two exceptions, they were obscure
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Map 11.

Henry de Ferrers' Estates in Derbyshire

360

knights of no standing, and they all settled south of the Ribble.

Fur-

thermore, it is likely that most of them gave up their lands and

left.-""^^

Lancashire was, in fact, so unattractive to Normans that Roger was
forced to rely heavily on natives.

Nineteen natives were holding land

south of the Ribble in 1086, and there were probably others who are hid-

den by the incomplete nature of Domesday's description of Lancashire. ''"^"^
By 1094 a hybrid aristocracy unquestionably existed in this area, and
the early thirteenth-century surveys reveal that a large number of than-

ages had survived the coming of the Normans into Lancashire.

These

thanes held, moreover, by fee farm, and this probably means, as Jolliffe
has suggested, that Roger of Poitou simply terminated the old renders

and works of the shire in favor of rents because the former were valueLess to hxm.

In Lancashire Norman settlement faded out, as it were, between the

Ribble and the Mersey rather than coming to an abrupt stop as it did
around the Pennines, and something rather similar happened in Northumbria,

area

Durham was probably on the very southern edge of the oat bread

— or

barley bread area

— in

the late eleventh century if the later

grain renders of the bondage vills accurately represent agricultural

production prior to the Conquest.

Nevertheless, Nomians were estab-

lished in this area before 1100, and their settlement was apparently

made feasible by changing the manorial structure of Durham.

Bishop

Walcher, it will be rememoered, was responsible for radically expanding

demesne farming in a number of St. Cuthbert's villages and for imposing

week-work on the peasants of these villages; and although this can be
explained as a straightforward act of economic exploitation, it is
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likely that it also represented an attempt by the bishop
to obtain

direct control over what the peasants were growing. ''"^^
gested by the fact that at the time

of

Durham was almost entirely confined

to the

which had been manorialized by Walcher.

This is sug-

Boldon Book, wheat production in
demesnes of those villages

Furthermore, even at this lat e

date most of the unmanorialized vills were either administered by drengs
or were farmed by their inhabitants."*^^
In general, the first wave of Norman settlement in the North went
to the oat bread line

— to

the limit of dependable wheat cultivation as

expressed in peasant breads.

In southern Lancashire and Durham, the

Normans may actually have crossed the line somewhat, but in both of
these border areas wheat could be grown even though it had not played an
important role in peasant agriculture prior to the Conquest,

Moreover,

in these areas the Normans altered the old manorial system of the North.
In Lancashire the shire system was scrapped, as it were; and in Durham
the element of demesne farming was intensified.

These changes, although

different in their specifics, both represented attempts to improve local
traditions of peasant agriculture which were unacceptable to the Normans.

Where wheat could not be grown, the Normans did not take lands, and
this was one of the basic reasons for their weakness in the North

between 1070 and 1100.

This factor kept Normans out of the free-zone

which occupied the most intractable part of the oat bread area, and it
shielded northern Lancashire, the Vale of Eden, and the Cumbrian lowlands from their settlement.

Estates in these regions held little value

for Normans, and their reluctance to establish themselves on the other

side of the oat bread line was the chief reason why they had difficulty
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controlling the free- zone.

During the reigns of William the Conqueror

and William Rufus, the southern free-zone was contained by castleries,

but it was not occupied.

In Yorkshire where the east coast plain could

support a numerous baronage, this policy had some success, and in Durham

which was fairly well protected against raids from the West by the mass
of the northern Pennines, it also worked.

Yet beyond these limits, Nor-

man power remained tenuous until after 1100.

Rufus was unable to con-

solidate his hold of Carlisle by the establishment of a local baronage,
and this failure combined with the inability of the Normans to penetrate
the free-zone restricted Norman, settlement in Northumberland.

There was land above the Tyne which was worth having from the point
of view of the Normans.

Wheat can be grown as an aristocratic crop

north of Durham, especially in the Merse, Lothian, and the coastal
"'"^^
fringe of southeastern Scotland proper.

The only difficulty with its

cultivation in the dry parts of this region is the danger of occasional
failures, a threat which kept peasants from growing it but which did not

restrain nobles if they were sufficiently determined.

This the Normans

were; and there was, therefore, no insurmountable barrier in terms of

wheat to Norman

settle*^-^nt above the Tyne.

One simply had to be pre-

pared to pay a very high price for it in certain years.

158

Of course,

in realistic terms this consideration may not have been too important.
As it existed, peasant agriculture undoubtedly produced unappealing

crops; and, given the preponderance of renders in kind over labor dues

in Northumbria, the introduction of the cultivation of wheat would have

been difficult unless one were prepared to follow Walcher's example.
in
This consideration notwithstanding, the real bar to Norman settlement
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Northmnbria was the insecurity of the east coast plain vis-a-vis
the
free-zone.

Above the Tyne this plain becomes progressively narrower and

more exposed.

It is backed by the hills of the northern free-zone
all

the way to Tweeddale, and beyond this break, the coastal plain of

Lothian is similarly confined by the eastern extension of the southern
highlands.

In agricultural terms

ested the Normans

— the

— and

these were the terms which inter-

Far North consisted of this restricted plain, and

as long as the northern free- zone and the West were unsubdued, the agri-

cultural communities of the coastal plain were of little value.

Indeed,

if one is to believe some of the miracles attributed to St. Oswin of

Tynemouth, the countryside of southern Northumberland was so poor in the

late eleventh century that Norman armies could not feed themselves
there, and this was apparently true not only of southern Northumberland

but of Lothian and Tweeddale as well. 159

King £dgar is known to have

given away two deserted villages in the latter area and to have extended

material aid to the recipients for their redevelopment, terms which
strongly suggest a small and inqsoverished population in the general
area.

In addition to this, several of the Anglo-Saxon and Norman expe-

ditions against Scotla^'^ in the eleventh century were accompanied by
'''^^
fleets whose purpose was presumably to carry supplies.

tainly the case in 1091.

This was cer-

When Rufus lost his grain fleet in that year,

a number of his knights and horses died of hunger in Lothian or Northum1
V
her land.
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During the reign of Henry
greatly reduced.

I

this problem was solved

He and King David installed

a

— or

at least

Norman aristocracy in

Cumberland and eastern Galloway who began the work of establishing law
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and order on the local level and sealing in the Galwegians.

In terms of

the previous discussion of the Norman preference for wheat producing
land, this extension of Norman settlement may sean mysterious, if not

contradictory; but in fact there was a simple explanation for why Henry
and David could achieve what had escaped William the Conqueror and Rufus.

On a practical level the nobility of northern France was not entirely

homogeneous in its criteria for land.

There are signs that this was the

case among the men who took land along the northern fringe of the king-

dom during the reign of the Conqueror, and it was within this context
that Henry I and his new men had special significance for the North.

There had been a political split in the Norman Bofaility in the reign of

William the Conqueror, at least in the sense that the nobility

of Lower

Normandy had not benefited from the distribution of English lands to the
same extent as the nobles of Upper Normandy; and presumably it was this

which led Henry to cultivate men from the former area in the days before
he became king.

16 2

In Lower Normandy there was disaffection which he

could turn to his own advantage.

Once he was king, the fact that his

political debts and his patronage network were based on this area had
important consequences for the North because western Normans and their
neighbors in Brittany had wider standards with respect to land than did
the great men of the east.

It was not a matter of their not sharing the

same concepts of nobility.

They too valued wheat highly as an article

of food and as a symbol of their status.

Their numerous grants of

yearly gifts of wheat to the monasteries of the area prove this conclusively, but they also illustrate another point.

These gifts, examples

payment of
of wheat being used as money, and tenures based on the yearly
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a stated quantity of wheat show that while this grain
was highly prized,

it was also rare.
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Indeed, there is literary evidence to this effect.

Prior to the Conquest, the bishopric of Coutances was so poor that Bishop Geoffrey's household had to subsist on black bread, and this was not
due sin5)ly to an absence of estates.

In terms of cereal production,

much of Lower Normandy and the adjacent section of Brittany was poor
land, and the common bread grains were rye and oats.

Because of

their poverty, nobles from this region were more flexible than nobles

from Upper Normandy.

They would take land which would not grow wheat.

Furthermore, it is likely that

ssany

nobles from the region were

anxious to obtain estates elsewhere and that they knew the value of land
in the oat bread area.

In a general sense, the Breton massif and its

eastern extension, the lands which later bore the Norman bocage, were
poor lands.
inf ertile."^^^

They are wet, and the soil is generally acid, leached, and
It would seem, in fact, that they were so poor in places

that their agricultural system would not support all the local nobles.

During this period many Bretons becaiae mercenary soldiers because of the

poverty of western Brittany; and according to Orderic Vi talis, Robert
"^^^
Guiscard and his followers left the Cotentin for the same reason.

In

many instances, then, it is likely that western Normans and Bretons had

compelling reason to leave home, and they were probably peculiarly fitted, moreover, to deal with the oat bread area.

In his account of

William the Conqueror's early invasion of Brittany, William de Poitiers
says that the Bretons normally ate little bread and that they relied

principally for their livelihood on their herds and flocks rather than
upon agriculture.

Furthermore, William had to withdraw from Brittany on
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this occasion because he could not find enough wheat to feed
his

army.""-^^

These were, of course, conditions reminiscent of the North, and to
a
lesser degree they applied to western Normandy.

Both the higher parts

of Brittany and the Norman bocage were areas of infield-outfield farming.

Peasant labor dues were light, and livestock raising was very

.

important.
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These were conditions which were very similar to those

found in northwestern England and western Scotland, and the fact that

Henry's new men were familiar with such an agricultural system, at least
in principle, meant that they could utilize land worthless to an eastern
No man.

The relevance of this is obvious.

Henry's new men would take land

which the first generation of Norman nobles had despised.

This is the

meaning of the fact that no eastern Normans settled in Cumberland and

western Scotland,

What the Lower Normans and Bretons would not take

could be given to Flemings who were accustomed to rye and oat bread and

who were concerned, in any case, with raising sheep
northern England at least, went to Henry's Anglo-Saxons.

The residue, in
Thus one

returns in the end to the original point, although with more precision.

Peace with Scotland and the establishment of a French aristocracy above

Durham and Lancashire were a direct result of Henry's politics.

For his

own reasons, he brought to England a group of men who were able to

breach the oat bread line.

Norman settlement of the east coast plain

from the Tyne to the Forth followed.
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Chapter VII

^olt. The Northerner s,

p. 202.

2

Anglo-Saxon Chronicle, s.a, 1097 E, p. 175; Florence of Worcester,
II» 41; Tigernach Annals, Continuation . s,a .
1099, p. 119.
3

Annals of Winchester

,

in Scottish Annals , s.a . 1099, p. 119.

4

See the witnesses to Edgar's charters, ESC, Nos. XV, XX. Ritchie
bases his interpretation of the reigns of Edgar, Alexander, and David
upon this assumption, but he has no proof for it, Normans in Scotland
,
~~
See infra , n. 19.
p. 106=

^RRA-N ,

I,

Noso

367, 463, 478.

Liber Feodorum I, 197-203. The baronies in question are Bolam,
Callerton (DeLaval) , Dilston, Mitford, Morpeth, and Morwick. The
holders of Bothal and Redesdaie said that their families had held de
antiquo feffamento ibid., pp. 201-202. This phrase has been takerTto
imply an origin during tne reign of William the Conqueror, but it surely
indicates merely an origin prior to 1135, see J. H. Round, Feudal
England: Historical Studies on the Xlth and Xllth Centuries (London,
1909), pp. 236-46.
.

,

^Between 1107 and 1116 Henry I confirmed to Tynemouth the tithes of
several villages which had been given to the priory by Earl Robert and
his men.
Numbered among these were the tithes of two villages. Black
Callerton and Dissington, wnich later were included in the barony of
Callerton, RRA-N , II, No. 1170; Craster, The Parish of Tynemouth , p. 49,
n. 2.
By itself this proves nothing, but in a notification of a similar
date, Henry specifically confirmed the tithes which had been given by
Hubert de la Val.
This confirmation included the tithes of Black Callerton and Dissington, and this creates the presumption that Hubert had
been a follower of Earl Robert and had held these villages prior to
1095, RRA-N , II, No. 1172„
^Ibid., Nos. 363-68.
It is hard to reconcile Gaimar's account of
Gaimar, 11. 6129-75.
He seems to say that Rufus
this revolt with the earlier descriptions.
came north, built an unidentified new castle, and besieged Morpeth
Both the Anglo-Saxon
11. 6149-57.
before moving up to Bamburgh, ibid .
Chronicle , s.a. 1095 E, p. 172, and Florence of Worcester, II, 38,
record that Rufas initiailv besieged Tynemouth and that while this siege
was in progress, he captured an unnamed small castle. This might have
been Morpeth, but Gaimar's failure to mention the siege of Tynemouth
makes his assertions suspect. William de Morley is also mentioned in De
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de Umfraville "l" to help fill up the time gap until Robert de Umfraville
"II" appears in charters ca. 1120, ibid . , p. 81. In fact, of course,
this "second" Robert de Umfraville was the founder of the Northumbrian
In 1207 Richard de Umfraville, the descendant of Robert,
Umfravilles.
was of the opinion that there had been but one Robert, ibid . , and the
phrase which is used as the foundation for an origin before 1087 actually means that the barony was created before 1135. Finally, it is
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CONCLUSION

By 1135, the year of Henry I's death, the great theme which has

united this study, that is, the destruction of northern society and its
rebuilding, was complete in its essentials.

There were, of course,

unfinished tasks, but in most respects the North of the High Middle Ages

had come into existence by this date.

The region's old problems had

been largely solved, and the northern barons faced new difficulties such
as the Galwegians' reaction to the intensification of Lowland culture

which the Norman settlement represented or the question of the political
relationship between Norman Scotland and Norman England.

We have, in

fact, reached a familiar world, a world whose birth has been dated too

early, misunderstood, or simply taken blithely for granted because of

the way in which eleventh and twelfth-century English history has been
written.
Court-centered history is not an adequate medium for recovering the
past, even in England.

When written from a regional point of view, the

history of the North between 1000 and 1135 assumes

a different shape

reign by reign with
than that found in accounts which inexorably advance
focus.
the deeds and worries ol a southern king as their

The findings

has obscured the nature and
of this study show that the latter approach

accomplishments of
continuity of the North's problems, distorted the

several kings, and even failed
ments in northern history.

to notice a number of important develop-

In particular, the prominence normally

child of court history followaccorded the Norman Conquest, that great

biography, needs
ing its inherent trend towards

to be

modified and the
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concept itself expanded as it concerns the North.

The idea that the

Conquest was a primary causative factor which had completed its work by
1070 has artificially severed the post 1066 history of the North from

what went before and beclouded the history of the Norman settlement of
the North.

To reduce the matter to basics, the idea that the northern

thanes resisted the Conquest because it was a conquest being carried out
by Normans, and the assumption that once the former were crushed in the

reprehensible but effective harrying Norman settlement immediately followed, are false.

Before 1066 the North had, in fact, been changing in

the direction it later followed.

After that date it was a number of

years before the old northern world passed away entirely, William the

Conqueror notwithstanding, and many more before Norman power was firmly

established throughout the North.

During the first eighty years covered by this study, northern
political history was dominated by a clash between the regional nobility
and the kings.

In the most general terms, this conflict was the result

of the kings' attempts to govern the North and the northerners' progres-

sively more desperate efforts to resist the king or his agents.

There

was little real correspondence between the self-interest of the two parties.

The North was poor, politically and fiscally privileged, and in

need of defense.

It was also, however, remote from the Anglo-Saxon

concerned with it
kings* center of power and interest, and they were

means of maintainonly as a source of danger to their authority or as a
system.
ing the equilibrium of the kingdom's political

Between 1000 and

against each other
1066 the North was ruled by setting the northerners
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and by unpopular earls whose power was bolstered by the earldom of Northamp ton.

By the fall of 1066, the opposition which such measures had aroused
above the Humber had become so powerful that the bond between the northern nobility and the king had nearly dissolved, and this is of great

importance in understanding the course of the Conquest.

The northerners

had no way of knowing that William the Bastard and his mercenaries repre-

sented the wave of the future, and they reacted to him not as

a new phe-

nomenon that had radically altered the political order but rather in

accordance with the lessons of their past.
oppressed either Northumbria or York.
of York with the Northumbrians.

Every king since 1000 had

Ethelred had controlled the Danes

Cnut had reversed the relationship, and

Edward the Confessor had governed the North through Siward who had been

unpopular in Northumbria and through Tostig whose rule had provoked the
great northern revolt of 1065.

With these precedents, the northern

thanes had every reason to expect the worst from William simply because
he was king; and he, unfortunately, lived up to their fears.

His

appointments, gelds, and confiscations were reminiscent of Tostig's rule
families
and clear evidence that he would ignore the traditional ruling

of the North and trample on the area's privileges.

When combined with

and
his castles, these measures provoked the revolts of 1067, 1068,

1069.

the tactics
In these insurrections, the northerners employed

which had worked for them in the past:

surprise attacks aimed at

destroying the agents of southern government.

Northern resistance to

regional nobility's pre-Conquest
the Conquest was an extension of the

William's authority.
resistance to the king, and its object was to reject
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not to undo the Conquest.

William, however, did not understand this;

and when the northern revolt merged with the Danish invasion in the fall
of 1069, he destroyed the immediate threat to his power which the latter

represented and solved the old problem of resentment in Yorkshire to

West Saxon rule by the harrying.

Despite the prominence of this event

in most accounts of the Conquest, however, it did not give the Normans

control of the North.

Rather, it activated the free-zone which made the

redevelopment of Yorkshire a slow process, and this in turn was a serious barrier to the extension of Norman power beyond York.

For ten years

the Conqueror was forced to govern Northumbria through a succession of

natives, and this policy had little success because the nobles above the
Tees had not been cowed by the harrying.

True to their past, they

answered new Norman outrages by revolts in 1074-75 and 1080, and the
last of these led William to destroy the Northumbrian nobility.

In a political sense, this was the end of the Norman Conquest of
the North.

It was also the last episode in a conflict which stretched

back to the early eleventh century and perhaps into earlier times, but
of the old
a conception of the Conquest which turns on the elimination

nobility between the Humber and the Tweed is incomplete.

Until after

the Normans did not
1100, Norman power in the North was weak because

kingdom or into
immediately spread to the old limits of the Anglo-Saxon

the Northwest.

aristocracy was
The establishment of the new territorial

for another.
not the substitution of one group of nobles

It was in

the first of these,
reality a colonization with two stages; and during

determined the scope and nature
the expectations of William's followers
king's victories.
of the Conquest quite as much as their

The Norman
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nobles wished to transplant their culture to England, and in an important respect they were unable to do this in parts of the North.

In

their culture bread made from wheat was a primary sign of nobility, and
the corollary of this was that land which would not grow wheat was little esteemed.

Of course, in the North wheat either would not grow or

did poorly in several areas, and this directly limited the extent of

Norman settlement.

William's men took estates in Yorkshire, Durham, and

southern Lancashire.

Moreover, in the first two of these shires, they

exploited the desperate conditions produced by the harrying to impose on
the peasants a more rigorous nanorial regime than the one in force

before 1066, and at least in part their objective was to establish a
system which would give them control over what the peasants planted.

Where wheat could not be growa, the Normans did not settle.
explains why William

I

This

and William II had to contain the free-zone

rather than conquer it, and why Cumberland and Northumberland remained

without territorial aristocracies after 1092 and 1080 respectively.
first was on the wrong side

of

The

the oat bread line, and the second was

worth settling.
too vulnerable to depredations from the West to be
was one of
Finally, the fact that the border counties were unoccupied
and Rufus to deal with
the principal factors which forced the Conqueror
in their internal
the Scots by means of diplomacy and intervention

affairs.
of the North was impeded
Between 1070 and 1100, the Norman Conquest

Upper Normandy, who were the most
by the culture of the barons of
followers, and this barrier was
trusted and rewarded of the Conqueror's

politics occurred.
not removed until a shift in Norman

When settlement
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pushed forward after ca, 1106, it encompassed the border counties and

southern Scotland as well because these areas could best be occupied
That this was accomplished was the Normans' most important

together.

contribution to the North.

For political reasons King Henry brought to

England a group of western Normans and Bretons who were willing to take
lands on the other side of the oat bread line, and he established these

men in northwestern England and through Earl David in Galloway.

Their

settlement shielded the East from the Galwegians and closed the routes
through the hills; and once this was done, Norman nobles pushed up the
east coast plain from the Tyne to the Forth and even into Fife.
As a concept the Norman Conquest usually consists of two parts, the

establishment of effective Norman power and a radical break with the

past or a turning point; and in terms of these criteria, the movement

which brought Normans to the Tweed and beyond marked the true end of the
Conquest of the North.
region.

This colonization fundamentally altered the

In a negative sense, the problems which would complicate the

future stemmed directly from the nature of the second stage of settlement.

In the West this was not a spontaneous migration.

It was the

and
establishment of a specific group of men. King Henry's supporters,

Galwegians, not to conquer
they were only numerous enough to contain the

all Galloway.

Galwegians
This was a serious shortcoming because the

violent fashion.
reacted to foreign penetration of their land in a
seat of an anti-dynastic
Before 1135 southwestern Scotland became the

and— given

revolt which was the
the nature of David's rule~anti-f oreign

during the invasions of Stephen's
harbinger of several later revolts, and
the hills to torture and kill the
reign, the Galwegians came out of
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Low landers of the North whose increasing strength threatened their
world.''"

Furthermore, the willingness of Henry's followers to take land

in the West was largely a function of their poverty, and there is one

piece of evidence which shows that they did not automatically pass on
their taste for the West to their wealthier descendants.

2

Throughout

the rest of the century, in fact, the marcher lords of Galloway had to

be continuously replenished by newcomers.

Finally, for the next two

centuries Anglo-Scottish relations would be bedeviled by the fact that
the border divided a single nobility.

3

These problems notwithstanding, however, it is difficult to exaggerate the positive results of the second stage of colonization.

Had

isolated Norman barons pioneered in Northumberland and Lothian, they
probably could only have recreated the depressed conditions which had

existed there before 1066, but by subjugating the West, the Normans
revived a set of circumstances not seen since the years when Northum-

brian power was at its peak.

The security thus gained was the basis for

the redevelopment of the old Northumbrian lands on both sides of the

border.

Even before 1135, Henry's new men began to fill the North with

same task in
burghs and monasteries, and King David was engaged in the

Lothian and Tweeddale.

Moreover, the taming of the free-zone made it

into the hills, a
possible for the monks and nobles to send their sheep

complex which was
most fortuitous circumstance given the industrial

emerging in Flanders in this period.

These developments need to be

of the free-zone and
investigated both in the light of the reduction

Norman colonization of the
from the standpoint of their function in
amounted to nothing less than
North, but in general terms they clearly
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the successful transplanting of Norman culture to the lands between the
Htunber and the Forth.

It was in creating the peaceful conditions which made this possible

that the Normans surpassed their imnediate predecessors and even the

Romans who had not been able to master the Northwest for long, but the
triumphs of the second period of Norman colonization also have an ironic
element.

brians.

The Normans did not, in fact, surpass the pre- Viking NorthumFor a time they, too, had mastered both the East and part of

the West, and their culture had flowered until their kingdom was laid

in ruins by the Danes in Yorkshire and the Norwegians in the West.

The

North did not recover from the effects of these depredations until
Henry's supporters breached the oat bread line, and it is here that one

encounters a curious phenomenon.

Norman colonization of the North was

to some extent a reverse migration, or perhaps one should say that it

followed an old pattern.

Recent research has found that Danes from

eastern England played a major role in the Scandinavian colonization of

Upper Normandy and that Norwegians from the Irish Sea littoral were dominant in the settlement of Lower Normandy.^

It was the descendants of

establishment
the latter who supported Henry I against the Upper Norman
limited solely
and tamed the West„-,and the significance of this is not
to its irony.

imporThe repetition of this pattern suggests that the

cultural divisions with
tance of the oat bread line (or at least the
episode of medieval colowhich it corresponded) was not limited to the
must be considered
nization studied in this paper and that this factor
of Scandinavian settlement in
in any attempt to explain the distribution

Britain and in Ireland too, for that matter.
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CONCLUSION

After the initial failure of the revolt of Angus, the earl of
Moray, and Malcolm Macheth in 1130, the latter apparently fled to the
Southwest and continued his revolt. Usually it is assumed, of course,
that this second part of the revolt took place in Moray or Ross, Ritchie,
Normans in Scotland , pp. 230-32; but this is apparently incorrect. King
David was unable to put down the revolt until 1134, and he was only successful in that year because he obtained Norman aid. Walter Espec summoned the northern barons to Carlisle and gathered a fleet, and these
preparations induced the rebels to surrender, Aelred of Rievaulx "De
Standardo," p. 193. How a Norman expeditionary force in Carlisle could
so intimidate rebels in Moray or Ross that they would capitulate without
a battle defies the imagination, but the difficulty vanishes if one
assumes that the rebels were in the Southwest. On the Galwegians, see
ibid ., pp. 187-88.
2

After the Battle of the Standard, Robert de Brus the elder
"imprisoned" his son Robert in Annandale for siding with the Scots, and
the latter is known to have complained over the fact that wheat could
not be grown in the area, see Ritchie, Normans in Scotland p. 278.
,

3

See Holt, The Northerners , pp. 208-10.

Musset

,

Les invasions , pp. 257-60.

o
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